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
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Culture in Interaction¹

Nina Eliasoph and Paul Lichterman
University of Wisconsin

How does culture work in everyday settings? Current social research often theorizes culture as “collective representations”—vocabularies, symbols, or codes—that structure people’s abilities to think and act. Missing is an account of how groups use collective representations in everyday interaction. The authors use two ethnographic cases to develop a concept of “group style,” showing how implicit, culturally patterned styles of membership filter collective representations. The result is “culture in interaction,” which complements research in the sociology of emotion, neoinstitutionalism, the reproduction of inequality, and other work, by showing how groups put culture to use in everyday life.

Communication is at the core of recent scholarship in the sociology of culture. Culture, this current work says, is a set of publicly shared codes or repertoires, building blocks that structure people’s ability to think and to share ideas. A society’s collectively held symbolic system is as binding and real as a language (see, e.g., Alexander and Seidman 1990; Alexander and Smith 1993; Bellah et al. 1985; Kane 1997; Rambo and Chan 1990; Sewell 1992; Somers 1995; Steinberg 1999; Swidler 1986; Tipton 1982; Wuthnow 1984, 1987, 1991, 1992). Earlier work (e.g., Almond and Verba 1963; Parsons and Shils 1951) treated culture as a set of inner beliefs and values that people may never express but carry around in their heads.

¹ With enthusiastic appreciation we thank Jeffrey Alexander, Robert Bellah, Courtney Bender, Paul DiMaggio, Mustafa Emirbayer, Michèle Lamont, Jerry Marwell, Ann Mische, Pamela Oliver, Jane Piliavin, Jeff Weintraub, and the *AJS* reviewers for thoughtful and challenging comments on, or conversations about, earlier versions of this paper, and for inspiration and support. Thanks, too, to workshops and colloquia in the sociology departments at Northwestern University, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Wisconsin, where we presented earlier versions of our argument. We presented a much earlier version of this paper at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, New York, 1996. We are equal coauthors; we even rewrote each other’s cases, more than once. Please direct correspondence to Paul Lichterman, Department of Sociology, University of Wisconsin, 1180 Observatory Drive, Madison, Wisconsin 53706. E-mail: lichterm@ssc.wisc.edu

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Those earlier works made a conceptual leap from the social system straight into the individual's psyche and back out, with little attention to patterns of communication. The recent concepts of culture, in contrast, all draw upon something like Emile Durkheim's ([1912] 1995) understanding of the binding, structured, and structuring property of culture. For simplicity's sake, this article will refer to these newly prominent concepts of culture—different as they are—with Durkheim's term, "collective representations."

These collective representations, say the theorists, exert a strong social force. But they are polysemous; the same symbol or collective representation can take on different meanings in different contexts (e.g., Swidler 2001; Schudson 1989; Walzer 1985; Sahlins 1981; Hall 1973). As Paul Ricoeur (1974) writes, people rely on symbols to make sense of experience, but at the same time people interpret the symbols they use (Kane 1997). A fundamental task for sociological studies of culture, then, is to conceptualize how people use collective representations to make meaning together in everyday life. This article takes on that task.

In several separate ethnographic studies, we entered the field with recent cultural sociology's theories of collective representations. But we came to realize that we could not adequately understand how the groups we studied drew upon collective representations. To illustrate, we offer just one example here: in different groups of activists and volunteers (Lichterhan 1996; Eliasoph 1998), the "language" of individualism made public-spirited community involvement meaningful. This poses a puzzle, if not a downright paradox, for theories of collective representations. For these theories (Bellah et al. 1985, e.g.), the dominant language of individualism makes it hard for Americans to express concern about anything beyond their own private affairs. These theories would guess that participants would have used the language of individualism to signify selfish action or withdrawal from public engagement altogether. But instead, listening to activists and volunteers associate words and actions, we found them interpreting individualist language to *mean* community involvement and to make community involvement possible.

To discover how people use collective representations to make meaning together in everyday life, we drew on an old and crucial insight shared by symbolic interactionists, cognitive sociologists, and pragmatist social philosophers. People always make meanings in specific social settings—large or small, face-to-face or virtual—and they make those meanings in relation to each other as they perceive each other. Those perceptions are the shared ground for interaction in a setting (Mead 1934, 1964; Dewey 1927; Goffman 1961; Stone 1962; McCall and Simmons 1978, esp. pp. 143–47; Snow 2001; Cicourel 1993, 1991, 1973).²

² As McCall and Simmons (1978) put it, people in a situation develop a "working

This article marries that insight to the study of collective representations. Actors make meaning with collective representations, and they do so in a way that usually complements the meaningful, shared ground for interaction. We will conceptualize this shared ground as "group style." We argue that the style filters the collective representations and the result is what we will call *culture in interaction*.

Drawing on two main ethnographic cases—a group of suburban activists and a group of bar patrons—the article shows how group style filters collective representations in ways that may depart markedly from the meanings that scholars have imputed to the representations. One cannot fully understand a group's shared culture in an everyday setting without understanding the group's style. So, while agreeing with the recent emphasis on publicly communicated, collective representations, this article views the culture concept in a more fully sociological way—by analyzing collective representations as groups communicate them in interaction.

WORKING TOWARD A CONCEPT OF GROUP STYLE

We define group style as recurrent patterns of interaction that arise from a group's shared assumptions about what constitutes good or adequate participation in the group setting. Group style is not just a neutral medium for communicating meanings that are already fully formed before their practical enactment. Group styles, like collective representations, are elements of *culture*. Groups do not create them from scratch; they are patterned and relatively durable. Neoinstitutionalist insights, discussed below, help us theorize that group styles are not idiosyncratic to particular groups but are shared across many groups.

Studies of public life have demonstrated something like multiple "styles" or "genres" of civic participation, even within the framework of broadly similar ideologies or beliefs. Michael Schudson (1998) shows that Americans have, over the centuries, practiced different genres of what appear, on paper, to be very nearly the "same" collective representations of citizenship. Different eras have held very different assumptions about what the very act of voting means, for example. Penny Edgell Becker (1999) has shown that even within the same religious denomination, church

agreement" about their social identities. This agreement serves as the "ground upon which participants may stand" as they continue their interaction (p. 146), we borrow this notion of "ground"; see also Cicourel's work on background knowledge (for instance, 1991). Studies of interaction disagree on how tenuous or changeable these "working agreements" or "definitions of the situation" may be (McCall and Simmons 1978, p. 142; Goffman 1961). Our case studies would affirm Goffman's emphasis on their rule-like quality. Threatening the "agreement" could require "repair work."

congregations maintain different models for "being a congregation." There are "family"-style congregations and "community"-style congregations, for instance. These models do not derive simply from theological doctrines. Courtney Bender (2003) shows how volunteers at a kitchen for housebound people with AIDS give each other room for political and social differences. She argues that their courteous, nonpushy style of forming a group is itself what builds group solidarity; the solidarity is not a result of a strongly shared ideology. Similarly, recent studies of media document surprisingly varied "styles" of media consumption,³ which suggests that group styles in everyday practice are culturally patterned and meaningful in themselves (see also Fine 1987; Hart 1994, p. 8; Rambo and Chan 1990; Hall 1995).

Everyday experience makes the concept of group style intuitively plausible. When people walk into a group setting, they usually recognize the style in play. They know whether the setting calls for participants to act like upstanding citizens or iconoclasts. They know some settings call for joking irreverence, while others demand high-minded seriousness. Settings usually sustain a group style; different settings do this differently.

Insights from psychology and cognitive studies support the intuition that group styles are patterned and that participants can recognize those patterns. First, some studies show that what Erving Goffman (1959) famously called "the presentation of self" varies depending on the context (Mischel 1969; Mischel and Shoda 1995). Knowing how someone acted at lunch on Monday will not necessarily tell you how the person will act in a meeting on Monday, but it may help you predict how the person will act at lunch on Tuesday. Similarly, as Jean Lave (1988) shows, a person who cannot do a math problem abstractly on paper can easily solve the very same math problem concretely while grocery shopping; in these cases, people cannot even think the same thoughts in all contexts. We do not argue that no stable, core self exists;⁴ we claim simply that to understand how groups work, we need to know how the same people might define

³ Ron Lembo (2000), e.g., asks what meaning viewers ascribe to the activity of television-watching itself, surprisingly showing that a person might watch high-toned documentaries and boxing with the same style. The variations in the practice of TV watching do not themselves seem to depend much, if at all, on the contents of the show. Similarly, David Morley (1992), Elihu Katz and Tamar Liebes (1990), Andrea Press (1999), and others show how different audiences sustain different styles of TV watching. Katz and Liebes (1990) found, e.g., Israeli Jews from the former Soviet Union, Palestinian Israelis, and Americans in the United States, variously treated the show *Dallas* as a political statement about capitalism (the Soviet Jews), a moral statement about corrupt U.S. society (the Palestinians), or a message about the careers of the real-life actors themselves (the Americans).

⁴ Mischel and Shoda's (1995) psychological data show that stable personality and variable behavior across situations are not mutually exclusive.

and experience themselves in different contexts or settings—"lunchtime," "doing math," "grocery shopping"—and not simply assume that these self-understandings are always the same. Research also suggests there are some limits to the number of settings people can recognize as needing different styles; people tend to fit new experiences into a finite number of familiar categories or "schemata" (see, e.g., D'Andrade 1995; Kahneman and Tversky 1973; Cicourel 1973; see also DiMaggio and Powell 1991; for a deft review of this large literature, see Howard [1994]).⁵ Schemata categorize and distinguish between different types of people, organizations, things, or contexts.

Extending these social-psychological insights, we infer that people might also schematize group settings. The moment people enter a group, they try to cue themselves into the group style, to answer, What style is in play here? If schemata for group settings are widely shared, enduring, and meaningful, then we can call them elements of "culture." Doing so begins to build a much-needed bridge between cognitive psychology and cultural sociology (DiMaggio 1997).

To make group style easier to operationalize for research, we highlight three dimensions of group style that we found useful in organizing and sharpening our observation of culture in groups. Each dimension is an observable pattern of members' implicit understandings of participation in the group.

1. "Group boundaries" put into practice a group's assumptions about what the group's relationship (imagined and real) to the wider world should be while in the group context.
2. "Group bonds" put into practice a group's assumptions about what members' mutual responsibilities should be while in the group context.
3. "Speech norms" put into practice a group's assumptions about what appropriate speech is in the group context.

We arrived at these three dimensions by constructing categories inductively. We found, through sustained comparisons across six different cases (Lichterman 1996; Eliasoph 1998), that these three dimensions kept arising, over and over, as we tried to make sense of our groups. They allowed us to figure out how groups sustained shared grounds for participation (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1991). We compared these six cases with 10 other ethnographic cases (Lichterman 2002, 1999, in press; Eliasoph 1990, 2002a, 2002b) and found,

⁵ Schemata, or individual personality, may limit the number of different settings that people can recognize as requiring different styles. This poses an interesting empirical question, but one beyond the scope of this article.

again and again, that the three dimensions adequately covered the definition of good or adequate participation in the groups.⁶ Analyzing these three dimensions together allowed us to document the ways in which group style is not as elusive or evanescent as the word "style" might imply. However, these dimensions should not be reified; they are useful for helping the researcher notice and document patterns of interaction and meaning making that might otherwise go unnoticed.

Of course literary scholars have analyzed style at least as much as have sociologists. Kenneth Burke's influential scholarship (1945), for example, discovers a stable style of representing action across a wide range of literary, philosophical, and popular works, from Ibsen to Lenin. Discourses always identify the act, the scene, the agent, the means of agency, and the purpose of the action. The question for him, then, is how different discourses combine these elements in different ways. Burke (1945) offers crucial insights into the ways people create *stories or arguments about* action—what he calls "a grammar of motives." But to understand how collective representations become meaningful in everyday life, social researchers need to observe how *groups* coordinate themselves, not only how individuals or texts conceive of action (illuminating as that is for other purposes; see, e.g., Benoit 2000).

Social psychologists have developed many valuable concepts for studying group life. Some of these, discussed below, helped us develop the concept of group style we present here.⁷ Here, we briefly introduce those

⁶ The three dimensions also dovetail nicely with a trio of forms of action that have been conceived repeatedly in the sociological tradition. Emirbayer and Sheller (Emirbayer 1996; Emirbayer and Sheller 1999) identify three "contexts of action"—social-psychological, social-structural, and cultural. These build upon and revise Alexander (1988) and Parsons and Shils (1951). For ethnographic inquiry, we needed to reconstruct these definitions if we wanted to understand how people summon the "contexts of action" into relevance in everyday interaction (Cicourel 1981). To spell it out, Emirbayer and Sheller's "social-psychological context" corresponds to this article's second dimension, about group bonds; Emirbayer and Sheller's "cultural context" corresponds to our third dimension, about shared meaning of speech itself; and their "social-structural context" corresponds to our first dimension, about the group's shared understandings of its relations to the wider world.

⁷ Since the aspects of interaction that mattered most in our empirical cases were patterned and durable, the frameworks most helpful to us were those that illuminate group culture, rather than fluid situations or individual "roles." The patterned styles of interaction we found are not adequately addressed in either a symbolic interactionism that emphasizes emergent norms and selves or a role theory that emphasizes relatively stable relations between roles that are seen as patterned by social structural forces. Synthesizing the two perspectives is a valuable enterprise (Stryker and Statham 1985), but addresses different questions than those that our cases raised about group culture. We found stable patterns of interaction that are instantiated in groups and, we propose, belong to a broader cultural repertoire. Neoinstitutionalist conceptualizations of organizational culture capture the stability and breadth that our cases suggest, and have particularly strongly influenced our thinking.

frameworks. After presenting the empirical cases, we will return to them and show how the "group style" concept draws on, and in turn, contributes to them.

The first dimension of group style draws upon studies of "social identity" and "symbolic boundaries." These studies show that people carry with them images of how their group relates to, and is distinct from, other groups on the horizon (see, for some excellent examples, McCall and Simmons 1978; Tajfel 1981; Farr and Moscovici 1984; Hewitt 1989; Jenkins 1996; Stets and Burke 2000; Lamont 1999, 1992; Lamont and Fournier 1992; Lamont and Thevenot 2000).

The second dimension parallels the neoinstitutionalist insight that different institutions or groups define the obligations and connections between members differently. Even organizations similarly structured "on paper" may impute different meanings to group ties. We found, as neoinstitutionalists suggest, that those definitions tend to come in "bundles" and are mostly stable over time (for some powerful examples, see DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Morrill 1995; Stevens 2001, 1996; Clemens 1997; Becker 1999).

The third dimension of group style draws on symbolic interactionism (e.g., Goffman 1979, 1961, 1959), linguistic anthropology, ethnography of communication, and related fields (Bergmann 1998; Brenneis and Macaulay 1996; Brenneis and Myers 1984; Carbaugh 1988; Fitch 1999; Gumperz 1982*b*, 1982*a*; Gumperz and Hymes 1972; Myers 1996; Philipsen 1992; Rosaldo 1973, 1982, for some examples) that analyze how groups sustain speech genres (see also Bakhtin 1988; Silverstein 1972). These genres implicitly tell members what appropriate speech is—what the very act of speaking should mean in the group. This interdisciplinary work typically comes out of departments of communication, rhetoric, and anthropology; we think that sociologists—of institutions and culture, especially—can gain important insights from it and should contribute to the dialogue.

This article does not make causal statements about group styles. It does not attempt to map out all the possible group styles in U.S. society. It does not focus on how interactional style is connected to social-structural patterns, such as class or racial inequality; we discuss that elsewhere (Eliasoph 1999, 2002*a*; Lichterman 1996, 1995). Instead, the goals here are to understand the importance of group style for theorizing collective representations—to show how group style works with collective representations to produce "culture in interaction." Group style will prove itself a worthy concept if it improves the analysis of collective representations that social researchers could carry out if they used only extant concepts in sociology (Burawoy 1998; Lakatos and Musgrave 1968).

The next section, below, reviews two prominent theories of culture,

arguing that a focus on culture in interaction might make these concepts more useful. After that, we present two empirical cases,⁸ showing how group style filtered the meaningful use of collective representations in everyday settings. The following section compares the cases with each other, and compares situations *within* each case, showing how members can challenge group style within a group. Next we show how an analysis of "culture in interaction" produces questions and insights different from those offered by other major efforts at linking culture and interaction. Then we show how focusing on culture in interaction might advance lines of research in cultural resistance, symbolic boundaries, neoinstitutionalism, and linguistic anthropology. In conclusion, we suggest ways that scholars could use the idea of "culture in interaction" to study a range of settings, beyond the civic groups of the sort portrayed here. Finally, an appendix offers practical methodological suggestions for investigating culture in interaction.

WHAT DOES THE CONCEPT OF GROUP STYLE ADD TO THE STUDY OF CULTURE?

Languages, Vocabularies, Tools

Many scholars of culture focus on the "languages" or "vocabularies" through which people explain their actions (Bellah et al. 1985; Hays 1994; Hart 1992, 2001; Teske 1997; Tipton 1982; Witten 1993; Wood 1994; Wuthnow 1991, 1992). In *Habits of the Heart*, Robert Bellah and his colleagues (1985) describe the different "languages" of American moral reasoning not as a set of static, inner beliefs and values but as conventional, easily accessible words and phrases that give form and meaning to otherwise uncharted, vague, contradictory sentiments.

One of these is the language of individualism. The authors of *Habits of the Heart* argue that middle-class Americans often talk about their commitments to others in terms of "what feels good to me" or "what I can get out of it." As these writers argue, without these shared languages, communicating motives would be nearly impossible; without the communication, they argue, forming motives would be nearly impossible (see also Wuthnow 1991); form and the content are inseparable. Ann Swidler (1986) takes the focus on form farther, saying that the languages, or "repertoires," have a life of their own. They make meaning independently of consciously affirmed values or beliefs; people use cultural "repertoires" or "tools" in the ways the tools most easily allow themselves to be used. In

⁸ For detailed descriptions of the groups and the methods of study in each project, see Lichterman (1998, 1996) and Eliasoph (1998).

this way, the tools *give* people the projects and the shared language for thinking and talking.⁹ To take one of Swidler's examples, even though the vast majority of Americans do not live in the "standard" household of two parents plus children, we all know what the "standard" is and refer ourselves to it, even if only to distance ourselves from it (Swidler 2001). This is an important point about shared languages that is often misinterpreted. Being "shared" does not mean that a language adequately describes all Americans' experiences, or even anyone's experience, or that most Americans agree with the norms that this language implies. It means that it is the common reference point, the "standard"—even if almost no one adheres to it.

Culture scholars often derive cultural vocabularies from interview evidence (Wuthnow 1991; Hart 1992) or combinations of interview and participant-observation evidence (Bellah et al. 1985; Hart 2001; Tipton 1982). But the interview is itself also a setting (Cicourel 1981; Mishler 1986; Briggs 1991) that does not have the same properties as other everyday settings. And the interview is organized according to a researcher's own time, rather than participants' time (Bourdieu 1990; Cicourel 1981). Analysts of cultural vocabularies have not taken differences in setting explicitly into account. Implicitly, their analyses *hold the setting constant*, or take the interview setting to be a universally generalizable setting.¹⁰ They assume a "default" setting, in other words, and so they hold the group style relatively constant too.

The connection between language and action is not airtight (Bellah et al. 1985). Americans' stripped-down moral language is a liability, the Bellah team argues, that constrains the ability to think and act. However, they are careful to say that Americans are often more socially committed than their frequently self-interested or self-expressive language makes them sound. The speakers' actions can outstrip the language; conversely, one assumes, the language can outstrip the speakers without that being simple hypocrisy. But generally, the languages constrain action. Our empirical work dives straight into this gap between the saying and the doing,

⁹ Wuthnow argues, in his theoretical work, that sociologists should not attempt to ask how these vocabularies make meaning for people—he leaves the question of meaning up to "metaphysics" (1987). But his empirical work (1991, e.g.) sometimes treats meaning as a problem that sociologists can address; obviously, we prefer this latter stance.

¹⁰ We want to emphasize here that critiquing the interview method does not mean that we have nothing to learn from it. On the contrary; our work was initially inspired by the long history of interview studies in social research. And sometimes, the interview setting is just like the settings in which people normally discuss an issue. Swidler's *Talk of Love* (2001), e.g., uses private, thoughtful interviews to mine people's ideas about something that they might talk about thoughtfully mainly in private settings.

specifying what the gap is between the "languages" and the everyday meanings and practices that do not always match the languages.

Cultural Codes

Another approach to collective representations searches for shared "binary codes" of public discourse (Alexander 2001; Alexander and Smith 1993; Kane 1997; Jacobs 1996; Battani et al. 1997). From their analysis of U.S. legislative crises over the past 200 years, Jeffrey Alexander and Philip Smith (1993; Alexander 2001) argue that a specific set of binary codes has continuously organized debate in large U.S. political forums. These implicit, binary civic codes work, the authors say, to divide good and bad. U.S. legislators designate political actors "good" by declaring them "active, not passive," "autonomous, not dependent," "rational, reasonable and realistic, not irrational and hysterical"; the legislators impute "goodness" to social relations by calling them "open, trusting, truthful and straightforward" (Alexander and Smith 1993, pp. 162–63; see also Alexander 2001). The codes are the sturdy scaffolding of public discourse upon which people build arguments to justify why a person, policy, or institution is good or bad for the country.

The authors' point is that, rather than sharing some ineffable consensus about ideas, speakers in the United States share a code. Speakers must invoke the same codes *even when they make arguments on opposite sides of a political debate*. The codes do not map onto action in any linear way, and people interpret them in surprising ways; that is, like Bellah and his colleagues, Alexander and Smith clearly say that the codes never call forth a single political position or line of argument. For example, whether arguing in favor of or against women's citizenship rights in the early years of the United States, legislators had to use the codes (Alexander 2001, p. 376). Invoking the codes is not the same as agreeing; again, this subtle point matters and is easy to misapprehend. To show how people set the code into motion, Alexander and Smith borrow the term "ad hoc-ing" from ethnomethodology. That is, people improvise; they think with the codes creatively as they formulate particular arguments.

We want to push the inspection of the enactment further. Alexander and Smith probe national and foreign policy debates conducted in Capitol forums (Congress, investigative committees) during crises or "liminal" times. The authors chose these high-pitched episodes because during such moments, they argue, the underlying codes of civil society appear especially clearly (Alexander and Smith 1993, p. 166). Thus, like scholars of cultural vocabularies, Alexander and Smith hold the *settings* and styles for their study roughly constant. These "default settings" are moments of high seriousness, "sacred" moments of collective crisis, in high govern-

mental arenas, in which powerful politicians' words must really matter. Speakers hold major national institutions and the American public in mind; a serious, engaged style of talk usually seems necessary.

Studying culture in ordinary, everyday settings requires moving the analytic spotlight beyond these formal, institutional settings and training it on a range of contexts in which high seriousness is not usually the mode. Different settings afford different group styles that can give different meanings to the same codes. In summary, these varied, Durkheimian analysts have developed their concepts to analyze serious speech, or thoughtful reflections. They assume a certain setting with a certain style, even though such assumptions are not explicitly part of their analyses. But, we argue, there is no "neutral" or "default" social position. Communication always happens in some setting, even if a virtual setting.

This point makes sense for culturally subordinate codes or languages, as well as ones that researchers claim are widely shared or dominant. Subordinate or subcultural collective representations, too, can be patterned and enduring. Ronald Jacobs (2000), for example, documents an African-American public sphere, in which journalists articulate binary codes of "good" or "bad" citizenship somewhat differently from the mainstream actors Alexander and Smith studied (similarly, see Herbst 1998). And not all Americans share the language of individual, personal dignity; some are more preoccupied with preserving social honor (Philipsen 1992; Horowitz 1983; Meyerhoff 1979). Bellah et al. (1985) illustrate that less widespread biblical and civic-republican languages of social commitment still exist alongside individualist languages. Not only are there subcultural or suppressed codes and languages, there are also simply varied ones. Wuthnow (1991) shows that American volunteers draw on diverse vocabularies of motives. Our analysis here does not require readers to accept prior claims about some language's or code's *dominance*; the point is to see how group styles filter the languages or codes in particular settings.

Whether the researcher begins with "languages," "codes," or some other concept of collective representation is unimportant for our argument. That must be an empirical question, grounded in the particular setting and framed by a theoretical and substantive agenda. Some research focuses on moral reasoning of the sort Bellah and colleagues examine, while other research highlights public debate of the sort Alexander examines. And some everyday settings may be illuminated in different ways by both sets of questions and analyses. Both ethnographic cases presented here—of the suburban activists and the bar patrons—happen to have begun with the concept of "vocabularies." But the point we are making about group style applies to the quite different analytic lens of binary civic codes, too. When rereading our data through the theory of "codes," the puzzles we encountered also returned us to the group style concept. Both in the

interest of brevity and to show the breadth of the style concept's usefulness, case 1 focuses on "vocabularies," while case 2 focuses on "codes," but either conception of collective representation would have illuminated either case.

We are using the "vocabularies" and "codes" concepts for reasons beyond their capacities to illuminate aspects of our cases. Both are prominent in recent scholarship, and both have been applied empirically and developed further by scholars other than the originators. If the concept of group style fulfills its promise of "sensitizing" (Blumer 1986) us to something we might have overlooked, it will systematically distinguish between two different enactments of the "same" vocabulary, or code, without writing off those enactments as inscrutable or ad hoc improvisation.

A musical metaphor might help illustrate the point. John Coltrane's bebop improvisation of the song "My Favorite Things" is easily recognizable both as "Coltrane" (style) and as "My Favorite Things" (language, or code). No one would ever mistake it for Julie Andrews's smooth, sweet singing of the same tune in the film *The Sound of Music*, even if the basic themes are the same. When looking for the realm of free agency, theorists often turn to interaction—Alexander and Smith point to the creative ad hoc-ing that people do, to get from the code to the enactment of the code. But after only a few notes, a music lover will easily recognize Coltrane's style. Just as Coltrane's "Favorite Things" was simply not an unpatterned, ad hoc variation, so group styles are not just loose, superficial, or ad hoc interpretations of stable, constant collective representations.

ILLUSTRATIONS

Each of our two cases begins with very brief descriptions of the groups. Then we walk readers through the puzzles we confronted when armed only with the analyses of collective representations given by previous cultural sociology. Taking note of puzzles and addressing them with further observations from the field, the research followed the logic of "grounded theory" (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss 1987; Strauss and Corbin 1991; Lichterman 2002). Each case shows how the puzzles led us to the group style concept and its three dimensions. We record group members' "mistakes" or avoidances that helped cue us in on the dimensions of group style (Goffman 1961, pp. 7-81; McCall and Simmons 1978, p. 142). Brief comparisons help make the argument that group style filters the meaningful use of collective representations. In all, the cases show that collective representations and group style together produce "culture in interaction."

Case 1: Suburban Activists and Timid Affiliation

Airdale Citizens for Environmental Sanity (ACES) tried to create critical, civic engagement in a milieu that made that kind of engagement scary. The far outpost of a metropolitan area, surrounded by countryside, Airdale was a town of single-family, ranch-style homes and low-slung shopping malls with enormous parking lots. ACES members often characterized Airdale as "suburban." Taking their cue from more established urban activists, the ACES group started challenging the environmental practices at Microtech, a local military contractor. When we began our research, core members of ACES had already been involved in this activism for six years; they remained with the group through our two-year study. ACES stopped Microtech from building a toxic waste incinerator, and they monitored and publicized many other environmental issues related to Microtech. They encouraged Airdale residents to discuss those issues at town meetings and government hearings. In contrast with the urban activists whose example they followed, ACES members were more tentative and timid about going public with their cause. They practiced a style that we will describe below as "timid affiliation." But first, let us describe the collective representation that the group's style "filtered."

Investigating a Collective Representation: The Language of Expressive Individualism

ACES members frequently drew from what Bellah et al. (1985), Charles Taylor (1991, 1989), and others call the language of expressive individualism. The words, phrases, and symbols of this language posit that each individual has unique feelings and intuitions that ought to be expressed; the personal self is the ultimate reality, and expressing it is a good (Bellah et al. 1985, esp. pp. 333–34; see also Rieff 1966). Expressive individualism resonated in ACES members' talk about "personal empowerment." ACES's leader, for instance, imagined Airdalers as selves with the potential to develop, to empower themselves by finding their *personal* voice in the debate about Microtech, a voice that came from deep within the self. This was not "empowerment" in the sense of a subordinate, aggrieved, tightly bound group taking power away from powers-that-be, as in some 1960s student movement groups or community organizing campaigns (Gitlin 1987; Delgado 1986). The ACES leader never said ACES needed strength in numbers or tight organization; rather Airdalers needed to find the power "from within" to dissent from the majority opinion in Airdale. While "empowerment" in the more traditional sense depends on strong community leaders, the ACES leader liked to say that she looked forward to entire movements of self-propelled, self-empowered individuals who

would "not need any leaders." Using herself as an example, she said her activism developed out of a long process of inner searching.

Other members affirmed the expressive individualism of "empowerment," too. There was Stacey, who said she found strength "from within" to deal with Microtech by meditating. Another member, Clement, who did not speak in personal empowerment language himself, said just after a town meeting that he agreed completely with one speaker's explanation for Airdalers' seeming lack of concern about Microtech. Referring to a book popular in the peace movement (Macy 1983), the speaker said Airdalers were personally "disempowered," *psychologically* blocked from speaking their minds on mind-boggling issues. The "personal empowerment" discourse that circulated widely among urban activists found its way into Airdalers' talk.

Bellah et al. (1985) thought expressive individualist language was a liability that would constrain people's abilities to think and act in a socially minded way. Other studies of moral vocabularies also have argued that expressive individualism encourages people to see their own, unique selves as ultimately more meaningful, more real, than social responsibilities (Tipton 1982; Wuthnow 1991; Wood 1994; Hunter 2000; see also Rieff 1966). In this view, a cultural language that celebrates the good of the unique self must make it difficult for people to articulate social responsibilities.

The overriding puzzle of this case is that ACES members used expressive individualism to *affirm* social responsibility and public-spirit-edness, rather than to subordinate them to self-centered expression. For instance, at a town forum on environmental hazards, the ACES leader observed that relatively few Airdalers had spoken during the open microphone period. They had not fully developed their inner selves. "We still have a lot of empowering to do," she concluded. While talking about the float that ACES entered in the annual Wild West Days parade, the leader and another member said that not everyone could be "empowered" immediately. Some Airdalers were not "ready," they said; pushing the issue would be like trying to toilet train a baby, said one. But the sight of the float might "plant a seed in people's minds," these two agreed, for later on when people were more ready to discuss Microtech reflectively.

"Empowering" Airdalers, in other words, was a long-term project of patiently coaxing people into public life, into responsible citizenship, and not simply an invitation to "do your own thing." The group agreed that it was good for Airdalers to speak out on the issues, regardless of their opinions; that is why they opened their monthly meetings to everyone—even to Microtech employees. At these meetings, the group made decisions about the campaigns and lawsuits and got updates on environmental problems at Microtech. Still, the group made time for members

to explore their own opinions. They would erupt into spontaneous discussions about the morality of risk taking at the Microtech plant, for instance, or the politics of military production. At one meeting, group members began venturing their opinions about the Cold War and its impact on American democracy. The ACES leader said these exchanges ought to happen more often because "that's what ACES exists for—to empower people." In short, this group understood public-spirited citizenship in the language of expressive individualism. Their use of this language differed from what previous research would have guessed. How can an observer understand the difference?

Group Style versus the Default Style

This article's opening insight begins our quest to make sense of the difference between the group styles we observed and the default styles implied by the theories of culture. Groups use collective representations from the larger culture in a way that usually complements the groups' meaningful, shared ground for interaction. Clearly, the language of expressive individualism mattered for meaning making in the group, because members repeatedly associated a very personal notion of empowerment with public, active citizenship. Discovering the ACES group style helped make sense of how members could use individualist language to affirm public engagement. The ACES style was very different from the group style implicit in the Bellah team's analysis of expressive individualism.

A researcher listening for the language of expressive individualism would have been struck by several puzzles in the field; addressing these puzzles ultimately speaks back to the overriding question. First, even though ACES members affirmed personal empowerment, they seemed fearful of expressing themselves at all. Talking about Airdale's environmental hazards—even at ACES meetings in the local library—felt risky to them. One early member of ACES complained, for instance, that municipal leaders had dismissed him as a political "faddist" for questioning Microtech's proposed toxic waste incinerator. Another worried that some of her friendships in town would not survive her involvement in ACES. The ACES leader's own son complained that her activism made him feel embarrassed at school. ACES members felt brave to enter their homemade float in the town's annual parade: a cardboard mock-up of a toxic waste incinerator, complete with smokestack belching a fluffy mass of orange and gray fiberglass to represent toxic fumes. Their nervousness was palpable as they stood next to the float, awaiting the start of the parade, and one member wore a "company scientist" costume and a mask so that no one would recognize her. Speaking out was perfectly legal; why was it so scary? And why would scared people use the seemingly brazen, no-holds-

barred language of self-expression? Discovering an element of group style—relations to the wider world—helped address these questions.

Group boundaries.—ACES members understood their organization as a group of local citizens, very much rooted in if ambivalent about Airdale, peering warily at Microtech. Not surprisingly, Microtech was an important, negative reference point for ACES's group identity. ACES members experienced Microtech as a looming behemoth, present wherever they turned. One member said that her petitioning sorties had made her think that "in this town, in terms of organizations, everything seems so tied up with Microtech." Another member said that when he first saw his name on a list of plaintiffs in a lawsuit over Microtech's proposed incinerator, he thought to himself, "What if they try to take my house away?" The group would muse on how Microtech sometimes "accidentally forgot" to send notices of environmental impact hearings to people in town. Microtech was not simply a competitor with ACES in the public fray; it was more like a fearsome giant against which ACES defined its group boundaries.

The group defined its own boundaries in relation to images of Airdale and of urban protestors, too. Members complained about having to fend off derogatory labels that they assumed townspeople would foist on them. Liz insisted that if only ACES could create a flyer that told Airdalers what ACES was really about, people would be less likely to think it was "some radical-leftist organization." The group leader hoped the flyer might encourage Airdalers to stop thinking of ACES members as "monsters with two heads."

Though ACES members wanted to distance themselves from negative images of ACES that they assumed many Airdalers harbored, members embraced their identity as Airdalers. They identified themselves in contrast with the urban protestors who were culturally as well as geographically distant and traveled to Airdale for annual rituals of protest and arrest. ACES members pointed out that they shopped at regular grocery stores, not the funky organic food shops that urban protestors frequented. One had a son in the 4-H club. Another played softball on a local team, and kept her opinions to herself so she would not get a reputation as an "activist." Another complained that "we are perceived as being these radical anarchists, but we are all concerned about our families" and "trying to live responsible lives." Yet another wanted to distance the group from the image of "antinuke, peace kind of people." Group members got a good laugh when their leader said the urban activists were having a "cultural experience" just to hear locals talk articulately at a public hearing. "We didn't bring any cows [to the meeting]," joked one. In short, the ACES group saw itself situated in a specific, very threatening milieu with which they also identified, albeit ambivalently.

The group's relations to the wider world were very different from what the Bellah team's analysis of expressive individualism *assumed* about group style. The Bellah et al. (1985, pp. 47, 121–38) study takes the psychotherapeutic relationship, and its close cousin, the support group, as the model setting for expressive individualist language. Much of the evidence excerpted in the Bellah et al. book derived from fascinating personal interviews. Interview settings take people out of routine group contexts and encourage them to explore issues at length; interview settings are not so unlike the setting of the archetypal therapeutic relationship. It makes sense, then, that the possibility of different settings with different styles would not enter into the analysis. But at least implicitly, Bellah and his coauthors took the style of the therapeutic setting as a default style. As for relations to the wider world, they pictured participants in these settings disconnecting themselves from most reference points (Bellah et al. 1985, pp. 136–38). This characterization is typical and telling. "Separated from family, religion, and calling as sources of authority, duty, and moral example, the self first seeks to work out its own form of action" (Bellah et al. 1985, p. 79). In the default style of the setting that Bellah and his coauthors imagine, it would not be surprising for people to use expressive individualist language in reference to limitless personal exploration.

But ACES did not try to disconnect itself altogether from surrounding standards of cultural authority or duty. On the contrary, members identified enough with the local community and its "suburban" norms of privacy (Baumgartner 1988) to be wary of speaking out. ACES used the language of personal empowerment in a way that fit, or at least did not seriously threaten, this aspect of the group style. Thus, personal empowerment did not mean "do your own thing," in a cultural vacuum. Instead, when the ACES members associated personal "empowerment" with developing opinions and voicing them, they were in effect saying, "It's OK for normal, local people to speak out individually." No wonder the ACES leader kept encouraging herself and other members to develop personal "empowerment"; they identified themselves with the "normal," family-oriented people of Airdale who, they imagined, would find speaking out unseemly. The culture in interaction was different from the meanings that Bellah and his coauthors ascribed to expressive individualist language. Given the group's relations to the wider world, ACES members' association of personal empowerment with public commitment makes sense.

Urban activists talked of personal empowerment, too. But the urban activists and ACES practiced different relations to the wider world, and so empowerment did not get used quite the same way in each group. At a rally against Microtech in Airdale, one urban activist intoned angrily, "We are empowering ourselves, withdrawing our consent [from Micro-

tech's operations]]” A statement like this does not convey any particular relation to communities or institutions. Empowerment, for the urban protestors like this one, got associated with standing out angrily—as she was doing while yelling into the microphone.

In contrast, when the ACES leader talked of empowerment after the town meeting or the parade, she associated it with Airdalers’ quiet, personal development into more active citizens. She associated it with calmly, individually, finding one’s own way *into* the thick of public engagement—not standing out individually and loudly from others. The urban protestors claimed to speak on behalf of Mother Earth, not any specific community. And rather than identifying with Airdale, they related to Airdalers as rather distant, sometimes parochial others, even though ACES members agreed with them on important issues. Identifying itself as a specifically local group, with local people’s apprehension of giant Microtech, ACES carried a different sense of relation to the wider world, resulting in a somewhat different use of personal empowerment talk.

A second set of puzzles arises for a researcher listening to expressive individualism in the group. If it was so easy for individuals to speak out, why would members not find very different ways to “empower” themselves, thereby threatening the group’s unity? If empowerment is personal, there is no guarantee that different individuals would find and express their inner selves in the same way. Not only did the Bellah team argue that expressive individualism would weaken public, collective effort (e.g., Bellah et al. 1985, p. 133), but social movement scholars have implied something similar. Contemporary activist groups that prize individuality can get pulled in conflicting directions (Melucci 1989; Epstein 1991). Once again, we can address the puzzle by discovering group style at work—in this case, the dimension of “group bonds.”

Group bonds.—ACES assumed group bonds should give individual members a lot of leeway for different opinions and different degrees of tolerance for risky encounters. That does not mean ACES had no real bonds. Quite the contrary, group members felt obligated to accept other members’ privacy and individuality *as responsible members of the Airdale community*. The group did not obligate members to express their deepest, personal values or feelings aloud, as some contemporary activist groups do (Epstein 1991; Melucci 1989). The group depended, rather, on mutual respect for whatever degree of privacy that any member wanted, as long as members were doing something for Airdale without unduly offending Airdalers.

The group bonds bid members to respect one another’s private motivations without having to revere the same cultural and political traditions. So one member could speak as an “anticapitalist,” while another member presented herself simply as a “good citizen,” and another as a New Age

spiritualist, because the group validated all sincere expression that did not tread on other individuals' autonomy. The few times members did talk about their own motives for involvement in the group, they got a respectful hearing, but no members of the group insisted that their own beliefs become a subject of sustained conversation. Carrie briefly described her church's "church and society" group at one meeting. Stacey once said that she found Airdale's environmental issues so overwhelming that she would "meditate to release the energy" that these issues generated inside her. But neither Carrie nor Stacey invited, much less enjoined, other members of the group to talk about Christianity or New Age precepts about personal energy; they simply mentioned them. Unprompted, ACES's informal leader said that members did not "come on too strong" with their own moral or political motivations. "Carrie doesn't come on with Christianity" at meetings, and the leader herself said she had "certain spiritual commitments to peace, justice, and the environment, but I don't come on strong with them at meetings."

A few times one member threatened the style of bonding in the group, by trying to convincing members to go in his own, more vocally radical direction. Other members met his harangues with long, awkward silence. They never criticized his own stance. But they never took him up on his proposal that they articulate their own moral or political viewpoints in ideological depth. *He had threatened the shared grounds of interaction*, trying to make ideological priorities a bigger part of group life instead of respecting members' privacy. He breached the group style.

ACES members depended on one another as local people, and not just as people with the same points of view. Members respected Liz, who conducted a door-to-door petitioning campaign, even though this was not the most effective way to gain support for ACES, because Liz was daring to speak out and was doing it for Airdale. Members told each other they wanted more local residents to attend public hearings, even if they disagreed with ACES. They declared at public hearings that residents of a community had the right to participate in decisions affecting the local environment. While ACES members affirmed the opinions of the more experienced, more flamboyant, more publicized urban protestors, they did not simply merge with the urban protest groups—though they could have. They kept their distance and created their own group with its distinctive sense of local obligation. They respected each other's "conventional" lifestyles. They depended on each other to pursue the group cause in a way that would invite locals, not scare them off. Clearly, the urban protestors felt no such obligation when they went to Airdale for the purpose of getting arrested and shocking locals into a new consciousness.

ACES group bonds were different from those implicitly assumed in previous analyses of expressive individualism. Previous analyses pre-

sumed that bonds would consist in the obligation that individuals meet each others' personal needs, ideally without limits imposed by community or custom (Bellah et al. 1985, pp. 130, 134–35; Wuthnow 1994). In this default understanding of group style, one's obligations as a member of a community—even the obligation to respect external norms of privacy—plays little part. In the context of the default style, it is not surprising that expressive individualism would signify endless pursuit of authenticity, unfettered by communal bonds. But a community-disregarding pursuit like that would have little meaning and perhaps only threaten a group of people who beamed with pride when one newspaper editorial praised the group as a model of local good citizenship. Personal empowerment signified a nurturant “come to commitment at your own pace,” as when the ACES leader talked about parade on-lookers who were not “ready” to discuss the issues yet. It never signified “use the group to go where you need to go.”

Still another puzzle arises for scholars of expressive individualism. Why did ACES not transform into something like a support group? If the language of personal empowerment did not send members in separate directions, it might have sent them in the same direction—toward their navels. This is the fear that haunts some critics of identity politics (Jacoby 1975; Lasch 1978; Gitlin 1995). The ACES leader suggested once that group members should discuss more often their personal feelings about Microtech. At least one ACES member had come to realize that Microtech's toxic leaks might have caused a disability in one of her children; talk about personal feelings might have been more comforting than long political and legal battles with uncertain outcomes. It was striking, though, that members did not interpret empowerment as an invitation to emote or explore their deeply personal experiences. That is because they shared some assumptions about talk itself, another element of group style. As with the other two dimensions of style, this one became particularly evident when breached.

Speech norms.—ACES members related to their own speech in the group as civic-minded, deliberative individuals trying out new opinions. When invited to apply for a large grant from a foundation, ACES core members all agreed that their grant proposal should encourage ordinary Airdalers—people just like themselves—to attend public forums. Tellingly, they named their funding proposal “Speak out, Airdale!” They proposed to develop a bureau of speakers who could travel to local schools and volunteer groups and talk about the toxic threats. In ACES, polite, citizenly exchange was the appropriate genre of speech.

A disagreement between two members at one meeting illustrates the norms of speech in ACES, the value ACES placed on expressing personal opinion openly in a polite forum. John, always more outspoken than the

others, said that ACES should be blunt and tell people that Microtech managers were "killers" for allowing the company to endanger Airdale. He threatened the speech norms of the group. Margo objected that this would only polarize people. John needled Margo, reminding her that she herself detested Microtech. Margo said she would choose different words in a broader forum. Laura, the group leader, pitched in. "All the voices need to be heard. It's a tapestry. You're not wrong and your way is not the only right way." No one suggested a different resolution from Laura's, and no one proposed that ACES should sound more strident at the next public hearing. Expressing individual opinion was a good thing to do, as long as people did it civilly, in a way that did not sound judgmental of others' opinions.

With the exception of group outlier John, members very rarely spoke emotionally about Microtech at their own meetings—even when emotional outbursts could have seemed very understandable responses to circumstances. ACES discovered enough facts to establish that Microtech had severely polluted groundwater in Airdale; members thought Airdale's abnormally high rate of skin cancer could be traced to Microtech, too. Yet, like Margo, ACES members mostly followed an unspoken rule that speech should sound reasonable. Except for John, they did not say, much less yell, confident statements about Microtech's evils and their own cause's rightness, the way urban protestors did. The mother with the disabled son never sounded very angry at the prospect that Microtech's pollution may have poisoned him, and did not say what she *felt* about the topic, even when asked directly. An ex-employee of Microtech in the group bristled once that it was "ridiculous" for Microtech to test dangerous substances in the open air, but usually he sported a scientific demeanor, and said nothing about how he felt about his former employer. ACES was not like a support group, nor an impassioned committee of the self-righteous.

In the default style ascribed to expressive individualism, the meaning of speaking is to discover emotions and articulate them intensely (e.g., Bellah et al. 1985, p. 123; Wuthnow 1994). In that context, the language of personal empowerment could lead, unsurprisingly enough, to verbalizing emotion endlessly. In the context of the ACES style, members associated personal empowerment with finding the inner strength to create public issues reasonably, rather than by-passing them as some of ACES's detractors did, or laughing them off, as did a boozy man at the Wild West Days parade who asked why he should worry about Microtech when he had already "put all sorts of toxics in my body."

Summary of the Culture of Interaction

To summarize the group style of "timid affiliation," ACES members understood themselves as rooted, if ambivalent, members of the Airdale community, not as random individuals with gripes, or outraged outsiders. They needed to respect each other as local residents who could give each other private space and not pressure anyone into engagements that might be frightening or unseemly by local standards. They wanted to treat issues reasonably, deliberatively, with an emphasis on facts over feelings.

They used the collective representation—a language of individualism in this case—in a way that complemented, or at least did not threaten, this style most of the time. In the context of the ACES group style, expressive individualism did not signify a hedonistic "do your own thing," or "sound off when you feel like it," as some scholars would guess. Instead, ACES members used the vocabulary to signify that "it's OK to speak out—let's give each other room to speak out reasonably as sincere individuals." *That was the culture in interaction.* That is how a language of individualism could keep getting used, seemingly paradoxically, to signify active public engagement.

A Comparison

Groups with a style closer to the default style may use expressive individualist language much more as previous scholarship would predict. The Bellah team's analysis of the language would have worked quite well for Planet Friends, an environmental group in the same sprawling metropolitan area as ACES. Members of Planet Friends met monthly to talk about global environmental dangers and celebrate earth spirituality. For some of their time together, they talked about their personal lives. Like others in this very loose, international network, Planet Friends said that they would best "heal" the planet by working on themselves. Therapeutic spirituality was like good "energy" that could rebalance the environment and promote peace. Bellah et al.'s description of one variant of expressive individualist language suits Planet Friends precisely. "At the core of every person is a fundamental spiritual harmony that links him or her not only to every other person but to the cosmos as a whole. . . . The self in all its pristine purity is affirmed. But somehow that self, once discovered, turns out to be at one with the universe" (Bellah et al. 1985, p. 81).

The Planet Friends' group style was much different from ACES's and much more like the "default" style delineated above. As for their relation to the wider world, Planet Friends did not identify with any locale in particular; the group's monthly meetings took place anywhere within a 60-mile radius of the researcher's home. In the group, their main reference

points were the universe as a whole and the members' own selves. The group bonded on members' mutual obligation to hear one another out, and a responsibility to respect the monthly host's plan for a group exercise. Appropriate speech was therapeutic—it was speech that would express one's feelings about oneself, about the planet or world peace. When a member suggested the group take a position on a current environmental issue, in public, conflict ensued. Another member said that going public in that way might wreck the group, threaten its status as a safe place for personal sharing. It certainly would have meant cultivating a different relation to the world, a different basis for respecting members, and a different set of expectations about speech itself. The group dropped the idea. Planet Friends did not use expressive individualist language to affirm public engagement, the way ACES did. As a group, they did not participate in demonstrations, town meetings, hearings, public education workshops, or campaigns. Yet one individual member ran for office as a Green Party candidate; another supported the Green movement; another supported a local antitoxics group. These campaigns and issues did not get discussed *in Planet Friends settings*. In those settings, with the group style in play, these kinds of political or civic discussions would have been out of bounds. While perceiving one another in the context of Planet Friends, members drew on expressive individualism in a way that was close to what previous scholarship would suggest.

The collective representation, expressive individualism, could mean different things in the context of different group styles, but the variation was hardly random. We can still recognize some of the emphasis on self and separateness that scholars of moral vocabularies find in the language. As Michael Walzer points out (1985, pp. 134-35), collective representations sustain a range of interpretations, but the interpretations are still of those collective representations, not others. In ACES, expressive individualism got associated with public engagement, but on a very *individualized* basis. ACES members never said that "empowerment" would enable them to "stand in unison" or stick together over the long haul, even though the group has lasted for nearly two decades. Empowerment was a property of individuals, not of a community as a whole. Collective representations matter; group styles do not do all the work of making meaning by themselves. But the difference in everyday interpretation made a putatively antipublic language of self-exploration into an everyday idiom of public engagement.

An Alternative Interpretation

Some analysts of culture in social movements would offer a worthwhile alternative interpretation, that the timid style had strategic value in Air-

dale.¹¹ Could it be that ACES self-consciously chose a style that would make suburbanites want to join the cause? If so, the group style would not be a durable element of group culture—as we have theorized—but a contingent response to external conditions, one that might change readily in the face of new opportunities to recruit members.

Timid affiliation may well have had strategic value in a town that made outspokenness scary and unseemly. But members' ordinary conversations strongly suggested that their group style was neither a temporary adaptation nor a carefully calculated strategy. They unselfconsciously upheld the privacy-oriented civic culture of Airdale, even if they also wanted to change or increase Airdalers' talk about Microtech. For instance, nearly all core ACES members spoke spontaneously and apprehensively about violating the civility norms of a placid, "family-oriented" suburb. Public speaking made them feel shy. Just after her presentation on groundwater pollution, one member blurted out that public speaking reminded her of gynecological examinations. Then there was Liz, who wore the costume and a mask in the annual parade, so that townspeople could not identify her. Others spoke in frustration at being considered "crazy" or "one of those loonies" by local residents. Carrie said she liked "exposing" her kids to activists. Members were shy about strident talk at their own meetings; some would cringe visibly when John went on one of his tirades about death-for-profit at Microtech.

Further, ACES kept its group style going even when it faced the likelihood that other group styles could help it grow and meet its goals more effectively. At a weekend workshop with ACES, an outside community organizer was surprised to hear the group had never planned a fundraising campaign, even though members all agreed the group needed more money. Nearly all the core members also had puzzled *individually* over why active membership had not grown. But the issue became a topic for group discussion only those few times it was introduced tentatively by the group leader, and once by group gadfly John. Core members of this very participatory group had all put many hours into ACES, but they said very little during these episodes. Members practiced a relation to group life itself that made participation an individual, privately motivated, and voluntaristic if public-spirited activity. This style limited what the group could even imagine as topics for strategic consideration.

¹¹ See, e.g., the strategic identity perspective of Bernstein (1997) or the strategic framing perspective (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996; Snow and Benford 1988).

Case 2: Bar Patrons and Active Disaffiliation

The Buffalo Club seems to represent a classic civic space, like the Elks, the Lions, the Moose, and the other fraternal organizations named after animals. At the entrance to the smoky bar is a shelf full of literature inviting participation in various charitable programs. Eight-page pamphlets advertised the national Buffalo Club's antidrug campaign for teenagers, others described a home in the Midwest for orphaned children of Buffaloes, and there were other pamphlets for other causes as well. At least once a month, the club holds lotteries, raffles, and other fundraisers, collecting money for disease prevention, abused children, the Salvation Army, and other charities. The club sends thousands of dollars a year to several worthy causes.

Members of the Buffalo Club's country western dance team often said they wanted the place to have "a real community feel" and to be "not just a bar, but a community center, a family place." On six-lane strips between fast-food drive-throughs and gas stations, this was no down-home neighborhood bar: members commuted an hour or longer to come. Nevertheless, dance team members usually spent half the weekend and two nights a week at the club. They took pains not to treat the club as a pick-up joint and not to rely only on personal preferences when creating their community feeling at the club. Women made a point, for example, of dancing with one guy who was skinny and short and thus not their "type." An elaborate initiation ceremony required a fairly substantial outlay of funds, possibly indicating that joining requires some commitment to this community.

In short, if Robert Putnam's famous bowling leagues (1995, 2000) count as "civic," the Buffalo Club certainly fits the bill. Jean Cohen (1999) smartly argues that Putnam's categories are too flat and that we need a more textured analysis of civil society that does not treat all ties as equal. One way to distinguish between different sorts of ties is to ask if members enact the codes of civil society that Alexander and Smith (1993) describe.

We find that Buffalo Club members did use the codes. But we also find that an analysis of codes is still not enough. An observer needs to hear how the group style filters the codes. As argued above, Alexander and Smith held the setting constant. By *varying the setting* from that of the code analysts' legislative assemblies during moments of high seriousness, a listener can easily hear how different styles filter the codes differently.

Investigating a Collective Representation: The Codes of Civil Society

This case will show that, on the one hand, Buffaloes shared the cultural codes of civil society that Alexander and Smith (1993) describe. We italicize

them throughout our analysis in this case for ease of reference. Talking about their group and its members, Buffaloes placed themselves on the good side of the binary oppositions Alexander and Smith (1993) outline. That is, they considered themselves to be *active, not passive; critical, not deferential; autonomous, not dependent; open, not secretive; realistic, not distorted; trusting, not suspicious; inclusive, not exclusive; friendly, not antagonistic; truthful, not deceitful; straightforward, not calculating; honorable, not self-interested; altruistic, not greedy; egalitarian, not hierarchical; self-controlled, not wild-passionate; rational, not irrational; calm, not excitable.*

On the other hand, the way Buffaloes tried to enact the codes was to appear *irrational, excitable, wild, and passionate*—elements that Alexander and Smith (1993) put on the opposite, “bad” side of the democratic code. Buffaloes used the bad side to enact the good side. Speech that would have been stigmatized as *wild, irrational, excitable, passionate* in the sort of official contexts that Alexander and Smith analyzed, paradoxically, came to signify the most *truthful, open, active, autonomous, reasonable, straightforward, friendly, egalitarian* exchanges in the Buffalo Club’s setting. This rude and crude style made Buffaloes seem unburdened by the pious manners and constrictions that their churchgoing relatives might prefer—relatives whom country westerners describe as “hypocrites.” Such speech made it clear that speakers were not trying to impress anyone, were not fooling anyone, or being fooled by, pomp, puffery or pretension, that they accepted people for who they are. Thus, Buffaloes vied to be the “most bad” in order to be “good.” How could this happen in a culture that values the “good” side of the binary opposition, in which, as Alexander and Smith argue (1993), the elements all tend to accompany each other?

Discovering “Active Disaffiliation”

Speech norms.—The first puzzle any investigator who begins with codes might confront would be to understand the constant raucous, racist, sexist, and scatological joking, and the pride speakers took in advertising their self-proclaimed stupidity. When Buffaloes did converse at the bar, it was almost always to joke about each other’s supposed stupidity or sexuality (who was dancing together, what someone else was wearing, whether Chuck could wear a dress, why George did not know what a condom was, who might be wearing earrings) or to make racist and sexist jokes about blacks, women, or “Indians,” or to make jokes about food, digestion, and relations with animals. It might be hard to imagine how one could use the term “democratic code” to describe Americans who chug along so enthusiastically with this sort of speech; in most Americans’

commonsense view, it would be obvious that a group that allowed such racist and sexist joking must just not be party to any "democratic code."

However, taking account of the complex historical relationship between American democracy and American racism, Alexander and Smith say that the code does *not* exclude racism. They convincingly argue that speakers in civil society must speak their racism *through* the code (and similarly with sexism; see Alexander 2001, p. 376). Alexander and Smith's counterintuitive analytic move is highly illuminating; it is a good first step in our analysis, but it does not go far enough in explaining everyday uses of the code.

While the code analysts expect to hear serious and straightforward speech, speech norms at the Buffalo Club encouraged people to say outrageous things and debunk the pieties and con games that they saw everywhere. Trying so hard to break the rules, members dwelt upon topics like race, bathrooms, sex, mean behavior toward animals, and members' stupidity. The different topics served the same interactional purpose. Participants could count on the jokes to violate very general rules that they presumed others out there obeyed. The offensive form was useful for its clarity; no one could possibly take the gross jokes seriously or assume that speakers were using childish humor to impress each other. This aversion to "good manners" was a powerful rule itself: *Do not talk seriously in the group context, and try to appear to be breaking rules*. It was impossible to miss the point here. The members' "fierce joking" (Sartre 1948) was a speech act, a way of "doing something" with words.

In the settings Alexander and Smith (1993) describe, 19th-century legislators used the code to debate and justify racist institutions. In doing so, the legislators claimed to be *realistic* and all the rest of the good side of the binary opposition. But Buffaloes never deliberated about racism, sexism, the tormenting of animals, or anything else. Serious deliberation was considered pointless grandstanding. It would have been viewed as *exclusive*, or *hierarchical*, or *antagonistic*—all items from the "bad" side of the code.

This becomes clear when we hear Buffaloes making mistakes. For example, one member tried to take a political position at the bar, but he almost instantly recognized that taking a position was the wrong thing to do. The waitress had come offering "Coors or Bud?" George, a union member, said, "Coors, that's scab beer. I'll take a Bud." No one said anything in the split second during which someone was supposed to interrupt or chime in with a teasing rejoinder, so he continued, in a self-mocking tone, "Me, Ah like Bud. Gimme a Bud. Boood." Another member laughed at his pronunciation and said, "Bud. Sounds like Boood. Boood!"

The conversational sequence here is a powerful indicator that a speech

norm in the group had been momentarily violated. Speech at the country western club was supposed to be "unpolitical." George's interactional mistake made it clear that members of this group were not supposed to deliberate, to persuade each other of their opinions. Indeed, the next time someone mentioned Coors, while showing George an ornate belt buckle emblazoned with the Coors logo, George did not offer any negative comment. Lecturing someone about Coors's antiunion position would have been considered "getting on a high horse." Members used that phrase to describe any speech aimed at persuading. The fact that Sue often "got on her high horse," for instance, easily explained to the other women why she never had any boyfriends. George dumped a born-again Christian girlfriend when she talked too much about her newfound faith.

Thus, Buffaloes were well aware of, and even affirmed, the code of civil society. They honored it in the breach by systematically and deftly inverting it, carrying on in a way that they could be sure would be taken as *wild, irrational, hysterical, and excitable*. They did so in service of a greater loyalty to the code, to its demand that speakers are *honorable, realistic, critical, independent, friendly, honorable, open, egalitarian*, and the rest. In the settings that Alexander and Smith (1993) imagine as the settings of civic life, discussion and speech are the main activity. In contrast, Buffaloes considered conversation a difficult burden and did not want to be taken seriously. A clear route to that end is to invert the code that everyone knows and to tease or make jokes that are sure to offend.

Having figured this out, the observer would have to confront another puzzle. What was it that members were so eager to mock? Maybe there were some shared points of reference in their world that resonated with the jokes but eluded the researcher—a "hidden transcript" (Scott 1990) that defied oppressive, shared institutions. Maybe they had some common institutional anchors or long-standing, shared histories that made serious talk unnecessary and made the raucous jokes an implicit political critique.

Group boundaries.—The main point of group events at the Buffalo Club—the grab bags, raffles, lotteries, fashion shows—was for members to affirm their distance from convention, rules, and tradition and from ritual itself. Institutions of the wider world certainly made their presence felt at the Buffalo Club: beer companies, the U.S. military, national charities, the country music and country accoutrements industries, the bar itself. These institutions and industries supplied the beer mirrors and other wall adornments, the music, the lace and calico skirts, the expensive Tony Lama boots, the flags, the scripts for events like the Welcome Home the Troops celebration (see below), and activities like the fundraising raffles and lotteries. These institutions and industries filled the scene, serving as a backdrop for the Buffaloes' disaffiliation. The club had rituals and fundraisers and raffles for charity, yet these events did not claim devout at-

tention, but sidelong, inattentive, scornful glances. Members simultaneously ignored and depended on the conventions and rituals to take up conversational airtime. The rituals filtered collective representations through the Buffaloes' distracted, playful, convention-busting style. Members related to institutions by relying on them without wanting to acknowledge that reliance.

A patriotic "Welcome Home the Troops" celebration for the Gulf War was one typical gathering. Sponsored by a local radio station and Budweiser, the celebration was stationed in the bar parking lot. No one paid attention to the loud extravaganza. They took to it the same practical logic that they used in other gatherings, *actively, not passively* ignoring institutions that came to propagandize the Buffaloes. Participants sat at about 30 picnic tables, eating and joking. At one table, people talked about a member's new dance dress and wondered how she was going to change clothes in time to be in the dance show and asked each other to pass the ketchup and the mustard.

Frustrated at the audience's lack of attention, the announcer finally screeched, "Do you *know* how many Americans exercised our precious freedom to vote in the last presidential election?!" A rejoinder came quickly from Kay, a teenage member of the dance team whose father was also on the team. "Who *cares*? I don't *care* how many people voted in the last election. When's the music coming on?" The rejoinder was directed at the people around the table, not yelled out for all to hear and ponder. Kay's dad and the others around the table chuckled. Later that evening, no one remembered the medley about the war. When asked about it, Jody said, "What medley?" She said she must have been inside, but the researcher saw that she had been at a table right in front of a loudspeaker the whole time.

The legislators and speechmakers in the code analysts' examples looked out onto the social landscape and saw powerful institutions that they might change for the better. They imagined they might have an effect on the world, but Buffalo Club members did not share their map or their feeling of power. How do the codes filter down to a group whose members want to avoid the empty and corrupt social landscape they imagined to be surrounding them? If there are no good institutions on a group's imagined map, but only *self-interested* and dishonorable ones, then the way to maintain a sense of *honor* and stay on the "good" side of the codes is to stay as disconnected from politics as possible. This is what the Buffaloes did. So, in their relations to the wider world, country westerners did still enact the codes that Alexander and Smith (1993) describe. But once again, they rearranged and inverted them. *Active* meant actively avoiding politics; *honest* meant being honest enough to recognize that ignorance, *distortion*, and *self-interest* were the only public motives. Being *reasonable*,

realistic, and *rational* required appearing *passionate*, *wild* and displaying all the other emotions on the wrong side of code.

The fact that the clubs constantly held fundraisers for worthy causes may seem to challenge this interpretation. One might guess that participants treated the fundraisers as an implicit, affirming connection to institutions, without needing to verbalize it. To answer this possible objection, we need to look at how members treated the raffles and lotteries. The fundraising raffle at "Welcome Home the Troops" was typical of members' distant, issue-free, institution-scoring approach. Two members complained about how useless some of the Navy's raffle prizes were. Referring to the fluorescent pink windshield wiper blades and brown denim jackets that one said "look like UPS drivers' uniforms," one said to the other, "If I had known what the prizes were I never would have bought a ticket!" They did not treat the event as a fundraiser but as a chance to win something. That is, the referent for the act of giving money was not "the wider world" and its institutions in any active sense. Similarly, most Buffaloes never talked about the war, except as it impinged on their travel plans. They worried that they or their family members in the military might be harmed; some were very worried about the researcher, who boarded a plane that had been featured on the local news because of a bomb scare on the day the war began. They took the danger of the war very personally, but not politically (Bourdieu 1977).

The group did depend on institutional reference points in a way—they served as a backdrop for enacting an anti-institutional stance. Buffaloes viewed the social landscape as hostile; they often talked about who was trying to rip off whom and who was charging too much for what and about the bargains they had gotten. They assumed that commercial and other institutions were trying to fool them or steal from them. But they assumed that that was the institutions' job, just as it was the consumer's job to outsmart them. In other words, at least market institutions were *honest* in their *self-interestedness*. But when anyone made a speech or propagandized for a cause or a product at the club, members made a strenuous effort to avoid being fooled.

Such a distant, ironic relationship to the wider world can itself be a kind of political position. That is the point. When citizens proudly claim disaffiliation in a variety of ways, perhaps including voting for candidates who themselves claim to be disaffiliated,¹² they still might be doing so from within Alexander and Smith's binary code. Their *honesty* and *activity* filter through a group style that upended the binary codes' official meanings.

¹² Bob Dole, a 1996 presidential candidate, e.g., proudly claimed that he had not even read his party's platform.

But just stopping there, with a declaration of the "world turned upside down" theme (Hill 1972; Scott 1990), still leaves some puzzles. Plenty of oppressed peoples around the world have held world-upending rituals. Here is a good place to entertain an alternative interpretation, one that would attribute the Buffaloes' style to their class backgrounds.

Alternative interpretation.—Could we explain all of this with a class analysis? Could upholding rural, down home, egalitarian values be country westerners' method of taking a stand against urban, liberal elites (Peterson and DiMaggio 1975)—resisting the cosmopolitan, yuppie class culture that sanctimoniously and hypocritically frowns on homophobia, sexism, and racism? An analysis that began with this hypothesis would be off to a promising start, but would miss too much.

It would be very hard to consider Buffalo Club members all part of the same social class. For example, some are college graduates, while others had not finished high school. Still, many shared fairly low-status work (see below, in the discussion of emotion work), and it was clear that Buffaloes were trying to resist something, whether or not on the basis of class. Furthermore, a class analysis would not by itself help an observer distinguish the Buffaloes' style from some other, seemingly "resisting" style. The concept of group style allows a researcher to distinguish, for example, between the Buffaloes' sort of resistance and another sort that might have had more of a germ of activism. The Buffaloes' resistance had the opposite political valence from the one that "resistance" theorists imagine (de Certeau 1984; Baudrillard 1981). Even if they were rebelling against something, Buffaloes could not be "for" anything in a serious way. Resistance theorists could not say how resistance might work when the people resisting want to imagine that there simply are no institutions on the landscape.

Like Alexander and Smith (1993), resistance theorists have an implicit setting in mind. Their imagined setting is tightly constricted by nearby institutions and by a clear hierarchy, like the school and factory in Paul Willis's study of teenage boys (1981) or the peasant societies in James Scott's various studies of the "weapons of the weak" (Scott 1985, 1990). But sometimes, resistance provides a sense of togetherness so thin, all it can create is reactionary politics, not subversion of something "given." The Buffaloes tried hard not to see anything given on their social map at all, except the market—which they took as an inevitable interloper. They did want a down-home, familiar, long-standing community, but they did not want to have to create it themselves. They wanted it to be there, already made. Thus, one typical member often spoke about his relatives' farm in Idaho and the healthy, down-home lives they led. Songs and conversation often invoked nostalgia for places that neither the Buffaloes nor the researchers had ever been.

Sometimes rejecting the wider world's institutions leads to overt rebellion, sometimes hidden, secret rebellion, sometimes knowledgeable cynicism, sometimes political avoidance (Scott 1990, 1985; Willis 1981; Gaines 1992; Fiske 1993; Havel 1989). Sometimes it leads groups to formulate alternative communities and counterinstitutions, like those of urban food cooperatives or back-to-the-land hippies (Berger 1981; Case and Taylor 1979). Sometimes, disenfranchised groups unite around a cause; one could imagine a group in which all members stood solidly united in their hatred of blacks and women. Buffaloes were not firmly united about anything—except their disaffiliation.

We were surprised to find that outside the group many Buffaloes did express opinions. One Buffalo was in a union and went along with its positions (boycotts, e.g.), and another had petitioned her county for more green spaces and volunteered at a center for endangered marine mammals. Dissenting members whispered in little duos or trios to complain about the raucous or mean jokes—in the kitchen, the ladies' room, or the parking lot—never confronting the jokers. Members were not simply devoid of social awareness. They sometimes expressed their commitments when speaking to the researcher, or when outside the group context. So, our puzzles continue. Why did they never bring their concerns *into the group setting*, even when they vehemently disagreed with the conversation's direction?

Group bonds.—Members had a very powerful obligation to let each other be who they “really” were, to be authentic to one another, but to do so without needing to know much about each other. Like Alexander and Smith's (1993) legislators, they wanted actors to be *autonomous*, *not dependent*, *open*, *not secretive*, and *critical*, *not deferential*. They wanted groups to be *inclusive*. When imagining the setting of a legislature or high public forum, we can easily grasp the meaning of these paired oppositions. But what of a setting whose participants are not trying to persuade each other, much less a larger public audience? What of a group whose members do not claim to speak for anyone but themselves? Buffaloes wanted to avoid constraints and judgments. Their way of filtering the code asked members to accept each other for who they are, without trying to change anyone in any way at all. Filtered through the Buffalo group style, *autonomous* meant “atomistic,” *open* meant “completely accepting,” and *critical* meant “unwilling to mouth hypocrisies that others (especially those in power) mouth.”

Members often proudly remarked on the *inclusive* nature of their club. As one proudly put it, “Everyone comes here—black, white, young, old, lawyers, mechanics, doctors, cabdrivers—everyone's invited.” And indeed, in this almost all-white bar, an old black couple often danced a complex Southern folk dance in the center of the floor; a few other people

of color came from time to time as well. Further in keeping with the bar's emphasis on *inclusivity*, the dance floor was arranged to accommodate the partnerless women who danced in the center, while couples danced in a ring around the edges.

Teasing and being teased was a way of saying to each other that they were all accepted as human beings, pure and simple. A good member of the Buffalo scene was one who relished teasing, who laughed when being teased. George was probably the most beloved member of the group, and he happily endured the most teasing. In just one typical hour, we heard how his cupboards were full of Spam, how he did not know what nutrition meant, how smelly and dirty his dog was, how he did not know how to give his dog a bath, how he did not know the difference between a washing machine and a dishwasher so he put his feed hat in the dishwasher, how he could not explain to a kid who asked him what he did for a living, and more. The point of all the teasing was that we all appreciated him anyway, no matter how tacky or smelly or stupid his tastes, habits, or dog were.

This silent appreciation was obvious in many gatherings. For example, one peaceful, comfortable evening, several country westerners gathered in a cabin, passing many minutes in complete silence—only the sounds of the frogs and the breeze rattling the dry grass. No one was striving or competing or showing off. After a while, Mike plugged in a boom box and played air guitar to the loud music. The main conversation was about the dog, much of it addressed to the dog itself. Members said later that this had been a really nice night. Club members wanted and needed to accept each other and give each other space to be who they already were, without anyone having to “prove” anything.

They did not worry that their group somehow represented something beyond the immediate interaction, or that one person's behavior could reflect badly on other group members. There was nothing more important than this mutual individual respect. Behind the scenes, Jody talked to another member about her black son-in-law, saying, “It's a shame he can't come. . . . It's too bad it's like that. It shouldn't be like that.” But it was like that, and since her son-in-law was not very eager to attend anyway, she did not think of it as a good thing to object to the jokes *in the group*. In a group of the sort Alexander and Smith imagine, members feel mutually responsible for upholding institutional decorum, objecting to objectionable jokes, for instance. But Jody did not imagine that the very fact of participating in the Buffalo Club should somehow reflect upon her (or anyone else) as a person.

Members respected each other's autonomy too much to drag it into group life or to criticize it in any way. People could talk outside of group settings in ways that they could not in the group. “Staying up ‘til two

talking" was a sure sign of love; it happened only at the moment lovers were falling in love. Talking this way allowed one to discover the true self, hidden deep inside the potential lover, but, after that initial exploration, they considered this dialogue unnecessary. In other words, Buffaloes do not consider anything beyond the individual to be fully real; they believe that what really matters is what is inside, that the tender, flickering "real self" almost never brazenly displays itself in mere words. They shared an obligation to respect that real self instead of stifling it with decorum.

Members kept group bonds thin, on purpose. When Buffaloes stopped making the long commute to the bar, no one knew why or where they had gone. Members often did not know basic things about each other, for example, what they did for a living, where they lived, whether or not they had children, whether or not they condoned the constant racist, sexist and scatological joking that some kept up. Taken together, the style filtered the collective representations in a way that allowed members to steer clear of all the implicit norms of responsibility that most of Alexander and Smith's legislators would have taken for granted.

Summary of the Culture of Interaction

We would summarize the group style of "active disengagement" as composed of *appropriate speech* that steered clear of serious explorations of opinion and violated the pious rules that participants thought were hypocritical. The group relied on institutions of the wider world to take up conversational airtime and put on events from which they could disaffiliate. That is, members usually assumed the point was to draw *group boundaries* against institutions. Finally, they assumed they ought to respect each other as human beings pure and simple, and they wanted to give each other ample room to be themselves; that was the way the *group bonds* worked.

The three dimensions of group style—group boundaries, group bonds, and speech norms—all work together; beginning one's analysis with one or with another will be a result of the particular researcher's own confrontations with puzzles. But wherever one begins, the two cases portrayed here—in addition to other studies we have analyzed with the same framework—all suggest that the three dimensions will usually be crucial for understanding the ways that a group incorporates and filters collective representations.

In the Buffalo Club setting, members used the collective representations—the codes—in a way that complemented, or at least did not destroy, the shared ground for interaction. Members who threatened those grounds met with awkward silence or rejection. In maintaining their group style,

the Buffaloes could use ostensibly democratic codes of civil society to affirm seemingly uncivil interaction. Buffaloes revalorized "bad" terms as "good." *Antagonistic* teasing and joking signified an *egalitarian* spirit, and wild, *irrational*, or *self-interested* expression signified *honesty* and refusal to "get on a high horse." *That was the group's culture in interaction.*

Engaged Disengagement

Of course, not all recreation group participants sound like the Buffaloes. One cannot reduce the interactional style to the physical setting or the general type of group, whether volunteer, activist, recreational, or other type of civic group. To provide a brief comparison, we can look at another, smaller subgroup of Buffalo Club country-western dancers. The two "subgroups" mingled, dancing and sitting together quite often, but the group was quite large, so members fell into a pattern of usually sitting with the people with whom they felt more comfortable.

This second, small subgroup enacted a "*cynical chic*" style. They talked politics constantly, but in a way that pushed the wider world away. In their engaged disengagement, the cynics' style was somewhat closer to Alexander and Smith's (1993) default style than the majority of Buffaloes' style was. In contrast to the majority of Buffaloes, the cynics talked constantly, and rapidly, and the topic was often politics. (Individuals' level of education do not fully account for this difference here.) Being more attentive to the world and its problems than to the other Buffaloes, the cynics' effort at pushing the wider world away took more work. The effort was constant; politics could poke into the conversation at any time.

For example, a conversation about a seemingly pretty, light green landscape led to discussion of the toxic waste hidden under the hills. That, in turn, led to a conversation about eating toxic foods, and from there the topic turned to pesticide use.

Tim: At least they don't use the really bad stuff they used to use—like DDT.

Hank: There's a whole mess of chemicals they banned, that were around 20 years ago.

Maureen: [emphatically]. Then they just send them to other countries, so they use them there. [Poking Hank, gleefully]. Hey, isn't that funny?? They ban the chemicals here, so the American companies keep selling them to other countries, and then they use them on food that they turn around and sell to us! So we get it anyway.

Tim: And we end up eating it!

Other joking sessions showed that these "cynics" paid more attention to the news than did the other Buffalo Club members. But they used their

knowledge not to become *active* citizens in the sense Alexander and Smith (1993) imagine, but to push the world away.

Like the mainstream Buffaloes, cynics heard and made racist jokes. For them too, the point of the jokes was not primarily to say that blacks, Asians, and Latinos are bad. On the contrary, cynics claimed that blacks at the club laughed at the jokes. In their view, just as in other Buffalo Club members' view, the club was *inclusive* of anyone who had a *reasonable, open* sense of humor. This aligns them with the code, briefly. One cynic told a story about the previous weekend, saying that the band sang a song imitating rap music, "with grunts and u-u-ee-ee [monkey sounds] and words that were something about 'gotta get back, to makin' my crack, nine to five,' and all about 'your lovely big flat nose.' I noticed that the band looked around real careful before doing that number—and there were a few blacks there." When asked what the blacks there did, he responded, "I'm sure they took it as a joke. Like that black couple over there. They dance all the dances. I'm sure they don't take that stuff seriously."

Like legislators arguing against affirmative action, these cynics used the code in a more argumentative vein than the other Buffaloes, to signal that they were *inclusive*. They seemed to say, "Anyone who accepts our relation to jokes can be included, whatever color they are!" They considered themselves to be inclusive because they treat everyone the same, as long as they play by the rules, of taking all teasing as good, no matter how charged the topic of the tease is.

We seem, then, to have the same upside-down relation to the code that the mainstream Buffaloes had, but it meant something different here. Here, members did consider their actions to be "political." Like the Buffaloes' style, the cynics' style stressed *autonomy* and *inclusiveness*, but differed from the other in its constant attention to institutions; cynics' attentiveness made them have to work harder to avoid institutions, in order to be good (*honorable, truthful, realistic, sane*, etc.) citizens.

Like the mainstream Buffaloes, the cynics used the code of civil society against itself. The cynics' style of filtering the code was different from the other Buffaloes', but in both cases, speakers were faithful to the code. And both styles are probably familiar to many Americans. The mainstream country westerners' down-home style likely would be recognizable and easy to learn for many Americans precisely because, we propose, it is a cultural pattern. The cynics' more twisted style would also be easily recognizable to many Americans—especially those who are well informed about, and disgusted by, world events. The club members' twisted appropriation of the code is itself a cultural structure;¹³ it is not simply

¹³ For the phrase "cultural structure," see, e.g., Rambo and Chan (1990), Alexander

creative or free, but a stable group style. Both styles filtered the collective representations to create a political stance, a gesture, a posture that defined group membership.

COMPARING STYLE BETWEEN AND WITHIN CASES

Group boundaries.—Country westerners proudly disconnected themselves from most of the wider world without locating themselves in any particular place in it. They anchored the group tenuously in commercial institutions that they did not quite trust. Country westerners criticized the world without trying to change it. ACES members, on the other hand, defined themselves explicitly as Airdalers, even when Airdale's milieu pained them. They represented their notion of an Airdaler's identity to Microtech, to other Airdalers, and to the urban activists.

Group bonds.—Neither group considered itself to be composed of comrades, marching in unison. Both had a more privatized sense of self, assuming that members did not all have to be the same in order for them to be together and that members should respect each other's privacy. Both ACES and country westerners assumed that political proselytizing—"getting on a high horse," as country westerners put it, or "coming on strong" as the ACES leader put it—was out of place, because the point was not to arrive at an elaborately articulated, common position. But country westerners wished that they had a different sort of group bond that was much more unified, much closer, and based on years of neighborhood togetherness and shared community. In contrast, ACES members wanted to be given space and respected as private individuals while representing themselves to each other and to Airdale as normal "members of the community."

Speech norms.—ACES members assumed that it was their duty to speak out individually about shared social issues, even if individual members did it timidly. They valued speech itself, paid attention to words, and assumed that it was important that all voices be heard, no matter how uncomfortable public speaking made them. Country westerners tried hard to avoid speaking seriously. Both groups were critical of wider political institutions, but they held their critical positions quite differently. For ACES, critique required speaking out; for country westerners, it

and Smith (1993), or Somers (1995). This phrase conveys the idea that culture itself is structured and that it structures interaction; it signals the understanding of culture shared by the theorists named at the start of this article, and we apply it to group style. Given the more common understanding of "structure" as "social structure," the phrase is counterintuitive, so we use it little and signal the underlying idea with other terms.

meant shrugging the wider world off, momentarily, by making jokes guaranteed to offend.

Subordinate Styles within a Group

Theoretical work on organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991), and empirical work on church congregations (Becker 1999), along with the psychological schema theory reviewed earlier, suggest that a group will likely have a *dominant* style that members usually try to maintain. But a group may also have submerged styles. These submerged or suppressed styles may arise "backstage," as Erving Goffman would put it (1959), or members may try to change the dominant style up front.

Backstage, for example, was the country westerner who mourned to another member about her African-American son-in-law's fear of coming to the Buffalo Club. Backstage conversation often took this more serious form, but only in whispers, in groups of two or three, in the ladies' room or parking lot, away from the main stage. Anthropologist Judith Irvine (1979) argues that part of what constitutes a group is precisely how it distinguishes between formal and informal speech; following her logic, we argue that part of what constitutes a group is how it distinguished between frontstage and backstage speech.

Sometimes, members may openly challenge the dominant style, front stage. Remember the woman who kept getting on a high horse at the Buffalo. Similarly, and even more explicitly, ACES member John tried unsuccessfully to challenge the group's "timid affiliation" style several times. For the participant-observer, John's challenge made the mostly taken-for-granted group style all the more apparent. John's favorite means of challenging the group style was to get other members to talk about "capitalism," in either group meetings or informal get-togethers. Other members would greet his efforts with awkward silence and a quick switch of topics. These were signs of an inability to continue verbalizing meaning together in a group bonded on the implicit understanding that ideological motivations (a critical stance on capitalism, e.g.) were private matters. At a combined meeting and holiday party, for instance, John launched into an impromptu tirade against Microtech for producing "death for a profit." Giving an ironic twist to a format intended to make people feel comfortable in groups, John proposed that party goers in Barb's living room "go around the room and each say what he thinks about capitalism." Barb broke in to say, "Maybe we should all introduce ourselves." Once we introduced ourselves, she announced that dinner was ready. When John initiated the topic again in a private conversation by the potluck table, Barb broke in to say it was time to watch a video. An ACES ally from a metropolitan activist group, an experienced activist himself, whispered

to John at this point, "You know, capitalism really does stink." By insisting that the group debate his own ideological stance, John was challenging the group style of allowing leeway for privately held ideological motivations. The silences, frozen expressions, and quick switches of topic that greeted John's salvos at capitalism strongly suggest that group interaction, and group purpose itself, was threatened by challenges to the style.

An observer might wonder if the group devalued John's speech because of his explicit ideology—anticapitalism—and not because of his breach of the group's style. But that interpretation would not work easily. When members remarked publicly on John's ideological positions, or referred to him in confidential interviews, they always addressed his outspokenness, his zeal—his style—and *never* his anticapitalist positions. Because they knew John, they knew that he was making intentional but somewhat playful breaches. They knew he meant it, but he was not going to push the point. These were not furious provocations or just plain mistakes, and they were not just simple jokes with no message, either (Geertz 1973). To grasp the group's way of categorizing John's breaches, we had to observe what they counted as the "same" type of interaction over time (Cicourel 1993, p. 90; Billig 1999; Fitch 1999; Burawoy et al. 1991; Sanders 1999). The interactional style itself counted in the group's understanding of John; our analysis needed to recognize style more than cultural researchers usually do. The cases portrayed here begin with cultural theories; other research on culture and interaction begins with theories of social structural inequalities like class and gender, and it is to those that we now turn.

"Culture in Interaction" and the Cultural Reproduction of Inequality

Many scholars have argued that everyday interaction helps reproduce social inequality; they identify this interactional link as culture. To take two influential and persuasive examples among many, the concepts of "emotion work," from Arlie Hochschild (1983, 1979), and Pierre Bourdieu's trio of "habitus," "practice," and "field" link individual feelings, tastes, and habits to social structure. But both sociologists skip a crucial loop through everyday interaction in group settings. At the same time, they pay less attention to collective representations than we do. In this way, their projects are simultaneously less "interactional" and less "cultural," as we have defined these terms. We argue that their concepts could become even more useful for the study of inequality than they already are if they paid more attention both to collective representations and to groups' habitual styles of interacting.¹⁴

¹⁴ We have separately begun pursuing that research agenda elsewhere; while analytically separable, the study of culture structures and social structures—of collective

Hochschild and Bourdieu both draw on Erving Goffman's classic work. Goffman's overlapping concepts of "footing" (1979), "game," and "role distance" (1961) all highlight how participants cue each other into "what is going on here." But Goffman either resolutely denies, or at best, leaves implicit (Snow 2001), any connection between these micro processes and larger institutions. In criticizing Goffman's myopia, Hochschild and Bourdieu are two of the many critics who take the next step, asking how social structural forces, like class or gender inequality, shape interaction.

Hochschild's (1983) study of flight attendants, for example, shows how hard they must work to fulfill one of their job requirements, the relentlessly cheery, 15-hour-long smile. "Emotion work" links everyday interaction and social structure—in this case, the imperatives of corporate profit making, in a society that often deems it "women's work" to make people feel comfortable. "Emotion rules" are the implicit moral rules people share for naming, and expressing, and attributing a moral valence to their feelings (Hochschild 1979).

To sharpen and make more systematic the *cultural* dimension of "emotion rules," we would ask how the flight attendants' emotion work draws on larger cultural structures—along with the structure of corporate labor relations. We would study the "collective representations" that informed the flight attendants—their engagement with individualism, for instance. We would also examine the flight attendants' group style of interaction more closely. Hochschild devotes little attention to flight attendants' interactions among each other in the back of the plane (but see Weinberg 1996; Cahill and Eggleston 1994). Yet there must have been some sociable means of helping each other prop those 15-hour smiles up. As the Buffaloes and ACES cases suggest, attributing anyone's lack of resistance to "the language of individualism" by itself would not offer a fine enough brush. People always encounter situational puzzles when invoking the language of individualism. Individualism could invite workers to protect their "true selves" and play along with the game at work, rather than imagine collective solutions to work-induced frustration. That is what Hochschild says happens. But it could equally plausibly lead flight attendants to talk critically in a group setting about a work situation that violates their deeply felt right to individual self-expression (Inglehart 1990; Roszak 1969; Melucci 1989). To know whether flight attendants interpreted the broad culture of individualism in either of these ways, or in some other, we would need to ask how the flight attendants' emotion work was enabled and constrained by group style. In the end, the analysis would reveal the

representations and social inequality—are *empirically* thoroughly intertwined in ways that illuminate both.

culture in interaction, deepening and specifying our understanding of the kind of emotion work that flight attendants needed to do in that setting.

To apply this enhanced analysis of emotion work to ACES, we can see that group members did emotion work to steel themselves as protestors in the suburban milieu. They *worked* at calming their fears of going public, telling themselves they really were responsible, "normal" people who cared about their families. The larger cultural context—the language of personal empowerment—influenced this emotion work, as well as the social-structural one. Microtech loomed large in the social-structural context, of course, but the company did not say to ACES members, "Sound calm and quiet if you are going to dissent." If ACES members had followed the company's own statements about dissenters, they would have empowered themselves as screaming protestors. They would have worked at sounding angry, as some of the urban protestors did. Instead, they did the emotion work consonant with the quiet version of "empowerment" they could adopt given their group style.

A study of emotion work at the Buffalo Club could benefit from attention to culture in interaction, too. Such a study might start by observing that many Buffaloes came to the club from jobs as data entry clerks, mall cashiers, maintenance personnel, and short-distance truck drivers. The researcher could say that the club's emotion rules offered a necessary antidote to their dehumanizing work lives. Here, if nowhere else, they could appreciate each other for just being human. This analysis would make sense, but it would make the emotion work seem more inevitably, causally related to inequality than it is. Members of other nonelite groups have tried to inoculate themselves against the pain of dehumanizing work differently—by complaining to each other, or rebelling, or cultivating a skill together, or trying to be just like their bosses, or turning to God and prayer and song, for some possibilities. The insults of dreary, low-status work loomed large, but the workplaces did not say to Buffaloes, "Tease each other, as the only realistic vaccination against the insults we give you all day!"

While the concept of "emotion work" is brilliantly useful, our examples show that emotional expression takes its form through culture in everyday interaction. A focus on culture in interaction would ask, first, how the given collective representations make a certain kind of emotion work necessary. Buffaloes' love of autonomy and equality, for example, required emotion work that another group might find unnecessary. Collective representations make certain emotions necessary, for preserving members' sense of humanity—in a way that that society or subgroup defines it. Second, a focus on culture in interaction would find that a group's style asks for certain ways of expressing emotion in the group.

Bourdieu's fruitful notion of practice (1990, 1984, 1977; Bourdieu and

Wacquant 1992) could, in similar ways, become even more compelling if it focused more on everyday culture as it plays out in group interaction. Bourdieu characterizes "practices" as ways of doing things, patterns of action that unfold in real-time interaction; he says that agents in different "field" positions enact different practices, shaped by different amounts of capital (1984; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Agents' everyday interactions usually reproduce an unequal distribution of capital, or an unequal social structure.

On first glance, Bourdieu's "practice" looks like "group style." But Bourdieu (see, esp., 1984), like Hochschild (1983), focuses on biography more than situation. For Bourdieu, to study practices is to identify mostly taken-for-granted "schemes of action" that individuals transfer from one setting to another (Bourdieu 1990, pp. 83, 92, 94). In contrast, the "group style" draws attention to properties of a group setting—which are never just the sum of their individual parts. Individual members of voluntary associations do not necessarily have matching biographies, yet they do manage to agree on how to hold beliefs and present opinions in a group setting.

Bourdieu's "practice" ultimately connects the person to a social-structural position. In his elaborate framework, practices have more or less *value*—economic, cultural, or social capital—in a field. In contrast, "group styles" have different qualities, not just different quantities. The question of what group style *means* is not entirely reducible to the question of what a style is "worth" in some form of "capital"—be it money and property, honor and refinement, or the capacity to build social networks.

In sum, both Bourdieu and Hochschild examine individuals' "structures of feeling" as they pertain to social inequality; they move quickly from the individual to the social structure, without asking enough about how participants communicate in groups together. On the face of it, the distinction seems only to be that their goals are different from ours. They link feelings and habits to *social* structures, while we, most immediately, link groups' patterns of interaction to "*culture* structures"—collective representations and group styles. Their project may seem to be more about power and politics; ours, simply "cultural." But we propose that by understanding how people make meaning together in groups, researchers understand more about power, political change, or political quiescence. Analytically, in this article, we have separated culture structures from social-structural inequality, even if empirically, inequality is almost always weighing heavily on interaction. But *after* making this analytic separation, an observer can understand class reproduction more clearly, in more detail. A study of "culture in interaction" offers a crucial complement to analyses of the reproduction of inequality in everyday group settings.

IMPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

Cultural, social-psychological, and organizational modes of analysis deeply inform the concepts of group style and culture in interaction. This section briefly shows how these conceptions build on and advance four lines of research: the cultural studies project of studying "resistance" social identity theory and the allied, symbolic boundaries approach; neoinstitutionalism; and linguistic anthropology.

"Resistance" in Cultural Studies

Studies of cultural "resistance" (e.g., Frith 1981; Hall 1973; Hebdige 1979; Morley 1980, 1992; Radway 1984; Fiske 1993; Lancaster 1988; Kelley 1996; Scott 1990, Willis 1981) show that audiences filter messages through differently patterned interpretive lenses. In Stuart Hall's (1973) example, a working-class union member hears on the TV news that it is in "the national interest" to end inflation, but interprets the phrase as really meaning "in the interests of the corporate ruling class."

The analysis presented here would go further, asking how this union member *communicated* his interpretation of "the national interest" in everyday group settings. When he talks about his interpretation, what *bonds* are there between participants? Does the working-class news watcher present his interpretation proudly and defiantly, demonstrating a sense of *comradely bonding* with other workers who he expects should agree? Or does he say it hopelessly and cynically, as many politically disconnected Americans do when discussing the mass media? Resistance can mean different things in different settings; when there is no sense of shared goals, and very loose bonds, as with the Buffaloes, resistance may simply reproduce and reinforce the lack of mutual obligation.

Second, we would ask where he assumes it is *appropriate to speak* about his interpretation. Does he assume that it is somehow his duty to talk about his interpretation of the news or that it is impolite to entertain that kind of conversation, or that talk does not matter? Finally, we would ask *what image of the wider world, and his relation to it*, does he have in mind when offering his interpretation of the news? Studies of resistance (Hall 1973; Morley 1980; Scott 1990; Lancaster 1988; Willis 1981; Kelley 1996) describe long-standing communities resisting clear, structural domination: Working-class listeners relating to mainstream news, peasants or slaves relating to official pronouncements, or African-American or working-class students relating to white, middle-class teachers. But not all modes of interpreting dominant culture are only either "resisting" or "complying with" elites or powerful institutions; they do not just say "yes" or "no," but articulate whole new meanings. Second, resistance studies show

situations in which members actively perceive oppression as coming directly from an employer, schoolteacher, or political ruler who is immediately present or to whom members can speak directly. But our studies show situations in which the source of oppression is not very clear to members. Oppression may be coming from diffuse sources, in which there is no clearly embodied oppressor against whom to rebel (Hayward 2000).

Social Identity and Symbolic Boundaries

Important insights into group style come from the focus on group identity in social identity theories (Tajfel 1982; Farr and Moscovici 1984; Hewitt 1989; Jenkins 1996; see also McCall and Simmons 1978; Melucci 1988) and the "symbolic boundary" perspective (Lamont 1999, 1992; Lamont and Fournier 1992; Lamont and Thevenot 2000). These approaches alerted us at the outset to the fact that groups draw boundaries that identify "people like us," and exclude others as different, or less worthy, in the process. For instance, upper-middle-class people draw socioeconomic, cultural, and moral boundaries between themselves and other groups (Lamont 1992); people develop musical preferences by contrasting themselves with others who have different preferences (Bryson 1996); moral entrepreneurs enforce boundaries between art and "obscenity" with specific social groups, not just society in general, in mind (Beisel 1997). People imagine their tangible, face-to-face group on a broader, less tangible social map. This "mapping" is one of the three dimensions of group style—the "group boundaries" dimension—introduced at the start and illustrated in our cases. And as Lamont argues (1992), a group's social map has many overlapping kinds of distinctions, not just class distinctions.

Focusing on group style directs us to watch how people draw boundaries in everyday life, and in particular, highlights the boundaries that people draw between different group settings. The symbolic boundaries school could find fuel for new research in the situational boundaries we describe—boundaries between backstage and frontstage, or between groups—such as ACES and their urban protestor allies—that mark the boundaries precisely by enacting different group styles, for example. We argue that individuals might draw evaluative boundaries between people differently in different settings. By following these differences from setting to setting, a researcher might better understand where and how gatekeepers—college admissions staff-persons, job recruitment personnel, talent scouts—draw the boundaries when they are at *work*, where they matter most for social inequality, even while the same gatekeepers might privately abhor the existence of those boundaries when they are at *home*. For example, it would help us understand why even the most well-mean-

ing guidance counselors might consistently steer promising minority students away from good colleges (Mehan 1978; Erickson and Schulz 1982). Lamont says that her interviewees noticed some boundaries and ignored others; she notes that the absences are as noteworthy as the presences (Lamont 1992, p. 4). We agree, adding that people can speak about some boundaries in some settings and not in others, and they can speak about boundaries differently in different settings; here, too, the silences are as noteworthy as the speech.

Neoinstitutionalism

The new institutionalism (DiMaggio and Powell 1991) emphasizes the durability and power of taken-for-granted understandings in formal institutions. Neoinstitutionalism underscores the persistence of group culture without resorting to older, widely criticized formulations of culture as shared beliefs. The concept of group style firmly upholds their idea and extends it to the analysis of less formal settings and everyday interaction. Neoinstitutionalists usually focus on large-scale rules or models that shape entire organizations, networks, or institutions (e.g., DiMaggio 1991; Becker 1999; Clemens 1997). Clearly complementing these broader studies, the concept of "group style" highlights everyday interactional routines. The same organization can host different group styles in its different group settings. Patterned or institutionalized cultures—group styles—work at a more microsociological level also.

The new institutionalism also makes the important point that the same organizational forms recur in many organizations; these forms reside in fields or institutional sectors of society, not in single, separate organizations (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p. 14). Similarly, we hold that a group's style is not unique to that single, separate group but potentially recurs in many groups. Elsewhere we have suggested examples of different, widely dispersed groups that share something like what we now call group style (Lichterhan 1999, 1996; Eliasoph 1998).

We found neoinstitutionalist scholarship particularly pertinent to the second dimension of group style ("group bonds"). Neoinstitutional scholars show how ties between members of an organization have a qualitative, not just quantitative character. As Mitchell Stevens (1996, p. 1) puts it, "Network relations are also moral relations"; groups define mutual responsibilities among members.

In these ways, the "group style" concept extends neoinstitutionalists' insights. A study of "culture in interaction" ties interactional routines to large-scale, enduring patterns of "culture" in groups. And it shows how those patterns work with widespread, collective representations. Some analysts of large-scale cultural codes have argued that the neoinstitution-

alist approach is a competing approach to culture, one that neglects the richness of symbolic meaning (Kane 1997). We argue, instead, that analyzing a group's routines actually enhances our understanding of symbolic codes and meanings they produce in everyday life.

Linguistic Anthropology

Some eye-opening studies describe societies that are so spectacularly different from the United States that their strangeness and incomprehensibility force the foreign observer to notice that interactional style itself bears meaning and is culturally patterned (Basso 1979; Brenneis and Macaulay 1996; Brenneis and Myers 1984). Without taking the participants' understandings of speech itself into account, the anthropologists would have found speech in these societies incomprehensible. But these studies collapse the "style" with the collective representations. Our concept of culture in interaction took inspiration from this work, and we borrowed from it our "speech norms" dimension of group style; but now we, in turn, add to it, by showing how important it is to distinguish between collective representations and group style.

Michelle Rosaldo's (1982, 1973) studies of public speech in the Philippines, at the advent of Western influence, provide one splendid example of such work. Rosaldo argues that the native Ilongots' traditional, flowery, indirect public speech style implicitly acknowledged their idea that no one person had a singular claim to the truth and that no one could do very much to enforce one version of the truth in a dispute between differing truth claims. When Western imperial powers overshadowed local rulers' power, the speech style became more direct and forceful. The West brought the idea that there was one universal, single truth, and that there were powerful institutions that could enforce that single truth, even if not everyone accepted it as truth. These new collective representations—new notions of truth, power, and personhood—were inseparable from the change to a more direct, brusque, conflictive, Western style of public discourse.

Similarly, Fred Myers (1991) analyzes collective representations and speech style all in one stroke. The meetings he studied, among the Pintupi of Australia, all had the same style, which made sense given their institutional and cultural structures. The Pintupis' roundabout, nonconflictual ways of carrying on group meetings revealed their deeply held ideas about self and polity—their collective representations.

In the societies Myers and Rosaldo studied, different styles inhered in different social orders with different collective representations, separated in space and time. But in a study of a complex, large-scale society, we need to distinguish between style and collective representation. In a com-

plex society, a person has access to different settings with different styles, but may carry the same collective representations to these different settings. When linguistic anthropologists shift their perspective to complex, large-scale society, they often assume that speakers must have one "home base" style, against which all others pose difficult violations of speakers' basic core selves. That is, they replicate Rosaldo and Myers' one-on-one relation between the collective representations and the style.

For one example among many, Gerry Philipsen's (1992) insightful and influential work brilliantly contrasts white working-class Chicagoans in "Teamsterville" and mainstream West Coast, middle-class Americans. Teamstervillers' patriarchal kinship and church, Philipsen argues, offered men a sense of self that Philipsen, echoing scholarship on ancient Greece, calls the "code of honor." Philipsen says that the Chicagoans had to defend their honor with violent, "strong," hyperbolic speech and by behaving in ways that his West Coasters would have found inexplicable and primitively tribal. The West Coast speakers, in turn, wanted egalitarian relations and an individualized sense of self: a "code of dignity." Their speech style valued "communication" as a panacea for any threats to individuality and equality. Philipsen says that these styles embody different deep myths and symbols, different answers to basic questions about what a person is, what a society is, and how they are linked through communication (Philipsen 1992, p. 15).

But, we argue, collective representations do not simply create styles of speaking. Speakers who share the same collective representation set them in motion differently, in different settings, through different styles. ACES, for example, placed something like the "code of dignity" at its center, yet the group carried out a community minded, activist agenda. Furthermore, a person intuitively uses different styles in different settings, to make different sorts of points (Gumperz 1982*b*, 1982*a*; Gumperz and Hymes 1972).¹⁵ People in a diverse, complex society have to *settle upon* a footing; it is not singular and prescribed. David Halle shows, for example, that white, American workers hold different identities in different contexts—as consumers, workers, family members, or members of different ethnic and religious groups (1984). In our empirical cases, participants' implicit answers to all three questions Philipsen outlined were not clearly prescribed. Further research could show whether this may hold true for many Americans who live in relatively new suburbs like the ones portrayed here

¹⁵ Thus, even grammar and pronunciation—such as the use of subcultural dialects (black English, accented English) and nondominant languages—vary by microcontext, as many creative field experiments have shown (see, e.g., essays on code switching collected in Gumperz and Hymes [1972], Gumperz [1982*a*, 1982*b*], Gigliolo [1972]). People know the rules of grammar and pronunciation, but do not always use them; and their code-switching varies in statistically regular patterns.

(Baumgartner 1988), rather than established urban communities like Teamsterville.

CONCLUSION

Group styles filter collective representations; the result is culture in interaction. By contrasting each of our main groups' style with those of other groups, and with the "default" style in previous cultural theories, this article has shown how groups can use the same collective representation to different meaningful ends in everyday life. The point is not that collective representations are meaningless in themselves, but that a focus on "culture in interaction" helps us understand how the same widely shared symbols, stories, vocabularies, or codes make different meanings in different settings.

This article's main agenda has been to make scholarship on culture more useful for thinking about everyday life settings. It is a friendly debate with cultural sociology that asks observers to remember what social psychologists have long argued. People always make meanings in specific social settings, in relation to each other as they perceive each other. Conversely, though, thinking about these styles as patterned, as part of a larger culture, could help interactionists understand how styles of interpersonal interaction may have a history. For example, Kenneth Cmiel's (1990) fascinating historical study of American political discourse shows that Americans demanded plain, direct, vigorous speech, as a mark of egalitarian sociability; speakers needed to distinguish themselves from their 18th-century European cousins, whom they considered florid, stuffy, and in need of fresh air. Essays like Cmiel's help us view these patterned, enduring, group styles through a cultural lens, as a dimension of culture themselves.

The study of "culture in interaction" has helped us systematically grasp some important theoretical puzzles. But it does more. It clarifies problems that confront researchers and observers of many institutions that generate and circulate collective representations: civic associations, religious organizations, schools, government, and others.

The two main empirical cases presented here portray "civil society"—the public or potentially public settings in which uncoerced participants engage in ongoing, voluntary association, outside of the immediate demands of family, work, or government (Walzer 1992; Barber 1984; Alexander 1995, p. 6; Fraser 1992; Habermas 1992; Cohen and Arato 1992). Many scholars and politicians have worried about the "tone" of American civic life, lamenting what they hear as narrowness in American public discourse (e.g., Hughes 1993; Etzioni 1996; Hunter 1994, 1991; Gitlin 1995;

MacIntyre 1981; Marty 1997; Bellah et al. 1985; Wuthnow 1998; Putnam 2000, 1995). Groups such as ACES and the Buffalo Club are just the sorts of places these observers would search for the cultivation of civic engagement and public spiritedness (Alexander 1995; Boyte and Evans 1986; Cohen and Arato 1992; Fraser 1992; Goldfarb 1980; Goodwyn 1978; Habermas 1992; 1989. Rosenzweig 1983; Ryan 1985; Tocqueville [1831] 1969). A study of culture in interaction offers a more systematic method for analyzing the "tone" of these groups. Thus, the bar patrons and the suburban activist group's styles were not just not neutral, transparent conveyors of cultural meanings. Neither were they just *pro*- or *antidemocratic*. The concept of culture in interaction operationalizes an insight from students of public life such as Dewey (1927), Mead (1964), and others that meaning and practice—or "content and form"—are intertwined, creating varied kinds of openings for members to become democratic citizens.

One could investigate culture in interaction in other kinds of civic groups, as well. For example, the very act of participating in a nongovernmental organization—the Red Cross, for example—might carry different meanings in different times and places that one could not guess by knowing the organization's stated mission and institutional form. The concept of culture in interaction would give researchers a way to grasp those differences. Similarly, a history of the category of "the volunteer" over time and in different places could focus on the culture in interaction—the ways styles of group membership filter collective representations of compassion or a good society.

Examining culture in interaction helps us understand religious groups, too. For example, observers puzzle over the question of how Christianity and Islam (and other religions) can be used by terrorists and pacifists, fanatics and contemplative scholars, and casual observers alike. Previous explanations hinge on differences in interpretations of sacred texts—that is, different doctrinal standpoints, different beliefs about divine and earthly reality. Clearly, that is correct; certain branches of a religion highlight different chapters and verses of their sacred texts, and that explains many differences between members of the same religion. But we add another dimension to the question: an inspection of "culture in interaction" would ask if some of the differences between adherents of the same beliefs stem from different group styles.¹⁶

Culture in interaction helps us think about institutions and organizations outside the broad sphere of civil society, too. We have already outlined one way of using this analysis to investigate work settings, in con-

¹⁶ Becker's (1999) study of different styles in religious congregations is a big step in this direction; see also Roozen, McKinney, and Carroll (1984), and Lichterman's (in press) study of faith-based volunteer groups

junction with the emotion work concept. Schools make up another intriguing site for studying culture in interaction. Impressive and astonishing scholarship shows that schools around the globe have become more alike in some ways; school curricula have become more uniform, so that "villagers in remote regions learn about chemical reactions; members of marginalized groups who will never see a ballot box learn about their national constitutions" (Meyer et al. 1997, p. 150; Meyer, Nagel, and Snyder 1993). An inspection of culture in interaction could complement this far-reaching and important macroscopic analysis by asking how this massive uniformity plays out in everyday interaction. Habitual, unspoken group styles might filter a curriculum differently, expecting and inviting students to band together around it; to treat it as scaffolding for each student's deep personal identity, to treat the curriculum as official nonsense worth memorizing for strategic reasons but otherwise irrelevant to everyday life. But whatever the explicit curriculum is, groups have implicit, culturally rooted styles for enacting it.

Finally, we can turn the tables back onto the "default setting" that Alexander and Smith (1993) portray. We began by saying that studies of binary codes hold the setting constant, keeping it focused on governmental settings. But even governments do not always have the same relations to the wider world. Appropriate speech in different governmental bodies varies from teeth-clenching but polite disagreement in the U.S. Senate (. . . "the gentleman from Louisiana . . ."), to shouting, booing, and jeering

(in, e.g., the British House of Commons; see Merelman 1991); and bonds between legislators vary. One could study differences between state institutions, not just as formal institutional differences, and not just as differences in the "discourses of civil society" of the sort Alexander and Smith (1993) describe, but also as differences in group styles.

"Culture" becomes publicly available and shared in group settings. The meaning of culture depends in part on what it means to participate in a group setting that filters that culture. The concept of culture in interaction brings group life squarely into cultural analysis. To understand culture, we need to know how groups put it to use in everyday life.

APPENDIX

How to Observe Group Style: An Outline of Sensitizing Questions

Ethnographers rarely say how they arrived at their interpretations of taken-for-granted meanings; this outline of questions will "sensitize" (Blumer 1986) researchers to group style in everyday interaction. These are not questions that the researcher should ask research subjects; rather,

these questions should help *focus the researcher* on the kinds of interaction that reveal group style. These questions can sensitize researchers to everyday meanings that group members, taking those meanings for granted in the course of group life, might not speak about. We take the three dimensions of group style, one at a time.

Group Boundaries

The dimension of “group boundaries” puts into practice a group’s assumptions about what the group’s relationship (imagined and real) to the wider world should be while in the group context.

1. What references do members make to institutions, organizations, and identity categories? Do members position themselves positively or negatively in relation to these anchors? Which references do members make problematic, and which ones are just considered natural? What happens if one member identifies with, or against, a group or person that other members never mention?
2. How do actual interactions between the group and other institutions compare with those inside the group? What can members do or say in their own group meetings that they cannot do or say when they are in the presence of wider institutional authorities?
3. Does the group itself enjoy access to the public’s ears? Through what fora does it get this access—through journalists’ reports about the group, or face-to-face public events, word of mouth, or “alternative” media? How does the group define “the public,” and how does it think the public imagines it?

Group Bonds

The dimension of “group bonds” puts into practice a group’s assumptions about what members’ mutual responsibilities should be while in the group context.

1. How do members define a good member? Is it one who adds a lot of individual initiative, or perhaps one who carries out tasks efficiently? What responsibilities do members assume they bear toward one another and toward potential members? When and how do members take offense at other members? How do they deal with people they perceive as “different”? Are offensive or different people seriously engaged, politely tolerated, or shunned? Who returns to meetings and who does not?

2. What do members *say* about commonalities inside the group? For instance, do they consider themselves to be members of a preconstituted community that they imagine shares something deep and natural, such as religion or race? Or do they imagine themselves to share just one goal, one interest, and say they are banding together for instrumental purposes? Or do they emphasize that the group is diverse, accepting, embracing of cultural, ethnic, racial, and class differences?
3. Do members talk in a way that implies that gathering together is a good in itself, or a distasteful necessity? Which kinds of people can or cannot join? Which kinds would be comfortable in the group, and which kinds would not?

Speech Norms

The dimension of “speech norms” puts into practice a group’s assumptions about what appropriate speech is in the group context.

1. What do participants assume that the goal of speaking in the group is? Examples might include exploring a self and respecting other self-exploring individuals, affirming shared opinions, arguing in order to come to an agreement, arguing to refine ideas, arguing to win, expressing upstanding citizenship, accomplishing tasks, letting people know what side one is on or who one is, having fun, or showing off. How do these categories overlap and mutually imply one another? For example, one group might express upstanding citizenship by avoiding disagreement, while another group might express upstanding citizenship by arguing. Do people enjoy talking for its own sake? How much do they assume one *should* enjoy talking? What kinds of ideas are expressed in meetings versus in other group contexts?
2. To what kinds of speech do members pay attention? What constitutes a mistake in interaction, or inappropriate speech? How do people make sense of mistakes—do they try to decipher them, lapse into awkward silence, or rebuke the speaker?
3. How do members talk *about* what went on in group meetings, and how do members take notes, if applicable? What speech do members notice and what do they leave out? What do members consider a tangent? When describing what happened in a gathering, do members describe speech, or do they focus on other kinds of action?

Of course, researchers routinely pursue some of these questions, through

different methods of research. Part of our methodological contribution is to bring them together in the concept of *group style*.

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Institutional Change in Toque Ville: Nouvelle Cuisine as an Identity Movement in French Gastronomy¹

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A challenge facing cultural-frame institutionalism is to explain how existing institutional logics and role identities are replaced by new logics and role identities. This article depicts identity movements that strive to expand individual autonomy as motors of institutional change. It proposes that the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists, extent of theorization of new roles, prior defections by peers to the new logic, and gains to prior defectors act as identity-discrepant cues that induce actors to abandon traditional logics and role identities for new logics and role identities. A study of how the nouvelle cuisine movement in France led elite chefs to abandon classical cuisine during the period starting from 1970 and ending in 1997 provides wide-ranging support for these arguments. Implications for research on institutional change, social movements, and social identity are outlined.

Institutions are composed of logics and governance structures and are produced or enacted by individuals and corporate actors (McAdam and Scott 2002). Institutional logics are the belief systems that furnish guide-

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lines for practical action (Friedland and Alford 1991), and governance structures consist of the arrangements by which field-level power and authority are exercised. So defined, institutions denote durability: logics constitute the identities of actors and generate obligations, and governance structures constrain action. Since institutions structure human action, organizations resemble each other and reflect little diversity (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983).

Such institutional arguments that explain stability are poorly suited to illuminate institutional change (Powell 1991, pp. 183–200). So, a central challenge facing cultural-frame institutionalism consists of explaining the locus and sources of institutional change (Clemens and Cook 1999). Institutional change can consist of (a) institution formation or the birth of a new logic or governance structure, (b) deinstitutionalization or the dissolution of an existing logic or governance structure, and (c) reinstitutionalization where an existing logic or governance structure is replaced by a new logic or governance structure (Scott 2001).

An emerging synthesis of social movement theory and cultural-frame institutionalism suggests that social movements are important motors of institution building, deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization in organizational fields (McAdam and Scott 2002; Rao, Morill, and Zald 2000). Social movements are collective challenges to authority in political and cultural domains that endeavor to affect change at various levels of social life (Snow 2002). Researchers distinguish between instrumental movements and identity movements. Instrumental movements seek to redress injustices, challenge economic and political structures, and strive for policy impact in the form of new laws or governance structures. By contrast, identity movements arise in opposition to the dominant cultural codes, consist of a “we-feeling” sustained through interactions among movement participants, and are expressed through cultural materials such as names, narratives, symbols, and rituals (Taylor and Whittier 1992). Identity movements seek autonomy rather than justice, aspire to cultural change, and promote new institutional logics (Gamson 1995). Unlike instrumental movements powered by bureaucratic social movement organizations, identity movements tend to be more informal, decentralized, and diffuse (Melucci 1996).

Students of institutional change have emphasized instrumental movements but have devoted little attention to identity movements. Thus, scholars have looked at how instrumental social movements have promoted the rise of new institutions such as consumer watchdog groups (Rao 1998) or alternate dispute resolution systems (Morrill 2001). Other scholars have analyzed how instrumental social movements compelled American colleges to disinvest from firms with business interests in South Africa (Soule 1999) and prompted the replacement of managerial capi-

talism by investor capitalism (Davis and Thompson 1994). However, cultural-frame institutionalists have yet to grapple with how identity movements challenge cultural codes, reshape the identities of individuals, and promote changes in lifestyles and individual practices.

Moreover, cultural-frame institutionalism says little about how social movements underpin reinstitutionalization in the professions. For the most part, cultural-frame institutionalists have portrayed the professions as an exogenous force operating on organizations, but they seldom study how old logics are replaced by new logics in the professions (Scott 2001). Cultural-frame institutionalism has tended to emphasize the role of professional logics in shaping the role identity of actors but has glossed over the sources of variation in professional logics and role identities (Clemens and Cook 1999). The study of identity movements in professions can enable us to understand how social movements foster cultural change in the professions by reshaping logics and redefining the role identities of individuals (Polletta and Jasper 2001).

We start with the premise that institutional logics are the organizing principles that furnish guidelines to actors as to how to behave (Friedland and Alford 1991). Institutional logics create distinctive categories, beliefs, expectations, and motives and thereby constitute the social identity of actors. One link between an institutional logic and the behavior of individual actors is social identity, or the self-image derived by actors when they categorize themselves as members of a collectivity or occupants of a role (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Stryker 2000; Deaux and Martin 2000). The other link between logics and individual behavior, of course, is a system of incentives that rewards actors for conformity to a given logic and penalizes actors for violations of behavior (Ingram and Clay 2000).

We propose that identity movements in the professions critique the existing logic and role identity as constraints on autonomy, and they offer a new logic and role identity emphasizing expanded autonomy. Since role identities are more proximal and concrete when compared with institutional logics, identity movements celebrate differences between the traditional role identity and the new role identity (Bernstein 1997). Both role identities compete for behavioral expression at the level of individual actors. Drawing on self-categorization theory (Turner 1985), we suggest that identity movements disseminate identity-discrepant cues that jeopardize the old logic and role identity and lead actors to adopt the new logic and new role identity. We discuss four types of identity-discrepant cues as the sources of change: the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists, theorization of new roles to be adopted, defections of peers from the traditional logic to the insurgent logic, and gains that accrue to prior defectors. We also predict that theorization is a more influential identity-

discrepant cue than prior defections by peers and gains accruing to prior defectors.

Empirically, we study how these identity-discrepant cues disseminated by the nouvelle cuisine movement induced elite French chefs to abandon the orthodoxy of classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine. The nouvelle cuisine movement arose in opposition to classical cuisine embodied in Escoffier's academism and was built around 10 commandments centered around the values of truth, light, simplicity, and imagination. Classical cuisine emphasized the power of the restaurateur, long menus requiring huge inventories and little freshness, rituals outside the plate, flambé preparations, and a long consumption process. By contrast, nouvelle cuisine emphasized the autonomy of the chef, with short menus requiring fresh ingredients and low inventories, service through the plate, and a short consumption process. We undertake a longitudinal study of elite French chefs and begin our window of observation in 1970, when the nouvelle cuisine movement arose, and end our observation in 1997, because by then, "cuisine sous contrat" and "cuisine rassurante" (comforting and reassuring cuisine) had arisen on the scene.

We draw on multiple sources of data to develop an analytical narrative of the nouvelle cuisine movement. We interviewed gastronomic critics and faculty members at the leading professional schools (École des Arts Culinaires et de l'Hotellerie created under the patronage of Paul Bocuse in the late 1980s in Lyon, France, and École de Savignac in Périgord) to gain a contextual understanding of classical and nouvelle cuisine. These interviews lasted from two to four hours and were recorded; all told, there were 20 chefs, 15 gastronomic critics, and four professors. Some chefs had one star, others had two stars, and a few had three stars. Some of the chefs had lost a star, and others had gained a star. Some chefs worked in restaurants that included a complementary hotel service, and others belonged to the top-end luxurious chain Relais et Châteaux. Our gastronomic critics were editors or columnists in leading journals such as *La Revue Thuries*. We relied on annual directories issued by the *Guide Michelin* to obtain panel data on elite French chefs. Below, we draw on all of these sources to chronicle how French chefs abandoned the institutional logic and role identity embodied in classical cuisine and embraced nouvelle cuisine.

NOUVELLE CUISINE IN FRENCH GASTRONOMY AS AN IDENTITY MOVEMENT

French gastronomy is a site of convention and invention (Ferguson 1998, p. 637). Gastronomy emerged as a field in the first half of the 19th century

with the advent of restaurants—a secular culinary tradition that countered negative judgments of gastronomic pleasure—and with the rise of a culinary discourse in which gastronomic journalists and chefs codified culinary knowledge and formalized French national cuisine (see Ferguson [1998] for a detailed account of its early origins). Subsequently, its development in the 20th century may be understood as a professional project consisting of the creation of a body of knowledge, the organization of professional bodies, and the consolidation of a professional elite.

The French Revolution of 1789 undermined the institutional logic of the ancien régime cuisine and the associated role identity of the chef. In the ancien régime, meals were public spectacles organized according to hierarchy, and the chef was virtually owned by patrons or nobles. But after the French Revolution, chefs who once worked in the houses of private patrons offered their services to the public by establishing restaurants in Paris and its environs. Haute cuisine shifted from private homes into public restaurants; the spectacle of the banquet was replaced by a more intimate encounter; the hierarchy of the banquet of the ancien régime was supplanted by a more egalitarian order; and the extravagance of banquets gave way to economy (Ferguson 1998).

An informal and decentralized gastronomic effort to systematize the principles of this cuisine was led by chefs and gastronomic journalists. Among these writers, the most influential was Antonin Carème (1784–1833), a chef who worked in the houses of great patrons such as Talleyrand. He pioneered the effort to systematize the principles of the modern cuisine that emerged after the French Revolution. Carème disparaged the old cuisine of the ancien régime because it did not mesh with the zeitgeist of postrevolutionary France, and in his *Philosophical History of Cuisine* (1833), Carème took the idea of chef as artist from ancien régime cuisine and created a vision of *grande cuisine* as both an art and a science. He simplified meals so that there were four courses at dinner instead of eight, gave more space to those persons sitting at the table, and sought to redefine humble dishes such as the *pot au feu* as the essence of a modern cuisine. He and his disciples produced sauces that were works of art; sauces such as bourguignonne, salmis, sauce suprême, or sauce hollandaise camouflaged the meat, game, or fish being served rather than enhancing their flavor (Simon 1952). Stressing delicacy, order, and economy, Carème brought symmetry to the service of meals and introduced a new awareness of freshness and sanitation into the French kitchen. Carème's ideas quickly diffused throughout the kitchens of Parisian restaurants, and the rest of France, and reshaped the culinary culture of the times (Ferguson 1998).

Classical Cuisine: Institutional Logic and Role Identity

Carème's ideas were strengthened by a new breed of chefs such as Georges Auguste Escoffier (1847–1935) and his circle of collaborators—including his friend Prosper Montagné (1865–1948), author of the *Larousse Gastronomique* (1938), who worked in the kitchens of fashionable hotels that had been established in the major cities of Europe, notably by César Ritz, toward the end of the 19th century. If Carème's books constituted the Old Testament, Escoffier's *Guide Culinaire*, first published in 1903, was the New Testament that formed the body of what came to be known as classical cuisine and remains a central text in the training of professional cooks, even to the present day (Mennell 1993). Escoffier wrote down dishes in the order of presentation (*service à la russe*) and developed the first *à la carte* menu. He simplified the art of cooking by getting rid of ostentatious food displays and elaborate garnishes and reduced the number of courses served. He emphasized the use of seasonal foods and urged that sauces be used to reveal the flavors of game, meat, and fish rather than to conceal them. Escoffier simplified professional kitchen organization, as he integrated it into a single unit from its previously individualized sections, which operated autonomously and led to waste and duplication of labor. It was during the Escoffier era that French haute cuisine achieved the undisputed international hegemony that it had begun to acquire since the Restoration (Mennell 1993). Escoffier summarized classical cuisine as follows: "In a word, cookery whilst continuing to be an art will become scientific and will have to submit its formulas which very often are still too empirical, to a method and precision which leaves nothing to chance" (1907, preface).

He conceived of classical cuisine as codified grammar of culinary practice: a *product* can be *cooked* in different ways, *served* with different sauces, and *accompanied* with different fillings. Escoffier's guide was issued in several editions and remained the dominant orthodoxy until it was undermined by the nouvelle cuisine movement. Fischler (1989, 1993) identified five dimensions as useful in understanding the institutional logic and role identity of classical cuisine: culinary rhetoric, rules of cooking, archetypal ingredients used, role of the chef, and the organization of the menu. Table 1 displays these dimensions, and we describe them below.

The culinary rhetoric of classical cuisine reveals the emphasis on conservatism and preservation. Often, dishes have the names of places, noblemen, or mythological characters associated with them. Neirinck and Poulain (1997, pp. 59–62) studied Carème's texts and found that nearly 213 dishes had names associated with noblemen. Moreover, cooking consisted of the application of two rules: conformation to the rules formulated by Carème and Escoffier and sublimation of the ingredients such that the

TABLE 1
CLASSICAL CUISINE: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND ROLE IDENTITIES

Dimension	Defining Characteristics
Culinary rhetoric	Names of dishes refer to <i>Rhetoric, Memory, and Legitimacy</i> .
Rules of cooking	<i>Conformation</i> , or staying in conformity with Escoffier's principles. Examples: gratins and quenelles, terrines, pâtés, confits, jambons, jambonneaux, saucissons, boudins, andouillettes. <i>Sublimation</i> , or sublimating the ingredients: brioches, croûtes, vessies, farces, émincés, chaussons, croustades, vol au vent, sauces, flambages (flambé), bisques, délices, dodines, timbales, Chateaubriand.
Archetypal ingredients ...	High game, shellfish, cream, poultry, river fish
Role of the chef	The restaurateur, rarely the owner, and never the cook, has the power in the rooms of luxury hotels and palaces. The classical service is organized through the saucepan. The waiters cut and serve the dishes, blaze ("flambé") preparations. The rituals are outside the plate.
Organization of the menu . . .	Extremely long menu, almost all the classical dishes are registered. Need for large inventories, therefore less freshness. Consuming is a long ceremony. Related art is <i>Architecture</i> (three dimensions). Relief and contours are important. One sense is critical: vision.

raw material is visually transformed. Moreover, the archetypal ingredients used were high game, shellfish, river fish, cream, and poultry, and the menu was organized so that it consisted of a long menu, which required substantial inventories in the restaurant. The chef was an employee of the restaurant owner and was in the background. The rituals of dining prominently featured the waiter who cut and served dishes, flambéed the preparations, and organized the service through the saucepan. Fischler summarized it as follows: "The art of the cook consisted in accommodating, in transforming, in metamorphosing the raw material, to put it from Nature to Culture. . . . The maître queux was a kind of grand 'sophisticator', in the etymologic sense of 'falsificator'" (1993, p. 238).

This logic and role identity of chefs became institutionalized through a network of training schools, such as Le Cordon Bleu, and professional societies, such as Association des Maîtres Queux. Although it was started in 1896 to provide training to housewives, Le Cordon Bleu began offering courses in haute cuisine classique from 1900 that were first overseen by Charles Driessens, then by Mademoiselle Distel from 1904 until 1930, and

later by Henri-Paul Pellaprat for several decades. In 1950, 40 chefs trained in haute cuisine classique established the Association des Maîtres Queux to certify master chefs who were exponents of haute cuisine and to ensure the highest standards of professional excellence.

Classical cuisine reigned supreme for three decades after Escoffier's death in 1935, due to the role of training schools such as Le Cordon Bleu and societies such as the Association des Maîtres Queux. Such was the ascendancy of classical cuisine that the magazine *Le Cordon Bleu* had 25,000 subscribers in 1930 and became a drawing card in its own right. Thereafter, it declined in importance as classical cuisine became taken-for-granted, and it was eventually discontinued in the early 1960s. Below, we elaborate how the edifice of classical cuisine gave way to nouvelle cuisine and discuss how an external shock, the events of May 1968, enabled activist chefs to exploit hitherto latent tensions between the logic of classical cuisine and the emerging zeitgeist of the times. We begin with a theoretical account of how activists gain opportunities to attack the existing institutional logic and role identity.

Institutional Change: Nouvelle Cuisine as a Spinoff Movement

Given the durability of institutions, early writers sought to explain institutional change as the outcome of exogenous shocks emanating from outside the institutional system in the form of wars or crises (see Powell [1991, pp. 181–200] for a review). These initial arguments glossed over how actors from within the institutional system could exploit the mutability of the existing logic, internal contradictions of the existing logic, or its incompatibility with logics in cognate fields and generate a momentum for change (see Clemens and Cook 1999).

Logics are mutable to the extent that they value autonomy or rely on ambiguous language that can be appropriated. Innovators justify changes by recasting them as efforts to restore tradition (Skrentny 1996, pp. 154–58), or exploit the ambiguity of language, as English cotton spinners did when they appropriated the discourse of the dominant class, fashioned their own identity, and mobilized themselves for collective action (Steinberg 1999). Institutional logics also sow the seeds for change to the extent that they embody contradictions; for instance, citizenship classifications used by empires to construct “nationalities” became the basis for opposition to the central state (Brubaker 1992). Tensions between multiple logics can trigger instability; thus, in the savings and loan industry, competing institutional logics induced founders of thrifts to develop hybrid forms that combined the properties of competing models (Haveman and Rao 1997). Exogenous shocks such as the growth of new constituencies (Amenta 1998) or initiator movements (McAdam 1995) can expose mu-

tability, trigger contradictions, and exacerbate hitherto suppressed tensions among multiple logics. By doing so, exogenous shocks create opportunities for activists within professions to critique the existing orthodoxy and proffer a new logic and a role identity.

Nouvelle cuisine arose because an initiator movement exposed the mutability of the logic of classical cuisine and surfaced tensions between the logic of classical cuisine and the new logics that were being established in cognate fields such as literature, drama, and film. McAdam (1995) distinguished between rare, but exceedingly important, initiator movements that set in motion an identifiable protest cycle and more populous spin-off movements that drew inspiration from the original initiator movement, and he suggested that initiator movements create a political opportunity for spin-off movements. Spin-off movements represent the diffusion of the master logic animating an initiator movement and entail the customization of the initiator movement's master logic. Just as the French Revolution was the master movement that sounded the death knell of the ancien régime cuisine and the construction of classical cuisine by Carême and other gastronomic writers, the events of May 1968 triggered the decline of classical cuisine and the growth of the nouvelle cuisine movement. Fischler writes, "The Grande Cuisine, at the end of the 1960s, experiences a kind of revolution and revelation. Beyond this sudden vogue, there is a larger wave, one of wide-ranging social and economical movements that had been transforming the French society, and wavelets, those that the larger wave indirectly induced in the Cuisine and catering industries. The Grande Gastronomy crystallizes and precipitates latent trends in the society. . . . When studying the nature and content of the Nouvelle Cuisine, one could perceive a large part of further evolutions in the attitudes and behaviors in France" (1993, p. 247).

The larger wave was the protests of May 1968, which hastened the wavelet of nouvelle cuisine. On May 6, 1968, students at the Sorbonne who were protesting against the punishment meted out to eight students at Nanterre for their opposition to the Vietnam War were attacked by police on the boulevard Saint-Germain. Scores of students were arrested, and many students and policemen were injured. Soon students mobilized with marches, decried examinations as a rite of initiation into capitalism, called for the triumph of the "general will over the General" (De Gaulle), and sought to create a society that valued personal autonomy and eliminated distinctions between order-givers and order-takers. France was on the verge of a revolution, with 12 million workers on strike, 122 factories occupied by workers, and students battling against an authoritarian system. The antiauthoritarian wave of May 1968 amplified the effect of undercurrents already visible in the literary, theater, film, and culinary worlds through the *le nouveau roman*, *la nouvelle critique*, *le nouveau*

théâtre, and *la nouvelle vague* antischools. All of these antischools shared similar conceptual principles (Beaugé 1999).

The nouveau roman movement, which first appeared in 1956 with the publication of "*Pour un nouveau roman*" written by Robbe-Grillet, challenged the traditional plot premised on coherent and well-defined characters with the corresponding assumptions of logic, order, sequence, cause and effect, suspense, climax, denouement, beginning and an end. It reached new heights with the publication of *Triptyque*, authored by Claude Simon in 1973, which featured a wedding party, the drowning of a boy, and a scene in a hotel room—these three narratives ran concurrently without paragraph breaks. In a similar vein, nouvelle critique, championed by Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida, sought to redefine the identity of the critic and argued that texts were not limited by the intentions of authors but were recreated through acts of reading. Subsequent writers suggested that the fundamental relationship was not one of speaking and hearing but one of writing and reading. Thus, distinctions between author and critic and author and audience were blurred. In the world of the performing arts, le nouveau théâtre, epitomized by Beckett's *En attendant Godot*, attempted to displace the traditional model of theatre characterized by the ideas of unity of tone and register, and instead explored incomprehension, terror, suffering, and death. By the late 1970s, le nouveau théâtre had moved from the fringe into the mainstream. In the realm of film, la nouvelle vague arose in the late 1950s and sought to replace the primacy of the scriptwriter with the director and to emphasize natural light, realism, improvisation, and audacity.

The nouvelle cuisine movement was an echo of these antischools; its first stirrings appeared in 1965 and were visible in 1970 (Beaugé 1999; Fischler 1993, p. 254), and it was labeled as an antischool only in 1972. The time lag between the antischools in the literary, theatre, and film worlds and the onset of nouvelle cuisine was a consequence of the professionalization of French gastronomy.

There were no professional requirements to write a novel, stage a play, make a low-budget movie, or even critique a book. By contrast, it took a long time for a chef to acquire professional accreditation, and recruits had to progress through various phases. Thus, antischools in the realms of film, theatre, criticism, and novels were championed by insurgent new entrants from the outside. By contrast, nouvelle cuisine was promoted by activists in the centre of the French culinary world who had received honors from the French state and had garnered plaudits from the *Guide Michelin*. Nouvelle cuisine was led by insiders with more credentials and expertise than outsiders because professional talk embodies a culture of critical discourse. In the culture of critical discourse, the right to question the rationality of existing arrangements is based on technical criteria

(DiMaggio 1991; Gouldner 1979). Moreover, members in professions simultaneously value collective identity and individual autonomy. So insiders with expertise can attack existing logics and social identities because these inhibit autonomy, creativity, and freedom, and they can proffer new logics and identities on the grounds that these expand individual autonomy and, by implication, enlarge professional control. In such cases, identity movements may arise to “invert” the dominant symbols and structures and to replace hierarchy with individual freedom, ritual with spontaneity, and routine with virtuosity (Gerlach and Hine 1970; Ansell 2001).

In this sense, *nouvelle cuisine* was a bid to enhance the professional control of restaurants by chefs. Under classical cuisine, chefs possessed the freedom to establish their own restaurants in classical cuisine and design their menus, and celebrity chefs with three Michelin stars could also control financial promoters. However, they lacked technical autonomy because their role was to translate the intentions or prescriptions of Escoffier’s guide into products. Chefs under classical cuisine lacked the freedom to create and invent dishes, and the *nouvelle cuisine* movement sought to make chefs into inventors rather than mere technicians. The movement was shaped by activists such as Paul Bocuse, Michel Guérard, the Troisgros brothers, and Alain Chapel. Each of these chefs had won the *Meilleur Ouvrier de France* title (MOF) and were awarded stars by the *Guide Michelin*. Below, we discuss how these activists constructed a new logic and role identity.

Nouvelle Cuisine: New Institutional Logic and Role Identity

Identity movements arise when activists construct institutional gaps by showing how the existing logic cannot be an effective guide for action. In doing so, activists exploit the inherent mutability of an institutional logic or seize on its incompatibility with other master logics on the landscape. Institutional gaps arise when movement activists develop rationales for why the existing logic cannot dictate action effectively and then offer a repertoire of practices that embody a different institutional logic (Swidler 2001). Identity movements create institutional gaps through framing activities that situate “relevant sets of actors in time and space and by attributing characteristics to them that suggest specifiable relationships and lines of action” (Hunt, Benford, and Snow 1994, p. 185). Bernstein (1997) identified two mutually exclusive identity deployment strategies—suppressing differences with the mainstream or celebrating differences with the dominant group.

Nouvelle activists celebrated their differences with the dominant orthodoxy of classical cuisine but also exploited the foundations of classical cuisine for their project. Bocuse and other activists were able to denounce

the lack of autonomy for chefs in classical cuisine because their criticisms resonated with the sentiments against hierarchy gaining ground after the events of May 1968 and were also in tune with the avant-garde movements in the literary and artistic worlds. However, Bocuse and other activists exploited the ideas of simplicity and economy in classical cuisine to fashion a new logic and a new identity for chefs. Just as students in Nantes and film directors such as Godard challenged old rules such as exams or a stylized sequence of shots, Bocuse and his allies questioned culinary conventions and exhorted chefs to engage in culinary invention. In an echo of the students' protests against ostentation and fakery and filmmakers' struggles for realism, Troisgros and Chapel wanted simplicity and economy of presentation. If literary critics like Barthes and Derrida sought to portray the reader as a creator of meaning, Bocuse and Chapel wanted chefs to have a role in creating and inventing dishes rather than simply understanding the intentions of Escoffier. "In their way, Nouvelle Cuisine Chefs were a conceptualist avant-garde; one often went to their restaurant to enjoy the shock of the new" (Ferguson and Zukin 1998, p. 94).

Table 2 shows that the institutional logic and role identity of nouvelle cuisine had five dimensions: culinary rhetoric, rules of cooking, archetypal ingredients used, role of the chef, and the organization of the menu. The culinary rhetoric of nouvelle cuisine emphasized innovation, and the appellations of dishes referred to poetry and imagination rather than place names or the names of nobles. Weiss writes, "If there were to be a theorization of nouvelle cuisine, it would be a theory of exceptions, nuances, refinements. . . . The operative terms for the use of condiments, for instance, are often referred to as *un rien*, *un soupçon*, *une touche*, *une idée* (a nothing, a suspicion, a touch, an idea)" (2001, pp. 233–34).

Nouvelle cuisine relied on the rules of transgression and acclimatization (Fischler 1993). Transgression consisted of using old cooking techniques with new ingredients, or using old cooking techniques with old ingredients in illegitimate ways; for example, mixing meat and fish, preparing salads containing vegetables and foie gras, and fixing *pot au feu* with fish. Acclimatization was the import of exotic foreign cuisine traditions, notably seasoning and spices. Two influences can be identified: the influence from Japanese cuisine during the late 1970s, when most of the evangelists traveled to Japan, and the growing influence of former colonies and immigrants (Beaugé 1999). The ingredients of nouvelle cuisine were fruits, vegetables, potatoes, aromatic herbs, exotic ingredients, and sea fish. The new rules and ingredients transformed ordinary dishes such as the salad; as pointed out by Fischler, "The salad imposes itself as a territory of superlative freedom, of a more or less considered madness. It is by definition the domain of *mélange* and organized disorder. It therefore escapes

TABLE 2
NOUVELLE CUISINE: INSTITUTIONAL LOGICS AND ROLE IDENTITIES

Dimension	Defining Characteristics
Culinary rhetoric	Appellations refer to <i>Poetry</i> , <i>Imagination and Evocation</i> : small ('petit'), diminutives, émincés, allégés. Symphonies, trilogies, menus, assiettes.
Rules of cooking	<i>Transgression</i> , or using old cooking techniques with new ingredients, or using old cooking techniques with old ingredients, yet for which these cooking techniques were not legitimate: mixing meat and fish, salad mixing vegetables and foie gras, pot au feu with fish. <i>Acclimatization</i> , or importing "exotic" foreign cuisine traditions, notably seasoning and spices: Fresh pasta, raviolis, cannelloni, cheesecake, cappuccino, crumble, carpaccio, pudding, presskopf, risotto, tajine
Archetypal ingredients	Fruits, vegetables, potatoes, aromatic herbs, exotic ingredients, sea fish.
Role of the chef	The chef is at the centre of operations. Since "service à la japonaise," service through the plate and service under a "cloche" waiters no more intervene in the process.
Organization of the menu	Very narrow menu, even no menu: chefs propose "Cuisine du marché," "Cuisine selon saison." No inventories to increase freshness. Consuming is a shorter ceremony. Related art is <i>Painting</i> (two dimensions). service through the plate leads cooks to add products only for esthetical reasons. Colors, contrasts and decoration, and the five senses are important.

from traditional culinary grammars, and henceforth permits unhindered transgression and innovation" (Fischler 1993, p. 264).

The role of the chef was reframed to that of an innovator, creator, and owner, and the role of the waiter was minimized. *Service à la japonaise* or service through the plate (first offered by Troisgros in the late 1960s) and service under a *cloche* (first presented by Guérard in the early 1970s) minimized the role of the waiter. The nouvelle cuisine menu was far shorter than the classical cuisine menu, and large inventories became superfluous since chefs emphasized freshness. Service through the plate and service under a cloche led cooks to add products only for esthetic reasons: colors, contrasts, and decoration were emphasized but in a shorter ceremony. In summary, the object of nouvelle cuisine was "no more the metamorphosis of the food product, but the revelation of its essential truth" (Fischler 1993, p. 238).

Conversion to Nouvelle Cuisine as Identity Change: Stories of Chefs

Conversion from classical cuisine to nouvelle cuisine was an identity change for chefs and not a mere question of strategy. We discuss the early conversion experiences of three-star chefs who were key activists, such as Michel Guérard and Pierre Troisgros. We then present the conversion experiences of Gilles Etéocle and Jean-Paul Jeunet (two-star chefs), who inherited their restaurants from a father or father-in-law. We also discuss the conversion experience of Bernard Collon, a one-star chef who was downgraded.

Dissatisfaction with their own knowledge and the desire for autonomy were triggers of identity change for key activists. Michel Guérard, a winner of three Michelin stars and the MOF in cooking and pastry, was a nouvelle cuisine activist who rejected classical cuisine. Guérard, speaking of himself and Delaveyne, who also started as a pastry chef, said that "classical cuisine itself had been lifeless, inert, apathetic for a while. . . . The desire emerged in us to do something else, to singularize ourselves, to be recalcitrant and reject the traditional authority and whatever existed before" (Michel Guérard, quoted in Charretton and Charetton 1985, p. 30). "I was complaining about my cuisine and the classical discipline. Jean Delaveyne came in and told me: You are a . . . idiot! At least do what you would like to do. Do not consider failure, at least you will have enjoyed what you did" (Michel Guérard, quoted in Nanteau 1999, p. 224).

The conversion story of Pierre Troisgros, the "garde manger" and his brother Jean, the sauce chef, also underscores the salience of identity. Jean Troisgros died in 1983, but Pierre, awarded a third star in 1968, remains in 2003 the longest-titled three-star chef after Paul Bocuse, a three-star chef since 1965. In an early article, Jean Troisgros pointed out that nouvelle cuisine required just-in-time assembly, whereas classical cuisine implied advance preparation and noted that identity rather than task difficulty was the issue. "Is that so much more difficult to prepare the dishes at the last moment? I am not sure. It is a question of habits and organization. I think that, in many restaurants, everything or almost is ready in advance and stuffed into the fridge, one could well work differently. There are many bad habits in this profession. And bad routines" (Jean Troisgros, quoted in Gault and Millau 1976, p. 123).

In an interview with one of the authors, Pierre Troisgros described innovation as an act of blasphemy and spoke of the need to jettison old reflexes and ways of thinking when making a nouvelle cuisine dish such as "L'escalope de saumon à l'oseille" and said,

What was *revolutionary* in this dish was the cut in scallops, and not in "darne" [like a steak], whilst the salmon was a luxury product. *What a cheek! What a nerve!* It was *blasphemous*. Moreover, we abandoned the

starchy liaison in the sauce. Then, we under-cooked the product, only 25s on one side, and 15s on the other: such cooking times were really short at that time. We also cooked in a Tefal plate; hence we could reduce the fat on the slice of the salmon scallop. . . . The shock of the time, a revelation, was not to add a fish velouté sauce. This was my reflex of an old cook. Nor to add a knob of butter. Only a very fat cream with special Vermouth and very little white wine. . . . And when you tasted it, you really tasted the fresh savors and flavors of pasture. (Troisgrois interview with Phillippe Monin, Roanne, January 25, 2001)

Identity change was accomplished gradually when a chef succeeded his father or father-in-law, and chefs underwent personal struggles when making the transition. Jean-Paul Jeunet, the chef of the Restaurant de Paris in the Jura province, worked along with his father André from the mid-1970s and took over from his father in the late-1980s. One star for decades, Restaurant de Paris was awarded a second star in 1996. During the early 1970s, under the direction of André Jeunet, classical cuisine was fully endorsed, and the restaurant adhered to Escoffier's grammar. Jean-Paul Jeunet stated,

This is a familial history, we have just celebrated my father's 50 years of professional activity. I cannot disrupt everything. On one hand, I am guided by my inspiration towards more simplicity, lightening, stripping all the unnecessary ornamentations. I am confronted with my own personal desire to go ahead, while keeping my personality, my natural instincts that tell me to thrive towards a simplified, more original, creative cuisine. But on the other hand, I consider the reassuring and comfortable side of a traditional cuisine that will rally more people. . . . We [younger chefs who take over after our parents] are all facing this difficulty of managing the coexistence of two kinds. Now my leitmotiv is the individualization of dishes according to one's personality. My role is to bring something, to transcend the product through the techniques. *I am a technician, first and above all.* (Jeunet interview with Monin, Arbois, March 9, 2001)

The conversion of Gilles Etéocle, chef of *La Poularde*, located in Montrond-les-Bains, a large village in a sparsely populated, agriculture-based area of the center of France, shows how chefs also had to respond to old customers while embracing nouvelle cuisine and had to manage the transition. *La Poularde*, awarded two stars since 1967, is the oldest two-star French restaurant, and Johannes Randoing, a cook since 1934, was succeeded by his son-in-law Gilles Etéocle in 1988. Etéocle declared,

We are a family business. My father-in-law cooked a very rich cuisine. We used up to 200 liters of cream a week, down to 15 liters a week now. The sauce drove all the cuisine. The sauce was the quintessence . . . There is an old cook's saying: "If you are not capable of some sorcery, it is not worth getting involved in cuisine." The sauce chef was the alchemist. At that time,

the customers came for that cuisine. When I took over in the mid-80s . . . I started to innovate and proposed a more personal cuisine. However, it was very complicated to have two ethics living under the same roof. When loyal old customers come along and tell you: "it is no more what it used to, there is no more Creole rice to sponge up the sauce." . . . It has taken more than fifteen years for me to affirm my spirit in my cuisine. . . . Now, I have done it, I am in coherence with my cuisine. You know, it is an art; I have been on the edge for years to keep this second star. I have flogged myself to death. But in my head, I felt unwell. Today, I regret it, I should have set up my business elsewhere, I should not have taken over this business. *These two stars were a nightmare.* . . . People came for these two stars and the classical, sauce-led cuisine of the restaurant. . . . After I took over, my father-in-law was over 70, but he would show up on Sundays and shake hands to all his loyal customers. I got ill. The family composition was tough." (Etéocle interview with Monin, Montrond-les-Bains, March 1, 2001)

Conversion to nouvelle cuisine was by no means complete. Quite a few chefs who persisted with classical cuisine also saw it as a question of maintaining identity. Consider the case of Bernard Collon of Auberge de Letraz, located on the border of Lake Annecy. Collon was awarded one star in 1975 but downgraded in 1996, and he characterized identity as follows:²

I do not like the caricatured classification between classical and nouvelle cuisine. I categorize myself in the "Classics," but . . . I use fresh products. I have learned a classical basis, I know the Escoffier by heart, and by the way I have taught the Escoffier Cuisine in Japan. It is a bit like music, one cannot be a musician without knowing the rudiments of music. One can't! The rap musicians, they know their rudiments, they know the rhythm! But afterwards, either you remain a classic, or you modernize. (Collon interview with Monin, Annecy, February 20, 2001)

Thus, each of these chefs discusses how the shift was a matter of logic and identity and not a matter of marketing strategy, despite variations in regional location and training: some started as cooks by education, and others were initially pastry cooks (see Ruhlman 1997, pp. 187–202).

² "It took me three years to accept my new identity of not being an elite chef any more. . . . With time, you get to think you deserve it, and you give less attention to details. What is especially difficult to cope with, is that I was never given a rationale for my losing this star, it is the Michelin guide policy. . . . But since they also awarded you this star years before, without given reasons, you cannot but accept the decision" (Collon interview with Monin, Annecy, February 20, 2001).

Was Nouvelle Cuisine a Fashion?

An alternative rendition is that nouvelle cuisine was a fashion. Hirsch (1972) notes that fashions are social patterns favored for a short time by a large number of actors and that fads are unconventional social patterns embraced briefly but enthusiastically by actors. By contrast, social movements differ from fads and fashions in that they are organized efforts to reorganize a social field and result in more gradual and enduring social change. In order to address whether nouvelle cuisine was a short-lived fad, information on the temporal pattern of abandonment of classical cuisine and adoption of nouvelle cuisine is required.

Our interviews with our panel of elite chefs and industry experts indicated that it was unwise to code the role identity of chefs using a binary variable, and they instead urged us to code their identity on the basis of the number of signature dishes of the chef. These signature dishes are dishes defined by the chef as emblematic of his or her style and are therefore sources of pride for the chef. Each year, the Michelin guide lists three "signature" dishes of any chef in a given restaurant who received a star.

We collected information on the signature dishes of all of the chefs in our database and designed a computer program to code over 54,000 dishes into classical and nouvelle cuisine based on the rules of both cuisines as stated in Fischler (1993) and Neirinck and Poulain (1997). We then extracted a random sample of 400 dishes and asked two raters to code these signature dishes into the classical and nouvelle cuisine categories. One rater was a consultant to two- and three-star chefs and a former chef himself, and the other was a retired chef with two Michelin stars to his credit. The raters did not know each other. The interrater reliability was 95%. We also estimated the match between the ratings of the raters and those of the computer program and found a 95% degree of reliability.

Table 3 provides a breakdown of the chefs according to the number of nouvelle cuisine signature dishes in 1970, 1975, 1987, and 1997 and suggests gradual change rather than sudden adoption. In 1970, when our window of observation was started with the onset of the nouvelle cuisine movement, 47.69% of chefs had all three signature dishes in classical cuisine. Only 2.26% had all three signature dishes in nouvelle cuisine. By 1997, only 6.32% of chefs were all classical, and 30.83% were all nouvelle cuisine.

Table 3 also shows that in 1970, 225 chefs (35.77%) had one nouvelle cuisine dish (and, by implication, two classical cuisine dishes). Our interview data suggested that chefs were experimenting with nouvelle cuisine and were waiting for cues before increasing their commitment to nouvelle cuisine. Chefs in 1970 considered one nouvelle cuisine dish to

TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF CHEFS BY CUISINES, 1970-97

Year	N Chefs	0 Nouvelle (All 3 Classical Dishes)	1 Nouvelle	2 Nouvelle	3 Nouvelle
1970	629	300 (47.69)	225 (35.78)	86 (13.67)	18 (2.86)
1975	600	219 (36.5)	264 (44)	96 (16)	21 (3.5)
1987	646	98 (15.17)	221 (34.21)	226 (34.28)	101 (15.63)
1997	506	32 (6.32)	119 (23.52)	199 (39.33)	156 (30.83)

NOTE.—Nos in parentheses are percentages

be a trial and did not take risks; in many cases, they copied Troisgros's *l'escalope de saumon à l'oseille*. So, right at the outset of the movement, there was interest in nouvelle cuisine. If a dominantly classical cuisine chef is defined as one with zero or one nouvelle cuisine dish, they accounted for 83.46% of chefs in 1970. By 1997, this had declined to only 29.84%, and 70.16% of chefs were dominantly nouvelle cuisine, having two or more signature dishes in the nouvelle realm. Table 3 indicates that nouvelle cuisine steadily gained adherents over time, and classical cuisine eroded over time, which is consistent with the growth of a social movement rather than a fad.

Did chefs merely flirt with nouvelle cuisine only to abandon it later? Table 4 defines the risk set as chefs who had one or more nouvelle cuisine dishes and shows that the majority of those who had one or more nouvelle cuisine dishes did not abandon them wholesale. In 1975, 84.8% of nouvelle cuisine adoptees did not abandon even one nouvelle cuisine dish for classical cuisine, and this number remained as high as 74.3% in 1997. Chefs abandoning one nouvelle dish for a classical dish rose from 14.9% in 1975 to 25.6% in 1997, thereby indicating some degree of hybridization. But none of the chefs with three nouvelle cuisine dishes abandoned them for classical cuisine, and less than 1% of chefs with two nouvelle cuisine dishes abandoned them for classical cuisine in 1975 and 1987. We also checked the mean time since adoption of a nouvelle cuisine dish and found that it ranged from 0 to 144 months, with a mean of 28.8 months (SD = 31.2 months), thereby indicating that people did not adopt nouvelle cuisine and shortly abandon it.

On balance, these data indicate that nouvelle cuisine was not a case of fashion but is compatible with the gradual and enduring change characteristic of social movements. Below, we outline why French chefs abandoned classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine and begin with a theoretical

TABLE 4
PERCENTAGE OF ABANDONMENTS OF NOUVELLE CUISINE,
1975-97

Year	0 Changes to Classical	1 Changes to Classical	2 Changes to Classical	3 Changes to Classical
1975	84.8	14.9	.3	0
1987	80.1	19.6	.3	0
1997	74.34	25.6	0	0

discussion of how identity movements lead to identity competition by disseminating identity-discrepant cues that undermine traditional role identities.

Why Did French Chefs Leave Classical Cuisine for Nouvelle Cuisine?

When identity movements celebrate the differences between the traditional logic and role identity, and the insurgent logic and new identity, both identities compete for behavioral expression at the individual level (Stryker 2000). Self-categorization theory provides a useful point of departure to understand identity competition, and its starting point is the premise that actors sometimes think of themselves as group members when they share a common category (e.g., race) or a shared attribute (e.g., role) with other anonymous individuals, or have common interpersonal bonds. At other times, actors think of themselves as unique entities. The first is referred to as social identity, the latter is referred to as personal identity, and both are basic to a self-concept (Tajfel 1981; Turner 1985; Turner, Oakes, Haslam, and McGarty 1994).

Self-categorization theory holds that actors define groups in terms of the appropriate behaviors expected of a category or role, identify with the group that they perceive themselves as belonging to, and compare the in-group (the group to which an actor belongs) to an out-group (a rival group). Members preserve their positive social identity by positively stereotyping their group and by negatively stereotyping others. When negative feedback threatens these stereotypes and jeopardizes social identity, members respond to threats to their social identity by using the three basic strategies of social mobility, social creativity, and social change (Turner 1985). One strategy is that of social mobility, where actors can exit their group and join another group. A second strategy centers around social creativity, where actors can change the criteria of comparison so that the in-group becomes more favorable. A third strategy hinges on social change, where actors compete directly with the out-group to alter the relative status of both groups through collective action. Several laboratory

studies have suggested that social mobility strategies are preferred when boundaries are permeable and changing group membership is a realistic possibility (e.g., Jackson, Sullivan, Harnish, and Hodge 1996; Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 1997; Taylor and McKirnan 1984).

When an identity movement in a profession critiques a traditional logic and its concomitant role identity and promotes a new logic and a new role identity, actors encounter negative feedback that induces them to abandon the traditional role identity for the new identity. For such negative feedback to be persuasive, it should create discrepancies between their existing identity and desire for positive image. In turn, persuasive messages lead to change only when they fall within an actor's zone of acceptance and are discrepant enough so that they cannot be assimilated with the anchor point.

Social judgment theory, developed by Sherif and Hovland (1961), holds that actors possess three categories of judgment: zone of acceptance (positions we accept), zone of rejection (positions we disagree with), and zone of noncommitment (zone of positions we neither accept nor reject). When actors encounter a persuasive message, they locate it in one of the three zones. A persuasive message judged to be within a zone of rejection is likely to be disregarded, and if a message is judged to fall within the latitude of acceptance, individuals adjust their attitude to accommodate it.

Actors also distort incoming information to fit with their categories of judgment; new information in the zone of noncommitment that is judged to be close to their anchor point is assimilated by individuals, but messages in the zone of rejection are distorted to become more incompatible than they are from the anchor point, and then they are summarily rejected. These mental processes are mechanical and unthinking (Sherif and Hovland 1961). Persuasion occurs when new messages fall in the latitude of acceptance and are discrepant or different from the anchor position. The greater the discrepancy between a persuasive message and an individual's own anchor, the more people adjust their attitudes, as long as the message is within their latitude of acceptance. When applied to identity movements, the implication is that persuasion is a gradual process occurring through the accumulation of discrepant cues. Moreover, messages from credible speakers stretch the latitude of acceptance, as do the actions of similar others. Below, we depict the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists, theorization of new roles, defections of peers, and gains that accrue to defecting peers as identity-discrepant cues, and then we show how they were central in the success of the *nouvelle cuisine* movement.

Sociopolitical legitimacy of activists.—Activists deliver identity-discrepant messages when they highlight institutional gaps, articulate problems with the existing logic and identity, and demand redress. They

also proffer a solution to correct the situation and provide motives for actors to undertake change (Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986). Such identity-discrepant messages are more likely to fall within the zone of acceptance of the targeted individuals when activists possess sociopolitical legitimacy. Absent sociopolitical legitimacy, members of a profession may dismiss activists as irrelevant gadflies and may be unwilling to jettison old logics and identities because of adverse career consequences. When activists are accepted by powerholders as legitimate representatives of a point of view, they are likely to gain access to political resources and to influence the agenda of the professions (Schumaker 1975; Gamson 1990). The greater the number of activists who occupy key positions in field-wide organizations and champion a new logic and a role identity, the more favorable it is vis-à-vis the traditional logic and role identity.

Nouvelle cuisine benefited from the fact that activists derived sociopolitical legitimacy due to their positions in the professional society of French chefs. In 1969, the professional society of French chefs, *Maitres Queux et Cordons Bleus de France*, was renamed as *Maitres Cuisiniers de France* (MCF), and its management consisted of four groups: (1) founders and honorary presidents and vice presidents, (2) an executive committee composed of an active president, three to five vice presidents, two general secretaries, two treasurers, and between five and ten appointed members drawn from the ranks, (3) an admission committee composed of 12–18 members, and (4) a control commission, made up of three members. The first group, composed of founders and honorary officials and the control commission, played marginal and cosmetic roles. Real power resided in the executive committee because it designed the agenda of the MCF, nominated members of the admissions committee, and thereby influenced admissions into the MCF. In turn, membership in the executive committee was by invitation, and the tradition was to invite recipients of three Michelin stars or winners of the MOF titles.

Early nouvelle cuisine activists such as Paul Bocuse, Jean Delaveyne, and Charles Barrier played key roles in the executive committee in the early years. These three chefs were winners of the prestigious MOF, respectively, in 1961, 1952, and 1958 and were also chefs in restaurants awarded three stars by the *Guide Michelin* in 1965, 1972, and 1968, respectively. By virtue of these accomplishments, they were welcomed in the executive committee because existing members believed these chefs would promote and develop the fading image of the MCF association. During 1970–72, Barrier was treasurer, Bocuse was a member of the executive committee, and Delaveyne was a member of the admissions committee. By 1973, as older members retired, nouvelle cuisine proponents increased their power: Bocuse became a vice president, two other nouvelle cuisine chefs, Vandenameele and Ferriere, entered the board and were

friends of Bocuse, and in 1974, Jean Delaveyne became the general secretary and Vandanameele became the treasurer. Over the years, newer nouvelle cuisine activists (such as Alain Senderens) and other nouvelle cuisine chefs who had worked as "seconds" to Bocuse (Delaveyne and the others) were also inducted into the executive committee, and in 1984, five of the six entrants to the executive committee were nouvelle cuisine exponents. After 1984, nouvelle cuisine activists and exponents steadily expanded control of the MCF board. Taken together, the theoretical arguments about the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists and the composition of the MCF suggest that as the number of activists who occupy key positions in field-wide organizations increases, the more acceptable is the logic and role identity implied by nouvelle cuisine. Therefore,

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*The greater the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists, the greater is the extent to which actors abandon classical cuisine for a nouvelle cuisine.*

Theorization of new roles.—Activists create gaps and proffer solutions, but deliberate attempts to spread such ideas among the population are necessary for mobilization to occur. One such mechanism is theorization of the new roles and practices to be adopted. Theorization increases the zone of acceptance by creating perceptions of similarity among potential adopters and by providing rationales for the practices to be adopted (Strang and Meyer 1993). Theories can originate from many places, ranging from academic researchers to journalists, and can be communicated to the public in various ways, ranging from research articles to media articles. Journalists are interesting sources of theories because they have a predisposition to cover newsworthy disruptions and celebrate the differences between the old logic and identity and the insurgent logic and identity. Media coverage of innovations is seldom neutral, often laudatory, and a study of media coverage of quality circles reported that 85% of references were laudatory (Strang 1997).

In the case of nouvelle cuisine, culinary journalists sympathetic to nouvelle cuisine played an important role in creating a shared symbolic environment for chefs and the public to appreciate the new logic and identity. A monthly periodical was created in 1972 by Henri Gault and Christian Millau, two culinary journalists, to advance nouvelle cuisine, and Gault and Millau went on to encapsulate the 10 commandments of nouvelle cuisine in *Vive la Nouvelle Cuisine Française*. These 10 commandments reflect four values, which also characterized the protests of May 1968: truth, lightness, simplicity, and imagination.

1. *Thou shall not overcook.* This applies to almost all the products used (and abused) by classical cuisine: fish, shells, seafood, game birds, game animals, waterfowls, poultry, which were overcooked

- (overcooking protects from poisoning due to poor and long storage conditions).
2. *Thou shall use fresh, quality products.* Select products only if you are sure of their outstanding quality, avoid intensive agriculture.
 3. *Thou shall lighten thy menu.*
 4. *Thou shall not be systematically modernistic.* Avoid a new orthodoxy.
 5. *Thou shall seek out what the new techniques can bring you.* This will also increase the cooks' working conditions, through airing and ventilation, reduce consumption of coal or wood, which are replaced by electrical or gas techniques.
 6. *Thou shall eliminate brown and white sauces.* Abolishing marinated dishes and high game; abolishing white and brown sauces, which are heavy and indigestible.
 7. *Thou shall not ignore dietetics.* The postwar times of malnutrition are over.
 8. *Thou shall not cheat on thy presentation.* Simplicity instead of fakery.
 9. *Thou shall be inventive.*
 10. *Thou shall not be prejudiced.*

Culinary journalists writing in magazines such as *Le Cuisinier Français* (published since 1934) or newer culinary journals such as *La Revue Thuriers* (published since 1988) propagated nouvelle cuisine by popularizing its virtues, advancing rationales for the adoption of nouvelle cuisine, and chronicling success stories of conversion and innovation. Favorable media coverage of nouvelle cuisine by culinary journalists undermined the logic of classical cuisine, created a discrepancy between members' desire for a positive social identity and their current affiliation, and induced them to jump ship. Therefore,

HYPOTHESIS 2.—*The greater the theorization of new roles, the greater is the extent to which actors abandon classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine.*

Prior defections by peers and gains to peers.—Actors are influenced by those who are similar to themselves (Turner et al. 1994; Scott 2001). Defections by peers in the traditional camp signal that the boundaries of the new group are permeable, create a discrepancy between actors' desire for a positive social identity and current realities, and enhance the acceptance of innovations. Krackhardt and Porter (1986) found that turnover in fast food restaurants tended to snowball because individual exits undermined role identity. When peers of the traditional group join the insurgent group, existing members in the traditional camp are likely to infer that there is something wrong with their social group and, by implication, their own

social identity. As these identity-discrepant cues cumulate, the social identity of members is likely to be damaged, and the new insurgent identity becomes progressively acceptable. Defectors also vary in their reputation, and the greater their visibility as an exiter, the more consequential they are as role models (Podolny 1993; Strang and Soule 1998; Haunschild and Miner 1997).

When high-status peers with two or more Michelin stars abandoned classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine, chefs felt that they received permission to defect. Sometimes, this sense of permission arose from direct contact between a defector and a prospective adopter, given the small social world of elite French chefs. Often, direct contact was superfluous, as prior defectors became role models for others to copy recipes and begin the abandonment of classical cuisine. In an interview, Pierre Troisgros, an early activist with three stars, complained of plagiarism and offered an example of a specific dish:

To understand the story of this famous dish: L'escalope de saumon à l'oseille, you need to know the context. We were in a very creative period, with the nouvelle cuisine, new journalists, new cooking techniques. . . . I remember, it was in 1970; I presented the recipe to the Culinary Academy. It was refused, it was too easy! Yet, afterwards, the recipe spread. We were sickened, appalled by the plagiarism. But you know, Coco Chanel once said: "Sad is the day, the day when I won't be plagiarized any more." It was great, if my colleagues mentioned our dish with a mention "according to Troisgros." My friend Paul [Bocuse] did it. Nobody could ignore . . . the inventors, the creators. (Troisgros interview with Monin, Roanne, January 25, 2001)

Defections of visible peers are damaging because they are accessible and vivid (Greve 1995). So, the larger the number of defectors, weighted by the extent of their reputation and participation in the new role identity, the more acceptable nouvelle cuisine becomes, and the more likely they are to abandon the traditional role identity. Therefore,

HYPOTHESIS 3.—*The greater the number of defectors weighted by their reputation and extent of defection, the greater is the extent to which actors abandon classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine.*

Gains to defectors as identity-discrepant cues.—If members of the group are able to observe the successful outcomes accruing to defectors, they are likely to be susceptible to outcome-based imitation (Haunschild and Miner 1997). A key indicator of a social movement's success is the advantages obtained by challengers that can be observed by all (Gamson 1990). One such advantage may be heightened reputation or positive evaluations by independent third parties (Fombrun and Shanley 1990).

Defection can be risky to the extent that the adoption of a new role identity modifies their reputation and standing in the eyes of third parties outside the group. Reputational gains that accrue to defectors create discrepancies between the social identity of actors in the traditional camp and their desire for a positive image, but these gains also make the new identity more acceptable.

In the case of *nouvelle cuisine*, elite chefs realized that unlearning classical cuisine and embracing *nouvelle cuisine* was risky, so they paid keen attention to whether the adopters of *nouvelle cuisine* gained in reputations and Michelin stars as a result of their change. Chefs were attentive to the number of Michelin stars, desired more stars than they had, and were terrified of losing the ones they possessed. Although the inspection by the *Guide Michelin* is performed by anonymous inspectors and is opaque, chefs attributed gains or loss of stars to changes in the menu and, by implication, the shift from classical to *nouvelle cuisine*. The greater the reputational gains that accrue to defectors embracing the new role identity, the stronger are the identity-discrepant cues faced by group members, and the more intense are pressures for them to abandon the traditional role identity. Therefore,

HYPOTHESIS 4.—*The greater the reputational gains that accrue to defectors, the greater is the extent to which actors abandon classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine.*

Relative salience of theorization versus imitation.—When identity movements celebrate differences between an insurgent logic and identity and the traditional logic and identity, theorization is likely to be more influential than defections by peers. Strang and Meyer (1993) opined that theorization has dramatic empirical consequences because organizations adopt standard forms despite wide variation in resources and constituencies. Theorization and defections by peers and gains to defectors may be seen as alternative pathways by which the new logic and identity become available for actors. McAdam, Tilly, and Tarrow (2001) argue that local innovations undergo a scale shift and become widespread when brokers connect hitherto unconnected groups and create similarity or when actors imitate peers. However, they are silent about whether theorization or imitation is more consequential as a source of scale shift. Below, we propose that theorization had stronger effects on the adoption of *nouvelle cuisine* than imitation of peers in the case of French gastronomy.

Culinary journalists were theorists who brokered among chefs from different regions and led to perceptions of similarity between adopters of *nouvelle cuisine* and potential adopters. Defections by peers and gains to peers were mechanisms of imitation. Defections by peers made the new

logic and identity available through sheer frequency but lacked vividness since they were not grounded in a story. Gains to defectors validated the new logic and identity but said little about the similarity between the focal actor and the successful defector. By contrast, theorization of the new practices by journalists was vivid since it consisted of stories that created proximity between the focal actor and those who had embraced *nouvelle cuisine*. Such theorization made the new logic and identity comprehensible and fostered a shared understanding of what a chef is and ought to be among chefs based in different regions and having different backgrounds. Therefore,

HYPOTHESIS 5a.—*Theorization is likely to be a stronger identity-discrepant cue than defections by peers.*

HYPOTHESIS 5b.—*Theorization is likely to be a stronger identity-discrepant cue than gains to defectors.*

DATA AND METHODS

In order to investigate our hypotheses, we restricted our attention to elite chefs since classical and *nouvelle cuisine* defined the identities of elite French chefs. Our panel of interviewees suggested that elite French chefs were those who had received a one-star rating or more by the *Guide Michelin*. We obtained a listing of elite French chefs from the *Guide Michelin* since it is an authoritative and widely disseminated guide in which experts rank chefs (Ferguson 1998; Karpik 2000). By contrast, the *Gault Millau* guide favors *nouvelle cuisine*, and the two founders of the guide were culinary journalists who codified the principles of *nouvelle cuisine* into the 10 commandments of *nouvelle cuisine*. An elite chef was defined as an individual who had received a minimum of one star in the Michelin guide during our window of observation.

We focused on the *nouvelle cuisine* era from 1970 until 1997 because the institutional impacts of movements and their effects on individual biographies unfold over time (Giugni 1998). So for each year, we collected information on all chefs who had received one star or more during the period from 1970 until 1997, and chefs who had lost their only star in a given year were also followed throughout the window of observation. We started our window of observation in 1970 when the *nouvelle cuisine* movement first appeared on the culinary landscape (Fischler 1993). We ended our window of observation in 1997 because by then the logic of *nouvelle cuisine* was being breached by two trends: the growth of *cuisine sous contrat* and the rise of bistros and *cuisine rassurante*.

Under the *cuisine sous contrat*, the chef and owners (using hospitality firms) have a written and explicit contract in which both cooperate to

develop the company's image by garnering stars from Michelin. Again, this new agency relationship is at odds with the nouvelle cuisine philosophy and with the chef being the owner. However, cuisine sous contrat lightens the burden of the chefs in significant ways: they are no more required to be profitable, with losses being expected and compensated for with related gambling or hospitality businesses. The first step was taken in August 1996 when Alain Ducasse, the chef of the three-star Louis XV in Monaco, opened his eponymous restaurant in the Hotel Le Parc in Paris. Soon other famous three-star chefs followed. In parallel, some chefs, such as Christian Constant who had worked in high-status three-star restaurants, also led a renegade movement, wherein they wanted to make "comfort food" or cuisine rassurante in less ostentatious surroundings.

Chef-Restaurant Dyad as the Unit of Observation

Although our interest was in how the nouvelle cuisine movement reshaped the social identities of chefs, we were also sensitive to how chefs were embedded in restaurants. On the one hand, chefs embodied the culinary model of the restaurant, but on the other hand, restaurants were the vehicle by which these culinary models were expressed. Our interviews with the panel of chefs and industry experts suggested that the appropriate unit of analysis was the chef-restaurant dyad because elite chefs decided on the choice of cuisine and could have moved from one restaurant to another. Accordingly, our data set consisted of chef-restaurant dyad years, and new dyads were created when chefs changed employment. The *Guide Michelin's* policy is that when an existing chef moves from an origin restaurant to a destination restaurant, the origin restaurant gets to keep its number of star(s) in the year of the move, but the next year, the number of stars is adjusted on the basis of new visits by its anonymous inspectors; the new chef either maintains the rank or the restaurant gets regraded. A similar policy applies to the destination restaurant; it retains its previous number of stars in the year in which it received the new chef, if any, and then is evaluated afresh in the next year and regraded.

Variables

Dependent variable.—Our dependent variable, extent of abandonment of classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine, was defined in terms of the number of signature nouvelle cuisine dishes reported in the *Guide Michelin*. When all three signature dishes listed in the *Guide Michelin* were classical cuisine, the score was "0"; and when all three dishes were nouvelle cuisine, the score was 3; when two dishes were nouvelle cuisine, the score was

"2"; and when a chef had one dish in nouvelle cuisine, it was coded as a "1."

Independent variables.—We focused on four identity-discrepant cues. To test hypothesis 1, the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists was defined as the number of positions held by nouvelle cuisine activists in the executive board divided by the total number of positions in the executive board of the MCF. We defined a nouvelle cuisine activist as a chef who was identified by culinary journalists as such and whose signature dishes were all nouvelle cuisine. Thus, Bocuse, Delaveyne, Guérard, and others were included in this category of actors.

Since theorization of new roles implies the codification and dissemination of information (Strang and Meyer 1993), it was defined as the number of articles written by gastronomic journalists such as Henri Gault, Christian Millau, and others. To test hypothesis 2, the number of articles describing and extolling nouvelle cuisine in culinary magazines was computed annually. We used the Myriade database produced by l'Agence Bibliographique de l'Enseignement Supérieur (the French Bibliographic Agency of Graduate Education) and Code 641 of the Classification Décimale Universelle to find the reviews covering nouvelle cuisine in France. Examples of magazines covered include *Le Cuisinier Français*, published since 1934, and the more recent *La Revue Thuries*, published since 1988. The counts of articles favorable to nouvelle cuisine were standardized by the number of issues of the magazine for each year and then summed across all magazines.

To test hypothesis 3, we computed the number of prior defectors as follows. A prior defector was defined as a chef who had added a minimum of one nouvelle cuisine dish as part of his signature trio of dishes. Each defector was weighted by the extent of his or her participation in nouvelle cuisine on the basis of our scale and the number of stars received from the *Guide Michelin*. For example, if one defector had two dishes in nouvelle cuisine and two Michelin stars, he or she received a score of "4." In cases where the defector had no star in the past year (but had at least one star in his or her career history), three dishes received a weighting of 0.75, two dishes a weight of 0.50, and one dish a weight of 0.25.

To test hypothesis 4, gains to defectors were defined as the number of increases in rank experienced by them in the *Guide Michelin*. Since an increase from a one star to two stars is different from an increase from two stars to three stars, we weighted increases by the number of stars. Thus, increases from two to three stars were multiplied by three, and an increase from one to two was multiplied by two, and so forth. All of the independent variables were lagged by a year.

Control variables.—We included the past affiliation to nouvelle cuisine as a control and defined it as the number of nouvelle cuisine signature

dishes listed by the chef in the previous year.³ Since reputation can influence mobility (Podolny 1993), we controlled for the lagged reputation of a chef; it was measured by the number of stars awarded by the *Guide Michelin* in the previous year. This variable ranged from "0" to "3." We also included two dummy variables to account for gain of reputation and loss of reputation in the previous year.

It is likely that chefs located in major cities such as Paris or Lyon are cosmopolitan, whereas chefs located in more rural areas are local. We created a variable called distance to large cities (measured in kilometers) to account for localness, with low scores meaning high cosmopolitanism. Since it is likely that new entrants into the world of elite chefs, that is, those chefs gaining one star or more for the first time, behave differently from established incumbents, we created a variable called duration, which measured the number of years since they were first ranked by *Guide Michelin*.

Restaurants sometimes may be owned by chefs or by other entrepreneurs, but data on ownership could not be obtained from publicly available archives or in the *Guide Michelin*. Our panel of interviewees indicated that a useful proxy for the chef's discretion was whether the restaurant was evaluated by the *Guide Michelin* as having a special charm or idiosyncratic characteristics (*agrément*). Chefs in such restaurants are less constrained than others because they derive their identity from the location and also because customers are less sensitive to the cuisine and more interested in the special charm. Accordingly, we created a dummy variable to account for restaurants with *agrément*.

We also controlled for period effects. We created a dummy variable for the early period of nouvelle classical cuisine and defined it as the period from 1970 until 1975. Fischler notes that "the 70s marked a rupture. The change, preceded by a heralding sign in 1965 [Bocuse's third star], and clearly perceptible in 1970, became manifest and resounding in 1975" (1993, p. 254). We also defined the period from 1976 to 1987 as the middle period, since chefs traveled overseas and were also exposed to influences from the erstwhile colonies of France.⁴

We treated the late period, from 1987 until 1997, as the reference category. This period witnessed the growth of the bistro phenomenon; in 1987, Michel Rostang first opened Le Bistrot d'à Côté, and since then

³ This specification assumes interval scaling. An alternative is to create dummy variables for one, two, and three nouvelle cuisine dishes using all classical cuisine as the reference category. Similar results were obtained when using the latter specification. Note that we also use interval scaling for our measure of lagged reputation and obtain similar results when we use dummy variables for one, two, and three Michelin stars and treat no stars as the reference category.

⁴ We included these period effects at the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer.

many other famous Paris chefs have opened annex restaurants that roughly follow the same formula—stylish rustic cooking at easy prices in a relaxed but attractive setting (Ferguson and Zukin 1998, pp. 94–95). Moreover, in late 1987, some elite chefs who had never joined the MCF association, like Robuchon or Loiseau, along with a very small group of MCF members (but not MCF board members) created a new association, called *Chambre Syndicale de la Haute Cuisine Francaise*. This association defended business values: while MCF claimed the chef had to personally supervise the kitchen, the *Chambre Syndicale* pretended that, if correctly staffed and managed, the kitchen crew could do without the chef being physically present. Only two- or three-star chefs could join, and it was a very small group. At its height, there were 80 members. This association was dissolved in 1998.

All of these variables were lagged, and a chef-restaurant dyad years data set was compiled. Table 5 displays the correlations among the variables used to test the hypotheses. Table 5 also shows some high correlations between the early period dummy variable and theorization by culinary journalists and prior defection, and between the legitimacy of activists and theorization (by culinary journalists).

In view of these correlations, we conducted a test to discern if collinearity was a problem. Belsley, Kuh, and Welsch (1980) recommend that the conditioning number of the matrix of independent variables should not exceed 30. In our case, it was 8.4 and well below their stated threshold. Moreover, Belsley et al. (1980) also recommend that the variance inflation factors should not exceed 10. In our case, the mean variance inflation factor was 3.0 and did not exceed 10 for any of the independent variables.

Methods

We initially checked whether our dependent variable had ordinal properties since it had outcomes ranging from “0” to “3.” Accordingly, we began with an ordered logit model that assumes that higher values on the dependent variable imply “higher” outcomes. The ordered logit models presume that odds in k categories have the same ratio for all independent variable combinations. But a constraint of the ordered logit model given the presumption of proportional odds is that it implies that the coefficients are identical across all levels of the ordered dependent variable. Following Long and Freese (2001), we tested whether the proportional odds assumption was valid. When we constructed an ordered logit model with control variables, we were forced to reject the null hypothesis that the coefficients were identical across the levels of the dependent variable with a Wald chi-square test ($\chi^2 = 1356.00$; $df = 18$).

As a result, we had two options. One was to estimate a generalized

TABLE 5
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Past affiliation to nouvelle cuisine												
2. Lagged reputation01											
3. Prior loss of reputation	-.001	-.02										
4. Prior gain of reputation01	.14	-.01									
5. Agrément03	.20	.03	.01								
6. Duration04	.23	.04	.02	.08							
7. Localness	-.005	-.08	-.02	-.02	.04	-.01						
8. Early period	-.11	-.04	-.007	-.03	-.07	-.40	.05					
9. Middle period02	.006	-.005	.01	-.01	.009	.01	-.43				
10. Legitimacy of activists08	.04	.009	.01	.08	.36	-.06	-.45	-.40			
11. Theorization by culinary journalists09	.05	.01	.01	.09	.41	-.06	-.60	.36	.70		
12. Prior defections11	.05	.01	.03	.08	.42	-.07	-.70	.03	.60	.60	
13. Gains to defectors04	.02	-.01	.03	.01	.14	-.01	-.37	.29	.17	.07	.24

logit model that relaxes the proportional odds assumption and allows coefficients to vary by category level. The second was to estimate multinomial logit models. We opted for the latter because it has two advantages (Long and Freese 2001). First, a Hausman test allows us to test whether the number of categories influences the odds. This independence of irrelevant alternatives test is an important method of validating our categories. Second, a Wald test explores whether categories should be pooled and treated as identical because the coefficients do not differ. These tests are available in the *Spost* post estimation commands specially written for STATA by Long and Freese (2001). Since our data set consisted of chef-restaurant dyad years, there was within-cluster dependence of yearly observations, and we used a robust estimator or Huber-White sandwich estimator to obtain the results.⁵

We used STATA 7.0 to estimate multinomial logit models. In the multinomial logit model, we assume that the log-odds of each response follow a linear model where α_j is a constant and β_j is a vector of regression coefficients, for $j = 1, 2, \dots, n$:

$$\eta_{ij} = \log \frac{\pi_{ij}}{\pi_{i0}} = \alpha_j + x'_{ij}\beta_j.$$

This model is analogous to a logistic regression model, except that the probability distribution of the response is multinomial instead of binomial. If $J = 2$ the multinomial logit model reduces to the usual logistic regression model, contrasting successes with failures. In the multinomial logit model, we contrast each of the categories with the reference category. In our case, with $J = 4$ categories where 0 is the reference category (all classical cuisine signature dishes), categories 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the number of nouvelle cuisine dishes. Accordingly, we contrast category 0 versus 1, 0 versus 2, and 0 versus 3.

RESULTS

Table 6 presents the results obtained from our analyses. Model 1 displays the effect of all control variables. Prior affiliation to nouvelle cuisine has significant and positive effects, understandably, since those committed to nouvelle cuisine are likely to increase it. Lagged reputation has positive and significant effects, indicating that higher-status chefs were more likely to have nouvelle cuisine dishes. The effect of a loss of a star in the previous year is significant and positive, but the gain of a star in the previous year

⁵ We also present generalized ordered logit estimates as a robustness check.

is significant and positive for categories 2 and 3. The effect of the *agrément* dummy is significant and increases abandonment of classical cuisine. Duration in the elite system is significant and negative for all categories. The effect of localness is significant and negative for category 2 of the dependent variable, but insignificant elsewhere. The effect of the early period dummy is significant and negative when compared to the reference category (the period after 1987), but the middle period dummy is significant and negative for categories 1 and 2 only.

Model 2 includes the effects of identity-discrepant cues, and the Wald chi-square statistic indicates that it is a significant improvement over model 1. We conducted the Hausman test of the independence of irrelevant alternatives and found that the odds were not influenced by the number of categories present. We computed a Wald test to discern if the categories were indistinguishable from each other and found that they were significantly different from each other.

Model 2 shows that the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists is significant and positive at all categories of the dependent variable, thereby indicating support for hypothesis 1. The impact of theorization by culinary journalists is positive and significant and endorses hypothesis 2. Past defectors weighted by participation and reputation have significant and positive effects on the extent of involvement in *nouvelle cuisine*, and so hypothesis 3 is supported. Reputational gains to defectors have positive and significant effects, and so hypothesis 4 is endorsed.

Hypotheses 5a and 5b assert that theorization by culinary journalists was a stronger cue than prior defectors and gains to defectors, respectively. In order to test these predictions, we reestimated model 2 after standardizing the variables and obtained standardized coefficients. We used the Lincom procedure in STATA to test for the differences between the standardized coefficients. This procedure provides an estimate of the difference, the standard error of the difference, and a *z*-statistic for determining whether the difference is significant or not. The effect of theorization was significantly greater than prior defectors at category 2 ($\alpha = .33$; $SE = .16$; $z = 2.9$) and category 3 ($\alpha = .53$; $SE = .12$; $z = 4.1$) but not at category 1 ($\alpha = .12$; $SE = .11$; $z = 1.2$), thereby providing support for hypothesis 5a in two out of three cases. The impact of theorization was significantly greater than gains to defectors at category 1 ($\alpha = .20$; $SE = .07$; $z = 2.6$), category 2 ($\alpha = .54$; $SE = .08$; $z = 6.6$), and category 3 ($\alpha = .83$; $SE = .09$; $z = 9.2$), thereby fully endorsing hypothesis 5b.⁶

⁶ Does the salience of imitation decline with increasing theorization? In unreported analyses, we interacted theorization by culinary journalists with prior defections by peers, and the interaction term was significant and negative. However, the salience of gains to defectors did not decline with increasing theorization; the interaction term

TABLE 6
MULTINOMIAL LOGIT ESTIMATES: ABANDONMENT OF CLASSICAL CUISINE FOR NOUVELLE CUISINE

VARIABLE NAMES	MODEL 1			MODEL 2			MODEL 3		
	NC 1	NC 2	NC 3	NC 1	NC 2	NC 3	NC 1	NC 2	NC 3
Constant	-.40*** (.14)	-.12 (.16)	.02 (.19)	-2.0*** (.28)	-3.3*** (.66)	-4.6*** (.34)	-2.0*** (.30)	-3.0*** (.30)	-4.1*** (.36)
Past affiliation	1.5*** (.07)	1.3*** (.06)	1.1*** (.06)	1.5*** (.07)	1.3*** (.06)	1.1*** (.06)	1.5*** (.07)	1.3*** (.06)	1.1*** (.06)
Lagged reputation20*** (.07)	.40*** (.09)	.30*** (.12)	.38*** (.08)	.59*** (.11)	.49*** (.13)	.30*** (.09)	.48*** (.12)	.28* (.15)
Prior loss of reputation	1.1*** (.23)	1.0*** (.25)	.95*** (.28)	.62** (.24)	.27 (.31)	.26 (.37)	.55* (.29)	.17 (.31)	.04 (.38)
Prior gain of reputation16 (.20)	.58** (.18)	.87*** (.20)	.13 (.20)	.54*** (.19)	.84*** (.20)	.15 (.20)	.56*** (.19)	.88*** (.21)
Agreement14 (.10)	.37*** (.12)	.38** (.15)	.11 (.10)	.32*** (.13)	.32*** (.15)	.05 (.11)	.24* (.13)	.15 (.15)
Duration	-.02** (.007)	-.04*** (.008)	-.05*** (.01)	-.03*** (.007)	-.05*** (.009)	-.07*** (.01)	-.03*** (.007)	-.06*** (.009)	-.07*** (.01)
Localness	-.000 (.001)	-.003** (.001)	-.002 (.002)	.000 (.001)	-.002 (.001)	-.001 (.002)	.001 (.001)	-.001 (.001)	.0000 (.001)
Early period	-.11** (.10)	-.24*** (.13)	-3.6* (.20)	-.23 (.17)	-38*** (.17)	-73*** (.24)	-.10 (.19)	-41*** (.18)	.11 (.11)
Middle period	-.62*** (.08)	-1.1*** (.09)	-1.7 (.11)	-.11 (.12)	-.006 (.12)	.05 (.14)	.0004 (.14)	-.01 (.13)	.02 (.15)
Legitimacy of activists46** (.12)	.68*** (.12)	1.0*** (.14)	.47** (.14)	.56*** (.13)	.83*** (.15)

Theorization-by culinary journalists									
	(20)	(20)	(22)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(20)	(23)	
Prior defections002** (.0009)	.005*** (.0009)	.008*** (.001)	.0010 (.0009)	.004*** (.0009)	.007*** (.001)			
Gains to defectors005*** (.001)	.009*** (.01)	.009*** (.001)	.003** (.001)	.008*** (.01)	.008*** (.002)			
Price009* (.006)	.03*** (.005)	.01*** (.006)	.009* (.006)	.01*** (.005)	.006 (.007)			
				.002*** (.0009)	.002*** (.001)	.004*** (.001)			
Average price difference between nouvelle and classical cuisine01 (.01)	-.01 (.009)	-.03** (.01)			
Log-likelihood	-17,028 3	-17,028 3	-16,889 9	-16,889 9	-16,677 5	-16,677 5			
df	27	27	12	12	18	18			
Wald χ^2	1,312 2***	1,312 2***	276 8***	276 8***	701 6***	701 6***			

NOTE.—NC1, NC2, and NC3 refer to the number of nouvelle cuisine signature dishes. The comparison category is all dishes being classical. The χ^2 statistics for all model 2 and 3 is vis-à-vis model 1. In the case of model 1, it is vis-à-vis a baseline model with no covariates N of spells = 14,962. All significance tests are based on two-tailed tests. Figures in parentheses are SEs of estimates.

* $P < .10$

** $P < .05$

*** $P < .01$

To What Extent Was Nouvelle Cuisine a Response to Market Factors?

An alternative explanation is that the adoption of nouvelle cuisine was simply a response to market considerations. One leg of the argument is that restaurants that were able to charge higher prices more easily adopted nouvelle cuisine because they were able to garner resources and innovate. We gathered data on the price of a *prix fixe* menu for each restaurant for each year and included it as a covariate in our analyses. A second leg of the argument is that classical cuisine was abandoned because *prix fixe* classical cuisine meals were less expensive than *prix fixe* nouvelle cuisine meals. So nouvelle cuisine was adopted because it allowed restaurants to charge higher prices. We categorized restaurants into two groups: dominantly classical cuisine (two or all three signature dishes being classical) and dominantly nouvelle cuisine (two or all three signature dishes being nouvelle), and for each year, we computed the average price of a *prix fixe* meal in a classical cuisine restaurant and a nouvelle cuisine restaurant. A *t*-test of the average price of a nouvelle cuisine meal (mean = Fr 284.44; SD = 171.8) and the average price of a classical cuisine meal (mean = Fr 179.29; SD = 154.1) showed that the nouvelle cuisine meal was significantly costlier than the classical cuisine meal ($t = 42.9$). We then computed the difference between these two average prices (average price difference) for each year and included it as a lagged covariate in our analyses.

Model 3 adds the effects of the market factors, lagged price, and lagged average price difference. The effect of price is significant and positive, indicating that higher priced restaurants were likely to abandon classical cuisine, presumably because they had greater access to resources. The effect of average price difference is significant and negative for category 3, thereby indicating that chefs were *less likely* to make radical changes on account of their ability to charge higher prices. However, it is positive for category 1 but not significant. On balance, market factors do play a role, but despite their inclusion, the effect of the legitimacy of activists, theorization, prior defectors, and gains to defectors remains largely unchanged from model 2. The only differences are that the effect of the theorization by culinary journalists becomes insignificant at category 1, and gains to defectors become insignificant at category 3. There are no other differences from model 2.

was positive and significant at categories 2 and 3 of the dependent variable. One implication is that gains to defectors and theorization by journalists make success stories more visible to adopters and create general models.

Robustness Checks

We conducted robustness checks designed to rule out other objections to the results and present them in table 7. One potential objection is that we did not include the number of classical cuisine supporters on the MCF board, the number of stayers, and the number of losses accruing to defectors. Recall that we had included the proportion of nouvelle cuisine activists/total members of the executive board of the MCF. However, we neither included the influence of weighted stayers (those whose all three signature dishes were classical and were then weighted by reputation) or losses to defectors. Therefore, we computed the proportion of defectors/stayers and gains to defectors/losses by defectors and included them instead of the weighted number of defectors and gains to defectors. Model 4 shows that the results support the hypotheses; sociopolitical legitimacy, theorization, and proportion of defectors/stayers have significant and positive effects on all categories of the dependent variable. The proportion of gains to defectors/losses to defectors has significant and positive effects on categories 2 and 3 of the dependent variable.

A second objection hinges on the specification of the dependent variable. In our analyses, we treated one, two, and three nouvelle cuisine dishes as categories that were compared to the baseline or reference category of all signature dishes being classical and, by implication, nouvelle cuisine dishes being equal to zero. What happens when a moving baseline is used? What happens when the baseline is defined as nouvelle cuisine dishes ≤ 1 and is compared with the outcome category where nouvelle cuisine dishes > 1 . Similarly, what happens if the baseline is nouvelle cuisine dishes ≤ 2 and then is compared with an outcome category where nouvelle cuisine dishes $= 3$. We reestimated model 2 using the gologit procedure in STATA. In model 5, the first column of the coefficients is based on a baseline where nouvelle cuisine signature dishes $= 0$ and the outcome category is nouvelle cuisine signature dishes > 0 . The second column of the coefficients is premised on a baseline where nouvelle cuisine signature dishes ≤ 1 and the outcome category is nouvelle cuisine signature dishes > 1 . The last column of coefficients is based on a baseline or reference category of nouvelle cuisine dishes $= 2$ and nouvelle cuisine dishes ≤ 2 and the outcome category is nouvelle cuisine dishes $= 3$. Model 5 reveals that the results endorse the hypotheses; sociopolitical legitimacy, theorization, weighted defectors, and gains to defectors all have significant and positive effects on all three categories of the dependent variable.

Another alternative is to treat one, two, and three nouvelle dishes as stages in a sequence of abandonment. In such cases, an option is to estimate ordered continuation ratio models (Wolfe 1988), where the ordered categories represent a progression through stages, so those individuals

TABLE 7
ROBUSTNESS CHECKS OF THE ABANDONMENT OF CLASSICAL CUISINE FOR NOUVELLE CUISINE

VARIABLE NAMES	MODEL 4 MULTINOMIAL LOGIT MODEL			MODEL 5 GENERALIZED ORDERED LOGIT MODEL			MODEL 6 ORDERED CON- TINUATION RATIO MODEL	
	NC 1	NC 2	NC 3	NC ≥ 1	NC ≥ 2	NC = 3		
Constant	-1.9*** (.26)	-2.9*** (.27)	-4.5*** (.32)	-1.5*** (.23)	-2.4*** (.21)	-3.5*** (.28)		
Past affiliation	1.5*** (.07)	1.3*** (.06)	1.1*** (.06)	1.5*** (.07)	1.6*** (.06)	-.14*** (.06)		27*** (.01)
Lagged reputation	38*** (.08)	59*** (.11)	49*** (.13)	43*** (.09)	29*** (.08)	.07 (.09)		.15*** (.02)
Prior loss of reputation	.61*** (.29)	.27 (.31)	.26 (.37)	.32 (.25)	-.22 (.31)	-.10 (.27)		.01 (.10)
Prior gain of reputation	14 (.20)	.55*** (.18)	.85*** (.20)	38*** (.17)	.48*** (.11)	.51*** (.13)		29*** (.06)
Agrement	.11 (.10)	.32*** (.13)	.31*** (.15)	23*** (.10)	25*** (.08)	12 (.09)		09*** (.02)
Duration	-.03*** (.007)	-.06*** (.009)	-.07*** (.01)	-.04*** (.007)	-.03*** (.006)	-.03*** (.007)		-.02*** (.001)
Localness	-.0006 (.001)	-.002* (.001)	-.001 (.002)	-.001 (.001)	-.003*** (.001)	-.001 (.002)		-.001*** (.0003)
Early period	-.27* (.16)	-.46*** (.17)	-.74* (.24)	-.36*** (.14)	-.28*** (.12)	-.57*** (.22)		-.17*** (.06)
Middle period	-.12 (.12)	-.05 (.11)	.004 (.14)	-.06 (.10)	.09 (.07)	.08 (.11)		.05 (.04)
Legitimacy of activists	38*** (.20)	.48*** (.20)	.83*** (.24)	.61*** (.16)	.51*** (.12)	.57*** (.15)		.32*** (.06)

Theorization by culinary

journalists001*** (.0009)	.004*** (.0009)	.008*** (.001)	.004*** (.0009)	.005*** (.0006)	.005*** (.0008)	.003*** (.0003)
Prior defections . .							
Gains to defectors							
Prior defections/prior stayers	2.1*** (.53)	3.9*** (.56)	4.3*** (.70)				
Gains to defectors/losses to defectors01 (.01)	.03*** (.01)	.05*** (.01)				
Cut point 1							
Cut point 209 (.10)
Cut point 3							1.4*** (.12)
Log-likelihood	-16,889.6	-16,889.6	-16,889.6	-17,152.3	-17,152.3	-17,152.3	-18,286.7 (.12)
df	15	15	15	42	42	42	13
Wald χ^2	277.4***	277.4***	277.4***	5,345.9***	5,345.9***	5,345.9***	3,086.7***

NOTE.—NC1, NC2, and NC3 refer to the number of nouvelle cuisine signature dishes. The comparison category is all dishes being classical. The χ^2 statistics for model 4 is vis-à-vis model 1. For models 5 and 6, it is vis-à-vis a baseline model with no covariates. N of spells = 14,962 for models 4 and 5 and 32,866 for model 6. All significance tests are based on two-tailed tests. Figures in parentheses are SEs of estimates. Robust SEs of estimates are used for models 4 and 5. No constant is provided for model 6.

* $P < .10$

** $P < .05$

*** $P < .01$.

must pass through each lower stage before they go on to higher stages. The original data set must be restructured to account for transition through stages, and the new data set is created by repeatedly including a subset of all observations contributing to each respective cutpoint (which is why the number of observations for this model is much larger than comparable multinomial logit models). A separate intercept is modeled for each stage, but the covariates are assumed to conform to proportional odds for each of the three stages. We estimated model 2 using the ocratio procedure in STATA, and model 6 reveals that the effects of legitimacy, theorization, prior defectors, and gains to defectors are all significant and positive.

We also conducted additional analyses that we do not report for the sake of brevity. We included dummies for regions to account for regional variations in economic forces and reestimated model 2 and did not find any change in the pattern of support for our predictions. Objections may possibly be leveled against our unit of analysis—chef-restaurant dyads because one might obtain different results if chefs were used as the unit of analysis or if restaurants were used as the unit of analysis. We reestimated model 2 by clustering observations separately by chef and by restaurant and obtained similar results.

The results may be challenged on the ground that they overlook the role of friendship networks in the reshaping of social identity and institutional logics in the field of gastronomy. Such social cohesion arguments imply that a chef may be more influenced by the defections of a friend than by the defections of anonymous peers. The empirical implication is that it is not the weighted count of defectors that matters but the weighted defections of friends that is consequential. Unfortunately, we could not obtain time-varying friendship network data to empirically ascertain the effect of such defections. However, the lack of these data is mitigated by two counterarguments. Self-categorization theorists presume that categorization entails depersonalization such that individuals view themselves and others as interchangeable representatives of a category, and hence, friendship ties may not be privileged sources of social identity. Thus, arguments about social identity are predicated on structural equivalence rather than cohesion, and studies have shown that structural equivalence is more powerful than cohesion (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991). Here, all elite chefs who gain a Michelin star view themselves as members of that category and constituted our database of elite chefs. One could be stringent in the definition of equivalence and define peers as chefs belonging to the same region and having the same star level. In analyses not reported for the sake of brevity, we reestimated model 2 but found a broadly similar pattern of results to those reported in model 2.

DISCUSSION

The findings reported in our study advance the literature of cultural-frame institutionalism, social movement theory, and social identity theory. Below, we elaborate these contributions and also outline directions for future research.

Contributions to Cultural-Frame Institutionalism

Although cultural-frame institutionalists have argued that institutional logics furnish guidelines for action, they have been silent about how social identity is the link between institutional logics and individual behavior (Strang and Meyer 1993). Moreover, cultural-frame institutionalists have emphasized the durability of institutions but have said little about how existing logics and identities are dismantled and how actors adopt a new logic and identity. While cultural-frame institutionalists insist that institutional change entails a "politics of identity," researchers have neither explicated the social-psychological mechanisms underlying the politics of identity nor provided empirical evidence (Scott 2001). Our study shows how identity movements create institutional gaps by highlighting defects at the immediate and proximal level of identities rather than at the abstract and distal level of logics. Since actors categorize themselves as group members and identify with the group, conversion hinges on identity-discrepant cues that jeopardize the existing role identity and validate a new role identity.

Cultural-frame institutionalists have treated professional logics as exogenous influences on organizations but have seldom studied sources of variations in professional logics (Scott 2001; Thornton and Ocasio 1999). The results show that identity-discrepant cues are important mechanisms that trigger institutional change within professions and implicate the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists and theorization as important identity-discrepant cues. Institutional logics and professions undergo change when activists gain control of professional societies, critique the traditional logic, and proffer a solution hinging on a new institutional logic. Theorization consisting of the dissemination of models and stories, as Strang and Meyer (1993) note, creates similarities and provides social proof, but has seldom been studied as an antecedent of institutional change. Theorization in the shape of articles and editorials by culinary journalists in France increased the abandonment of classical cuisine. Prior defections by peers and gains to defectors are also identity-discrepant cues that destabilize the existing logic and role identity and validate the new logic and identity.

This study recasts diffusion as the social construction of identity rather than the mechanical transfer of information. We build on other studies

that emphasize how the content of innovation affects diffusion (Rogers 1995; Greve 1995; Soule 1999), and we suggest that diffusion is not a mindless process of replication but a mindful process of identity construction. Chefs paid attention to the number of defectors and to reputational gains accruing to defectors to make sense of the new role identity implied by *nouvelle cuisine*. Both are identity-discrepant cues that dismantle the old logic and role identity and create appeal for the new logic and identity.

Contributions to Social Movement Theory

Our study also enriches the literature on social movements in three respects. First, social movement researchers have paid little attention to the effects of identity competition on the behaviors of individuals (Stryker 2000). One approach, as outlined by Howard (2000), is to focus on what identities we distance ourselves from, and what identities we embrace, and show how collective identities are linked to the behavioral choices of individuals. In turn, this requires an understanding of how collective identity is connected to individual-level social identities (Klandermans and de Weerd 2000, pp. 68–69). We connected social movement theory and social identity theory to demonstrate that identity competition hinges on identity-discrepant cues that jeopardize the social identity of existing members and promote social mobility. We depicted four identity-discrepant cues as the source of negative feedback about the existing logic and identity: the sociopolitical legitimacy of activists, theorization (by journalists), defections of peers, and reputational gains to defectors. All four identity-discrepant cues led chefs to distance themselves from the role identity implied by classical cuisine and to reconfigure their roles according to the logic of *nouvelle cuisine*.

Second, a notable deficiency of the social movement literature is that it has glossed over how actors may be differentially recruited into the social movement (Stryker 2000). This omission is redolent of cultural-frame institutionalism's treatment of innovation adoption as a binary, yes-no phenomenon and its neglect of variety in adoption (Rogers 1995; see Soule [1999] for an exception). By treating the number of signature dishes in *nouvelle cuisine* as the outcome variable, our study accounts for heterogeneity of participation in the *nouvelle cuisine* movement. An added benefit is that such a dependent variable allows us to test whether the strength of identity-discrepant cues varies according to the category of participation in *nouvelle cuisine*. We conducted analyses using the Lincom procedure in STATA but do not provide details for the sake of brevity and only summarize them here. We found that the legitimacy of activists had the weakest effect on category 1, but there was no significant difference in the effect of the legitimacy of activists between categories 3

and 2. Prior defections had the smallest effect on category 1, but there was no difference in its effect between categories 2 and 3. By contrast, the effect of theorization by culinary journalists was strongest for category 3, followed by category 2, and then category 1. However, the effect of gains to defectors did not significantly differ across categories. These findings imply that theorization by culinary journalists increased in salience for defectors in contrast to other identity-discrepant cues. These results highlight the need to study the extent of change and the impact of social movements.

Finally, the results also speak to a question in social movement theory as to whether brokerage or diffusion is the source of scale shift. McAdam et al. (2001) posit that local innovations can spread when brokers connect hitherto unconnected groups and create similarity or when actors emulate peers, and they urge researchers to discern which is a more powerful source of scale shift. In our study, culinary journalists may be considered to be brokers among chefs of different regions and locations. Defections by peers and gains to peers may be seen as the main mechanisms of imitation. Our results show that theorization by journalists was a stronger identity-discrepant cue than prior defections or gains to adopters, and suggest that theorization is a source of scale shift in identity movements. Absent theorization, similarities between activists and potential recruits may be latent rather than manifest, and local experiments and innovations may be unable to spread (McAdam et al. 2001).

Contributions to the Study of Social Identity

Our results also enlarge the literature on social identity. Social identity theory holds that members preserve their positive social identity by positively stereotyping their group (in-group) and by negatively stereotyping others. But when negative feedback threatens these stereotypes and jeopardizes social identity, members respond to threats to their social identity by using the three basic strategies of social mobility, social creativity, and social change (Turner 1985). The strategy of social mobility consists of leaving the in-group group and joining another group with a better image or reputation. The strategy of social creativity implies that actors change the basis of comparison so that the in-group looks better than out-groups. The strategy of social change means that actors compete directly with the out-group to alter their access to resources and power. Social mobility and social change are at two ends of the continuum, with social mobility being an individual-level strategy and social change being a collective strategy.

A limitation of this portrait of identity management is that it overlooks how social change can lead to social mobility and how social mobility also can be a foundation for social creativity. For example, low-performing

actors can leave an in-group and join a new group so that they can look good with a new set of performance criteria. Social change need not be driven by a sense of injustice or illegitimacy such that in-group members fight to reclaim status (e.g., Mummendey et al. 1999). Instead, as our study shows, identity movements may discredit existing logics and role identities and induce members of an in-group to embrace the new insurgent identity and logic. Thus, social movements can lead to social mobility.

A more potent criticism of social identity theory is that it presupposes group identity to be unitary in nature and excludes the possibilities of schisms and splits in groups despite their ubiquity (Ashforth 2000; Sani and Reicher 2000). Although splits in organizations and occupations arise through social movements and lead to defections of individuals from the parent group, social identity theory has had little contact with social movement theory (McAdam and Snow 2000).

In recent years, a number of scholars have shown how groupness is variable rather than fixed and have explored social processes by which categories get invested with groupness and are institutionalized in routines in the domains of sexuality (Kulick 1998), musical practice (Herzfeld 1988), and citizenship (Brubaker 1992; Laitin 1998). We extend this line of reasoning to the realm of the professions in general, and cuisine in particular, by showing how identity processes undergird boundary dynamics. For the most part, extant research that analyzes boundary-crossing behavior by individuals pays little attention to the hybridization of social identities (Ansell 2001; Lamont 2001). Some scholars have analyzed the formation of conglomerate citizen identities when minority populations learn the language of the majority, as Russians did in Estonia or Latvia (Laitin 1998). However, such studies of assimilation entail a debatable degree of choice and imply the erosion of the original identity. By contrast, chefs had a choice of whether to adopt *nouvelle cuisine*, and some chefs did not completely eliminate classical cuisine from their repertoire of signature dishes but instead made space for *nouvelle cuisine* dishes. Thus, even as identity movements aim to celebrate differences and replace a traditional identity with a new identity, their success may be limited and may produce hybridization. In turn, cross-cutting affiliations of chefs to classical and *nouvelle cuisine* prevent closure of boundaries and generate an institutional settlement through a bottom-up process of individual choice rather than a top-down mandated outcome.

Directions for Future Research

The literature on social movements has been more concerned with the origins of social movements rather than with their consequences (Giugni 1998). This study looked at the effects of an identity movement on in-

dividuals (chefs) working in organizations (restaurants). A natural extension of the study is to consider the effects of identity movements such as the nouvelle cuisine movement on outcomes such as curriculum changes in professional schools.

A rich area for future research is the effect of identity change on the fates of individuals and organizations (Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 2001). Chefs can engage in identity-enhancing changes, wherein they replace classical cuisine dishes in their repertoire with other classical cuisine dishes, or where they replace nouvelle cuisine dishes in their arsenal with nouvelle cuisine dishes. Alternatively, they can engage in identity-transforming changes, wherein they abandon classical cuisine for nouvelle cuisine and possibly nouvelle cuisine for classical cuisine. Research on the effect of identity-enhancing changes and identity-transforming changes on reputations and survival of restaurants have the potential to shed light on the content effects of organizational change rather than its process effects.

Moreover, this article studied how an identity movement led to institutional change when there was little explicit resistance from the die-hard defenders of the dominant orthodoxy. Although nouvelle cuisine activists celebrated their differences vis-à-vis classical cuisine and denounced it, proponents of classical cuisine did not succeed in launching a countermovement to resist such attacks. One reason was that nouvelle cuisine activists were chefs who had earned plaudits for being adept at classical cuisine and then felt the need for change and experimentation. Another reason was that nouvelle cuisine sought to make the chef an inventor of cuisine rather than an interpreter of Escoffier and sought to enhance the technical autonomy of the chef. A final reason was that the nouvelle cuisine movement did not mean that classical cuisine would be discontinued in the curriculum or training of chefs. However, the mere fact that identity movements celebrate differences with the dominant code does not automatically mean that resistance exists and thwarts the identity movement. So resistance from defenders of the orthodox is a variable rather than a given. What influences the success of identity movements when they face a countermovement defending existing cultural codes? Do the movement and countermovement exploit different arenas? How do they coevolve? Research into these and related questions is essential in order to understand how culture and politics permeate the world of organizations.

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Explaining Spatial Variation in Support for Capital Punishment: A Multilevel Analysis¹

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This research examines the effects of social context on support for the death penalty using individual-level data from the 1974–98 General Social Survey (GSS), which have been linked with aggregate-level data on homicide rates and sociodemographic, political, and economic characteristics. Consistent with instrumental, social threat, and constructionist perspectives, this study finds that residents of areas with higher homicide rates, a larger proportion of blacks, and a more conservative political climate are significantly more likely to support the death penalty, net of compositional differences. These results warrant further attention to contextual and individual sources of public support for the death penalty.

The United States is one of the few developed societies in the world that retains the death penalty. Various explanations for this aspect of American exceptionalism have been proposed, including distinctive features of American federalism and the populist nature of American politics (Zimring and Hawkins 1986; Hood 1998; Radelet and Borg 2000). Whatever

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the merits of these accounts, capital punishment receives substantial public support in the United States. Recent national surveys indicate that about two-thirds of American adults support the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.² However, the national figure conceals the substantial variation in death penalty support that exists across space *within* the United States. Some studies have demonstrated significant regional variation in levels of support (e.g., Bohm 1991; Fox, Radelet, and Bonsteel 1991), and independently conducted state-level surveys indicate that the often-quoted national figures do not adequately describe public sentiment in all U.S. states. For example, in 1999, support for the death penalty was much lower in Kentucky (59%) than in Missouri (78%) (Brinker 1999; Death Penalty Information Center 1999). But with the exception of this type of descriptive evidence for large geographic units, very little is known about spatial variation in support for the death penalty in the United States, including how much variation exists at relatively localized areas and what social conditions might account for that variation.

We begin to fill some of these gaps in the literature by examining the sources of variation in death penalty support across a representative sample of U.S. metropolitan areas and nonmetropolitan counties. Our analyses address two interrelated questions: Is there meaningful variation in support for capital punishment across these localized areas, and if so, how can this variation be explained?

With respect to the latter question, we are particularly interested in exploring contextual effects. Support for the death penalty might vary across areas simply as a function of the nonrandom distribution of the population. Specifically, areas with strong death penalty support might be those with relatively large numbers of persons with the individual attributes that have been linked with pro-death penalty attitudes. Prior research and theory, however, suggest that attitudes about punishment and social control are likely to be affected by features of the social environment, especially the level of lethal violence, political conservatism, and racial and economic composition. Drawing on this literature, we formulate hypotheses about the contextual determinants of death penalty support and test these hypotheses with a unique data set that permits multilevel modeling.

² Gallup poll results for 2001 reveal that 67% of American adults support the death penalty for persons convicted of murder, while a recent Harris poll (August 2000) indicates that 64% of American adults support the death penalty (the most recent Gallup and Harris death penalty poll results are available at www.gallup.com and www.harrisinteractive.com, respectively). Nearly identical results were obtained from a 2000 ABC News poll (see Daniel Merkle, "Death Penalty Remains in Favor," <http://abcnews.go.com/sections/politics/dailynews/poll000619.html> [last accessed February 3, 2003]).

BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

An extensive body of research has accumulated on the relationship between individual attributes and attitudes toward criminal justice policies, including the death penalty. For example, past studies have identified a broad set of personality characteristics and deeply held beliefs, such as authoritarianism, dogmatism, religious fundamentalism, and a belief in retribution, that give rise to a worldview supportive of harsh punishment (Neapolitan 1983; Bohm 1987; Finckenauer 1988; Grasmick et al. 1992; Smith and Wright 1992). However, although the literature acknowledges that public opinion about social issues is responsive to macrolevel events and conditions (e.g., Page and Shapiro 1992; Zaller 1992; Steiner 1999), very little attention has been directed to features of the *social context* that may influence punitive attitudes toward punishment in general and support for capital punishment more specifically.

Perhaps the most obvious contextual factor that might be related to death penalty support is the level of homicide (Stinchcombe et al. 1980; Gross 1998; Garland 2000; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Previous researchers have noted that national trends in support for the death penalty over the past 30 years correspond fairly closely to trends in homicide rates (Ellsworth and Gross 1994). Less than half of American adults—between 40% and 45%—polled in the mid-1960s reported that they supported the death penalty for persons convicted of murder (e.g., Zeisel and Gallup 1989; Bohm 1991; Ellsworth and Gross 1994). But support grew steadily during the 1970s and 1980s and, by the mid-1990s, more than three-quarters of the adult population were in favor of capital punishment (Warr 1995; Longmire 1996; Shaw, Shapiro, and Lock 1998; Radelet and Borg 2000). This 30-year period of increasing support was followed by an appreciable decline in support during the latter half of the 1990s. As noted above, recent population surveys indicate that about two-thirds of Americans polled support capital punishment. In a roughly similar manner, homicide rates rose from the mid-1960s through the 1980s and then fell rapidly beginning in the early 1990s and continued to decline through the decade (Blumstein and Rosenfeld 1998; LaFree 1998).³ Although far from perfect (Fox et al. 1991; Smith and Wright 1992), this correspondence has led to the widespread speculation that public opinion about the death penalty may be sensitive to levels of homicide (e.g., Gelles and Strauss 1975; Thomas and Foster 1975; Smith 1976; Stinchcombe et al. 1980;

³ Between 1993 and 1999, the national homicide rate fell by 40%, from 9.5 to 5.7 homicides per 100,000 persons. The homicide data were compiled by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and are available at www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/homicide/nomtrnd.htm (last accessed February 3, 2003).

Finckenauer 1988; Niemi, Mueller, and Smith 1989; Page and Shapiro 1992; Ellsworth and Gross 1994; Schneider 2000; Shapiro 2000).

Two main theoretical rationales have been cited for the apparent empirical association between homicide rates and death penalty support. One emphasizes instrumental/pragmatic concerns (Thomas and Foster 1975; Taylor, Scheppele, and Stinchcombe 1979; Stinchcombe et al. 1980; Tyler and Weber 1982; Tyler and Boeckmann 1997; Garland 2000). This perspective posits that persons exposed to high or rising rates of violent crime are likely to support extreme forms of social control, such as the death penalty, for the practical reason that such measures may deter violence. As Ellsworth and Gross note, "This is a commonsensical explanation: when crime goes up, people look for harsher punishments to bring it back down" (1994, p. 40). A second perspective links violent crime rates and support for capital punishment via direct and indirect socialization experiences. Gelles and Straus (1975, p. 609) suggest that persons exposed to higher levels of violence are more likely than others to support the death penalty because they are socialized to accept the normalcy of violence and to regard violence as an acceptable and effective form of punishment and social control (see also Borg 1998).

Despite speculation to the contrary (e.g., Stinchcombe et al. 1980; Ellsworth and Gross 1994; Garland 2000; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002), other than the widely observed correspondence in temporal patterns of homicide rates and death penalty support at the national level, systematic evidence to substantiate an empirical association between these factors is scant (Beckett 1997). An important exception is the work by Rankin (1979). Using data from the 1972–76 General Social Surveys, Rankin estimated the effects of national crime rates on support for the death penalty. Controlling for race, region of residence, and year of interview, he observed a significant positive association between death penalty support and a three-year lagged measure of violent crime rates.⁴

Rankin's findings provide suggestive empirical support for a positive effect of homicide rates on support for the death penalty. However, the limited number of control variables included in this study raises the concern that the effects reported for national homicide rates may be spurious. On the other hand, Rankin's (1979) focus on national-level homicide rates may have resulted in a deflated estimate of the impact of homicide on

⁴ The magnitude and functional form of this association varied across regions, with a relatively strong linear effect observed in the South and a weaker nonlinear effect found for all other regions. For respondents who reside in nonsouthern regions, Rankin (1979) observed significant effects for both a linear and quadratic form of the national homicide rate. The nature of these effects suggests that although higher homicide rates are generally associated with increasing support for capital punishment, this association dampens as homicide rates reach very high levels.

death penalty attitudes. Individual attitudes about capital punishment may be more responsive to the level of homicide in the local environment than to the national homicide rate.

Despite Rankin's suggestive evidence consistent with the instrumental/pragmatic perspective and its intuitive plausibility, the sociological literature on social problems provides grounds for skepticism about the extent to which objective levels of criminal violence will adequately account for variation in public opinion on crime, including support for the death penalty (Blumer 1971; Spector and Kitsuse 1977). In particular, studies informed by the constructionist approach have demonstrated the complexity of the processes through which social meanings are attached to objective conditions (e.g., Schneider 1985; Miller and Holstein 1993; Beckett 1994). As Beckett (1994) observes, conditions become social problems to the extent that they have been defined as such, and this is ultimately the result of "claims-making activities." Beckett further maintains that "efforts to signify social problems are typically components of larger political battles" (1997, p. 6). Political elites try to frame issues in ways that serve their interests, often by directing attention away from "inconvenient social conditions" that might challenge the status quo (p. 6).

Beckett and Sasson's (2000) assessment of the growth in popular support for punitive crime-control policies in the United States since the 1960s is a good example of research in the constructionist tradition. Although levels of serious criminal violence in the United States are high by comparative standards, Beckett and Sasson argue that they have not risen enough over the last 30 years to account for the growing harshness of public attitudes toward crime and criminals. Rather, changes in popular opinion on crime and punishment "reflect the ascendance of a particular way of framing the crime problem" (Beckett and Sasson 2000, p. 73). Conservative politicians, from Barry Goldwater to Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, exploited public concerns about crime and racial divisions with a "law and order" rhetoric that framed criminal behavior as a matter of individual moral choice encouraged by the permissive crime and welfare policies promoted by the liberals. The goal was to effect an electoral realignment, especially in the South, that would favor the Republicans by driving a wedge between working-class whites and blacks who had composed the traditional Democratic base. The law and order rhetoric, say Beckett and Sasson, was from the beginning a thinly veiled appeal to racial prejudice. There was never any question regarding the presumed racial identification of most of the violent criminals or welfare cheats the conservatives had in mind. The strategy worked. Public concern with crime and support for punitive crime-control policies grew within an

increasingly conservative political climate that affected the views of liberals and conservatives alike (see also Garland 1990).⁵

The constructionist perspective on public opinion, as explicated by Beckett and others, suggests that death penalty support will not be a simple function of objective levels of criminal violence. Rather, it should vary along with the political climate and the corresponding claims-making activities of political officials. Our data do not permit the direct analysis of claims-making activity, but we can measure the degree of conservatism of the political climate. Drawing on the constructionist perspective, we anticipate a positive effect of political conservatism on death penalty support, net of official homicide rates. Respondents residing in areas with a highly conservative climate should be more likely to support the death penalty than those in less conservative environments. Note that we are hypothesizing a genuine contextual effect of conservatism. The degree of political conservatism characteristic of the area should increase the likelihood of death penalty support controlling for individual ideological position.

Our final hypotheses about contextual effects are also predicated on the basic premise of constructionism that social problems must be actively problematized and that elites play a prominent role in the process (e.g., Schneider 1985). These hypotheses elaborate the traditional constructionist approach by incorporating insights from conflict theory concerning the structural conditions that are likely to be conducive to the mobilization of public opinion on crime (Scheingold 1991; Garland 2000). A long-standing tradition of research informed by conflict theory has identified racial and economic divisions as conditions that threaten the rule of dominant groups and lead to more extensive and repressive forms of social control (e.g., Hawkins 1987; Liska 1992). The basic logic of the threat hypotheses is that whites and economic elites perceive nonwhites and poor people as threatening (Blumer 1958; Chambliss 1964; Blalock 1967; Chambliss and Seidman 1980; Quillian 1995, 1996). When these latter groups increase in relative size, the level of threat increases, and dominant groups exert pressure for greater crime control to protect the status quo.

A number of studies have assessed the threat hypotheses by examining the effects of racial composition (typically %black) and economic inequality on police size. The results of this research are generally supportive of the hypothesis of racial threat, whereas support for the economic threat

⁵ Beckett and Sasson argue that public opinion on crime and punishment has always been more complex than the law and order discourse of conservative politicians. For example, as support increased for harsher criminal sanctions, substantial fractions of the electorate also remained committed to rehabilitative prison programs, drug treatment, and crime prevention initiatives (2000, pp. 136–42).

hypothesis is more mixed (Jacobs 1979; Jackson and Carroll 1981; Liska, Lawrence, and Benson 1981; Chamlin 1989; Jackson 1989). Research on perhaps the most repressive form of legal control—killings by police—has also offered some support for the hypothesis of racial threat. Jacobs and O'Brien (1998) examined the structural correlates of total police killings and police killings of blacks for a sample of 170 cities. They found that, although the percentage of the population that is black has no significant association with total police killings, it is positively related to police killings of blacks.⁶

The threat hypotheses have generally been applied to the explanation of the actual exercise of social control (e.g., police size, arrests, police exercise of lethal violence). We extend the basic argument to public attitudes about crime and punishment. Consistent with the work of Beckett and Sasson reviewed above, we propose that elites mobilize public opinion in the direction of more punitive attitudes to further their interests, and they are particularly likely to do so under threatening conditions. Accordingly, the relative size of the minority population and economic inequality should be positively related to death penalty support, net of the officially recorded homicide rate. A recent study by Jacobs and Carmichael (2002) that examined the presence of the death penalty in American states provides evidence consistent with these hypotheses. They found that states with relatively large minority populations and high levels of economic inequality were more likely than others to have legalized the death penalty. Also, in line with the constructionist hypothesis on the effects of political climate, their analyses revealed that measures of Republican legislative strength and conservative political climate are associated with death penalty legalization. Interestingly, they found no significant effects on the presence of capital punishment for violent crime rates or murder rates.

To summarize, the prior literature suggests four hypotheses about contextual determinants of death penalty support. Persons residing in areas with high homicide rates, a strongly conservative political climate, a relatively large minority population, and high income inequality should be more likely to express support for the death penalty. These effects should emerge net of individual attributes that have been linked with attitudes toward capital punishment, indicating that spatial variation in support for the death penalty is not simply a function of population distribution. They also should persist after holding constant other contextual variables

⁶ Jacobs and O'Brien also detected significant positive effects of racial inequality on both total police killings and killings of blacks. Their measure of income inequality was not significant for either dependent variable. They speculated that the use of a city sample might attenuate the impact of economic inequality because the affluent suburbs are excluded from the analysis (1998, p. 857).

that may be associated with these conditions and with support for the death penalty.

DATA AND METHODS

We estimate spatial variation in support for the death penalty with multilevel models applied to data from the General Social Survey (GSS) that have been linked with homicide data from the National Center for Health Statistics (NCHS) and socioeconomic data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

Data

The GSS is a cross-sectional probability sample survey of adults in the United States conducted annually or biannually since 1972.⁷ The GSS has been a valuable source of data for individual-level analyses of public opinion (e.g., Firebaugh and Davis 1988; Ellison and Musick 1993; DiMaggio, Evans, and Bryson 1996; Quillian 1996; Taylor 1998), and it has been used extensively to examine the effects of individual attributes on death penalty attitudes (e.g., Bohm 1991; Fox et al. 1991; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Longmire 1996; Borg 1998). A distinctive feature of the GSS data used for our research is that they contain geographic codes that enable us to append data that describe the geographic areas in which respondents reside (see also Taylor 1998; Rosenfeld, Messner, and Baumer 2001). These geographic areas are the primary sampling units (PSUs) used to select the GSS national samples. Roughly two-thirds of the PSUs are single- or multiple-county metropolitan areas, and the remaining third are nonmetropolitan counties. Samples selected within these PSUs are self-representing in the sense that aggregated individual responses are representative of the PSU from which they are drawn, and within any given survey year, the combined samples across PSUs compose a sample of households that is representative of the continental United States (Davis and Smith 1998). The sample upon which our analyses are based includes 32,632 respondents sampled from 268 PSUs between 1974 and 1998.⁸

⁷ The full samples for 1972–74, and half-samples for 1975 and 1976, were selected using a modified probability design. A stratified, multistage area probability sample design was implemented for half-samples in 1975–76 and has been used for the selection of all respondents interviewed between 1977 and 1998 (for a detailed discussion of GSS sampling methods, see Davis and Smith [1998, app. 1]).

⁸ We exclude the 1972 GSS data from our analysis because PSU identifiers are not available for these respondents. Data for 1973 are excluded because of a difference in the wording of the death penalty question compared to the one used in all subsequent years. Overall, 34,136 persons were interviewed in the GSS between 1974 and 1998; our sample excludes 1,434 of these cases due to missing data on the dependent and independent variables.

To assess contextual determinants of death penalty support, we merged data from the NCHS and the U.S. Census Bureau with the individual-level GSS data files using the geographic identifiers described above. The homicide data used in the analysis are from the U.S. vital statistics compiled from death certificates at the county level for 1973–98 (NCHS 1998). We attached contemporaneous and lagged homicide counts to each GSS respondent record using the census codes that correspond to the county or counties that compose the PSU in which the respondent resided. This process was a straightforward one-to-one merge in the case of single-county PSUs. For multiple-county PSUs, we aggregated homicides across all counties within PSUs and linked the aggregated homicide counts to the individual GSS records by matching on PSU codes. The counts were later converted to homicide rates, as described below.

We use data from the U.S. Census Bureau to construct measures of two of our key explanatory variables—minority population size and economic inequality—as well as some other contextual variables that we include as control variables (discussed below). PSU-level indicators of these socioeconomic conditions were derived using county-level census data for 1970, 1980, and 1990 from the County and City Data Book Consolidated File, 1947–77, and the USA Counties 1996 CD-ROM. Because county-level census data are not available on an annual basis, we used the decennial data to estimate values for the intercensal years. We then constructed PSU-level measures of these variables and merged them with the GSS using the procedures described above.

Measures

The dependent variable for our analysis is a binary measure of respondents' attitudes toward the death penalty, coded "1" for those who favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder and coded "0" for those who oppose the death penalty or who report that they do not know (favor death penalty).⁹

The key independent variables in our research are the homicide rate, the degree of conservatism in the local political climate, the relative size of the minority population, and the level of economic inequality for the PSUs in which GSS respondents reside. The homicide rate was created using annual data on homicide from the NCHS and population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau, and it represents the number of homicides

⁹ We reestimated all regression models shown below after excluding respondents who responded "don't know" to the death penalty question ($N = 1,990$). The results of these analyses were substantively identical to those reported.

per 100,000 residents in the year preceding the interview (homicide rate).¹⁰ A lagged measure of homicide is preferable to a contemporaneous measure because the latter might include homicides that occurred after the date of the survey, and because it is likely to take some time for the public to become aware of the crime rate.¹¹

We measure the degree of political conservatism in respondents' PSUs by aggregating responses to a GSS question about political ideology. Respondents are asked to report where they would place their political views on a scale from one (extremely liberal) to seven (extremely conservative). Our measure of conservative political climate reflects the mean level of conservatism in respondents' PSUs during the period in which the GSS interview was conducted (conservative climate). Because single-year sample sizes for some PSUs are relatively small, we combine responses to the conservatism question across three surveys, then aggregate responses within PSUs and compute moving averages for each PSU centered on the survey year.¹² This strategy seems reasonable given that the political climate for counties and metropolitan areas is likely to be stable in the short run.

The relative size of the minority population in the respondents' PSU is measured with census data on the percentage of residents who identify themselves as black (%black). To reduce skewness, we use the natural log of this variable in the regression models. The level of economic inequality for the PSUs in our analysis is measured with the Gini index for the relative distribution of family incomes within these areas (income inequality). Both measures are derived from census data as described above and characterize the demographic and economic conditions of the respondent's PSU in the year preceding the interview.

To isolate the effects of these contextual predictors, we include well-established correlates of death penalty attitudes as control variables in our analysis. Prior research on death penalty attitudes reveals higher levels of support among whites, older persons, males, wealthier individuals, conservatives, religious fundamentalists, married persons, and those who

¹⁰ The annual county population estimates were obtained from the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research (ICPSR) data archive (see studies #8384, #6031, and #2372).

¹¹ Although a one-year lagged measure of homicide rate seems justified on theoretical grounds, we also estimated all models shown below using two- and three-year lagged measures of homicide. The results obtained from these analyses (not shown) were very similar to those reported.

¹² For years in which the GSS sampling frame changes (i.e., 1982 and 1992), we centered the three-year moving average on the year prior to the year in which the respondent was surveyed. For the later years of the GSS data used in our study (1994, 1996, and 1998), which contain much larger annual sample sizes than earlier periods, we combine data for two survey years.

reside in less populated areas (for reviews, see Zeisel and Gallup [1989], Bohm [1991], Fox et al. [1991], and Longmire 1996). Although more ambiguous, there is some evidence that church attendance reduces support for the death penalty (Harvey 1986) and that the effect of educational attainment on support for the death penalty is nonlinear, with low levels of support observed among persons who did not finish high school and those who graduated from college, and higher levels of support for those whose educational attainment falls between these points (Fox et al. 1991). Some research has uncovered regional differences in support for the death penalty. Persons who reside in the U.S. West and, to a lesser extent, the U.S. South exhibit higher levels of support than persons from other regions (Bohm 1991; Fox et al. 1991; Barkan and Cohn 1994; Borg 1997).¹³

We include each of these variables in our analysis as controls, and our measurement of them conforms closely to strategies used in prior research (see app. table A1 for a more detailed description of the control variables).¹⁴ In addition, we capture time trends in support for the death penalty by including a variable that distinguishes the year in which respondents were interviewed. To facilitate a more intuitive interpretation of estimated coefficients than would be the case if the actual year of interview (e.g., 1974, 1975) were used, we constructed a rescaled measure by subtracting 73 from the year of the interview (i.e., 1974 respondents received a code of "1," 1975 respondents received a code of "2," and 1998 respondents received a code of "25"). To model the well-documented nonlinear trend in support for capital punishment during this period, we also include a

¹³ There is some evidence in the literature that fear of crime also has a significant, albeit weak, positive effect on support for the death penalty (Rankin 1979; Tyler and Weber 1982; Seltzer and McCormick 1987; Keil and Vito 1991; Longmire 1996). The GSS includes an indicator of fear of crime (e.g., Warr 1995), but it is unavailable for about one-third of the cases in our sample. To avoid dropping data for years in which this indicator is unavailable, we do not include it in the analysis presented below. However, we replicated our analysis on the sample of cases for which the fear item is available. These analyses reveal that fear exerts a significant, positive effect on death penalty support and that the effects of the other variables are virtually identical to those shown below.

¹⁴ We used mean replacement to minimize the loss of cases due to missing data for some of the control variables. For church attendance and education, we mean-replaced less than 1% of all responses. About 7% of the cases were mean-replaced because of missing data on the conservatism scale ($N = 2,282$). In all regression models reported below in which these variables appear, we include dummy variables that identify the cases in which mean replacement was used. To assess the sensitivity of our results to this strategy, we also reestimated all regression models after excluding respondents for whom information on these variables was missing; the results obtained from these supplementary analyses were substantively identical to those reported.

squared version of this variable.¹⁵ Finally, to minimize the possibility of drawing misleading conclusions about the hypothesized contextual effects, we conduct sensitivity analyses that incorporate three additional contextual variables: resource deprivation,¹⁶ the unemployment rate, and the male divorce rate. Although these variables have not been discussed in the death penalty literature, they are often included in studies of crime and punishment (e.g., Myers and Talarico 1986; Land et al. 1990; Myers and Massey 1991; Greenberg and West 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2001). Moreover, they are significantly correlated with one or more of the contextual predictors that form the focus of our analysis (see app. table A2), and they may influence death penalty support (Garland 2000; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002). Holding these factors constant increases confidence in our assessment of the hypotheses evaluated in the study.

Analytic Strategy

We employ a multilevel modeling strategy to examine the effects of homicide rates on support for the death penalty. Multilevel regression models have become the standard method for estimating the effects of community characteristics on individual attitudes and behaviors, especially when the data used for such studies contain a substantial amount of respondent clustering within communities (e.g., Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Conceptually, multilevel regression models provide a direct and efficient means of describing the degree to which a given individual-level outcome, such as support for the death penalty, varies across geographic areas. In addition, an important methodological benefit is that multilevel models formally adjust for nonindependence of sample members who reside in the same community. Failure to model this type of nonindependence can result in estimated standard errors that are biased downward, which may in turn produce misleading conclusions about the statistical and substantive importance of community variables (DiPrete and Forristal 1994; Snijders and Bosker 1999).

The two most general types of multilevel models used to estimate the effects of community variables on a given individual-level outcome variable are random-slope and random-intercept models. Random-slope models are particularly well-suited for examining cross-level interactions, such

¹⁵ We also conducted the analysis by modeling the time trend with dummy variables for each interview year using 1974 as the reference year (analyses not shown). The substantive conclusions drawn from these models were identical to those we describe below.

¹⁶ Resource deprivation is a principal components index composed of the poverty rate, median family income, and female-headed families (see app. table A1).

as whether the effect (i.e., the slope) of a specified individual-level explanatory variable varies across communities. In contrast, the main purpose of random-intercept models is to evaluate the degree to which the mean value of a given dependent variable (i.e., the intercept) varies across communities and to examine whether a specified set of explanatory variables helps to account for that variation. Because our theoretical focus in the present research is on the extent to which our explanatory variables help to explain variation in death penalty support across geographic areas, we estimate random-intercept models in which all slope parameters are treated as fixed across the geographic areas represented in our data. Specifically, given the binary coding of our dependent variable, we estimate a series of two-level hierarchical logistic random-intercept regression models (for detailed descriptions of these models, see Wong and Mason [1985], Patterson [1991], Guo and Zhao [2000], and Raudenbush and Bryk [2002]).¹⁷

Our analysis proceeds in the following manner. We begin by estimating multilevel regression models that describe the extent of variation in support for the death penalty across GSS PSUs and evaluate the degree to which that variation is due to compositional differences. We then assess whether our contextual predictors affect support for the death penalty, net of other factors, and whether they account for spatial variation in levels of support.

RESULTS

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for all of the variables included in the analysis. Although support for the death penalty has fluctuated substantially between 1974 and 1998, overall, 70% of GSS respondents interviewed during this period reported that they favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. On average, GSS respondents reside in geographic areas (i.e., metropolitan areas and counties) in which there are about 9 homicides annually per 100,000 residents and in which there is a moderately conservative political climate, a population composition of slightly more than 11% black (before logging), and a distribution of family incomes that is moderately unequal. Table 1 also demonstrates that there is variation in the social contexts to which respondents are exposed; our analysis explores whether this translates into geographic differences in support for the death penalty.

¹⁷ All models presented are estimated with HLM for Windows 4.01 (Bryk, Raudenbush, and Congdon 1996). The results shown are from unit-specific models (see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002).

Support for Capital Punishment

TABLE 1
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS
OF CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

	Mean	SD
Dependent variable:		
Favor death penalty70	.45
Contextual variables:		
Homicide rate	8.73	6.96
Conservative climate	4.13	.28
%black (logged)	1.66	1.61
Income inequality37	.03
Control variables:		
Individual-level:		
Time	13.47	7.46
Time ²	237.03	201.84
White85	.35
Male44	.50
Age	45.30	17.60
Bachelor's degree or more18	.39
Junior college degree05	.21
High school degree52	.50
No high school degree25	.43
Family income	9.73	2.85
Married56	.50
Conservatism	4.11	1.28
Religious fundamentalism32	.47
Church attendance	2.63	1.17
Place size (logged)	3.44	2.11
South35	.48
West18	.38
PSU-level:		
Resource deprivation	-.01	.99
Unemployment rate	5.97	2.02
Male divorce rate	5.93	2.35

NOTE.—Descriptive statistics for the dependent and individual-level control variables are based on 32,632 cases, and descriptives for the contextual variables and PSU-level control variables are based on the 268 PSUs within which these respondents reside.

Geographic Variation in Death Penalty Support

We begin by evaluating the degree to which support for the death penalty actually varies across geographic areas sampled in the GSS. We do so formally in model 1 of table 2, which presents results from a regression equation that includes an intercept parameter that describes the mean log odds of death penalty support for GSS respondents and a variance component that describes whether there is significant variation in support across the geographic communities represented by the GSS. The estimated

Church attendance						
Place size						
South						
West						
Homicide rate						
Conservative climate						
%black						
Income inequality						
Resource deprivation						
Unemployment rate						
Male divorce rate						
Random effects:						
Intercept, τ_{0i}						
σ						
χ^2						

NOTE.— $N = 32,632$. SEs are given in parentheses

* $P < .05$, two-tailed test


† $P < .05$, one-tailed test

intercept corresponds (within rounding) to the mean level of support for the death penalty across all geographic areas from which GSS respondents were sampled ($.71 = \exp(.901)/1 + \exp(.901)$). More important for the purposes of the present research, the random effects variance parameter and test statistic shown in model 1 ($\tau_{00} = .129$; $\chi^2 = 1117$) indicate that there is significant variation in support for the death penalty between these geographic areas. Figure 1 displays a histogram that summarizes the degree of variation in death penalty support across geographic areas represented in the GSS. This figure demonstrates that levels of support for the death penalty vary from less than 50% in some areas to greater than 90% in others. Thus, although the United States is often described as a nation that exhibits very high levels of support for capital punishment (e.g., Hood 1998), that characterization ignores the substantial internal heterogeneity in attitudes toward the death penalty that exists in the United States. Indeed, public sentiment about the death penalty is decidedly mixed in many of the geographic areas sampled in the GSS, and in some areas, a majority of persons *disapprove* of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder.

Figure 1 prompts the question as to what factors might account for differences in levels of support for capital punishment across space. One possibility is that these differences merely reflect compositional differences in populations. In other words, it is possible that geographic areas in which levels of support for the death penalty are higher simply contain more individuals with attributes that are associated with support for the death penalty. Alternatively, rates of support for the death penalty may be higher in some geographic areas because residents of those areas are exposed to higher rates of homicide or because of a more conservative political climate, a larger percentage of black residents, or higher levels of economic inequality. Models 2–4 of table 2 assess the validity of these possible explanations.

Compositional Effects

Model 2 includes individual-level attributes shown in prior research to be related to death penalty support. The fixed-effects portion of model 3 shows that whites, males, married persons, individuals with more conservative political views, and those with higher family incomes are significantly more likely to favor the death penalty. Individuals with relatively high or low levels of education, those who attend church more regularly, and those who reside in places with larger populations are significantly less likely to favor the death penalty. Net of these factors, respondents who reside in the southern or western region of the United States are more likely than those from other regions to favor capital



% of Respondents Who Favor the Death Penalty

FIG. 1.—Distribution of levels of support for the death penalty for 268 GSS primary sampling units, 1974–98

punishment. These results are highly consistent with an extensive body of prior research on death penalty attitudes (for reviews, see Bohm [1991] and Longmire [1996]).

The control variables explain a nontrivial portion of the variance in death penalty support across communities. A comparison of the variance components for models 1 and 2 indicates that more than one-quarter of the variation across PSUs in levels of support for the death penalty is accounted for by these individual-level attributes ($.271 = .129 - .094/.129$). Further analyses (not shown) revealed that about half of the overall spatial variance in death penalty support explained by the control variables is due to the time trend variables, while the other half is accounted for primarily by respondent race and political conservatism. Thus, part of the explanation for why some geographic areas exhibit higher levels of support for the death penalty is that respondents were sampled from these areas during years in which levels of support were higher overall and that these areas contain more whites and persons who self-identify as being politically conservative. Nonetheless, the variance component statistics in model 2 indicate that a significant amount of between-community variation in support for the death penalty remains even after controlling for these indicators. This suggests that other factors also contribute to differences across communities in levels of support for the death penalty.

Contextual Effects on Support for the Death Penalty

As documented above, a variety of contextual factors have been identified in the literature as potential predictors of geographic variation in support for the death penalty. Instrumental/pragmatic theories and socialization theories emphasize direct and indirect exposure to high levels of violence; constructionist perspectives on public opinion emphasize, among other things, the degree of conservatism in the local political climate; and threat perspectives highlight the relative size of minority groups and the concentration of economic resources. Models 3 and 4 of table 2 present regression results that evaluate these hypotheses. Model 3 includes all of the individual-level control variables, plus the four contextual explanatory variables that are of primary interest in our research. In model 4, we assess the robustness of our findings by introducing controls for additional contextual variables that may be associated with death penalty attitudes.¹⁸

¹⁸ Some of the contextual variables examined exhibit relatively strong correlations (see app. table A1), and therefore, multicollinearity is a potential concern. We inspected variance inflation factors (VIFs) for each of the contextual variables, and none was over 4 (the highest VIF was 3.8), indicating that multicollinearity is not a major problem

Model 3 indicates that three of the four contextual variables exhibit the expected effects. The estimated effect of the level of homicide is in the expected direction and is statistically significant. Consistent with instrumental/pragmatic theories, holding other factors constant, persons who live in areas with higher homicide rates are significantly more likely than others to favor the death penalty.¹⁹ We also find support for our hypothesis about the contextual effect of political conservatism. Several prior studies have shown that persons who identify with a conservative political orientation are more likely to support the death penalty. Beyond this, our results indicate that regardless of one's own political views, residing in a more politically conservative area increases the likelihood that individuals support the death penalty. Model 3 reveals mixed evidence for the threat hypotheses examined in our research. The coefficient for %black is in the expected direction and is statistically significant. Note that the contextual effect of %black is opposite of the individual race effect. Although blacks are significantly less likely to support the death penalty, persons who reside in areas with a higher percentage of blacks are significantly *more* likely to favor the death penalty. In contrast, the coefficient for income inequality is negative and is not statistically significant.²⁰

Although not the main focus of our analysis, two other noteworthy findings emerge in model 3. First, comparing the coefficients for the time trend variables in models 2 and 3 indicates that temporal changes in support for the death penalty are not due to changes over time in the control variables or the contextual predictors. The inability of changes in factors such as marital status, political conservatism, education, and homicide rates to explain temporal trends in support for capital punishment challenges much speculation in the research literature (e.g., Ellsworth and Gross 1994; Niemi et al. 1989; Page and Shapiro 1992) and the popular press (Shapiro 2000). Second, controlling for the contextual predictors

in our models. Evaluation of the condition indices, however, reveals some evidence of multicollinearity between the indicators of income inequality and resource deprivation included in model 4. Nevertheless, this does not alter the substantive conclusions drawn about these two variables (e.g., neither is statistically significant when the other is removed) and, more important, the coefficients for the other contextual predictors exhibit stability across specifications that include or exclude these variables.

¹⁹ In subsequent analyses, we considered the possibility that short-term *change* in local homicide rates, rather than the *level* of homicide, might affect death penalty attitudes. We constructed a variety of change measures (e.g., absolute change, %change) ranging from one to five years. None of these change measures yielded a significant effect on support for the death penalty in our multivariate models (results not shown).

²⁰ We evaluated a variety of different functional forms for these variables (e.g., linear splines defined at various points of their distributions, a quadratic transformation), but none yielded a significant coefficient or an improvement in model fit.

explains fully the effect on death penalty support of residence in the South. Further analyses (not shown) reveal that higher levels of support for the death penalty observed in the South are a function of regional differences in racial composition and homicide rates.²¹

The most important findings shown in model 3 reveal that the homicide rate, a conservative political climate, and the relative size of the black population are significant predictors of death penalty support. In model 4 of table 2, we assess whether these conclusions hold up under a different model specification. In particular, we evaluate whether the effects observed for these variables are confounded with other community characteristics, including levels of resource deprivation, unemployment rates, and divorce rates. Although past studies of public opinion on the death penalty have not considered these contextual variables, macrolevel studies have demonstrated that each is at least moderately correlated with homicide rates, %black, and income inequality (e.g., Land et al. 1990). Moreover, areas characterized by a more conservative political climate tend to have higher levels of resource deprivation and higher male divorce rates (see app. table A2). Thus, it is potentially important to hold these variables constant in evaluating the effects on death penalty support observed for homicide, conservative climate, and %black.

Model 4 shows that the unemployment rate and the male divorce rate do not exert significant effects on support for the death penalty. The coefficient for resource deprivation, in contrast, is negative and statistically significant using a one-tailed test ($P \leq .05$). Controlling for several individual-level attributes and other contextual conditions, persons who reside in communities with lower income levels and a larger percentage of families headed by females are significantly less likely to favor the death penalty. Most important for the purposes of our analysis, even after controlling for these factors, we find significant effects of homicide, conservative climate, and %black on death penalty support. Overall, the contextual predictors considered account for 18% ($.18 = .094 - .077/.094$) of the spatial variance in death penalty support not accounted for by the control variables, and, collectively, the variables included in the analysis

²¹ We reestimated model 3 of table 2 with each of the contextual predictors entered separately and in various combinations. The coefficient for southern regional location was not attenuated when conservative climate and income inequality were controlled. In contrast, it was reduced substantially and was no longer statistically significant when either %black or the homicide rate was considered.

explain 40% ($.40 = .129 - .077/.129$) of the total spatial variance in death penalty support.²²

In general, the individual-level attributes exert the strongest effects on support for the death penalty, but the magnitude of the effects of homicide, conservative climate, and %black are nontrivial. Table 3 presents predicted probabilities of death penalty support for respondents who reside in communities that differ substantially along these dimensions. In each case, the predicted probabilities were computed using the coefficients from model 4 of table 2 and assuming mean values for all other variables (see, e.g., Hosmer and Lemeshow 2000). The predicted probabilities associated with the estimated homicide effect imply that levels of support for capital punishment range from about 70% in areas with very low homicide rates (the 5th percentile) to about 75% in areas with very high homicide rates (the 95th percentile), assuming mean values for all other variables (including the other contextual predictors). Conservative climate and %black exhibit effects of similar magnitude.

Although modest in magnitude, it is important to note that the effects of these contextual variables are additive and, because some of them covary significantly, it is informative to consider their combined effects.²³ For instance, among those who reside in predominantly white communities with very low homicide rates, the predicted probability of death penalty support is 0.67, while the comparable figure for persons who reside in predominantly black areas with very high homicide rates is 0.77. This difference represents more than half of the range of observed temporal change in support for the death penalty across the years included in our study.

²² We also considered the effects on death penalty attitudes of the legal status of the death penalty (i.e., legal vs. illegal) and the number of executions carried out in the state in which GSS respondents reside. The state of residence for GSS respondents is not available, but can be inferred from the PSU geographic identifier for most respondents. For persons who live in PSUs that cross state boundaries, we created measures for all possible states in which they could have resided. The various measures yielded similar effects: persons who reside in states in which the death penalty is legal or in which more persons were executed by the state (in the year prior to the GSS interview) are significantly more likely to support the death penalty, net of the individual and other contextual variables. The causal order in these complex relationships is uncertain: the relationships could reflect the influence of state policy and action on public support for the death penalty, or they could reflect the responsiveness of the state to public opinion. A full assessment of this issue is beyond the scope of the present research. Nevertheless, the fact that the effects of homicide, conservative political climate, and racial composition persist after controlling for these variables bolsters our conclusions about their role in shaping public opinion about the death penalty.

²³ We tested for the possibility that the effects of the contextual independent variables were multiplicative. Of the numerous two- and three-way interactions considered, none was statistically significant.

TABLE 3
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES OF DEATH PENALTY SUPPORT IN DIFFERENT SOCIAL
CONTEXTS

CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES	PERCENTILE ON CONTEXTUAL VARIABLES						
	5	10	25	50	75	90	95
Homicide rate702	.706	.711	.720	.732	.745	.750
Conservative climate697	.706	.714	.723	.734	.741	.745
%black695	.703	.717	.727	.734	.737	.739

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

The sociological literature acknowledges that public opinion about social issues, including capital punishment, may be shaped by various features of the *social context*. However, despite a large body of research on the individual-level attributes that contribute to the development of punitive attitudes toward punishment in general and support for capital punishment more specifically, few studies have considered whether community contextual characteristics shape these attitudes. Using individual-level data from the GSS that have been linked with macrolevel data on the social and political contexts in which respondents of the survey reside, our analysis examined contextual effects on support for the death penalty. Drawing on instrumental and socialization theories of punitiveness, as well as insights from social constructionist and conflict perspectives, we hypothesized that individuals who reside in areas with a higher rate of homicide, a more conservative political climate, a relatively larger percentage of blacks, and a higher level of income inequality will be more likely than others to favor the death penalty for persons convicted of murder. We expected these effects to persist net of individual-level attributes and other contextual factors that may be associated with support for the death penalty.

The possibility of geographic variation in attitudes about capital punishment had been hinted at in past research, but never evaluated systematically. Our analysis revealed significant community-level variation in support for the death penalty. This challenges conventional wisdom and popular portrayals that support for capital punishment in the United States is universally high (e.g., Singh 2000; Hood 2001). Instead, there is substantial heterogeneity in attitudes about the death penalty within the United States, with some areas exhibiting very high levels of support and others more modest levels of support, including areas in which a majority of residents disapprove of the death penalty.

We found that differences in population composition account for a considerable portion of the geographic variation in public opinion on the

death penalty, but we also found support for the hypothesized effects of the homicide rate, political climate, and racial composition. Consistent with expectations, higher levels of homicide in the local area increase the likelihood that individuals will favor capital punishment, net of a wide array of individual-level predictors and other contextual factors. The theoretical literature on attitudes about crime and punishment suggests that exposure to high homicide rates may increase support for the death penalty by motivating pragmatic or instrumental crime-control responses or through socialization processes whereby residents of high violence areas come to consider violence, including violence carried out by the state, as an acceptable and effective form of punishment.²⁴

Although plausible, there are other possible interpretations of the association between homicide rates and support for capital punishment. For instance, Garland (2000) suggests that high crime rates have weakened the effectiveness of some informal social control mechanisms (see also Anderson 1999; Sampson and Raudenbush 1999), which in turn has created an insecure and precarious social environment in which support for punitive crime control policies has flourished. Somewhat similarly, Black (1976) has argued that where informal social controls are weak, populations tend to be more open to formal measures of social control. Thus, it is conceivable that high homicide rates increase support for capital punishment (and presumably other measures of formal social control) by increasing social disorganization and reducing confidence in informal social controls.

Whatever the mechanisms are that link homicide to support for capital punishment, our findings are inconsistent with the extreme constructionist view that objective conditions are irrelevant to the formation of public opinion about the death penalty. The framing of the crime issue in local areas is likely to be highly influential in the formation of attitudes about the death penalty, but *objective* levels of homicide also are important. We suspect that objective levels of crime and the rhetoric and imagery used by elites and the media to frame the crime issue coalesce in shaping public opinion about capital punishment (see also Garland 2000).²⁵ Consistent

²⁴ For a subset of the years included in our study, the GSS contains items that have been used in prior research as indicators of "fear of crime" (see Warr 1995) and "support for violence" (see Dixon and Lizotte 1987; Cao, Adams, and Jensen 1997). To evaluate whether these factors mediate the homicide effect, we reestimated our regression models based on the subset of cases for which these indicators were available (see also n. 12). Although fear of crime and the indicators of support for violence exert significant positive effects on death penalty support, they do not mediate the effects of any of the contextual predictors.

²⁵ For a general discussion of the importance of both objective and subjective features in the construction of social problems, see Best (1993).

with this assertion, Beckett suggests that "the increased incidence of crime-related problems may facilitate their politicization and contribute to growing support for getting-tough" (1997, p. 15).

The significant contextual effect observed for our indicator of the political climate provides support for the constructionist argument that, independent of levels of violence, the political context in which social problems are framed has an important influence on public sentiment about capital punishment. Although we do not have direct measures of the claims-making process, the results are consistent with suggestions that conservative politicians exploit concerns about crime in a manner that effectively increases support for punitive policies, even among those who do not hold a conservative ideology themselves. This could occur directly through exposure to political initiatives or media coverage of crime and punishment, or indirectly through collective socialization processes whereby some elements of conservative ideology (e.g., support for capital punishment), but not others, become contagious and spread throughout the community.

The results reveal mixed support for the threat hypotheses examined. Consistent with much of the literature on threat effects on the exercise of various forms of social control (for a review, see Liska and Messner [1999]), controlling for levels of homicide and a variety of other factors, we found that %black exhibits a significant positive effect on support for the death penalty, whereas the effect of income inequality is nonsignificant. It is perhaps not surprising that racial composition affects attitudes about capital punishment more than economic composition given the substantial degree to which race and punishment are inextricably intertwined in the United States (Hawkins 1997; Kennedy 1997; Blume, Eisenberg, and Johnson 1998; Bowers, Steiner, and Sandys 2001; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002).

We cannot test directly the causal mechanisms that account for the association between racial composition and support for the death penalty. It could reflect differences in perceived threat, but it also could represent some other macro- or microlevel process. For instance, Anderson and others (Massey and Denton 1993; Kennedy 1997) have suggested that in many predominantly black communities in the United States there is a "sense of alienation from mainstream society and its institutions" (Anderson 1999, p. 34), and as noted above, Garland (2000) argues that such conditions may increase public support for punitive measures of social control.

Overall, our analyses underscore the general importance of the larger social context for explaining individual attitudes toward capital punishment. The results suggest that a comprehensive understanding of public opinion on capital punishment requires information both about the char-

acteristics of individuals and the social environment in which they live. Nonetheless, although our results have identified some of the factors that help to account for spatial variation in support for capital punishment, a substantial amount of variation remains unexplained by the variables considered. An important avenue for further inquiry is to explore whether other variables enhance our ability to explain that variation.

One possibility is that spatial differences in support for the death penalty are better explained by disaggregated rather than total homicide rates. For example, stranger, felony, and multiple-victim homicides might have a particularly strong effect on attitudes toward the death penalty. It also may be that interracial homicides have a stronger effect than intraracial incidents on death penalty attitudes. These types of murders frame much of the public debate about capital punishment, and they tend to dominate local media coverage of violence. Alternatively, perhaps the incidence of wrongful conviction in capital cases or, more generally, perceptions of bias or a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system are keys to cross-sectional variation in public opinion about the death penalty (Westervelt and Humphrey 2001). Further research along these lines might contribute to a fuller understanding of spatial variation in death-penalty support.

Finally, future research on death penalty support might also consider the degree to which micro- and macrolevel factors *interact* in their effects on death penalty attitudes. The objective of our research led us to purposely fix the effects of individual-level covariates to be constant across geographic areas, but it is plausible to speculate that the effects of some individual-level attributes may vary across local contexts. For example, consistent with a large body of research on punitiveness, we found that race and gender were among the two strongest predictors of support for capital punishment, with whites and males significantly more likely than nonwhites and females to report that they favor the death penalty. But are race and gender differences in punitiveness invariant across social contexts, or are there certain structural and cultural conditions that moderate these differences? Pursuing these types of questions would advance considerably our understanding of how individual and aggregate factors affect death penalty attitudes. In light of recent calls for a moratorium on executions and renewed debate over the death penalty, greater attention to the sources of public support for capital punishment in the United States assumes special urgency.

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
DEFINITIONS AND METRICS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES INCLUDED IN ANALYSIS OF
CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

Variable	Variable Definition and Metric
Individual-level variables:	
White	Respondent's race (0 = nonwhite; 1 = white)
Male	Respondent's sex (0 = female, 1 = male)
Age	Respondent's age in years
Education	Four dichotomous variables indicating the highest educational degree attained by the respondent (bachelor's degree or more; junior college degree; high school diploma or GED; no high school degree)
Family income	Eight-point scale ranging from less than \$1,000 to over \$25,000
Married	Respondent's marital status (0 = unmarried; 1 = married)
Conservatism	Seven-point scale indicating respondent's political views (1 = extremely liberal; 2 = liberal; 3 = slightly liberal; 4 = moderate; 5 = slightly conservative; 6 = conservative; 7 = extremely conservative)
Religious fundamentalism	Fundamentalism/liberalism of respondent's religion (1 = fundamentalist; 0 = moderate or liberal)
Church attendance	Four-point scale indicating how often respondent attends religious services (1 = less than once per year; 2 = several times per year, 3 = 1-3 times per year; 4 = weekly or more)
Place size	Logged population size of the census place in which respondent lives
South	Respondent resides in the south
West	Respondent resides in the west
PSU-level variables:	
Resource deprivation	Three-item principal components factor that combines percentage of families living in poverty, median family income, and the percentage of families headed by a female
Unemployment rate	Percentage of persons age 16 and older in the civilian labor force who are not employed
Male divorce rate	Percentage of males age 14 and older who are divorced

TABLE A2
CORRELATIONS FOR PSU-LEVEL VARIABLES IN ANALYSIS OF CONTEXTUAL EFFECTS ON
SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
1. Homicide rate		-.042	.591*	.424*	.266*	-.056	.003
2. Conservative climate ..			-.105	.208*	.254*	.093	.240*
3. %black (logged)271*	.044	-.071	.108
4. Income inequality794*	.416*	.175*
5. Resource deprivation452*	-.081
6. Unemployment rate172*
7. Male divorce rate

NOTE: $N = 268$

* $P < .05$.

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Review Essay: The Souls of Sociologists—Equality versus Freedom in the Twenty-first Century¹

Problem of the Century: Racial Stratification in the United States. Edited by Elijah Anderson and Douglas S. Massey. New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2001. Pp. viii+470. \$42.50.

Still the Big News: Racial Oppression in America. By Bob Blauner. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2001. Pp. xiv+269. \$22.05 (paper).

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Well past Y2K, after the anxieties that normally accompany the fin-de-siècle, well launched (well, launched, anyway) into the 21st century, the field of sociology is still unable to comprehend the enormity of race. Ironical isn't it? The discipline arguably owes its very existence to the theme of race: its early theoreticians (think Spencer) and its early methodologists (think eugenics) were social Darwinists, especially in the United States. Of course there were important countertrends, emphasizing the social dimensions of race and opposing biological understandings of the "problem." But these authors too (e.g., Robert E. Park) were preoccupied with race. All this attention to racial themes was driven by historical change: abolition, immigration, urbanization, and industrialization all generated ferocious political and cultural struggles over the meaning of race. Du Bois's famous dictum ([1903] 1989, p. 35)—"The problem of the Twentieth Century is the problem of the color-line"—was thus both a summation of a commonly recognized reality and a challenge to the arrogant white supremacy that had been taken for granted for centuries.

So sociology owes its existence in large part to the problematic of race. It is not alone in this, by the way: this statement applies to the social sciences *tout court*, especially to anthropology and psychology, and even to modern history and economics. I cannot discuss this claim at length

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here, but it is argued elsewhere (see Chase 1977; Winant 2001, 2000; Zuberi 2001; Marks 1995). Yet the field is still divided internally about race as well, as it has been since such early works as Du Bois's *The Philadelphia Negro: A Social Study* (1899) and *The Souls of Black Folk* forcefully challenged the racist norms that prevailed within sociology as much as they did within American society. We are torn between science and politics, analysis and activism. And the sociology of race is riven by two conflicting substantive concerns: equality and freedom.

I can hear the teeth-gnashing of many liberal and progressive colleagues: they are asking how equality and freedom can be at odds. Cannot social science serve the high and worthy political goals of freedom and justice? Certainly for many years—let us say since the maturation of Chicago sociology in the 1920s and 1930s and since the appearance of the Myrdal (1944) study—mainstream sociology has perceived no contradiction here (with a few exceptions such as Ladner [1973]). Yet in recent years, as the United States has entered the post-Civil Rights era, as neo-conservatism and “colorblindness” have become the mainstream racial ideologies, as commitments to desegregation and affirmative action—never much more than symbolic at their height—have flickered out, as the national racial dynamic has shifted definitively from the bipolar black-white conflict that was an inheritance of slavery and abolition to a multifaceted (white/black/brown/yellow/red) racial system linked to the globality of race, the sociology of race has once more been overcome by political contradictions. These were—once again ironically—the same dilemmas that we thought we had transcended at the height of the Civil Rights movement of the 1960s. Perhaps we only flattered ourselves into thinking that we had transcended them.

Indeed our present “American dilemma” extends to the very meaning of the concepts of equality and freedom. Radical social theorists have long questioned the meaning of equality in a society that allocates resources so asymmetrically and unfairly. What can equality mean, asked such thinkers as Marx and Nietzsche (and Weber as well) when not only wealth, but also other varieties of positive “life chances,” such as access to education, health care, and human rights, remain unavailable? Such contemporary thinkers as Nobel laureate Amartya Sen have even questioned the possibility of measuring (in)equality quantitatively, arguing that it must be understood qualitatively, in terms of human capability, rather than in terms of possession of material resources (Sen 1999).

Problems persist in understanding the meaning of “freedom” as well. The gestation of U.S. society (and of modern world society) in the conquest, extermination, and enslavement of many millions of persons, most of whom were racially differentiated from those who ruled them and benefited from their captivity and labor, has given rise to a negative and

racially inflected definition of freedom as the absence of slavery. Here too Sen's work is useful: he attempts to conceptualize freedom positively, once again in terms of capability.

Racially speaking, though, at the beginning of the 21st century, U.S. society operates under more "normal" circumstances. Now there is more racial mobility: we have black, Latino, and Asian cabinet members and black CEOs of giant multinational corporations. Latinos and Asian Americans too play a far greater role than they did decades ago: changing migration and fertility patterns, the shifting demography of race, indeed the new racial transnationalism that followed World War II (Winant 2001), have greatly transformed the U.S. racial scene. As far as black-white dynamics are concerned, the present racial situation is often described as "the post-Civil Rights era." Everyday accounts of race and racism—such as those available from the mainstream media and from political leaders, as well as those that operate even in university settings—tell us that the racial crisis that engulfed the United States a few decades ago has passed. This is the new "common sense": that little remains of the organized black liberation movement that confronted Jim Crow in the South and rose up in anger in the ghetto "riots" during the 1960s; that reforms have been made; that racial attitudes have shifted; that far from espousing white supremacy (which was certainly the norm before World War II and far from uncommon even in the 1960s), most whites today call themselves color blind.

Yet at the same time, by almost every conceivable indicator researchers can bring forward, the same racial inequalities—or shall I say the same "structural racism"—that existed in the past persist today: modified here and there perhaps, but hardly eliminated and not even much reduced in scope, especially in terms of black-white disparities. This is not the place to inventory the data, but whether we look at wealth or income (in)equality, health, access and returns to education, segregation by residence or occupation, rates of surveillance or incarceration, or many other indicators that compare life chances across racial groups, we find patterns strikingly similar to those of the past.

So what can sociology make of this discrepancy between mainstream interpretation and the results of empirical investigation? Are we to join the pundits and politicians who ceaselessly instruct racially defined minorities to pull themselves up by their own bootstraps and, in callous distortion of Martin Luther King, Jr.'s message, exhort them to accept the "content of their character rather than the color of their skin" as the basic social value of the country? (Steele 1990; Thernstrom and Thernstrom 1997). Or are we to bend our efforts to the task—almost as difficult today as it was in times past—of undoing the inequalities and injustices our research generally documents? Can we envision our discipline con-

tributing—as Du Bois’s work did—to the creation of new political organizations, new forms of study and activism, new freedom schools, perhaps constructed within our own departments and institutions?

The two books examined here offer quite different takes on the sociology of race at the start of the 21st century. How effectively, how deeply, do they confront the peculiar condition of today’s racism—a system that has been both transformed and perpetuated in the years since World War II? How effectively do these two texts delineate and explain the condition of inequality that continues to characterize U.S. patterns of race and racism? How can these two works be put to use—in our classes, our research, our sociological practice—to advance the goals of antiracism and freedom?

I have not invoked Du Bois by chance. Anderson and Massey place their edited volume squarely in the master’s shadow. Based in a conference they organized at the University of Pennsylvania to commemorate the centenary of Du Bois’s first great work, *The Philadelphia Negro*, and titled in homage to Du Bois’s most famous dictum, *The Problem of the Century* seeks to survey the pattern of racial stratification in America.²

Yet there are also some discrepancies between the Duboisian legacy and the attempt to emulate it in the Anderson and Massey volume. For Du Bois, the problem of the century was not racial stratification but the color line—which centrally includes politics, culture, and identity and is not confined to inequality, important as that issue is. By his 1903 term “color-line” Du Bois meant what we today mean by the term “racism.” Of this there can be no doubt.

And there is another problem too: What century are we talking about? For Du Bois, writing in 1903, it was the 20th century. For the Anderson and Massey book, launched as a project in 1999 and published in 2001, matters are quite different. Is it a *fin-de-siècle* review of Du Bois’s “problem”? Or is the “problem” in the book’s title a prospective one, implying that the book is oriented toward the new century, the future? This is no small matter.

With some small exceptions, the book addresses issues of (in)equality in the present. Most of the articles consider very familiar problems of socioeconomic inequality: in the workplace (chap. 14, Edin and Nelson; chap. 1, Anderson), in residential segregation (chap. 10, Charles; chap. 12, Massey; chap. 11, Madden), and in resource distribution (chap. 9, Aiken and Sloane; chap. 16, Kao). A few contributors raise conceptual issues that problematize the overall focus on stratification, recogniz-

² I was a visiting professor at the University of Pennsylvania at the time and took part in the conference as a discussant for a paper, but I do not have a contribution in this edited volume.

ing—sometimes consciously and sometimes seemingly by accident—the extent to which this limited framework obscures the deeper social structure of racism and depoliticizes the issue of race.

More than any other contributor, Tukufu Zuberi (chap. 6) takes note of the color line by examining the deployment of racial categories in demography as if they were “real” rather than themselves reflections of a system of domination. His work here and elsewhere explicitly challenges demographers to reinvent their approach to race in order to make freedom, not (in)equality, the central concern. Ivar Berg (chap. 5) effectively demonstrates some of the ways that the American political system has shaped racial opportunity structures—and the color line—by affording legitimate group-based rights and status to whites while systematically denying these rights to blacks and other racialized minority groups. Berg deserves particular credit for linking the racism inherent in this process to the historical rise of capitalism (notably the achievement by corporations of fictive personhood), the global dynamics of job allocation (sweatshops, etc.), and the rhetoric of colorblindness. Looking at the racial conflicts and potentialities of the women’s movement, Robin Leidner (chap. 4) effectively gives attention to social movement questions, almost the only author to do so in the entire collection. She recognizes the extent to which racism has plagued feminism, and she wrestles valiantly with various attempts to overcome it, but in my view her approach would benefit from placing this effort in historical context, where it is notably visible. Randall Collins’s historical sociology of race (chap. 2) also laudably brings politics to the analytical foreground but suffers from its too-easy conflation of ethnicity/nationality/race. The peculiarly modern characteristics of race, its constitutive role in constructing capitalist labor processes, commodity chains, and indeed the modern world-system, as well as its centrality in enabling the emergence of concepts of popular sovereignty, cannot be reduced to a mere subset of the ethnicity phenomenon. This all-too-common error also tends to cast into doubt Collins’s attempts at prediction at the end of his essay.

Despite numerous valuable contributions, the *Problem of the Century* does not do justice to Du Bois’s legacy. By resolutely ignoring the political dimensions of U.S. racial dynamics, by restricting itself to the parameters of stratification, the book identifies itself with an overly optimistic perspective on the problem of the color line. Although the editors rather effusively congratulate their own department for its supposed leadership in the sociology of race, nowhere in the book does the legacy of subjugation and disenfranchisement, the comprehensiveness of U.S. racism, rise into view. Nowhere does the tradition of freedom struggle, of antiracist insurgency, of political opposition among African-Americans and other “race

rebels"—notably including Du Bois himself—receive the attention it deserves.

These problems do not affect Bob Blauner's *Still the Big News*, which is a retrospective collection of 30 years of the author's work on race and racism. Blauner's was a very influential voice in the late 1960s and through the 1970s, when ethnicity-based theories of race dominated mainstream sociology. This was the seedtime of neoconservatism: in a crucial series of writings Milton Gordon, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Moynihan, Irving Kristol, Michael Novak, and others repudiated the black movement, whose efforts they had formerly supported (as "moderates," to be sure). The movement was fine so long as it sought inclusion and integration, but when it went beyond opportunity-oriented demands to group-based ones, when it sought redistribution of income or other resources, when it ceased to rely on strategies based on integration and Civil Rights and instead began to make collective demands (like community control) and to seek "black power," the neoconservatives immediately got off the freedom train.

Blauner was the earliest and most forceful critic of Glazer, Kristol, and company. In his influential article "Colonized and Immigrant Minorities" (included in this volume) he refuted the neoconservative equation of black conditions with those faced by European immigrants arriving around the turn of the 20th century. Where Kristol (1966) had written a piece called "The Negro Today Is Like the Immigrant Yesterday," Blauner noted the particularity of different "third world" peoples: "Each third world people has undergone distinctive, indeed cataclysmic, experiences on the American continent that separate its history from the others, as well as from whites" (p. 60). With his detailed attention to the political and cultural dynamics of racism, his open advocacy of radical antiracist politics, his explicit linkage between domestic antiracist movements and global movements for national liberation and decolonization, Blauner's was for quite awhile a courageous and lonely voice espousing racial freedom within mainstream sociology. He was certainly one of the very few radical whites to make himself heard, and he was attacked and Red-baited for doing so. In developing his analysis, and in attempting to apply it practically—through his defense of the Black Panthers at the Huey Newton trial and his efforts to challenge an official investigation of the 1965 Watts revolt—Blauner was definitely working in the Duboisian tradition. He combined scholarship and activism, and he advocated for the oppressed: Watts for him was not a "riot" but a "revolt"; racism was best understood not as mere prejudice and discrimination but as "internal colonialism." He engaged the black community in respectful debate, looking early at the complex interactions of racism and sexism and interrogating black cultural politics (see "Black Culture and Its Critics," included here).

In the 1980s, Blauner and a group of associates produced a longitudinal qualitative study of black and white racial attitudes based on research conducted over more than 20 years. Only a small portion of this work, published as *Black Lives, White Lives: Three Decades of Race Relations in America* (1989), appears in this collection under the title "Almost a Race War." This book transcended just about all the qualitative sociology of race that had appeared before it, both in scope and subtlety. It is still worthwhile reading and has served to inspire a host of later qualitative studies. What is perhaps most remarkable about it is its breadth: the book encompasses both white and black radicals and moderates. And by capturing their political orientations and racial identifications as they develop and change over time the book gives a highly unusual, "bottom-up" picture of U.S. racial dynamics from the Civil Rights movement to the age of Reagan.

But since the 1980s, Blauner's scholarship on race has slowed. He has provided a few valuable articles, engaging important topical issues such as antiracist coalition politics, disjunctures in white and black racial discourse, tensions between blacks and Jews, and the use of blatantly racist tactics by the Bush campaign to steal the 2000 election in Florida (and thus in the nation). These materials are collected here under the title "Rethinking Critical Race Theory in a New Era." But regrettably, Blauner does not actually engage the substantial body of work that goes under the name "critical race theory" (see, e.g., Crenshaw et al. 1995; Delgado 1995; Kairys 1993). It would be particularly valuable to have his reflections on this vibrant and developing area of racial theory. Admirably, Blauner has reassessed his earlier position on "internal colonialism": this analysis, while valuable at the time it was originally presented (1969) had drawn significant criticism (including some from me) for sacrificing analytical depth to political desire.

Blauner's sociological merits derive from his sense of moral and political responsibility. He has made real theoretical contributions to the study of race and racism, and he has undertaken some deeply engaged research as well. He remains, as ever, the engagée. The flaws in his work stem from the same commitment that produced its strength and insight: his dedication to the freedom struggle. On occasion his politics have overwhelmed his social science. I, for one, would rather have it that way than the reverse, but if we are to follow in the footsteps of Du Bois—who was not free of this defect either—we must try to walk on both feet.

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Book Reviews

Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience. By John Law. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. ix+252. \$54.95 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

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In the 1980s, the sociologist of science and technology John Law was, along with Michel Callon and Bruno Latour, a founder of "actor-network theory." It argued that science, technology, and society were not separate spheres, not even interacting separate spheres. These spheres were constituted by networks: not the sociometric networks of conventional sociology, but actor-networks linking human and nonhuman actors. Under this theory, agency or intentionality should not be ascribed a priori to human beings alone: hence the controversial insistence that a scallop, the wind, an electron, a text, or a microbe could be classed as an actor. Agency and other properties of actors were formed (or eliminated) in network-building. A scientific statement, for example, became taken as corresponding to reality, not because it was more true than alternatives, but because it formed part of a stronger network, one whose robustness and powers of recruitment were greater.

In 1985, Law began an actor-network case study of the TSR2, a celebrated but canceled British military aircraft project. His goal was to show that the aircraft, its components, and the institutions that built it and decided its fate were all the malleable outcomes of what Law calls "heterogeneous engineering": the simultaneous shaping of the technical, the social, the political, and so on. By 1989, he had a book-length manuscript.

However, Law had "started to become uneasy about my relationship with the aircraft, and especially, with its high-status spokespersons" (p. 54). They wanted him to write a definitive history of the TSR2, to decide whether it had been right to cancel it, and to say what policy lessons could be learned. Law found the second of these expectations conflicting with the goal of exemplifying actor-network theory and discovered that to write policy prescriptions, especially about military procurement, was too uncomfortable. Indeed, he came to reject even the first of these expectations, the definitive history.

So Law put his original manuscript aside and has produced a book quite unlike the actor-network studies of the 1980s. It is broader in its theoretical inspirations: cultural theory and gender studies are particularly prominent. It pays great attention to representation, especially visual im-

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agery. Law talks (sparingly, without self-indulgence) of his own subjectivity: he confesses, for example, to a male "machinic pleasure" in aircraft, even when these are "killing machines" (p. 61). Above all, *Aircraft Stories* exemplifies the plural in its title. Law rejects a unified narrative, which implicitly lends order and coherence to the processes it narrates, preferring the metaphor of the "pinboard," with its juxtaposition of multiple texts and images.

Aircraft Stories can be criticized both analytically and empirically. Analytically, Law places great emphasis on the "performativity" of texts, pictures, and so on. In common with most current users of the term, he generally employs it in a weak sense, interpreting J. L. Austin, author of the classic account of performativity, as saying that an utterance is performative if it is "also an action." A performative utterance, says Law, "makes a difference" (p. 176): it does, or could, affect things. That, however, comes close to a redescription of all discourse: Are there any intentional utterances that are not actions, or any that one can be sure will have no effects? In contrast, there is a stronger sense of performativity in which a performative utterance is one that makes itself true. A simple example is an absolute monarch declaring someone an outlaw. The monarch's statement is self-validating: the person described as an outlaw is now, indeed, an outlaw. On the stronger definition (which Law alludes to, but does not generally use), most utterances—including many that have effects—are not performative. The virtue of the narrower definition is that it heightens curiosity about the empirical and theoretical features of utterances, images, and equations that make themselves true. There are echoes here of Robert K. Merton's account of the self-fulfilling prophecy and of Barry Barnes, whose work Law cites but does not fully exploit, who has recently shown just how central the topic is to understanding social order.

Empirically, there is one key absence from *Aircraft Stories*. In a book largely about the "microphysics of power," there is almost no attention to accountancy (surely a crucial such microphysics, both in general and in this specific case): the portrayal of the TSR2 as "too expensive" was critical in the aircraft's demise. It is a curious omission, since Law has written about accountancy in other contexts.

These, however, are minor flaws when set against the book's virtues. Law posits a world that is neither unified nor wholly fragmented, and he exemplifies this vision in a text constructed with great skill. He writes well, sometimes almost poetically, with few of the tortured sentences of much cultural theory. Many readers may disagree with his theses, but few will fail to be stimulated by this brave, challenging book.

The Story of Taxol: Nature and Politics in the Pursuit of an Anti-Cancer Drug. By Jordan Goodman and Vivien Walsh. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiii+282. \$27.95.

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This is an extremely timely and interesting book; a fascinating history of how *Taxus brevifolia*, a "trash tree" growing on public lands in the Pacific Northwest, was transformed into Taxol, the most profitable, possibly the most hyped, and the most controversial cancer treatment drug in the world. It is this multidimensional transformation, or series of translations—from tree to treatment, from public property to corporate entity, and from object of scientific study to subject of public scrutiny—that Jordan Goodman and Vivien Walsh document and analyze in *The Story of Taxol: Nature and Politics in the Pursuit of an Anti-Cancer Drug*.

Taxol was first identified and isolated in the early 1960s, when scientists working in the National Cancer Institute's (NCI) chemotherapy program, an outgrowth of Cold War chemical research, screened bark from the yew tree for possible anticancer properties. Over the course of the next three decades and with varying levels of enthusiasm, the NCI sponsored in-house and extramural research investigating taxol's potential effectiveness as a cancer chemotherapeutic agent. In 1991, after three decades of publicly funded research, the U.S. government signed a series of Cooperative Research and Development Agreements with Bristol-Myers Squibb. In exchange for a commitment to bring taxol to market and sell it at a reasonable price, Bristol-Myers Squibb was given the right of first refusal on all *T. brevifolia* harvested from public lands and exclusive access to the research on taxol already conducted by the NCI. A year later, Taxol (now a registered trademark of Bristol-Myers Squibb) became the first compound discovered in the NCI-USDA plant screening program to gain FDA approval for use in chemotherapy. In 1992, Taxol was approved for the treatment of ovarian cancer. Within two years, it had been patented in 70 countries and approved for the treatment of breast cancer, a much larger market than ovarian cancer. By the year 2000, Taxol had been approved by the FDA for the treatment of four different kinds of cancer and was earning between \$4 and \$5 million a day for Bristol-Myers Squibb. Along the way, however, taxol and its various permutations—including *T. brevifolia*, taxol, Taxol, and paclitaxel—sparked a number of controversies. Three of these resulted in congressional investigations, each of which engaged a different constellation of actors, including loggers, bark contractors, environmentalists, scientists, cancer patients, politicians, bureaucrats, and business people.

The authors, both of whom hail from the Institute of Science and Technology at the University of Manchester, approach their subject from a perspective known as actor-network theory. This approach, developed

most famously in the work of Bruno Latour, attempts, as Goodman and Walsh write, "to follow 'the fragile thread' of the object's associations through the various networks of which it is part" (p. 3). Actor-network theory attends to how the object is continually made and remade, emphasizing the contingency, instability, ambiguity, and multiplicity of the object's identities and uses. This approach is well suited to the study of taxol, and Goodman and Walsh aptly demonstrate that taxol is "an entity with multiple identities, a natural product, an anti-cancer drug, a complex organic molecule, a biomedical research tool, an agent of political leverage, an object of hope and a bone of contention" (p. 3). In part, the story of taxol is a story of linear progression, one in which taxol begins as a tree and ends up as a chemotherapy agent. In part, however, the story of taxol is a story of simultaneity, one in which taxol's identities are produced simultaneously, in nonidentical ways, within different actor-networks.

One of the many strengths of this book is Goodman and Walsh's detailed research into the political economy of *T. brevifolia*. We learn about the practical difficulties and the nitty-gritty of bark collecting, the ins and outs of contracting and subcontracting, and the business of taxol extraction and purification. In this part of the book, Goodman and Walsh argue that the whole problem of the so-called supply shortage of taxol was the result of "lock-in"—an inability to think outside the box and consider alternatives. They point out that the NCI was very slow, for example, to support the work of scientists who were attempting to develop ways of producing taxol using synthetic and semisynthetic processes—efforts that could have solved the supply problem much earlier than they ultimately did. Despite the buzz in the scientific community, the significance of these efforts went unrecognized and unappreciated by the NCI because the NCI was a key participant in a different actor-network, one organized around *T. brevifolia*, which functioned as a "boundary object," in the parlance of actor-network theory.

My one criticism of this book is that Goodman and Walsh do not follow taxol into the political economy of consumption and the actor-networks of the cancer clinic. In fact, in many ways cancer remains a minor player in their analysis, as do cancer patients, cancer care providers, and the health care system—as well as their relationships to Bristol-Myers Squibb and the pharmaceutical industry. This is unfortunate because the political economy of consumption is an important dimension of Taxol's biography and an important dimension of ongoing congressional debates about the health care crisis and its relationship to the pharmaceutical industry. Bristol-Myers Squibb has been under fire for almost a decade for pricing Taxol beyond the reach of public hospitals and cancer patients who lack private insurance. I was disappointed that Goodman and Walsh did not address the issue of drug access with the same degree of thoroughness and thoughtfulness as they did the issue of bark shortage. That said, I learned a great deal from this book, and I strongly recommend it. As a detailed case study of changing relationships between science, the state,

and the pharmaceutical industry, this book would make an excellent choice for courses in the sociology of knowledge, medical sociology, environmental sociology, the sociology of science, social movements, and even political sociology.

Making Sense of Men's Magazines. By Peter Jackson, Nick Stevenson, and Kate Brooks. Oxford: Polity Press, 2001. Pp. viii+214.

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What comes after the "new man?" The "new lad," or the "new lout?" role models popularized by British magazines that share in the success of British television shows like "Men Behaving Badly." *Making Sense of Men's Magazines* is a well-researched volume that provides a solid appreciation of magazines such as *Maxim* and *Stuff for Men* (available both sides of the Atlantic). The authors shy away from one-dimensional arguments of ideology, hegemony, and resistance to provide a more nuanced argument based on ambiguity, ambivalence, and contradiction: an argument that has its strengths and one potential weakness.

The authors situate this publishing phenomenon within the cultural context of 1990s Britain: a social landscape in which political incorrectness was accepted as a relief from the earnestness of feminists and their counterparts, the nurturing new men. The inside perspective on publishing was provided through seven interviews with editors at relevant magazines and also through interviews with other editors published in secondary sources. In the risky business of magazine publishing, editors balance the needs of advertisers with their own sense of editorial content. This content, sexy veering toward the pornographic, makes frequent use of irony to suggest that it is really all a bit of fun.

One editor did, however, admit that the magazine was "advertisement-driven," meaning it had been originally created as a vehicle for pulling advertisements and marketing specific products. Another admitted that these magazines appealed to men's baser instincts, "but they glorify it so that guys think that it's ok" (p. 70). Several other editors commented in one way or another that the magazines served to make order out of the chaos surrounding contemporary gender roles.

This is partly what bothers the authors, who see in this reestablishment of gender divisions a form of "constructed certitude," a concept originally created by Ulrich Beck. Constructed certitude acts as a form of magic that sweeps away doubts and uncertainties, offering magical solutions to questions of identity. The new lad emerges as the eternal masculine—as right as rain. Unlike the new man who preceded him and who is seen as a reactive response to feminism's attacks on patriarchy, the new lad is a regular bloke, doing what blokes have always done and always wanted

to do. Unlike traditional blokes, however, the new lad is very interested in style and consumerism, and his likely purchases include a full range of fashion and lifestyle products.

Above all, these magazines are revealed as reasserting the gender divide and denying all gender role uncertainties. Their discourses insist that men and women have different needs and expectations, and that the single life oriented around pleasures is infinitely preferable to marriage with its duties and commitments. When content turns from revealing female photos to articles on relationships, the topic is mostly how to avoid "traps" while getting what you want. The ironic tone once again legitimates sexism, while men's emotional needs are rarely acknowledged.

An important part of the book is based on discussions of magazine content held with 20 focus groups. Members of these groups ranged from Taunton working-class motorcyclists to London art students to Sheffield gays, and also included one group of women (working in the public sector). The discussions revealed different discursive repertoires used to analyze content (such as "harmless fun" and "women as Other"). Group members also exhibited "dispositions" toward these repertoires, ranging from the celebratory or compliant to the dismissive or hostile. The authors refer to Pierre Bourdieu's concept of cultural capital to make sense of the different dispositions. Thus, not surprisingly, they find that media professionals use expert language and concepts, while students have a better understanding of club culture.

Making Sense of Men's Magazines is clearly written and presented. As such, it represents an attractive option for course adoptions on both sides of the Atlantic, despite the more pointedly British content. Its theoretical approach and empirical findings will inform ongoing debates about cultural institutions, media, consumerism, and gender.

Yet one cannot help feeling, in the end, that so much emphasis on ambiguity and contradiction fails to confront important issues. For example, to answer charges that academics miss the point that such publications are "harmless fun," the authors write that "the symbolic and unconscious mobilization of fantasy structures . . . opens out more contested and ambiguous spaces than may first appear to be the case" (p. 153). Overall, the authors appear more concerned with inserting magazine content "into wider sociological frameworks" (p. 149) than with actively debating, much less combating, the new sexism. If that public commitment is lost or deemed irrelevant to sociology as a discipline, then perhaps the magazines' editors are not the only ones who are assuming a distancing posture.

The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics. By Zoltan Barany. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+408. \$69.95 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

Romani: A Linguistic Introduction. By Yaron Matras. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv+291. \$70.00.

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Neither of these books are by sociologists, but both are major scholarly syntheses that carry a significance for sociology that reaches beyond their immediate concern with Gypsies. Both are in fact written by hard partisans of their own fields. Barany is a political scientist who is dismissive of interdisciplinary Romani study for its self-referentiality and failure to submit to the discipline of peer review in mainstream learned journals. Matras is a technical linguist who makes no concessions to a nontechnical readership. Both men are notoriously combative controversialists who take no prisoners in debate, but there the similarities end. Barany swims with the tide of established European policy on Gypsies; against specialist Romani studies "activist authors" whom he accuses of "simultaneously ignoring the Gypsies' responsibility for their own predicament and belittling the efforts of states and organisations to assist them" (p. 18). Matras, however, has planted on the sands a massive boulder of contribution to knowledge that will not be swept away by any tides.

Barany summarizes current Eastern European policy attitudes to Gypsies and sets them in a historical context. Responding to political science imperatives, he asks whether these policies vary by regime type (imperial, authoritarian, state-socialist, and democratic) and whether the degree of Romani marginalization varies according to the resultant policies. Wisely, he concludes that it is all a bit more complicated than that, and there are historical variations that do not correspond to the political science typologies. What he does not ask is whether the policies might vary according to the characteristics of the Gypsy populations. He treats the Romani population as a given, and failing to realize how different criteria of inclusion apply, he mocks Romani historians for coming up with different estimates of how many died in the Nazi holocaust. He does perfunctorily recognize that Romani groups vary immensely, and he admits that in a climate of growing democracy the desire of governments that Gypsies speak with one voice is both perverse and racist. Yet, he shares their impatience with the ever-increasing number of tiny Romani NGOs whose major concern, as he sees it, is squabbling over the limited pot of grants and aid. He disclaims generalizations but then quotes approvingly British far-right philosopher Roger Scruton about the need to acknowledge Gypsy criminality (p. 358) and makes carefully crafted statements about "some Roma" or "Gypsies at times" developing "self hatred" (p.

258), or finds a convenient Romani intellectual, Andrei Mirga, to "admit . . . the single most important reason for the educational privation of the Gypsies is . . . their traditional lack of interest in schooling." The same Andrei Mirga, incidentally, is cited (p. 317) as an authority for Barany's view that the Polish government and media acted promptly and effectively to repress racism after the Mława pogrom of 1991. Barany echoes the position of the philanthropist Andras Biro that, while he is against people suffering just for what they are, "Personally I don't specially like the Gypsies. Neither do I hate them" (p. 19). Like those who repudiate anti-Semitism by claiming that some of their best friends are Jews, Barany has a (very short) list of Roma and philanthropists whose organizations he regards as genuinely serving the interests of a Gypsy constituency as opposed to the majority, which in his view act only out of short-term self-interest. He concludes that although Gypsies are themselves to blame for much of their predicament, it is up to governments to follow his short list of policy recommendations to change Gypsies so they can assimilate to more standard education and employment and thus fight racism. It is unrealistic to suppose the majority of the population will suddenly "like" Gypsies (p. 351), and he is pessimistic about things changing for the better. The idea that Europeans themselves might need to change has evidently never occurred to him. This is a book that will be welcomed by European governments and community relations consultants who conceive their task to be that of integrating small numbers of nonwhites into an enlarged European Union whose status (and dangerous desirability as an immigration target) in the world is a little lower than North America, but far above the rest of the world. It will add scholarly legitimation to their indignation at the continuing anomalous status of Roma.

One of Barany's assertions is that, "There is no one Romani Language, but rather several major and dozens of minor dialects" (p. 77). It is his misfortune that his own publishers have this year published Yaron Matras's book that refutes this statement definitively. Matras shows that there is a common Romani language spoken by at least 3.5 million people (a conservative estimate—5 million is more usual) whose dialects are part of the same structure and are easily mutually comprehensible by educated people—as can be seen in conferences, evangelical rallies, and on the Internet. The minority of "para-Romani" dialects, those so mixed with other languages that they are not mutually comprehensible, are spoken only by approximately 1 million people. This is in itself not new: Ian Hancock and Jan Kochanowski have asserted the theoretical possibility of Romani language standardization, and Marcel Cortiade has carried out elaborate statistical distance analysis to show that the core of major dialects are well within conventional linguists' norms of what constitutes a coherent language. But it is one thing to assert this theoretically and statistically and another thing entirely to present a clear description of the language for the reader. There have, of course, been numerous excellent descriptions of particular dialects, but Matras, using a method of

historical reconstruction of differentiation, manages to show the common structure of the core dialects by discussing each phonological, grammatical, and morphological point. He does not, unlike Barany, make general statements about Gypsy culture, but instead shows the range of difference between dialects and how they map onto each other within overriding structures, so that speakers can adapt to each other's dialects, just as Texans and New Yorkers can in fact not only understand each other, but instinctively grasp enough of the difference to mimic each other's speech.

What Matras has achieved is analogous to the work of biochemists who built on crystallography to describe the structure of complex molecules such as DNA. It is one thing to demonstrate such molecules exist and are important; another thing entirely to carry out the vast labor of describing and then representing them in diagrams or three-dimensional models. Matras has internalized the work, sometimes the lifework, of dozens of other linguists and put it together in a way that makes sense. Like Robert Pirsig describing repairing a motorcycle in *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance* (Bantam Books, 1974), he makes us see how the wheels go around, how they operate within tolerances and with alternatives. Anyone working with Roma from different dialect groups (as many are in counseling asylum-seekers) will experience constant starts of recognition as Matras resolves one knotty point after another. This is not just a great scientific synthesis; it is also high art. He concludes with a sober sociolinguistic analysis of moves toward codification, a term he prefers to the more normative "standardisation."

Roma are the great exception in most western understandings of social order. Here we see two social scientists approaching them: Barany using an ideal-typical method to analyze Gypsies' interaction with governments; Matras using the method of difference to look at language, the medium of Roma interacting with each other. Looking at their two different worlds of knowledge, it is hard to believe Barany's Gypsies are the same people as Matras's Roma, but sociologists, upon whom the burden of reflexivity in the social sciences falls, must attempt the task of explaining how these worlds coexist in the same space. In doing so they may find themselves not just analyzing the situation of the Roma, but making a fundamental critique of western structures of knowledge.

Unravelling the Rag Trade: Immigrant Entrepreneurship in Seven World Cities. Edited by Jan Rath. New York: Berg Publishers, 2002. Pp. xvi+237. \$68.00 (cloth); \$23.50 (paper).

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The study of immigrant and ethnic economic activities has been one of the most active and fertile arenas of sociological exploration to come on

the scene since the 1970s. This work has offered significant insight into a variety of important social processes, including the relationship between ethnic solidarity and economic life; the ability of disadvantaged populations to collectively access economic resources; the unequal distribution of work and reward within ethnic communities, families, and gender groups; and the role of ethnic businesses in shaping urban life. In turn, the findings of this research have contributed substantially to broader topics of sociological interest, such as the sociology of economic life, gender relations, ethnic and racial identities, labor markets, and immigration.

Despite these many positive contributions, research on immigrant and ethnic economies has been insufficiently comparative. With few exceptions, studies have been conducted within the United States. Accordingly, international contrasts are few. Moreover, nearly all investigations have focused upon specific groups, hence fostering comparisons between ethnicities or nationalities, rather than the economic activities in which they are involved.

Unravelling the Rag Trade takes a giant step forward in making work on ethnic and immigrant entrepreneurship more comparative. The book is based upon seven studies of the garment industry in distinct localities in Europe and the United States—Paris, Amsterdam, London, and the West Midlands (Birmingham) of the United Kingdom; New York, Miami, and Los Angeles. In addition to the case studies, the book's editor, Jan Rath, a Dutch anthropologist with a record for research on immigrant business in Europe, provides comprehensive introductory and concluding chapters that frame and integrate the findings.

Rath's conceptual contribution and guiding principle is his theory of mixed embeddedness, which seeks to understand entrepreneurship in view of both migrants' immersion in coethnic social networks, as well as their "relations and transactions . . . embedded in a more abstract way in wider economic and politico-institutional structures" (p. 5).

The array of cities described in *Unravelling the Rag Trade* offers fertile ground for comparative analysis. In each chapter, the local garment industry is described in light of the context, history, and nationalities involved. The garment industries of Amsterdam and Paris were established in the late 19th century. As a consequence of their age, they have endured several waves of migration and an array of political events and ways of doing business. Most of the Jewish entrepreneurs and laborers who helped to shape them were deported by the Nazis and perished in concentration camps. In the postwar era, these enterprises were reconstituted by new waves of migrants. In contrast, the garment industries of the West Midlands and Miami have dramatically different histories. Because these locations have achieved world city status only recently, their labor forces consist of postcolonial migrants—South Asians in the former and Cubans in the latter—who have arrived since the 1960s.

In addition to revealing historical variations among garment industries in various locations, *Unravelling the Rag Trade* also addresses the role of

state regulation, itself a product of economic conditions, migration patterns, and political trends. Lax enforcement of labor and immigration laws along with governmental efforts to encourage entrepreneurship yielded industrial expansion in many locations during the free market era of the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, more strict enforcement regimes attending to wages, health and safety requirements, and migrant work permits have limited business growth. The effect of this turnaround was most dramatic in Amsterdam, where free market policies caused garment production to grow rapidly through the 1980s and early 1990s. However, when the strict enforcement of existing laws was implemented in 1993, the result was an immediate and dramatic contraction in business.

The success of this book is the consequence of a carefully orchestrated writing process. Through conferences involving the assembled authors, Rath ensured that each chapter addresses integrating themes. Each of the case studies is capable of standing on its own as it describes the specific history and context of the community in question and reflects the unique skills, methods, and interests of its author(s). At the same time, each also resonates with the issues presented in other chapters, such that comparative insights are availed. These are amplified in the editor's introductory and concluding discussions. The whole is more than the sum of the parts.

In conclusion, *Unravelling the Rag Trade* is an outstanding volume. Richly detailed and theoretically refined, it exemplifies what can be accomplished through the use of high-quality international comparison. It is a must-read for specialists, students, and policy makers interested in migrant networks, ethnic entrepreneurship, urban ethnography, and the contexts of industrial production in an economic activity noted for its internationalization.

Shifting Borders: Rhetoric, Immigration, and California's Proposition 187. By Kent A. Ono and John M. Sloop. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2002. Pp. viii+253. \$64.50.

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This is a very useful and important book for several reasons. Not only do Ono and Sloop provide us with a nuanced analysis of the discourses about Proposition 187 (a proposition that sought to eliminate public health, welfare, and education provisions for undocumented migrants), but they also offer a model of critical rhetoric that will be very appealing to scholars who are aware of the "many ways in which academic labor interfaces with . . . activist labor and other work toward social change" (p. 158).

The authors position their study of Proposition 187 within the broader problem of differentiating between self and other in a world of multiple

diasporas and borders that shift and (eventually would) disappear while systems of identifying, classifying, and surveying the other persist and adapt, and the border that seems so permeable and crossable becomes reified in some discourses. They suggest that immigration and citizenship are arbitrary constructions necessary to a particular narrative of the formation of the U.S. nation-state. Ono and Sloop found a general tendency in the discourses they studied to operate within dominant and governmental logics as opposed to resistant logics. The authors' main argument is that most of the dominant civic discourses (widespread media discourses), regardless of their opposition or support for Proposition 187, have a very similar discursive logic: all of them construct the undocumented immigrant as the invading other and this other as Mexican. Some of the themes they share are a belief in bootstrapping, distinctions between good and bad immigrants, distinctions between us (citizens) and them (immigrants), construction of immigrants as criminals, representation of immigrants as economic commodities, anxiety over a health and cultural contagion, commitment to the United States as a nation with fair laws, and a racialization of contemporary immigrants. In this regard, all of these discourses (even those opposed to Proposition 187) are working within a dominant logic of governmentality.

Ono and Sloop also discovered that the vernacular discourse (spoken at the local level of everyday life) may, in certain instances, be complicit with the overarching logical assumptions constructed within dominant discourses, and therefore may reproduce the logic of dominant culture even while attempting to resist it. "As a result, space is limited or closed for arguments outside of the logic of legal/illegal, clean/dirty, healthy/diseased, economic benefit/cost" (p. 123). At the same time, the authors describe the appearance of an "outlaw logic" in some vernacular discourse that they, as critical theorists, not only endorse but actively promote because of its capacity to imagine different futures. That outlaw discourse (operating from a different logic, that of Lyotard's *differend*—i.e., incommensurable logics rather than commensurable ones) offers significant challenges to both Proposition 187 and the dominant discourses that support its logic and are linked to "discussions of guerrilla theater that challenge a governmental call for display of identity . . . problematize fixed binaries between citizen/immigrant and between legal/illegal immigrant" (p. 159). As part of those outlaw logics, Ono and Sloop also mention noncompliant resolutions by several institutions that refused to accept the legitimacy of the government to enact or rule on Proposition 187 as well as "discussions of immigration . . . beyond the boundaries of an individual and her body [that] radically challenge the possibility of distinguishing between citizen and immigrant" (p. 159).

We are dealing here with a very good book, but there are, of course, weaknesses. I would like to mention a couple that probably reflect my own theoretical commitments and should be seen in that light and taken with a grain of salt. First, the topic of the book is the construction of

hegemonic and counterhegemonic discourses about immigration, borders, citizenship, and the like; however, the word "hegemony" is only mentioned twice in the book, and Gramsci is barely quoted. I firmly believe that Ono and Sloop's analysis would have been enriched by the work of hegemony theoreticians like Gramsci, Mouffe, Laclau, and Zizek.

Second, I have my reservations about the way the authors analyzed "vernacular discourses" because their only source of such discourse analysis was "an examination of e-mail messages posted to an e-mail distribution list devoted to defeating Proposition 187" (p. 114). I see that source as very narrow, and although I am aware that their discipline is communication and not sociology, I still believe that analyzing "common people on the street" is a better way to get "vernacular discourses" than the Internet, above all if one of the goals of the book is to "draw conclusions about how people are affected by [media] messages" (p. 6).

Regardless of those minor problems, this book is clearly written, often perceptive, and a pleasure to read. It is well-positioned in the very interesting field of rhetorical analysis and will be of much interest for people working on immigration, border studies, race and ethnicity, discourse analysis, critical theory, governmentality, and the like.

Recasting American Liberty: Gender, Race, Law and the Railroad Revolution, 1865–1920. By Barbara Young Welke. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xx+405. \$65.00 (cloth); \$23.00 (paper).

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In this well-written book, Barbara Young Welke offers a thoughtful and comprehensive analysis of changing conceptualizations of liberty in the United States in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. In early U.S. life, freedom of action and individual autonomy were the hallmarks of liberty, but as the consequences of industrialization and urbanization began to endanger the physical and emotional safety of many U.S. citizens, liberty came to embrace a more protective orientation that authorized the use of state power to ensure order and to safeguard its people.

Welke examines these developments through the lens of private litigation against railroad and streetcar companies at the turn of the century. Relying primarily on appellate opinions and trial records in reported cases from the 1860s to the 1920s, she devotes a section to each of three types of legal claims: accidental injury, nervous shock, and race discrimination. Each section begins with an analysis of the way that railroads, streetcars, and other forms of mass transportation transformed social and political life. She then examines how individuals' experiences with railroads and streetcars were structured by race, class, and gender dynamics. Finally,

she analyzes the law's response to new forms of injury and injured individuals that arrived with the railroads.

The first section on accidental injury documents the diversity and extent of physical injuries caused by railroads. In earlier times, people accepted accidents as an inevitable part of life. But railroad accident reports, published by newly created state regulatory commissions, reflected patterns that suggested the railroad companies themselves created the conditions that led to accidents, often by putting corporate imperatives, such as efficiency and timeliness, ahead of public safety. Citizens' lawsuits reflected public anger at this early form of corporate irresponsibility. Welke emphasizes that these lawsuits were profoundly gendered. At first, men were expected to take care of themselves, while women were assumed to be incompetent. This assumption of incompetence led juries and courts to be more sympathetic to female plaintiffs, and their victories created precedents that expanded the legal rules of negligence.

The second section examines the law of nervous shock. Individuals witnessing accidents or living near railroad tracks often experienced severe shock that was so seriously disturbing that it impaired their normal functions. Relatively unknown at the turn of the century, this disorder was medicalized and then translated into legal injury—a development that was sharply contested in court and in medical journals by corporate doctors paid by the railroad companies. Welke argues that these cases represented another state-sponsored shift of responsibility away from the individual and toward the structural conditions of expanding industrialization, but again, it was a profoundly gendered shift. Welke argues that men felt discouraged from making these kinds of claims because it required them to admit that they were left helpless and depressed by the modern world—an admission more easily made by women who were the majority of plaintiffs in these cases. Thus, she claims, "It was through the minds and bodies of women that courts would come to recognize a right to recover for physical injury resulting from fright and shock" (p. 202).

Finally, the third section analyzes the complexity and contradictions of Jim Crow laws in private lawsuits stemming from racial segregation on the railroads. Class and gender structured the railroad cars themselves—white women sat in the most comfortable cars and all other passengers were relegated to the "smoking car." Blacks were routinely excluded from the best accommodations, especially in the South. When they obtained access, it was because they had lighter skin color or were from the emerging African-American middle class and therefore cloaked in "respectability." The conflicts around these negotiations of space often wound up in courts. But in litigating these suits, railroad companies defended themselves from encroaching state power: they challenged both antidiscrimination laws and "separate coach" laws requiring "separate and equal" accommodations for blacks on railroads. For the railroads, any form of state regulation was intrusive.

Welke's book should appeal to scholars in many fields, especially those interested in law, who will find familiar the complaints of judges and railroad attorneys, who bemoaned malingering plaintiffs filing frivolous lawsuits. Some stories never get old. Moreover, Welke provides interesting insights about the political nature of individual lawsuits, especially by African-Americans, where such suits asserted new claims to individual liberty and resisted growing corporate power. Although some may question the validity of making claims about social life based on appellate court cases—arguably the rarest and most unusual conflicts in social life—Welke does an excellent job of supplementing the case documents with other historical materials to support her arguments. Legal scholars should also be attentive to the powerful yet nuanced roles of race, gender, and class in Welke's analysis. In her analysis, these are not just simple categories, but meaningful structural conditions that shape individuals' interactions with each other, with the railroads, and with the state.

Mobilizing Public Opinion: Black Insurgency and Racial Attitudes in the Civil Rights Era. By Taeku Lee. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. viii+293. \$55.00 (cloth); \$19.00 (paper).

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From its inception, the study of public opinion has had substantial relevance to research on electoral politics, the development and legitimacy of national governments, and empirical as well as normative work on democracy. But the growing professional autonomy of opinion research, coupled with the rising methodological standards of the field in the 1970s, led to the dominance of relatively specialized strains of inquiry that sought to measure the structure and content of public opinion without necessarily seeking to address further questions about interrelationships with political institutions, organizations, and behaviors. The publication of a number of theoretically engaged studies during the past decade suggests that it is possible to combine methodological sophistication with a renewed focus on important questions of this sort.

Taeku Lee's *Mobilizing Public Opinion* exemplifies some of the best features of this intellectual trend. In an ambitious study of public opinion and social movement processes during the 1950s and 1960s, Lee develops a novel interpretation of the linkage between the two, while also contributing to the literature on the U.S. Civil Rights movement. Lee's theoretical targets are substantial; he wishes to call into question the tendency of many political scientists and sociologists to view public opinion and mass social movements as subordinate in causal importance to political parties and politicians. Lee argues that the prominence of theories centered on political elites rests on limited evidence. He further contends that elite

theories often lead their proponents to endorse minimal conceptions of U.S. democracy, ones that tend to confer legitimacy solely on existing institutions.

Through a careful analysis of survey data from the 1950s and early 1960s, Lee presents evidence against elite theories applied to the racial attitudes of ordinary people in the United States. Not only does partisanship (a key indicator of political elites' hypothesized influence) appear endogenous with respect to changes in mass racial attitudes, the notable degree of coherence in racial and social welfare attitudes prior to episodes of policy conflict between Democratic and Republican politicians casts doubt on key expectations of elite theories. Such results suggest that public opinion on race and civil rights was itself a causal factor behind new patterns of political party-based conflict. While Lee does not investigate policy making per se, the results of his statistical analysis bear further on the causal role of changing mass attitudes in the landmark civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s.

Lee seeks to broaden scholarly understanding of public opinion by connecting it to social movement processes. Instead of arguing that social movements determine the distribution of public opinion, Lee advances the more subtle proposition that social movements have the capacity to focus public attention, thereby raising the salience of specific policy issues. Lee investigates this phenomenon of "activated public opinion" by analyzing a sample of letters written to U.S. presidents between 1948 and 1965. Lee finds not only that the volume of letters on civil rights-related issues increased sharply in the wake of such notable movement activities as the 1964 Freedom Summer campaign, he shows that the framing of racial issues employed by letter writers was also linked to the Civil Rights movement. In particular, the letters of racially liberal whites during the 1960s were increasingly characterized by reference to ideas of universal rights, presenting new evidence for the influence of the civil rights frame employed especially by Martin Luther King, Jr. Such findings support Lee's hypothesis of movement-generated salience; they cast further doubt on elite-centered explanations of change in mass racial attitudes given the absence of a relationship between letter writing and key legislative or electoral events.

Like other recent studies that attempt to theorize the interrelationships of public opinion to political or institutional processes, *Mobilizing Public Opinion* raises more questions than it can fully address. One such question relates to the potential role played by electoral system type. Cross-national variability in the use of plurality versus proportional representation rules may bear on the likelihood that social movement actors can successfully activate mass opinion or influence political parties when politicians have incentive to attend to specific constituencies or to the median voter. Second, while Lee makes no assumptions that his case study is representative of the population of policy issues, the exceptionally long, brutal, and institutionally well-defined history of antiblack racism and civil rights

struggles in the United States suggests an unusually high potential for salience. Third, although Lee investigates a case where major opinion trends paralleled the notable successes of a specific movement, the field of social movements is usually crowded. The likelihood that movement organizations endorse competing or conflicting goals raises intriguing questions about the mechanisms that explain why a particular movement may successfully activate or influence public opinion. Taken in conjunction with the numerous contributions of *Mobilizing Public Opinion*, these and other questions should help to define the revitalized field of opinion research in coming years.

Racial Revolutions: Antiracism and Indian Resurgence in Brazil. By Jonathan W. Warren. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001. Pp. xxii+363. \$64.95 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

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Researchers of Brazilian racial dynamics are generally motivated by the depth of racial discrimination in Brazil, juxtaposing it to "the paucity of antiracist critique and political mobilization" (p. 234). The question is almost exclusively framed as a black versus white issue. However, Warren's book details an apparently successful example of "antiracism" found within indigenous communities. In doing so, he seeks to offer the "possibility of an antiracist movement being anchored, at least in part, in Indianness" (p. 237) and to challenge the generalized "assumption that black identities are key to antiracism and Indian subjectivities are irrelevant" (p. 235).

Warren employs ethnography to detail a "racial revolution," having conducted 50 in-depth interviews of Indians and 70 of non-Indians. These took place in four locations in eastern Brazil. Based principally on these interviews, Warren purports a significant increase in individuals choosing to self-classify as Indian. Furthermore, he points out organized political mobilization and a growing trend towards "Indianning" as opposed to "whitening" (i.e., valuing Indian culture and rejecting dominant culture).

As evidence of the increase in Indian self-classification, Warren mentions an initial estimate of the indigenous population at .2% of the total Brazilian population. He then points to 1995 data from the federal Indian bureau that also places the figure at .2%. However, mentioning the numerous problems with census and Indian bureau data, Warren lastly compares those figures to a 1995 attitudinal survey. This survey, which he treats as more credible evidence, reports a figure of 6.5%. He also asserts a consensus among researchers regarding an increase.

Warren uses the term "posttraditional Indians" to describe these newly self-identifying Indians. To be a posttraditional Indian "is to define one's

indigenous ancestral roots as essential to one's identity, to make them the anchor of one's dreams and future, and to work toward their recovery" (p. 21). The author points to a significant distinction between posttraditional and traditional Indians, finding that the former struggle constantly to be recognized by fellow Brazilians as Indian. He claims "non-Indian Brazilians are not readily distinguishable by custom from posttraditional Indians" (p. 26), and "most 'mixed-bloods' of Indigenous descent do not exhibit the somatic features associated with Indianness" (p. 29). Therefore, resulting from the caricatures that non-Indians attribute to Indians, a dynamic of nonrecognition exists for posttraditional Indians.

Another important part of the revolution is political contestation. The 1988 constitution granted extensive land rights to indigenous populations, which promoted "microregions of Indian contestation" (p. 119). These have become terrains of Indian resurgence where the Brazilian Indian struggles to maintain the "law of the Indian" instead of the "law of the white man." In these terrains Indians express nonmainstream discourses: "Like other eastern Indians I talked to, Cesar [research subject] . . . portrays *mestizagem* as a negative phenomenon—at least as it applies to Indians. This view represents a clear departure from the dominant discourse, which frames race mixing as a positive" (p. 246).

In sum, Warren details a nuanced process of an Indian resurgence and antiracism. This book is a must for those studying Brazilian racial issues. Furthermore, scholars of indigenous communities, social movements, and those interested in ethnogenesis and racial formation in general would find this book of interest.

The book does have flaws. First, Warren reports, "my sample [of 50] was skewed toward wealthier Indians" (p. 123). This presents a problem in the Brazilian context where class divisions are extreme. The overwhelming majority of Indians are poor, and just as poor persons of varying degrees of African descent in Brazil show little interest in the discourses of middle-class black activists (p. 238), this same cleavage might exist as concerns Indianness. This may be especially true for those who do not live in Indian territories. Second, Warren presents no firm evidence that the number of self-identifying Indians is growing or that the act of survey self-identification is significant enough to assert a racial divide between Indians and non-Indians. Beginning with the second point, identities are never monolithic, but multiple, situational, and overlapping, exaggeratedly so in Brazil.

Regarding numerical evidence, the reader is left wondering just what is the size of this revolution. Since the book's publication, the 2000 census data is out and places the percentage of the Indigenous population at .4%. This may mark a significant increase, if the 1991 figure is .2%. However, whereas Warren claims that it is hard to explain an increase of .2% to 6.5%, except through a revolutionary racial shift, I believe the 2000 census figure can be understood through an alternative explanation. After 140 years of national censuses that placed persons of indigenous

descent in the *pardo* category, in 1991, an "*Indígena*" category was added. A quite plausible explanation may be that a growing awareness of the category's existence is reflected in the 2000 census, as opposed to revolutionary resurgence of Indianness.

Consumption Intensified: The Politics of Middle-Class Daily Life in Brazil. By Maureen O'Dougherty. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2002. Pp. xv+261. \$59.95 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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Firmly grounded in a long-term, firsthand experience of Brazilian middle-class life and actively engaging theoretical understandings of class identity and class boundaries, Maureen O'Dougherty's *Consumption Intensified* explores the intertwining of the material and symbolic realities of these processes. The context of the inflationary and recessionary 1980s and 1990s allows for a particularly astute analysis of these processes, revealing the actors involved in this tale of definition of self (the media, the state, banks, large and small businesses, and of course the middle classes, all in a globalized context), through their well-being, statuses, and desires—sought, lost, and reshaped.

Anchoring her analysis of the Brazilian case in an incisive cross-cultural and interdisciplinary discussion of middle class-focused literature, O'Dougherty takes us past the debate of whether we should refer to "middle class" in the singular or plural: she simultaneously recognizes its socioeconomic heterogeneity, yet using native definitions while avoiding local stereotypes and following her own interests, strives to get to the essence of the middle class and to the dreams that sustain it. She focuses on Sao Paulo's "new middle class"—constituted of technical and liberal professionals—using three private schools as points of departure from which to build her pool of informants. She does not claim this sector to be more representative of the middle class than the traditional middle class of small business owners and the nouveaux riches sectors, which were originally indicated as potential research foci by her academic contacts. However, it would be interesting to see how class identity discourse and practices unfold among the latter, in particular given their differential relationship to print and audiovisual media.

Choosing to follow her informants' claims, O'Dougherty foregrounds the role of the private sphere and consumption in middle-class identity formation: home and car ownership, proper education of the children, and consumption activities for the family are essential in this process. This emphasis on consumption and the private sphere intensified as occupational boundaries became more flexible, especially for women, while

the crisis forced many to abandon professional occupations for, in their eyes, more "vulgar" yet more lucrative business activities.

One of the theoretical strengths of this work lies in its thick description of the two-way connections between the mundane details of everyday life: the claims or silences and practices or discourses of middle-class actors, and the interventions and influences of powerful political economic actors. In this scheme, O'Dougherty privileges the interpretations by middle-class actors of these interventions, finally highlighting their consequences in economic terms, as well as in terms of self and class identity formation.

Particularly fascinating is the author's work on the role transnational goods (consumer goods obtained mostly through contraband) and travel (especially to Florida) play in setting class boundaries. Resisting the increasingly common positive understanding of globalization, O'Dougherty demonstrates the way in which these goods and activities are in fact used to demarcate class boundaries in Brazil, just as they heighten awareness of hierarchy in northern and southern economies and lifestyles. Indeed, she convincingly illustrates how they epitomize the frustrated desires for modernity and "First World" status of the Brazilian middle class. Similarly, running counter to the general trend toward understanding these processes in the light of transnationalism, the author shows how the nation-state, far from disappearing in this context, becomes an important actor—as enemy of the middle class—because it hinders the acquisition of such desired goods, as it restricts consumption, freezes assets in attempts to dwarf hyperinflation, and prohibits the importation of cheaper international goods to protect national production.

Both men and women were interviewed in this study, which pays attention to gender, generation, and race in specific aspects of the processes it describes: middle-class housewives become economizers in the face of inflation; more women than men find their way to informal income-generating activities; the debutante ball, an extremely gendered entry into middle-class-hood, takes increased significance for the family as a whole. The racialized nature of the middle class in its patronizing stance toward darker-skinned northerners is made vividly clear (those interviewed were presumably of European descent, although this is not clearly stated). We have little sense, however, of whether and how middle-class people of color, women and men, differently view what it means to be middle class, their dreams of the middle class, and perception of the State or their relationship to the media. If indeed these dreams, norms, and perceptions are the same, the gendered and racialized nature of class identity and its formation processes would have gained at being more salient and theorized.

This is a theoretically dense, rich ethnographic text. It exemplifies the benefits of the cross-fertilization of political economic and postmodern analyses.

A Troubled Dream: The Promise and Failure of School Desegregation in Louisiana. By Carl L. Bankston III and Stephen J. Caldas. Nashville, Tenn.: Vanderbilt University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv+268. \$49.95 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

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ACT, Inc.

W. E. B. DuBois stated in 1903 that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the color line” (*The Souls of Black Folk*). Racial inequality issues shaped much of the social and educational policies of the 20th century, making DuBois’s statement prophetic. Striking a racial balance in our nation’s public schools has been a goal since the *Brown vs. Board of Education* decision in 1954 and the Civil Rights legislation that soon followed. In *A Troubled Dream: The Promise and Failure of School Desegregation in Louisiana*, Carl Bankston and Stephen Caldas analyze three Louisiana school districts where desegregation efforts led to the influx of black students from socioeconomically disadvantaged families into formerly white middle-class schools. They explain how the coercive desegregation legislation and policies meant to promote racial balance and equality in schools resulted in whites abandoning integrated schools, leaving African-American students concentrated in schools that are low-income, low-achieving, and racially segregated.

A Troubled Dream takes the reader through the historical events and legal decisions that helped shape Louisiana race relations. Chapters 1 and 2 give the history of segregated schools in Louisiana and of the broader struggle to desegregate schools throughout the United States. As in much of the South, the Jim Crow system of racial segregation flourished throughout Louisiana institutions. Through statistics and interviews, *A Troubled Dream* clearly shows that Louisiana’s blacks historically have suffered educational, social, political, and economic disadvantages, while whites have enjoyed opportunities and privileges that have helped them prosper. Today this has resulted in a society of “haves” and “have-nots” distinguished along the color line in much of Louisiana.

The next three chapters describe Louisiana school districts at different points in the desegregation process. In New Orleans, court-ordered desegregation efforts caused schools to shift from predominately white, to integrated, to overwhelmingly black and poor. From 1970 to 1990, New Orleans schools experienced a shift in population, as white families moved to the suburbs or sent their children to private schools. By the 1990s, over 90% of the New Orleans public school students were black. East Baton Rouge schools are following a similar path, as court-ordered desegregation in the 1980s led to a steady decline of white students, yet an increase in the black student population. Lafayette Parish began their desegregation process in 2000, creating magnet programs primarily attended by white students—further exacerbating racial and economic inequality. Despite

the intent of desegregation policies, many Louisiana schools remain racially unbalanced.

Why do white students leave integrated schools? *A Troubled Dream* argues that white flight is not necessarily a result of racist attitudes or desegregation strategies such as busing. Rather, many white and black families with resources choose to send their children to schools that provide the best educational opportunities for their children, avoiding low-performing schools with limited resources. This may mean moving to middle-class suburban communities, sending their children to private schools, or enrolling their children in magnet schools for high-achieving students.

A Troubled Dream connects many of the socioeconomic problems facing the black community and black schools to the family structure. Louisiana data show that black children are concentrated in schools and neighborhoods with high single-parent percentages, high poverty rates, and other factors that impede academic success. These schools are low-achieving and unappealing to middle-class families—black and white. Schools reflect the backgrounds and experiences of their students. Simply changing the schools' racial mix without addressing the disadvantages students bring to school does not support academic success. The authors could better connect the history of racial inequality and school achievement—it takes social and financial resources for families to send their children to private schools or move to neighborhoods with better schools. As the authors clearly present, the majority of black Louisiana families lack these resources. Other symptoms of black poverty include social isolation, inadequate health care, unemployment, underemployment, and other problems that limit students' chances for academic success. These issues also must be addressed in conjunction with the prevalence of single-parent black families.

Sociologists, legislators, educators, and policy makers should carefully read *A Troubled Dream* as they design programs and initiatives to create the best educational opportunity for students while maintaining racial balance. Most would agree that integrated schools provide potential social and educational benefits by exposing students to a racially diverse school experience. However, desegregation policies, such as busing, can have negative and contradicting long-term effects if issues of social and racial inequality are not addressed. Solving problems of the "color line" requires policies that examine race in multiple social spheres. *A Troubled Dream* addresses these issues through school desegregation policy recommendations that take focus on social and economic inequality issues.

Inside Charter Schools: The Paradox of Radical Decentralization. Edited by Bruce Fuller. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2000. Pp. xiii+285. \$34.95 (cloth); \$16.00 (paper).

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There have been many books on charter schools heralding the reform as the eighth wonder of the world. This is not one of those books. *Inside Charter Schools* provides a balanced account of a reform movement that is only now coming of age.

Charter schools are schools that are publicly funded but managed independently from their parent districts. With roots in the alternative school movement of the 1970s and in local-control and small-school reforms of the 1980s, the charter movement was initiated with state legislation in Minnesota in 1991 and became a darling reform of state governments through the subsequent decade. There were 1,600 charter schools serving almost 400,000 students in some 34 states by the year 2000. The dominant policy rationale for charter schools is threefold: first, charters encourage innovation by freeing educators to experiment with novel teaching methods and organizational forms; second, they bring healthy competition to public schooling; third, charters reconnect schooling to local communities by encouraging parental involvement. The qualitative accounts offered in this book indicate that charter schools have not fully measured up to these high hopes.

First, charter schools are less innovative than they are ecumenical in pedagogy and organization. They tend to borrow from a wider menu of educational ideas than conventional schools do, but they are still borrowing. So El-Shabazz Academy, a school in Lansing, Michigan, with an Afro-centric curriculum, employs fairly conventional classroom methods despite its distinctive mission. The rural Minnesota New Country School is run as a teacher's cooperative which mimics the co-op form long-nurtured by farmers in the upper Midwest. A charter school in suburban Boston embraces a flexible, project-oriented curriculum that looks much like the pedagogies fashionable in alternative schools 25 years ago. Charter schools provide more options for public school families, but not necessarily new ones.

Second, the studies in this volume suggest that the language of market competition that characterizes so much charter school advocacy elides the institutional complexity of public schooling. In what is perhaps the strongest chapter in the volume, Amy Stuart Wells and her colleagues visit Montera Charter High School in southern California and tell a story of an organization shaped as much by race, class, and geography as by the market. Once a conventional high school built to serve a wealthy white enclave in a largely poor and minority urban district, Montera became a charter as a defensive move: the school was losing its affluent white

children to private schools and faced closing. A coalition of neighborhood parents and Montera teachers secured charter status for the school and turned it into a district jewel. Montera now boasts academic excellence and racial diversity. Still, white parents are the key players in school politics: minority kids have a hard time participating in extracurricular activities because of their long commutes, and achievement levels of black students are far below those of their white peers. New choices do not necessarily fix old problems.

Third, charter schools do not automatically solve the puzzle of parent involvement. El-Shabazz Academy in Lansing frequently has trouble getting parents to show up for meetings, despite widespread parent enthusiasm about the school. White parents tend to be the movers and shakers at Montera, while minority parents sometimes report feeling like guests on campus. On the other hand, parents can be overinvolved in charter schools in ways that make routine school administration and big decisions difficult. Despite what our politicians and less critical school reformers have to say, parent involvement is both hard to sustain and hard to manage.

But the news is hardly all bad. As Fuller points out in his thoughtful concluding chapter, the big accomplishment of charter schools has been to get people excited about public schooling again. Teachers stampede to get appointments at charters. Parents and administrators work their tails off to keep these schools going. The excitement is partly due to the novelty of charters, but, as Fuller aptly notes, likely also flows from their syncretism of potent cultural values: entrepreneurialism, skepticism of state authority, and a fascination with the power of markets. Charters are school reform, U.S.-style.

The case studies in this volume betray varying degrees of methodological rigor. They are not, as a whole, models of systematic inquiry. Their strength lies in the window they afford on a wide range of schools and in their consistently lucid prose. For these reasons, the collection would be excellent for undergraduate seminars on education policy, or as supplementary reading in graduate-level courses. The authors' even-handed approach to their cases and editor Fuller's skillful placement of the charter school movement within a larger cultural framework make this book an admirable introduction to the most celebrated school reform of our generation.

Embedded Politics: Industrial Networks and Institutional Change in Postcommunism. By Gerald A. McDermott. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Pp. x+295. \$65.00.

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Yale University

Gerald McDermott's *Embedded Politics: Industrial Networks and Institutional Change in Postcommunism* should be of interest to students of economic sociology, development, and post-Communist transition. The original material describing the transformation of two large industrial concerns in the mechanical engineering sector of the Czech Republic makes it well worth reading. This data consists of about 200 interviews with firm and state actors collected from 1993 to 1995, supplemented by official documents. McDermott's very rich data makes this the best empirical description I have read of enterprise change in the post-Communist Czech Republic. McDermott uses this material to attempt to demonstrate the superiority of his notion of an "embedded politics" approach to both the economic (or neoliberal) and the developmental statist approach. McDermott very successfully shows that the neoliberal-inspired Czech transition strategy actually made it more difficult for firms to restructure and impeded their integration into the global economy. McDermott critiques what he calls the economic or property rights approach to transition. This is none other than the radical antistatist "Washington Consensus" that emphasizes stabilization, liberalization, and privatization, and as quickly as possible. Under this theory, the enormously complex task of privatizing thousands of state-owned enterprises should be accomplished extremely rapidly, even if that means giving away the property to owners with no additional resources, expertise, or market contacts. The transition to Capitalism could be accomplished by "the invisible hand" once free prices convey information to market-dependent private actors.

McDermott correctly emphasizes the "depoliticizing" agenda of this approach. According to the theory, to prevent the "short term losers" from sabotaging the reforms, a team of politically insulated technocrats is necessary to carry out the transition. Much as a vanguard had attempted to formulate Communism for a largely nonexistent working class with the application of Marxist-Leninism, a new vanguard would formulate Capitalism by applying neoclassical development theory.

McDermott argues that because production was organized via sociopolitical networks that arose to deal with the difficulties of the planned economy, the depoliticization approach actually made restructuring less likely through a variety of mechanisms. First, the destruction of the regional councils, a step necessary to concentrate power in the hands of the technocrats, eliminated a crucial component of the networks of firms that organized production. Without financial commitments and political coordination from these councils, cooperation within the sociopolitical net-

works totally broke down. The death of the regional councils also eliminated support for local vocational training centers. Left on their own, firms were unable to support these institutions, creating severe shortages of skilled manpower. In a similar vein, McDermott demonstrates that this neoliberal policy, with the stated aim of increasing integration with the global economy, actually made direct foreign investment less likely. Depoliticization and mass privatization made it possible for firms to form large holding companies based on socialist-era production networks and interdependencies. Foreign-owned firms were unlikely to want to buy the entire network of firms, or even particular firms that were highly indebted. It was also difficult to create joint ventures, because it was unclear what the obligations of the prospective partner firms were to other members of the holding companies. As a result, many tentative joint ventures broke down. Finally, depoliticization opened up space for parasitic and destabilizing actions by individual firms. McDermott provides a fascinating account of how one firm in a holding company attempted a takeover not only of other members of the group, but also of the state-owned Czech Insurance Company as well. In an effort to prevent an economic catastrophe ensuing from the neoliberal strategy, the government was forced to abandon the depoliticization approach and "become both a financial partner and conflict mediator" (p. 129).

McDermott has provided ample evidence that the neoliberal Washington Consensus was damaging to the Czech Republic, as an increasing number of others have shown elsewhere. However, I found the book less compelling as a critique of the developmental state approach. McDermott groups this approach with the neoliberal for supposedly also hewing to the depoliticization line. However, no textual evidence is provided in support of this position, and most of the book can be read as support of a variant of the statist approach. After all, McDermott continually points out how only a government institution could provide the resources and coordination that make firm restructuring possible. McDermott's lumping of Peter Evans into the depoliticization camp seems particularly unwarranted. It is not clear to me how McDermott's *Embedded Politics* differs from Evans's *Embedded Autonomy* (Princeton University Press, 1995). Still, this in no way diminishes McDermott's accomplishment. *Embedded Politics* should be a must-read for everyone interested in the post-Communist economy.

Cultural Dilemmas of Progressive Politics: Styles of Engagement among Grassroots Activists. By Stephen Hart. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Pp. xii+292. \$42.00 (cloth); \$17.00 (paper).

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Have recent progressive political movements unnecessarily ceded the moral and cultural high ground to the Christian Right? Indeed they have, according to Stephen Hart, and to great detrimental effect for the possibility of long-term progressive social change. In the place of attempts to "black box" faith and moral motivations for activism characteristic of many contemporary movements, Hart argues for a robust integration of values and morality into political organizing. In spite of numerous problems with the case analyses, in the last two chapters of the book, the author breaks new theoretical ground that makes this book worth a closer look.

Hart bases his arguments on his own case studies of local movement organizations, primarily on Milwaukee Innercity Congregations Allied for Hope (MICAHA), a community, faith-based social justice organization in Milwaukee, and also on a local chapter of Amnesty International. From an analytic point of view, the discussion of the cases, which encompasses the middle two-thirds of the book, is rather disappointing. The purposes of the sections and chapters (2–6) fade in and out of focus, and the chapters are burdened with seemingly extraneous detail and haphazard organization. The analysis itself is more impressionistic than systematic or methodical in approach.

As a result, the book meanders, and the author has a tendency to make assertions and conclusions that are weakly based in his empirical analyses or in the secondary literature. In addition to the lack of a systematic analytic approach, part of the problem is that the author is often at pains to make comparisons between primary cases, which appear to be too much like apples and oranges in their goals, organizational bases, tactics, recruitment, and so on, to be meaningfully contrasted. Moreover, the author makes surprisingly scant use of the empirical literature on social movements to frame and bolster his analysis of the cases.

In short, the middle five chapters of the book are rather tough going for the reader. Nonetheless, I am happy to report that patience pays off in the final two chapters of the book. There, the import of his case studies becomes clearer, and Hart proves to be a better theorist than empirical analyst. In contrast to research that adduces the difficulties of U.S. progressives to a deficient and overly individualistic political culture (à la Robert Bellah et al., *Habits of the Heart* [University of California Press, 1985]), to an increasingly disengaged civil society (à la Robert Putnam, *Bowling Alone* [Simon & Schuster, 2000]), or to the internecine squabbles associated with identity politics (à la Todd Gitlin, *The Twilight of Common*

Dreams [Henry Holt, 1995]), Hart argues that progressives have, by and large, simply failed to do the "cultural work" that undergirds activism. That work involves reconnecting civil society with politics, justice-oriented activism with rights-centered activism, and individualist with more communitarian approaches by "resurfacing" the underlying moral- and value-centered narratives that animate much of social action. In this argument, MICAHA is held up as a potential model because of its integration across denominational boundaries of the narratives of culture with political activism. The Amnesty International case, on the other hand, forms the basis for a cautionary tale of process and instrumentally oriented activism that refuses to examine the underlying motivations and justifications for its causes and thereby fails to gain new adherents and actors.

Though Hart clearly envies the success of the Christian Right in integrating culture and politics, he also recognizes that the left faces the difficult task, not only of simply beginning to examine its underlying values and morals, but of figuring out how to agree and to disagree about what those morals and values might be. What could the substance of such a discussion be? What cultural foundation could help serve as the basis for bridging the secular and the religious or the individualistic and communitarian and thereby reanimating a broad-based progressive political agenda? Hart offers an intriguing if still very inchoate analysis of a Durkheimian-based ethos of individual-society reconciliation. In *The Division of Labor in Society* (Free Press of Glencoe, 1933) and elsewhere, Durkheim grounds individual autonomy, not on the natural rights of individuals (as in utilitarianism), but on societies' evolutionary creation of individual capacities. In this sense, the "sacredness of *la personne humaine*" could serve as the basis for initiating and grounding the "cultural work" of progressives across religious faiths, ethnic groups, nationalities, and social classes.

This is a fervent hope of a fervent activist and optimist but one that is, unfortunately, not well-grounded in the research of the book. Nonetheless, there remains a good deal of substance here to inform studies of culture, social movements, and their intertwining in public arenas.

Collaborative Circles: Friendship Dynamics and Creative Work. By Michael P. Farrell. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001. Pp x+324. \$45.00.

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Exeter University

Much of Farrell's earlier work has been focused on group development. In his introduction to this work, Farrell tells us how, when he first discovered John Rewald's and Mary Rogers's work on the French Impressionists, "many of the dynamics I was observing in my research on group-

development in laboratory groups, and I saw the possibility of using group theory to understand the dynamics of circles of artists and writers" (p. ix). To this end, Farrell has gathered data on the creative work of artists, novelists, poets, scientists, inventors, and social reformers and has presented it here.

Farrell began with a straightforward question—How and to what extent is creative work affected by a group of collaborating friends? The project that grew out of this question is also straightforward. It draws on a series of case studies (French Impressionists, Fugitive Poets, the Ryer Circle, Freud's early psychoanalytic circle, and the Ultras, the women's rights activists of the 19th century). The histories and developmental dynamics of each of these groups are in turn reconstructed so as to produce a time line, beginning when the members first met. Each time line includes all the works produced by group members along with key events in the group's development. For this task, Farrell draws upon "expert evaluations of the work that members produced before, during and after the period of involvement with the group" (p. 3).

There is no doubt that a study of collaborative processes enhances our understanding of creative work. This point has been underscored by various exponents of the production perspective within sociology of the arts for some time. And it is *de rigueur* within science studies, where, following Bruno Latour's action paradigm, the focus has always been on the brokerage and negotiation involved in any attempt to stabilize a fact. The question is, then, what is new here? The answer is that this is an attempt to map the dynamics of collaborative circles over time so as to derive from it a more general theory of interchange and influence.

The problem with such an effort lies in how to find a balance between general theory and detailed historical investigation. An associated issue involves just how respectful one wishes to be to the secondary literatures on the cases in question. Farrell does not seek in any way to challenge his case study histories but rather uses what he determines are the best works of historians and biographers, "evaluating their work based on the same process used to evaluate the works of critics in a field—citations, currency of the publication, thoroughness of scholarship, and reputation among members of the relevant discipline" (p. 3). We have, in short, a model of historical sociology that does not interact with (or perhaps have repercussions for) historical studies, but one that stands above it and feeds upon it so as to generate theory. The result is that the individual studies tend to state as givens much of what might have otherwise been profitably explored. Hence, at times the recounting of what went on within the groups evidences an overidentification with particular—and occasionally hagiographic—accounts (e.g., "Elizabeth Cady Stanton, with her long brown curls, sparkling blue eyes, quick mind, and vivacious sense of humor, was the daughter of Daniel Cady, a distinguished lawyer, judge and politician from Johnstown, New York" [p. 216]).

Nonetheless, Farrell's study is heuristically good for at least two rea-

sons. For one thing, it introduces group theory, along with its strengths and deficiencies, to sociology of the arts as well as creative work more broadly, and it serves to remind us that the myth of the genius in the garret is sociologically not useful and historically inaccurate. For another, it reminds us of the value of comparative work as a tool for the generation of theory by encouraging us to think about the stages that may characterize group development. If Farrell's aim was to promote dialogue between group theory and the study of creativity, this book is certainly to be counted as a success. There is still scope for more detailed case studies of how particular works bear traces of collaborative interactions, how, in the making, particular creative products and their histories show us collaborative processes. I know of precedents for this type of study within current music sociology—in the micro-examination of how the actual putting together of a work evinces borrowing of or adaptation to what others within a circle (or ensemble) do, often in real time, as in the case of jazz improvisation (e.g., Peter Martin's forthcoming essay, "Spontaneity and Organisation" in *The Cambridge Companion to Jazz* [Cambridge 2002] and Will Gibson's recent Ph.D. thesis, "The Collaborative Process of Jazz Improvisation" [University of Manchester, Department of Sociology, 2002]).

The Dynamics of Knowledge Regimes: Technology, Culture and Competitiveness in the USA and Japan. By Dengjian Jin. New York: Continuum, 2001. Pp. xii+321. \$89.95.

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Recent debates over economic competitiveness and industrial policy have often led analysts to fasten onto the most salient characteristics of rising economies (or, more narrowly, the most vibrant economic regions), extrapolating them into prescriptive models that, in retrospect, can prove highly embarrassing. Thus, a short decade ago the academic cheerleaders of *keiretsu* and *kaizen* celebrated the coming century of "alliance capitalism," producing books that now have all the appeal of Nehru jackets and leisure suits. Industrial policy analysts move on and leave their scholarly litter behind.

In this context, Dengjian Jin's *The Dynamics of Knowledge Regimes* provides a measure of relief from the habits of overgeneralization that have plagued the literature on industrial policy. In this respect at least, Jin's book is a useful addition to the literature on competitiveness and innovation that is likely to provoke much thought and debate. The book's value is, however, limited by the author's tendency to engage in overgeneralizations of an entirely different sort. Advancing a form of cultural determinism that views systems of production and innovation as expres-

sions of deeper "cultural paradigms," Jin takes his analysis far beyond what the evidence might reasonably support. The result is a complex, nuanced, and often capable book that nonetheless undermines the contribution it could otherwise have made.

Although analysts have tended to view the economic strengths of the United States and Japan as highly dynamic, Jin mobilizes a wealth of secondary data demonstrating that (among other things) the two nations have shown persistent and enduring patterns of sectoral competitiveness over time. Thus, Japanese industry has for decades enjoyed competitive advantages in opto-electronics, communications equipment, home electronics, and automobiles, while U.S. firms have held strong positions in aircraft manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, food and beverages, and biotechnology for an equally long period of time. What has changed has been the increasingly strategic importance of the emerging knowledge economy, which has favored sectors in which the United States has been strong. In this view, changes in the economic fortunes of one or another nation are due to compositional shifts in the global economy, not to the generalized virtues or deficiencies of a nation's industrial system. This reasoning guards against simplistic explanations of economic growth and against efforts to identify all-purpose solutions to national economies facing competitive challenges.

While this sectoral approach seems quite suggestive, Jin's argument becomes less convincing as he develops his theory of knowledge regimes. Despite its Foucauldian-sounding name, this theory pays almost no attention to power as an element of social life. The theory holds that the United States and Japan display diametrically opposed cultural paradigms. Owing to the influence of its Lockean cultural paradigm, the U.S. knowledge regime is premised on a notion of "contractual man." By contrast, characterized by its Confucian cultural paradigm, Japan manifests a regime premised on "connectual man." The former gives rise to worldviews premised on an atomized conception of the self and to modular approaches toward task coordination and quantitative, depersonalized systems of production control. The latter, by contrast, encourages worldviews in which interdependence, tacit knowledge, and personalized forms of organization quite naturally arise.

Jin's claim, akin to Parsonian theory (which he admiringly cites several times) is that cultural patterns not only underlie each society's institutions, they also bring isomorphic pressures to bear on the society's systems of production and innovation. Such pressures have practical importance, for they affect the economy's ability to compete within particular economic sectors. Because U.S. firms rely on contractual principles, for example, they are better equipped to excel in industries that thrive on standardization, modularization, and formalization (Jin cites commercial software, biotechnology, and business services as leading examples). Because of its connectual principles, Japan's economy is at a disadvantage in these increasingly important sectors. Although Jin does not entirely neglect factors

such as governance mechanisms, transaction costs, or corporate structures and strategies, he sees the latter as merely a surface manifestation of a deeper process, in which axial principles lodged deep within each society's culture play the determining role.

Much of Jin's book is given over to discussion of the existing literature on technology transfer, systems of innovation, and industrial structure, which is used largely to substantiate his general argument. These chapters are often informative and wide-ranging, if highly repetitive. Yet they fail to provide evidence that cultural paradigms have the isomorphism-generating effects the author attributes to them. Other problems too arise. Lacking any historical dimension, the book has a static and even essentialist aspect that often seems to resonate stereotypical conceptions of national character while also neglecting important intranational variations in cultural patterns. Moreover, because Jin's approach largely sidesteps considerations of power, one can only speculate how Weberian concepts (such as patrimonial domination) might have bolstered his analysis of Japanese capitalism in particular.

Sociologists ought to welcome an effort to bring cultural meanings and symbolic constructs to bear on the analysis of knowledge creation and appropriation: indeed, this was the signal contribution of AnnaLee Saxenian's *Regional Advantage* (Harvard University Press, 1994). What Jin has produced, however, bends the stick so far in the cultural direction as to allow organizations and institutions few if any autonomous effects. His book is the weaker as a result.

Digital Divide: Civic Engagement, Information Poverty and the Internet Worldwide. By Pippa Norris. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xv+303. \$60.00 (cloth); \$20.00 (paper).

John P. Robinson
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The Internet has been described as ushering in as revolutionary an age as the industrial revolution. Although heralded initially as an inexpensive "information superhighway" that would break down earlier-established class barriers, the term "digital divide" (the alliteration needed to capture press attention) has become the fashionable term for indicating the Internet's failure, not only to reduce gaps between the information-rich and the information-poor, but for accentuating them.

Political scientist Pippa Norris examines the issue from three perspectives; social stratification within countries, the "democratic divide" reflecting political power again within countries, and most important, the global divide threatening to exacerbate differences between northern and southern countries in socioeconomic development. Some 87% of Internet users now live in postindustrial countries, with year 2000 diffusion rates

of less than 1% in most African countries and only 3%–5% in the Czech Republic, Chile, and Mexico—compared to more than 50% in Scandinavia and North America. Norris then uses a variety of aggregate, institutional, and survey data to explore evidence of increasing and decreasing gaps from the three perspectives.

Chapters 2–5 first document that the familiar S-shaped adopter curves in the United States show initial diffusion rates as steep as those found for televisions and VCRs and steeper than those found for radio, cable television, or personal computers. Chapter 3 uses a variety of graphs to illustrate geographically the global divide in postindustrial versus developing countries. The gap is not an isolated phenomenon, but reflects parallel gaps in earlier information (television and telephones) and non-information technologies (power drills and vacation homes). There is a 0.74 correlation between GDP and percentage online, which only reduces to 0.57 in the context of other powerful aggregate predictors like education level and democratization. Thus, usually important unmeasured variables (cultural attitudes, public policy initiatives, or utility of Web content) are unlikely to add much explanatory power. Survey evidence given in chapter 4 on the social inequalities within the United States and within European countries (across various demographic factors) provides little support of a normalization thesis of more equal access, “resource-based inequalities . . . grew in significance as Internet use diffused more widely” (p. 85). Policy fixes like wired schools or community centers are unlikely to overcome these inequalities, or those that arise by gender.

Chapters 5–9 in part 2 examine the virtual political system. Surprisingly, politics and government emerge as the fourth most prevalent topic area on AltaVista, Yahoo, and Infoseek search engines, not far behind computers, sex, and television. Examining specific e-governance Web sites across the world demonstrates increased use by government agencies to distribute information and to deliver services, but little of the two-way communication required in a dynamic representative democracy. Similarly, there is an increasing presence of online parliaments to serve multiple constituencies, but still more need for user-friendly search tools, interactivity, and studies of actual use to know whether more diverse voices are being heard. While political parties “represent the most important public face of connecting with the attentive public,” only about half of major parties have Web sites, with Green Web sites tending to be most sophisticated. The emergence of “flash” antiglobalization and antigovernment movements on particular issues does demonstrate the Web’s new power for rapid political mobilization, especially for those movements emphasizing irreverent, egalitarian, and libertarian causes.

Similar libertarian and antiestablishment values are then found to be more in evidence among Internet users in the United States and Europe according to public opinion surveys (chap. 10). While Internet use per se is unlikely to have produced greater support of postmaterialist views, this aspect of cyberculture could affect the views of children and of the un-

committed as they are continually exposed to the technology. Use of the Internet for news and politics is correlated not only with use of other mass and interpersonal communication in chapter 11, but with more political activity, public information, and institutional trust. This "virtuous circle" of positively reinforcing and "activating the already active" has its downside—those least active miss out on Web information because they are least likely to seek it, to attend to it, or to trust it. Chapter 12 recapitulates the book's three main conclusions: Established political institutions remain unimaginative in exploiting the Internet's potential, using it instead as "corporate wallpaper"; while the Internet may be ineffective in mobilizing the disengaged, it may foster a liberalizing atmosphere for social values; and while it cannot eliminate power differentials in existing institutions, those who know how to use it wisely can make the Internet a force for positive political change.

While laudably integrating data from a rich variety of sources, not much of this may come as news for researchers familiar with the literature on mass communication effects, in which the "rich get richer" pattern is a common theme. One of its most replicated findings is the "increasing knowledge gap" illustrating audience barriers facing new communication technologies: the classic 1947 Cincinnati study showing the minimal impact of a six-month media barrage on the United Nations; Sesame Street's inability to reduce the gap in preschool children's literacy skills; and the studies of the dissemination of television news stories.

As in most examinations of the digital divide, Norris sees it mainly as an issue of simple access. Yet, if studies of previous technologies are any guide, equally important divides can arise in how the technology is used once access is obtained—by DSL or modem, by frequenting entertainment versus capital-building Web sites, by basic versus advanced navigational skills, and by being involved in larger social networks that can steer one to the wealth of content available online.

However, the book does provide in a single compact document a compelling summary of hard evidence that challenges many of the initial and popular evangelistic prophecies, both of how the Internet could transform society and of its inaccessibility to important disadvantaged minorities. The book also provides those beginning students in the social sciences unafraid of quantitative tables and graphs with an easy and comprehensive appreciation of the variety of rich data available to them to study the Internet—aggregate NUA data on the extent of Internet adoption and other media use around the world, Web site data available on different search engines, and public opinion data collected both by the Pew Center in the United States and by Eurobarometer in Europe. In a new field of research subject to rapid change (like the collapse of the dot-com economy), the book's findings are unlikely to become rapidly dated.

The book might serve best as a supplementary text in a course about the Internet and society, to cover a 2–3 week period devoted to Internet politics and global issues. However, it would need to be supplemented by

case histories of successful applications of Internet strategies and of complex adoption processes in countries like China, Trinidad, or Singapore (perhaps the first fully wired country). Norris at several places in her text identifies Malaysia, Brazil, and India as countries that have adopted the Web in ways unexpected by her hard data, but she provides little explanation of how these countries managed to break the mold. Examples of how residents of non-English speaking countries manage to navigate a largely English-based universe would also prove illuminating.

Global Games. By Maarten Van Bottenburg. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2001. Pp. x+286. \$29.95.

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Globalization is undoubtedly one of the major issues of current debate, not only in the social sciences, but also in the political arena and in the media. Globalization is increasingly seen on the one hand as the main source of current social and political ills and on the other hand as the way to political and economical progress. Therefore, along with the mounting exposure of mega-international sporting events like the Olympics and soccer's World Cup, it is no surprise that sport sociologists have taken an interest in the influence of globalization on sport, as well as the manner in which sport fuels globalization. Indeed, since the beginning of the 1990s, a growing body of work specializing in sociology of sport and focusing on sport and globalization has made its way into journals.

Van Bottenburg's book is presented as a contribution to that literature. Its publication is much welcomed since it focuses on one specific issue that has by far not received enough attention in sport globalization literature, namely the international diffusion of sports. More precisely, the focus is on participation in organized sports. Therefore, the "global sport system" analyzed in this book is constituted by the 30 most widely diffused sports worldwide as defined by the international sport federations that have the most member countries. According to this system of classification, the sports most prominent in the worldwide media are not necessarily part of the global sport system. For example, professional U.S. football, baseball, ice hockey, rugby, and golf do not make the cut. According to the author, for the most part these sports are important in too few countries to be counted as global sports.

The book focuses on the popularity of sports in terms of their international diffusion, but pays much attention to class differentiation of practice within the 25 European and four non-European countries (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, United States) for which data on sport participation have been collected. Gender is not a variable considered in this book, and issues concerning women's participation in sport are addressed

only when the sport under discussion has been labeled totally or partially as a "girl sport" (e.g., field hockey). Race is also apparently a nonissue, although Africa's contribution to the world of sport is briefly addressed.

The book is first and foremost an empirical piece. Indeed, little attention is given to current debates on globalization, its definition, its magnitude, its facets, or its impact. From a theoretical standpoint, the author relies on fellow Netherlander sociologist Ruud Stokvis, who, according to the author, has developed "a comprehensive theory for the differential popularization of sports" (p. 41). Although few details are provided, it is argued that this theory draws mainly from Elias's figurational sociology, Wallerstein's world system theory, David Landes's modernization theories, and Bourdieu's theory of distinction. More precisely, the explanation of the current rankings of the international diffusion of organized sport are explained through the history of power relations between countries, as well as by social class rivalries for status. In this theory, four countries are responsible for the current diffusion of sport practice: Britain, Germany, the United States, and Japan. Much along the lines of Wallerstein's approach, these countries are seen as the countries in the center from which sports percolated toward countries in the periphery, leading to the current international diffusion of sports.

Despite its title, the book is much more about the internationalization of sport than about its globalization. Indeed, for the author, the globalization of sport started with the early diffusion of British sport in the late 19th century and equates to the international spread of specific sport practices. Most of the current literature argues to the contrary, that despite the fact that international relations are not new phenomena, globalization is a recent process. There is a qualitative shift occurring that blurs national economic, political, and cultural barriers, leading to the constitution of a new collective consciousness of a global world and raising issues of global governance, above and beyond the existence of nations and localities. Moreover, the reliance almost exclusively on selected parts of world system theory leads the author to overlook the contribution of "mid power" countries to today's global sport. The number of national sport federations in one given sport is too restrictive a criterion to account for sports that matter in current global sport.

However, despite the limitations in terms of the number of sports studied extensively and the limited number of countries for which participants' statistics are discussed, the book offers a convincing and coherent, although partial, explanation of the wider processes that influenced the international diffusion of sports since the beginning of the 19th century. Many of the limitations of this study are clearly acknowledged in the book, which opens the way for other studies that will move ahead in the understanding of sport practices in current global sport. Given this, this book provides solid foundations from which to work.

Globalization and Environmental Reform: The Ecological Modernization of the Global Economy. By Arthur P. J. Mol. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001. Pp. x+273. \$35.00.

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"We demand the World Bank and IMF stop their environmentally destructive policies." This position by recent protesters in Washington, D.C., is the latest expression of opposition to globalization and its neoliberal underpinnings by a wide variety of nongovernment organizations and other actors convinced that globalization could only extend human assaults on the environment. Among academics this demand is either dismissed as unsubstantiated, or reaffirmed as theoretically correct. Which position is right? Does globalization offer salvation for the environment or further threaten the sustainability of the planet? *Globalization and Environmental Reform* by Arthur Mol addresses this question, seeking to bring light to a topic that tends to attract considerable heat. His thesis is straightforward: the social and institutional processes accompanying globalization are too complex, too scale-dependent, and too varied to be captured in theories arguing for a uniform, linear process.

Accordingly, Mol theorizes the implications of globalization for environmental reform, arguing that although the process of globalization may spread detrimental ecological outcomes, it may also open new opportunities for protecting the environment. He dismisses as unfounded those theories, such as those from World Systems and from global capitalism, that argue that "globalization" is merely a fashionable neologism to describe processes that have been unfolding for centuries. The principal analyses are devoted to supporting the core thesis that globalization is not a single, predominately economic process driven purely by global capitalism, but rather a combination of several partially independent processes. Globalization is neither certain to improve global ecological conditions, as the neoliberal position would have it, nor just as certain to devour the natural world, as ecologists and neo-Marxists would have it. Rather it is a complex process with diverse, often contradictory, implications for the ecological sustainability of societies.

Criticizing other theoretical perspectives for either neglecting the environment or for applying frameworks of limited focus, Mol situates his analysis within Ecological Modernization Theory (EMT); a theory of which he has been the leading architect. He appropriately reviews EMT for readers not familiar with the theory. He then moves on to multilayered, multiregional institutional analyses. Mol examines how globalization has affected environmental reform and institution building, first in the "triad"

(the European Union, the NAFTA region, and Japan and Southeast Asia), because the quantitative data he presents shows that is where the global economy is concentrated. He extends his analysis to the developing world and then to three specific countries (Vietnam, the Netherlands Antilles, and Kenya) believed to exemplify different state and economy combinations. Finally, he concludes by positioning his argument and analyses in the larger debates about globalization, capitalism, modernization, and the environment.

Mol has performed a remarkable service in offering an antidote to the recurring apocalyptic vision of the environmental destruction of the planet. On this ground alone, the book certainly warrants our attention. Whether Mol has advanced EMT or has made a convincing case that beneath the clouds of international pollution lies a silver lining is far less certain. The book is punctuated with an essential tension, similar to Mol's previous work (*The Refinement of Production: Ecological Modernization Theory and the Chemical Industry* [Van Arkel, 1995]), that acknowledges the detrimental environmental consequences of modernization, capitalism, and globalization but insists that modernization, capitalism, and globalization are not in fundamental conflict with ecological sustainability. Mol walks a theoretical tightrope. He tries to avoid the untenable claim that economic development, as it has typically occurred, is ecologically unproblematic, while denying that neo-Marxists and other "radical ecologists" are correct in arguing that (capitalist) production invariably contributes to environmental deterioration. Remarkably, Mol, consistent with a wide variety of institutional approaches, ends his focus with institutional and regulatory changes favoring the environment. Such a narrow focus underscores one of the central problems with institutional approaches, including EMT: being overly focused on structural changes occurring in society in response to ecological concerns, these approaches neglect to analyze whether the structural changes actually mitigate environmental threats.

Readers from a neo-Marxist orientation, as well as those from the new human ecology tradition, will likely be frustrated with this work. Mol's dismissal of the "treadmill of production" and his claims that EMT has sufficiently addressed and moved beyond the critiques of neo-Marxists are unconvincing. Human ecologists will readily note his failure to recognize the basic material conditions of existence that are so inextricably linked with ecological sustainability. For example, Mol neglects to consider the pivotal role played by the driving forces not only in the spread of environmental deterioration, but also in the processes of modernity and globalization, such as population growth and the global convergence of consumption practices.

Despite the shortcomings of this book, its thesis is surely correct. Scholars need to think more seriously about the consequences of globalization for the environment, rather than uncritically accepting a simplistic view that globalization is a single process that can be classified as unambig-

uously good or bad. Institutional analyses, which take us part of the way on this quest, now need to be complemented with work that connects these abstract processes to what is happening on the ground—and what is happening in the air and in the oceans.

Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work. By Rhacel Salazar Parreñas. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001. Pp. xi+309. \$55.00 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

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The global political economy has given rise to an increasingly stark international division of reproductive labor. In response to rising national debt throughout the 1980s and spurred on by International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank policies, the Philippines is one nation that has strategically deployed (exported) at least 6 million overseas workers in an attempt to utilize their remittances to pay down debts. Over 60% of this diaspora is composed of women, the majority of whom are employed as domestic workers, caring for the homes, children, and the elderly in the economic North.

The struggles and triumphs of Filipina migrant domestic workers have gained scholarly attention in the last decade. *Servants of Globalization: Women, Migration, and Domestic Work* is a welcome addition to the growing literature on gender and globalization. Rhacel Parreñas, assistant professor of women's and Asian American studies, brings her combined background in these fields to this detailed analysis of the Filipina diaspora in Rome and Los Angeles—two locales often overlooked in the Filipina migrant worker literature. Combining information from participant-observation, in-depth interviews (46 in Rome and 26 in Los Angeles) and surveys (301 in Rome), Parreñas paints a complex picture of contested citizenship, dislocation, and resistance. Her study includes live-in and live-out ("part timer") housekeepers, child care, and elder care workers. Her decision to employ a cross-national comparative study is a distinct contribution to the literature, clearly emphasizing the existence of a Filipina diaspora.

Despite seemingly different "contexts of reception," such as historical migration streams, demographics (age and class), and U.S. versus Italian immigration policies, these Filipina women experience similar "dislocations" (p. 3). Parreñas focuses, in turn, on four dislocations: challenges to citizenship, transnational family formation, downward class mobility, and social exclusion or nonbelonging (vis-à-vis both host society and migrant communities).

Take, for instance, one of these issues: transnational families. Transnational families are a striking condition of migration. With the exception

of a few cases, Filipina migrants in Rome and Los Angeles maintained families in the Philippines while working abroad. Children ranging in age from infancy to early adulthood were left behind, with either often-estranged spouses or extended family. The women by and large infrequently visited due to high airfare, difficulty in taking time off, and fear of losing steady jobs.

While transnational family formation is discussed in much work on migrant domestic workers, the emotional costs have not been fully examined. It is on this topic that Parreñas provides richly detailed stories from the women themselves. One woman explained, "When I came home, my daughters were teenagers already. [Starts crying.] When I saw my family, I dropped my bag and asked who were my daughters. I did not know who they were, but they just on screaming 'Inay, Inay!' [Mom, Mom!]" (pp. 120–21; brackets in original). Separation is painful not only for the women, but also for their children. The women comfort themselves by focusing on the material gains they are able to provide, rather than on the emotional pains of distance. However, this "commodification" of the women's love for their children, Parreñas argues, has a tendency to reinforce the separation, rather than allow women to take steps to alleviate the distance. Their individual attempts to alleviate the pain of transnational dislocation in effect reinscribe the distance.

This same dynamic is seen when the women work to resist the sense of social exclusion and nonbelonging they feel within their work countries. This is especially clear in Rome, where many part-timers had "sideline" businesses (such as selling ethnic foods, music, telecommunications) in the Filipina/o migrant community. On the more lucrative side, Filipina women able to rent apartments often parlayed space into money, sometimes renting multiple beds per room to newer part-timers or live-in domestics in need of a place to stay on their day off. Sideline businesses, meant to alleviate the economic alienation and hasten exit from Italy, tended to reinforce the dislocation by commodifying personal relationships among the community. Additionally, those able to make profits tended to stay even longer, rather than leave. She concludes that as much camaraderie as she saw (e.g., gathering to share work tips and job referrals), competition was also enforced through the reality of segregation within Rome, and the global capitalist system framing their choices.

While at times the specificity of experiences between her Los Angeles and Rome domestics employed as live-in versus live-out housekeepers, child care, or elder care workers is lost in the analysis, Parreñas convincingly illustrates crucial shared experiences. She skillfully captures the complexity and malleability of family and community structures, as well as the women's adaptive strategies given local and global economic realities. Further, her nuanced analyses convey the women's fragmented existences, astutely avoiding any essentializing representation of Filipina domestic workers. This wide-ranging book yields substantial insights throughout and should be read by scholars, activists, and students inter-

ested in Asian American studies, women's studies, sociology, anthropology, and international development.

Workers after Workers' States: Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. Edited by Stephen Crowley and David Ost. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001. Pp. ix+241. \$75.00 (cloth); \$26.95 (paper).

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Recent history reduced Eastern European labor from being a collective actor of some political and economic weight under state socialism to little more than a factor of production under capitalism. This resulted in the near-total inability of the working class to influence outcomes of the transformation and produced an immense sense of social displacement and personal malaise among working men and women in the eastern half of Europe. One aspect of labor's decreasing significance has been the remarkable weakness of unions as they appeared on the new, pluralistic political terrain. The volume under review presents 10 parallel, country-by-country minihistories of the transformations of some basic organizational features of trade union politics and worker representation in the post-state socialist part of Europe.

Contrary to the promise made on its back cover, this is not a comparative book. As the introduction points out, the editors "deliberately chose not to engage in a comparative study" (p. 9) because they disapprove of that trend in sociological work on post-state socialism that sets up poorly informed, hasty, and decontextualized comparisons, only to produce premature and misguided conclusions. The sympathetic reader finds her or himself asking for more: for engagement with previous work, pointing out specific weaknesses.

Instead, the editors call for the construction of a common knowledge base—the basic idea of "area studies"—about institutional change in Eastern European labor politics since 1989. The resulting volume thus reads as a report from an interesting fact-finding conference. The authors include a fine assortment of North American and Eastern European scholars, many of whom are also union activists. True to its promise, the book is very rich in valid descriptive detail, particularly with respect to issues concerning processes of pluralization in union politics; confusions in levels, mechanisms, and objectives in demand making; the flight of intellectuals from the unions; the drops in unionization rates; and the links between union and party politics in the post-state socialist political context. The studies treat their empirical object with a perceptiveness and respect that is rare in work on Eastern Europe, especially in English.

It is surprising, however, given the book's title, to notice the absence

of class analysis, beyond the recurrent use of the very term "labor" whose meaning alternates between "union(s)" and "worker(s)"—a rather unfortunate imprecision. The volume reflects a moderate view of unions as organizations whose task does not extend beyond increasing the material rewards of workers, mainly in individual consumption. Collective consumption—a key to understanding working-class life and the unions' complex relations to that politically much-thematized class location under state socialism as well as in the Western European social welfare model, the implicit comparative norm for the volume—is thus by and large absent. Also left out is any idea of class politics that question capitalism as the best of all possible modes of production.

The book apprehends union weakness through such "indicators" (p. 4) as the disappearance of membership, especially in the private sector, the authoritarian styles of company management, the waning of collective bargaining, the dropping number and decreasing impact of strikes, the lopsided and unreliable nature of political alliances, weak union impact on public policy, and, hardly surprising knowing all of the above, the deteriorating material well-being of workers (pp. 4, 220). Among the wide range of possible explanations the work offers for this phenomenon, the editors dismiss all exogenous effects in a single paragraph (p. 228). The ferocity with which ownership of and control over some of the economies of the former Soviet bloc has been passed over to the multinational corporations, and the degree to which effective control over economic and social policies has been taken away from the local polity is not important, they argue, for two reasons: "Not all new global institutions are against labor" (p. 228), and in comparison to other countries with similar external pressures, "the response from Eastern European labor movements has been muted" (p. 228). So, because "the point in Eastern Europe is not so much that labor has been *weakened* since 1989 . . . but that it has been *created* as a weak actor" (p. 228, emphasis in original), they conclude that reasons for its weakness are to be found internally. This appears to this reviewer as a major non sequitur.

It is of course correct to point out, as the volume does repeatedly, that the force of free market ideologies is truly astonishing in Eastern and Central Europe, and that this provides a direct explanation for union weakness. That is an indictment of the ideological practices of the local cultural and political elites and a warning regarding the inability of most of the region's cultures to produce effective, non-extreme right resistance to such effects.

That cultural explanation, however, remains rather incomplete unless we take into account two global factors. Those anticollectivist ideologies emerged in a global climate of neoliberal ideological hegemony and in a political context in which the region's formerly state socialist economies were privatized wholesale, to a large extent through foreign direct investment (FDI), benefiting mainly the most powerful large and midsize multinational corporations headquartered in the European Union. This

transformation has resulted in the rapid peripheralization of Europe's post-state socialist economies, suggesting that well-contextualized, explicit comparisons with other (semi)peripheral parts of the world might yield some interesting additional insights about the causes for the current weakness of Eastern European labor.

This informative volume provides a valuable snapshot of the last 10 years of union politics in Eastern Europe. It offers a sound basis for further debates on union weakness and very suitable material for graduate courses in economic sociology, labor studies, and comparative politics, union or otherwise.

States of Imagination: Ethnographic Explorations of the Postcolonial State. Edited by Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 2001. Pp. viii+423. \$64.95 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

Jyoti Puri
Simmons College

The state may be "back in," but *States of Imagination* is an effective reminder of why it is well worth retreading this ground. This book offers ethnographies of states across a number of postcolonial contexts, which, given the inattention to theorizing about the state outside of European settings, is a point of no little significance. The importance of this collection for theories on the state lies in its emphasis on questioning the myths of coherence and sovereignty of the state, in its skepticism toward easy distinctions—such as European and Third World states, state and society, modernity and tradition, or liberal and authoritarian states—and on unravelling postcolonial states as sites for political and cultural struggles (see especially articles by Mitchell Dean, Thomas Hansen, David Nugent, Finn Stepputat, and Fiona Wilson).

In their coauthored introduction, editors Thomas Blom Hansen and Finn Stepputat position their approach between Gramsci's insights on the inherently politically fraught and violent nature of the state and Foucault's attention to the disciplinary and dispersed strategies of power and governance. The result, according to them, is a "denaturalized" (p. 3) and disaggregated understanding of how states are understood. Across the essays, the postcolonial state is seen as defragmented, with porous rather than impermeable boundaries, vexed by inconsistencies and contradictions, unstable, continually recreated symbolically, and invested with considerable but not unmitigated power. The editors view the state in terms of its symbolic functions, meaning the reiteration of state as the locus of governance and authoritative power, and its practical functions, including the assertion of territorial sovereignty, gathering and controlling knowledge of the population, and development and management of the national

economy (p. 7). Avoiding stagnant characterizations of postcolonial states as "weak" or "failed," the editors call for scholars to come to grips with the seemingly global desire to establish national states, while focusing on the contextual, detailed, and discrete practices and techniques of the state.

The following 13 essays grapple with what is promised in the introduction. Looking at a number of ethnographic sites, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (SATRC) and state formation in Ecuador, these essays are divided into three sections, each dealing with the state and governance, justice, and community. Perhaps the most consistent theme is the attempt to highlight imbrications of state and society (see especially essays by Akhil Gupta, Lars Buur, Hansen, Oskar Verkaaik, and Rachel Seider). Even though critics charge that the SATRC is an instrument of the South African state, Buur argues that the SATRC had to paradoxically assert itself as independent of state and society in order to successfully signal the symbolic transformation of both. Essays also unravel how examining notions of community with respect to the state (see Nugent, Stepputat, and Martijn Van Beek) lead to clearer understandings of the erection of normative boundaries on the otherwise porous terrain of state and civil society. Focusing on the Chachapoyas, located in northern Peru, David Nugent analyzes how perceptions of the corrosiveness of modernity and notions of the alien, compromised national state led to the Chachapoyanos representing themselves as a separate, racially distinct, premodern folk community; representations of tradition and the premodern community were contingent on perceptions of the state and, no less, were products of modernity in Nugent's analysis.

In this vein, the essays tend toward more complex interplays of power and resistance, emphasizing the unevenness of power and processes of struggle. Mapping multiple points of surveillance and resistance between state bureaucrats, "voluntary workers" and teachers, and the recipients of the services provided by the Integrated Child Development Services program, Gupta sees a much more reciprocal if uneven interplay between the agents and subjects of the state. In Rachel Seider's reading, efforts to develop more inclusive forms of citizenship in Guatemalan society, riven by class and racialized differences, are better located amidst contestations between Mayan communities and the state.

Disaggregating and contextualizing understandings of postcolonial states predisposes a number of the essays to focus on routine, everyday practices of the state (see especially Gupta, Verkaaik, Wilson). In his essay on the perceived dominance of the Pakistani state by one ethnic group, Verkaaik extends this approach to the "view from below" gathered from Muhajirs (immigrants from India after the 1947 partition) residing in Hyderabad and Karachi. Not only is Verkaaik able to garner popular views of the state, but he also argues that analysis of social unrest in Pakistan as a product of collapsed state authority reduces social unrest to the state, imposes distinctions between state and society, and misses the broader changes taking place within the society.

But no less important are the more structural and spectacular aspects of postcolonial states. As such, Sarah Radcliffe examines how notions of territory and sovereignty were actively produced by the state in Ecuador; Steffen Jensen explores the strategies through which the ANC normalized the South African state; and Alette Norval looks at representations of national identity and memory that lie at the heart of the SATRC. Spectacles such as the SATRC (see Buur and Norval), the Srikrishna inquiry commission set up to investigate culpability in the riots that took place in Mumbai in January 1993 (Hansen), and Fiestas Patrias, or Peru's national Independence Day (Wilson), are key moments to understand ongoing strategies and techniques of state representations.

Undoubtedly, this collection is a useful intervention in theories and research on the state and its modernist legacies. For that, I would recommend the book and its adoption in upper-undergraduate- and graduate-level classes. What does get left out of the collection is careful attention to the contemporary politics and policies of neoliberalism, as well as a more sustained analysis of the interplay of gender, sexual, and racial politics in considerations of the state and its modernist legacies. Notwithstanding the essays that pay somewhat glancing attention to these issues, the other essays would have only been strengthened through further disaggregations of state and civil society, and their interconnections.

Europe: The Exceptional Case. By Grace Davie. London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2002. Pp. xii+180.

Nancy J. Davis
DePauw University

In a reversal of the colonial past, Ghanaians in the Netherlands are preaching the gospel to their unchurched Dutch brethren. In the New World that once resisted the proselytizing efforts of Europeans, a thriving Christian marketplace, and growing Pentecostalism in particular, contrasts mightily with the empty pews of most Western European churches. In Manila, an estimated 4 million youthful pilgrims celebrated the Vatican's World Youth Day, while only a quarter that number attended when it was held in Paris. In a slim volume slightly expanded from the 2001 Sarum Theological Lectures, Grace Davie counters the claim that the subdued religious life of Western Europe is a harbinger of what is to come in the rest of the world. Employing a comparative Weberian approach to the Christian world, Davie surveys the religious terrain of Western Europe and compares it to that of the United States, Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Far East (notably, South Korea, the Philippines, and Melanesia). She contrasts the "moribund state churches" of Western Europe with the "vibrant religious marketplace" of competing and innovative denominations in the United States; the near absence of Pen-

tecotalism in Western Europe with its dramatic rise in Latin America (and indeed much of the Christian world); the dearth of missionary activity by European religionists with the vigorous exporting of religion from sub-Saharan Africa; and the secularization, or at least institutional decline of religion, that accompanied industrialization and urbanization in most of Western Europe with the seeming lack of conflict between economic modernization and religious vitality in the Far East. Davie pronounces Europe (more specifically Western Europe) as exceptional. After reading her book, I wondered whether each of these cases is not unique.

Davie asserts that Europeans are not lacking in religious sentiment, but rather are "differently religious" from Christians elsewhere, "believing without belonging" (p. 5). Drawing on ideas developed in earlier work (*Religion in Modern Europe: A Memory Mutates* [Oxford University Press, 2000]), Davie characterizes Europeans as "vicarious" religionists who are content to let others maintain or perform the collective religious life, but who do turn to religion in times of national emergency or to mark selected life passages (e.g., marriage and death). In this regard, Davie rejects as a characterization of European society both a strict version of secularization theory (e.g., Steve Bruce, *From Cathedrals to Cults: Religion in the Modern World* [Oxford University Press, 1996]) and its main competitor, rational choice theory (e.g., Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge, *The Future of Religion* [University of California Press, 1985]).

Important contributions of Davie's book include her review of current sociological theory, conceptual tools, and empirical studies in religion and her recognition of the geographic and cultural boundedness of many theoretical models in the sociology of religion. She is critical of those on both sides of the North Atlantic for assuming that what now characterizes their society will soon prevail everywhere.

It is hard to dispute the value of comparative and historical analysis or the importance of the questions Davie poses; however, the answers are not always as compelling as the questions, sometimes through no fault of the author. Empirical data on the characteristics of religious congregants, the nature of religious belief, the extent of religious participation, and the impact of these are much more available in Western Europe and the United States than they are, for example, in Nigeria or Melanesia. This sometimes leads Davie to slip into anecdotal illustration in describing religious life in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Far East. It is unclear, for example, if the Melanesian Brothers at Exeter Cathedral in England in their indigenous dress and religious style represent an occasional occurrence or a dominant pattern of reversal in missionary activity. Davie's expertise and considerable scholarship on religion is centered in Western Europe and to a lesser extent in the United States; her chapters on sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America, and the Far East are more sketchy and based on secondary materials on a variety of topics. Sometimes the analysis is too broadly stroked to do more than pique one's interest in reading more. For example, in the chapter on sub-Saharan

Africa, only six pages are devoted to the stated theme of the chapter, the reversal of direction in the flow of religion between Africa and Europe. It is not clear the extent to which these Afro-Caribbean religious traditions are marketed only to first-generation African immigrants in Europe or to a wider European audience, and if to a wider audience, the degree of their reception. That said, Davie does provide a corrective to the almost exclusive focus on economic and political motivations for African migration to Europe and to the near-exclusive focus on ethnicity over religion as an important badge of identity among these diaspora populations.

Finally, while her book does not provide a fully developed explanation for why Europe is different from the other regions of the world (there is mention of the early and slow pace of Europe's industrialization and urbanization and of "the collusions of religion and power over many centuries" [p. 41]), Davie does cover an extensive literature on Christian religions in Europe, the United States, and other countries beyond the usual focus on the North Atlantic, making the book useful for undergraduate- and graduate-level courses in religion. Nonetheless, Davie's goal of developing new conceptual tools and alternative schema that apply beyond the West European or U.S. contexts, where most theories of religion have originated, still awaits further work and research beyond Christendom.

Meaning and Modernity: Religion, Polity, and Self. Edited by Richard Madsen, William M. Sullivan, Ann Swidler, and Steven M. Tipton. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Pp. xviii+346. \$60.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

Joseph E. Davis
University of Virginia

Robert N. Bellah has had a remarkable academic career by almost any standard. For over half a century, he has been a specialist in Japanese society, a distinguished sociologist of religion, and a keen observer of U.S. culture. His first book appeared in 1952, followed by his doctoral dissertation, *Tokugawa Religion* (Free Press, 1957), which has been in print ever since its publication. In subsequent years, amidst a steady stream of contributions, he produced such classics as "Civil Religion in America" (*Daedalus*, 96:1), *Beyond Belief* (Harper & Row, 1970), and *The Broken Covenant* (Seabury Press, 1975). With the award-winning bestseller, *Habits of the Heart* (University of California Press, 1985) and its follow-up *The Good Society* (Knopf, 1991), books for which he was senior author, Bellah reached a national audience. A gifted teacher, he taught at McGill, Harvard, and then, for 30 years at Berkeley, from which he is now formally (but only formally) retired. In 2000, he received the National Humanities Medal. More books are forthcoming.

Meaning and Modernity is a festschrift to Robert Bellah, edited by his *Habits and Good Society* coauthors. With characteristic generosity, Bellah, in his epilogue, describes the volume as an "extraordinary collection of papers" (p. 255). And indeed they are. Written by an august group of colleagues and former students, the chapters deal with the major concerns of Bellah's lifework and approach them from various frameworks—historical, sociological, philosophical, and theological—singly or, as Bellah himself typically did, in combination. These concerns cluster into three broad groups set within the context of three fundamental arguments. Against ethicists' tendency to downplay institutions and sociologists' tendency to suppress the normative dimension of social life, Bellah emphasized the intrinsically moral nature of institutions and the importance of moral traditions as living realities. Against the view of a single and secular path to modernity, Bellah emphasized the comparative analysis of modernization processes and the influence of religion and transcendent religious symbols in shaping them. Against the view, finally, that democracy and its citizenry could thrive in a "procedural republic," Bellah proffered a vision of deliberative democracy and emphasized the vital rôle religious traditions—especially those with a strong sense of church—could play in fostering social cohesion and resisting alienating forms of individualism and the all-encompassing logic of the market.

Within the ambit of one or more of these concerns, each contributor develops his or her own substantive questions: the Japanese versus the U.S. path to modernity (S. N. Eisenstadt), for example, or the challenge of diversity to self-governance (Charles Taylor). While working "within a broad tradition of symbolic realist thought" (p. xi), the authors do not, for the most part, extend Bellah's ideas in any direct way (the clearest exception is Richard Madsen's very helpful essay "Comparative Cosmopolis"). But if our study of culture is to affirm the realities of symbols, to avoid the tendency to reduce symbolism to cognition or a utilitarian calculus, then some extension seems necessary, including with respect to method. Moving away from the formal and abstract paradigm of his mentor Talcott Parsons, Bellah developed a deeper and more sophisticated Durkheimian approach to symbols, society, and the problem of meaning. The accompanying and more Weberian methods, hermeneutics, and phenomenology, however, have proved to be troublesome bases for systematic inquiry (on this point see, e.g., Robert Wuthnow, *Meaning and Moral Order* [University of California Press, 1987]). If *Meaning and Modernity* has a weakness, it is the failure to grapple more with this important issue.

The systemization issue is crucial because an interpretive, humanistic, and "thick" account (not just description) of social life and human being is more needed than ever. Reductionism and the devaluing of the subject is rife in the sciences, from rational choice and naïve positivism in the social sciences to the information-pattern view of humans coming from such new fields as cognitive science and artificial life. A publicly responsible and morally engaged sociology needs Robert Bellah's intellectual

vision. His vocation has sometimes included the role of the prophet, and the burden of the prophet is often to stand alone. So be it. But in terms of his substantive contributions to sociology and beyond, his legacy needs to be secured by the kind of systematization that will generate an empirical agenda, a critical mass of scholarship—a Bellahian school, if you will—that extends his work and addresses the deficiencies that any one person's work necessarily contains.

Following the death of David Riesman in May 2002, Orlando Patterson published an op-ed piece in the *New York Times* that was both a critique of contemporary sociology and a tribute to Riesman. With the title, Patterson rhetorically dubs Riesman "The Last Sociologist." Even by the standards Patterson employs, in fact, especially by those standards, *Meaning and Modernity* suggests why he is wrong.

Sociology and the Real World. By Stephen Lyng and David D. Franks. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2002. Pp. viii+234. \$70.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

David Ashley
University of Wyoming

This is a useful and thoughtful book that seeks to show how social analysis can avoid, on the one hand, textualism, extreme social constructionism, and postmodern relativism, and, on the other, the naïve, empiricist, positivistic view that objective reality exists and can be known as a thing-in-itself. Whereas constructionism turns "objectivity" and "reality" into dirty words and abandons them, positivism, in turn, uncritically and dogmatically assumes that valid knowledge is unaffected by "the peculiarities of our bodies and by human thought-communities" (p. 6). Yet, as Lyng and Franks point out, precognitive and emotional activities are necessarily involved in knowledge formation because "the practicalities of acting in the real world demand more than abstract intelligence" (p. 15). "Truth," then, is not Platonically predetermined, but is best defined as "a practically accomplished unity of knowledge and reality" (Dmitri N. Shalin, "Critical Theory and the Pragmatist Challenge," *American Journal of Sociology* 98:266; quoted on p. 187). It follows that an increase in the sensitivity of organisms leads to their recognition of a larger, more diverse environment, which, as a consequence, elicits more (and, possibly, more complex) responses. Lyng and Franks expertly argue that the problem with most sociology is not that it claims to produce "objective" understanding where none can exist, but rather that the objective realities that actually do count "often go unrecognized" (p. 78).

For Lyng and Franks, the "objective" is not some realm that exists on its own terms and in its own right. Rather, it is resistance of some kind (e.g., the feel of a solid body against our hand, our recognition of the

indeterminacy of existence, or our rejection of a sick culture that is at odds with human nature). By contrast, the "subjective" refers to the processes by which the organism (e.g., through sensory organs) engenders a world we can recognize. Objective and subjective are jointly complicit: whereas the objective is brought into existence by our sensory and pragmatic activity, the subjective — always "the last to be discovered" (p. 76) — is the *a priori* of knowledge, not something that gets in the way of, or interferes with, reality.

In brief, Lyng and Franks rather elegantly steer us between, on the one hand, the extremes of rhetorical positivism (e.g., sociobiology's arrogant conflation of ant behavior methodologies with those more appropriate for human communicative interaction), and, on the other, the mind games of radical constructionists such as Jean Baudrillard who lose themselves in texts about texts, oblivious to anything outside their own claustrophobic little worlds.

By contrast, Lyng and Franks develop a transactional approach (introduced, initially, by Dewey and Mead), the main advantages of which are as follows. First, dualism is abandoned; it is recognized that humans create environments as part of a process best understood by reworking (insofar as this is possible) the praxis that constructs their realities. There are critical possibilities here. Humans, for instance, can imagine alternative forms of subjectivity. But, for these visions to be realized, objectivity must be achieved "through the elaboration of partisan viewpoints in the direction of hypothetical models" (p. 192). Of course, such "partisan agendas are most effectively promoted when they receive support from objective analyses of social problems" (p. 192).

In the second half of this book, Lyng and Franks discuss some applications of their transactional approach and apply it to the study of social problems. This section—which vividly and usefully shows how their transactional approach can be put to work—contains an excellent and insightful discussion of many key problems and issues in theory and methodology. This would be a great book to assign in a graduate seminar. Of course, in a work as ambitious as this, some problems are bound to emerge.

For instance, in criticizing Habermas's efforts to revitalize a deformed and antihuman life-world colonized by money and power, the authors effectively critique Habermas's overdependence on disembodied, process-based, nonsubstantive, quasi-transcendent, cognitive standards. Some troublesome questions emerge nonetheless. The neo-Weberian Habermas sees reason as taming (and as perfecting) our nature. By contrast, Lyng and Franks believe "the unreflective habit that fills the life-world consists of corporeal wisdom passed across generations as bodies engage in productive, consumptive, and communicative transactions" (p. 167). This suggests that it is they, rather than Habermas (or Weber), who appear to believe that the life-world can be made more accessible to itself and hence, one presumes, become more understandable, more reasonable.

But to what extent—and how, exactly—is corporeal wisdom revealed?

Part of the life-world and part of our own subjectivity seems, of necessity, to be linguistically unreflective. Lyng and Franks seem to accept this, but they also fail to trace out some of the implications. If corporeal wisdom is unreflective, how do we understand said wisdom? And, if we were to know this wisdom, would we not, as a consequence, destroy it? In any case, how is bodily wisdom shared? Socially, or precognitively? Both, or neither? According to the very standards Lyng and Franks have set for themselves, such wisdom does not seem to qualify as knowledge because it does not seem to be part of a thought-community.

Social Deviance: Testing a General Theory. By Howard B. Kaplan and Robert J. Johnson. New York: Kluwer Academic/Plenum Publishers, 2001. Pp. xiii+232. \$65.00.

Mark Christopher Stafford
University of Texas, Austin

This book reports tests of a theory of deviant behavior, using panel data from seventh grade students (time 1) who were resurveyed in eighth and ninth grades (times 2 and 3) and young adulthood (time 4). The first phase of testing estimated a relatively simple three-part model that self-rejection (time 1) increases a disposition to deviance (time 2), which, in turn, increases later deviant behavior (time 3); net of the indirect positive effects of self-rejection on later deviant behavior, self-rejection decreases later deviant behavior; early deviant behavior increases self-rejection, disposition to deviance, and later deviant behavior. The second phase of testing estimated an elaborated model that, in addition to the effects in the first model, estimated that association with deviant peers increases later deviant behavior and mediates the effects of self-rejection, disposition to deviance, and early deviant behavior on later deviant behavior. The third phase of testing estimated an even more elaborated model that, in addition to the effects in the first and second models, estimated that negative social sanctions increase later deviant behavior and mediate the effects of early deviant behavior on later deviant behavior by increasing a disposition to deviance and association with deviant peers.

After reporting results that were largely consistent with all of the models, the most inclusive model (estimated in the third phase of testing) was tested separately for males and females and white Anglos, African-Americans, and Mexican Americans. Deviant behavior by young adults (time 4) also was estimated with the most inclusive adolescent model, first for white Anglos and then separately for males and females. Several effects were stronger for females than males: early deviant behavior on self-rejection, early deviant behavior on association with deviant peers, self-rejection on a disposition to deviance, and association with deviant peers on later deviant behavior. There also were interesting differences by race

and ethnicity, including early deviant behavior increased association with deviant peers only among African-Americans, negative social sanctions increased association with deviant peers only among white Anglos, and association with deviant peers increased later deviant behavior only among white Anglos and African-Americans. Like the most inclusive model for white Anglo adolescents, early deviant behavior had no significant effect on association with deviant peers in the young adult model. However, unlike the adolescent model, association with deviant peers had no significant effect on later deviant behavior in the young adult model. The most notable gender difference in the young adult model was that association with deviant peers increased later deviant behavior only among males.

The theory integrates parts of other, less-inclusive theories of deviance, including strain, social control, containment, social learning, and labeling. However, the links to these other theories are not identified systematically; instead, their identification often is left to readers. Newer deviance theories, such as self-control, revised strain, and reintegrative shaming, are not incorporated in the theory. The first wave of data (time 1) was collected in 1971, before publication of these newer theories. Ordinarily, use of "old" data does not present problems in testing, unless the theory is limited to a specific period or point in time. However, in this case, the integrated theory and its tests seem dated and incomplete. The problem is exacerbated by the fact that, excluding the authors' self-references, over 90% of the listed references are before 1987. Moreover, many of the test results have been reported in previous publications by the authors.

The theory is "general" not only because it integrates parts of other theories of deviance into a more comprehensive whole, but because it purports to explain diverse types of deviant behavior. Moreover, it is general in that individuals are assumed to adopt "any mode of deviance from among a range of possible deviant patterns rather than . . . some specific pattern" (p. 101). The particular mode (e.g., theft versus fighting) is a function of situational contingencies.

A major strength of the book is its analytical thoroughness. Each hypothesized relation in each of the models was explicated clearly. Then each model was estimated by LISREL to analyze linear structural relations among latent constructs over the multiple waves of data. Measurement and structural relations models were estimated simultaneously, and there was an assessment of the fit of all of the models to the observed data. The careful exposition and execution of the analytical strategy makes the book a valuable resource for researchers and students who are attempting to master this kind of structural equation modeling.

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
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
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
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
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(Rev. 3/98)

The Mark of a Criminal Record¹

Devah Pager

Northwestern University

With over 2 million individuals currently incarcerated, and over half a million prisoners released each year, the large and growing number of men being processed through the criminal justice system raises important questions about the consequences of this massive institutional intervention. This article focuses on the consequences of incarceration for the employment outcomes of black and white job seekers. The present study adopts an experimental audit approach—in which matched pairs of individuals applied for real entry-level jobs—to formally test the degree to which a criminal record affects subsequent employment opportunities. The findings of this study reveal an important, and much underrecognized, mechanism of stratification. A criminal record presents a major barrier to employment, with important implications for racial disparities.

While stratification researchers typically focus on schools, labor markets, and the family as primary institutions affecting inequality, a new institution has emerged as central to the sorting and stratifying of young and disadvantaged men: the criminal justice system. With over 2 million individuals currently incarcerated, and over half a million prisoners released each year, the large and growing numbers of men being processed through the criminal justice system raises important questions about the consequences of this massive institutional intervention.

This article focuses on the consequences of incarceration for the em-

¹ Support for this research includes grants from the National Science Foundation (SES-0101236), the National Institute of Justice (2002-IJ-CX-0002), the Joyce Foundation, and the Soros Foundation. Views expressed in this document are my own and do not necessarily represent those of the granting agencies. I am grateful for comments and suggestions from Marc Bendick, Jr., Robert M. Hauser, Erik Olin Wright, Lincoln Quillian, David B. Grusky, Eric Grodsky, Chet Pager, Irving Piliavin, Jeremy Freese, and Bruce Western. This research would not have been possible without the support and hospitality of the staff at the Benedict Center and at the Department of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin—Milwaukee. Direct correspondence to Devah Pager, Department of Sociology, Northwestern University, 1810 Chicago Avenue, Evanston, Illinois 60208. E-mail: pager@northwestern.edu

ployment outcomes of black and white men. While previous survey research has demonstrated a strong *association* between incarceration and employment, there remains little understanding of the mechanisms by which these outcomes are produced. In the present study, I adopt an experimental audit approach to formally test the degree to which a criminal record affects subsequent employment opportunities. By using matched pairs of individuals to apply for real entry-level jobs, it becomes possible to directly measure the extent to which a criminal record—in the absence of other disqualifying characteristics—serves as a barrier to employment among equally qualified applicants. Further, by varying the race of the tester pairs, we can assess the ways in which the effects of race and criminal record interact to produce new forms of labor market inequalities.

TRENDS IN INCARCERATION

Over the past three decades, the number of prison inmates in the United States has increased by more than 600%, leaving it the country with the highest incarceration rate in the world (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2002a; Barclay, Tavares, and Siddique 2001). During this time, incarceration has changed from a punishment reserved primarily for the most heinous offenders to one extended to a much greater range of crimes and a much larger segment of the population. Recent trends in crime policy have led to the imposition of harsher sentences for a wider range of offenses, thus casting an ever-widening net of penal intervention.²

While the recent “tough on crime” policies may be effective in getting criminals off the streets, little provision has been made for when they get back out. Of the nearly 2 million individuals currently incarcerated, roughly 95% will be released, with more than half a million being released each year (Slevin 2000). According to one estimate, there are currently over 12 million ex-felons in the United States, representing roughly 8% of the working-age population (Uggen, Thompson, and Manza 2000). Of those recently released, nearly two-thirds will be charged with new crimes and over 40% will return to prison within three years (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000). Certainly some of these outcomes are the result of desolate opportunities or deeply ingrained dispositions, grown out of broken fam-

² For example, the recent adoption of mandatory sentencing laws, most often used for drug offenses, removes discretion from the sentencing judge to consider the range of factors pertaining to the individual and the offense that would normally be taken into account. As a result, the chances of receiving a state prison term after being arrested for a drug offense rose by 547% between 1980 and 1992 (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995).

ilies, poor neighborhoods, and little social control (Sampson and Laub 1993; Wilson 1997). But net of these contributing factors, there is evidence that experience with the criminal justice system in itself has adverse consequences for subsequent opportunities. In particular, incarceration is associated with limited future employment opportunities and earnings potential (Freeman 1987; Western 2002), which themselves are among the strongest predictors of recidivism (Shover 1996; Sampson and Laub 1993; Uggen 2000).

The expansion of the prison population has been particularly consequential for blacks. The incarceration rate for young black men in the year 2000 was nearly 10%, compared to just over 1% for white men in the same age group (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001). Young black men today have a 28% likelihood of incarceration during their lifetime (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1997), a figure that rises above 50% among young black high school dropouts (Pettit and Western 2001). These vast numbers of inmates translate into a large and increasing population of black ex-offenders returning to communities and searching for work. The barriers these men face in reaching economic self-sufficiency are compounded by the stigma of minority status and criminal record. The consequences of such trends for widening racial disparities are potentially profound (see Western and Pettit 1999; Freeman and Holzer 1986).

PRIOR RESEARCH

While little research to date has focused on the consequences of criminal sanctions, a small and growing body of evidence suggests that contact with the criminal justice system can lead to a substantial reduction in economic opportunities. Using longitudinal survey data, researchers have studied the employment probabilities and income of individuals after release from prison and have found a strong and consistent negative effect of incarceration (Western and Beckett 1999; Freeman 1987; Nagin and Waldfogel 1993).

This existing research has been instrumental in demonstrating the possible aggregate effects of incarceration on labor market outcomes. Unfortunately, however, there are several fundamental limitations of survey data that leave the conclusions of this research vulnerable to harsh criticism. First, it is difficult, using survey data, to rule out the possibility that unmeasured differences between those who are and are not convicted of crimes may drive the observed results. Figure 1 presents one possible model of the relationship between incarceration and employment outcomes, with a direct causal link between the two. In this model, an individual acquires a criminal record, which then severely limits his later




FIG. 1—Model of direct causation

employment opportunities. But what evidence can we offer in support of this causal relationship? We know that the population of inmates is not a random sample of the overall population. What if, then, the poor outcomes of ex-offenders are merely the result of preexisting traits that make these men bad employees in the first place? Figure 2 presents a model of spurious association in which there is no direct link between incarceration and employment outcomes. Instead, there are direct links between various preexisting individual characteristics (e.g., drug and alcohol abuse, behavioral problems, poor interpersonal skills), which increase the likelihood of both incarceration and poor employment outcomes.³ In this model, the association between incarceration and employment is entirely spurious—the result of individual predispositions toward deviance.

Consistent with figure 2, Kling (1999), Grogger (1995), and Needels (1996) have each argued that the effect of incarceration on employment is negligible, at an estimated 0%–4%. Using administrative data from unemployment insurance (UI) files matched with records from various state departments of corrections, these authors contend that the observed association is instead largely determined by unmeasured individual characteristics.⁴ The findings of these authors stand in stark contrast to the majority of literature asserting a strong link between incarceration and employment (Western and Beckett 1999; Bushway 1998; Sampson and Laub 1993; Freeman 1987; Grogger 1992). While it remains an open question as to whether and to what extent incarceration causes employ-

³ The variables listed here are just a few of the many potential sources of spuriousness that are virtually untestable using survey data.

⁴ Studies using administrative data have the advantage of analyzing large samples of ex-offenders over extended periods of time, before and after incarceration. However, this line of research also suffers from several important limitations: First, employment and wage data from UI administrative records are available only for those jobs covered by and in compliance with unemployment insurance laws, thus excluding many temporary, contingent, or "grey-market" jobs, which may be more likely held by ex-offenders. Second, administrative data are typically limited to one state or jurisdiction; individuals who move to other states during the period of observation are thus mistakenly coded as unemployed or as zero-earners. And finally, missing social security numbers or difficulties in matching records often results in fairly substantial reduction in sample representativeness. See Kornfeld and Bloom (1999) for an in-depth discussion of these issues.




FIG 2.—Model of spurious effects

ment difficulties, survey research is poorly equipped to offer a definitive answer. The Achilles heel of the survey methodology is its inability to escape from the glaring problems of selection that plague research in this field (see Winship and Morgan 1999; Rubin 1990; Heckman et al. 1998).⁵

A second, related limitation of survey research is its inability to formally identify mechanisms. From aggregate effects, we can infer plausible causal processes, but these are only indirectly supported by the data. Because numerous mechanisms could lead to the same set of outcomes, we are left unable to assess the substantive contribution of any given causal process. Survey researchers have offered numerous hypotheses regarding the mechanisms that may produce the observed relationship between incarceration and employment. These include the labeling effects of criminal stigma (Schwartz and Skolnick 1962), the disruption of social and familial ties (Sampson and Laub 1993), the influence on social networks (Hagan 1993), the loss of human capital (Becker 1975), institutional trauma (Parenti 1999), legal barriers to employment (Dale 1976), and, of course, the possibility that incarceration effects may be entirely spurious (Kling 1999; Grogger 1995; Needels 1996). Without direct measures of these variables, it is difficult, using survey data, to discern which, if any, of these causal explanations may be at work.

The uncertainty surrounding these mechanisms motivates the current project. Before addressing some of the larger consequences of incarcer-

⁵ Researchers have employed creative techniques for addressing these issues, such as looking at pre- and postincarceration outcomes for the same individuals (e.g., Grogger 1992; Freeman 1991), comparing ex-offenders to future offenders (e.g., Waldfogel 1994; Grogger 1995), estimating fixed- and random-effects models (Western 2002), and using instrumental variables approaches to correct for unmeasured heterogeneity (e.g., Freeman 1994). There remains little consensus, however, over the degree to which these techniques effectively account for the problems of selection endemic to this type of research

ation, it is essential to first establish conclusively the mechanism—or at least one of the mechanisms—driving these results. In the present study, I focus on the effect of a *criminal record* on employment opportunities. This emphasis directs our attention to the stigma associated with criminal justice intervention and to the ways in which employers respond to this stigma in considering applicants. While certainly there are additional ways in which incarceration may affect subsequent employment, this focus allows us to separate the institutional effect from the individual (or from the interaction of the two) and to directly assess one of the most widely discussed—but rarely measured—mechanisms of carceral channeling (Wacquant 2000). While incarceration may in fact additionally transform individuals (and/or their social ties) in ways that make them less suited to work, my interest here is in what might be termed the “credentialing” aspect of the criminal justice system. Those sent to prison are institutionally branded as a particular class of individuals—as are college graduates or welfare recipients—with implications for their perceived place in the stratification order. The “negative credential” associated with a criminal record represents a unique mechanism of stratification, in that it is the state that certifies particular individuals in ways that qualify them for discrimination or social exclusion.⁶ It is this official status of the negative credential that differentiates it from other sources of social stigma, offering greater legitimacy to its use as the basis for differentiation. (See Pager [2002] for a more extensive discussion of negative credentials and their implications for stratification).

In order to investigate this question, I have chosen an experimental approach to the problem, a methodology best suited to isolating causal mechanisms. There have, in the past, been a limited number of studies that have adopted an experimental approach to the study of criminal stigma. These studies have relied on a “correspondence test” approach, whereby applications are submitted by mail with no in-person contact. The most notable in this line of research is a classic study by Schwartz and Skolnick (1962) in which the researchers prepared four sets of resumes to be sent to prospective employers, varying the criminal record of applicants. In each condition, employers were less likely to consider appli-

⁶ Numerous opportunities become formally off-limits to individuals following a felony conviction, including (depending on the state of residence) access to public housing, voting rights, and employment in certain occupational sectors (e.g., health care occupations, public sector positions, child and elder care work). In addition, the widespread availability of criminal background information allows for the information to be further used as the basis for allocating opportunities not formally off-limits to offenders, as studied here

cants who had any prior contact with the criminal justice system.⁷ Several later studies have verified these findings, varying the types of crimes committed by the hypothetical applicant (Finn and Fontaine 1985; Cohen and Nisbett 1997) or the national context (Boshier and Johnson 1974; Buikhuisen and Dijksterhuis 1971). Each of these studies reports the similar finding that, all else equal, contact with the criminal justice system leads to worse employment opportunities.

Unfortunately, the research design of Schwartz and Skolnick and others using this approach has several limitations. First, Schwartz and Skolnick's study, while clearly demonstrating the substantial effect of criminal stigma, is limited to one job type only (an unskilled hotel job). It remains uncertain how these effects generalize to the overall population of entry-level jobs. Ex-offenders face a diverse set of job openings, some of which may be more or less restricted to applicants with criminal records.

Second, correspondence tests are poorly equipped to address the issue of race. While it is possible to designate national origin using ethnic names (see, e.g., Riach and Rich 1991), it is much more difficult to clearly distinguish black and white applicants on paper.⁸ Given the high rates of incarceration among blacks and the pervasive media images of black criminals, there is good reason to suspect that employers may respond differently to applicants with criminal records depending on their race (see discussion below). Prior research using correspondence tests to study the effect of criminal records, however, has not attempted to include race as a variable.

Finally, the type of application procedure used in correspondence tests—sending resumes by mail—is typically reserved for studies of administrative, clerical, and higher-level occupations. The types of job openings ex-offenders are most likely to apply for, by contrast, typically request in-person applications, and a mailed resume would therefore appear out of place.

The present study extends the work of Schwartz and Skolnick to include a more comprehensive assessment of the hiring process of ex-offenders across a full range of entry-level employment. By using an experimental audit design, this study effectively isolates the effect of a criminal record, while observing employer behavior in real-life employment settings. Fur-

⁷ The four conditions included (1) an applicant who had been convicted and sentenced for assault, (2) an applicant who had been tried for assault but acquitted, (3) an applicant who had been tried for assault, acquitted, *and* had a letter from the judge certifying the applicant's acquittal and emphasizing the presumption of innocence, and (4) an applicant who had no criminal record. In all three criminal conditions—even with a letter from the judge—applicants were less likely to be considered by employers relative to the noncriminal control.

⁸ For an excellent exception, see Bertrand and Mullainathan (2002).

ther, by using in-person application procedures, it becomes possible to simulate the process most often followed for entry-level positions, as well as to provide a more direct test of the effects of race on hiring outcomes.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

There are three primary questions I seek to address with the present study. First, in discussing the main effect of a criminal record, we need to ask whether and to what extent employers use information about criminal histories to make hiring decisions. Implicit in the criticism of survey research in this area is the assumption that the signal of a criminal record is not a determining factor. Rather, employers use information about the interactional styles of applicants, or other observed characteristics—which may be correlated with criminal records—and this explains the differential outcomes we observe. In this view, a criminal record does not represent a meaningful signal to employers on its own. This study formally tests the degree to which employers use information about criminal histories in the absence of corroborating evidence. It is essential that we conclusively document this effect before making larger claims about the aggregate consequences of incarceration.

Second, this study investigates the extent to which race continues to serve as a major barrier to employment. While race has undoubtedly played a central role in shaping the employment opportunities of African-Americans over the past century, recent arguments have questioned the continuing significance of race, arguing instead that other factors—such as spatial location, soft skills, social capital, or cognitive ability—can explain most or all of the contemporary racial differentials we observe (Wilson 1987; Moss and Tilly 1996; Loury 1977; Neal and Johnson 1996). This study provides a comparison of the experiences of equally qualified black and white applicants, allowing us to assess the extent to which direct racial discrimination persists in employment interactions.

The third objective of this study is to assess whether the effect of a criminal record differs for black and white applicants. Most research investigating the differential impact of incarceration on blacks has focused on the differential *rates* of incarceration and how those rates translate into widening racial disparities. In addition to disparities in the rate of incarceration, however, it is also important to consider possible racial differences in the *effects* of incarceration. Almost none of the existing literature to date has explored this issue, and the theoretical arguments remain divided as to what we might expect.

On one hand, there is reason to believe that the signal of a criminal record should be less consequential for blacks. Research on racial stere-

otypes tells us that Americans hold strong and persistent negative stereotypes about blacks, with one of the most readily invoked contemporary stereotypes relating to perceptions of violent and criminal dispositions (Smith 1991; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Devine and Elliott 1995). If it is the case that employers view all blacks as potential criminals, they are likely to differentiate less among those with official criminal records and those without. Actual confirmation of criminal involvement then will provide only redundant information, while evidence against it will be discounted. In this case, the outcomes for all blacks should be worse, with less differentiation between those with criminal records and those without.

On the other hand, the effect of a criminal record may be worse for blacks if employers, already wary of black applicants, are more hesitant when it comes to taking risks on blacks with proven criminal tendencies. The literature on racial stereotypes also tells us that stereotypes are most likely to be activated and reinforced when a target matches on more than one dimension of the stereotype (Quillian and Pager 2002; Darley and Gross 1983; Fiske and Neuberg 1990). While employers may have learned to keep their racial attributions in check through years of heightened sensitivity around employment discrimination, when combined with knowledge of a criminal history, negative attributions are likely to intensify.

A third possibility, of course, is that a criminal record affects black and white applicants equally. The results of this audit study will help to adjudicate between these competing predictions.

THE AUDIT METHODOLOGY

The method of audit studies was pioneered in the 1970s with a series of housing audits conducted by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (Wienk et al. 1979; Hakken 1979). Nearly 20 years later, this initial model was modified and applied to the employment context by researchers at the Urban Institute (Cross et al. 1990; Turner, Fix, and Struyk 1991). The basic design of an employment audit involves sending matched pairs of individuals (called testers) to apply for real job openings in order to see whether employers respond differently to applicants on the basis of selected characteristics.

The appeal of the audit methodology lies in its ability to combine experimental methods with real-life contexts. This combination allows for greater generalizability than a lab experiment and a better grasp of the causal mechanisms than what we can normally obtain from observational data. The audit methodology is particularly valuable for those with an interest in discrimination. Typically, researchers are forced to infer dis-

crimination indirectly, often attributing the residual from a statistical model—which is essentially all that is not directly explained—to discrimination. This convention is rather unsatisfying to researchers who seek empirical documentation for important social processes. The audit methodology therefore provides a valuable tool for this research.⁹

Audit studies have primarily been used to study those characteristics protected under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, such as race, gender, and age (Ayres and Siegelman 1995; Cross et al. 1990; Turner et al. 1991; Bendick, Brown, and Wall 1999; Bendick 1999; Bendick, Jackson, and Reinoso 1994; Neumark 1996). The employment of ex-offenders, of course, has not traditionally been thought of as a civil rights issue, but with the rapid expansion of the criminal justice system over the past three decades, there has been heightened concern over the growing population of men with criminal records. Recognizing the increasing importance of this issue, several states (including Wisconsin) have passed legislation expanding the fair employment regulations to protect individuals with criminal records from discrimination by employers. Employers are cautioned that crimes may only be considered if they closely relate to the specific duties required of the job, however “shocking” the crime may have been. If anything, then, this study represents a strong test of the effect of a criminal record. We might expect the effect to be larger in states where no such legal protection is in place.¹⁰

STUDY DESIGN

The basic design of this study involves the use of four male auditors (also called testers), two blacks and two whites. The testers were paired by race; that is, unlike in the original Urban Institute audit studies, the two black testers formed one team, and the two white testers formed the second

⁹ While the findings from audit studies have produced some of the most convincing evidence of discrimination available from social science research, there are specific criticisms of this approach that warrant consideration. Heckman and Siegelman (1993) identify five major threats to the validity of results from audit studies: (1) problems in effective matching, (2) the use of “overqualified” testers, (3) limited sampling frame for the selection of firms and jobs to be audited, (4) experimenter effects, and (5) the ethics of audit research. For a useful discussion of these concerns, see the series of essays published in Fix and Struyk (1993). See also app. A below.

¹⁰ Indeed, in a survey of employer attitudes, Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2002) found that Milwaukee employers were significantly more likely to consider hiring ex-offenders than were employers in Boston, Atlanta, Los Angeles, or Detroit, suggesting that Wisconsin may represent a best case scenario for the employment outcomes of ex-offenders relative to other major metropolitan areas (see also Holzer and Stoll 2001).

team (see fig. 3).¹¹ The testers were 23-year-old college students from Milwaukee who were matched on the basis of physical appearance and general style of self-presentation. Objective characteristics that were not already identical between pairs—such as educational attainment and work experience—were made similar for the purpose of the applications. Within each team, one auditor was randomly assigned a “criminal record” for the first week; the pair then rotated which member presented himself as the ex-offender for each successive week of employment searches, such that each tester served in the criminal record condition for an equal number of cases. By varying which member of the pair presented himself as having a criminal record, unobserved differences within the pairs of applicants were effectively controlled. No significant differences were found for the outcomes of individual testers or by month of testing.

Job openings for entry-level positions (defined as jobs requiring no previous experience and no education greater than high school) were identified from the Sunday classified advertisement section of the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel*.¹² In addition, a supplemental sample was drawn from *Jobnet*, a state-sponsored web site for employment listings, which was developed in connection with the W-2 Welfare-to-Work initiatives.¹³

The audit pairs were randomly assigned 15 job openings each week. The white pair and the black pair were assigned separate sets of jobs, with the same-race testers applying to the same jobs. One member of the pair applied first, with the second applying one day later (randomly varying whether the ex-offender was first or second). A total of 350 employers were audited during the course of this study: 150 by the white pair and 200 by the black pair. Additional tests were performed by the black pair because black testers received fewer callbacks on average, and there were thus fewer data points with which to draw comparisons. A larger sample

¹¹ The primary goal of this study was to measure the effect of a criminal record, and thus it was important for this characteristic to be measured as a within-pair effect. While it would have been ideal for all four testers to have visited the same employers, this likely would have aroused suspicion. The testers were thus divided into separate teams by race and assigned to two randomly selected sets of employers.

¹² Occupations with legal restrictions on ex-offenders were excluded from the sample. These include jobs in the health care industry, work with children and the elderly, jobs requiring the handling of firearms (i.e., security guards), and jobs in the public sector. An estimate of the collateral consequences of incarceration would also need to take account of the wide range of employment formally off-limits to individuals with prior felony convictions.

¹³ Employment services like *Jobnet* have become a much more common method of finding employment in recent years, particularly for difficult-to-employ populations such as welfare recipients and ex-offenders. Likewise, a recent survey by Holzer and Stoll (2001) found that nearly half of Milwaukee employers (46%) use *Jobnet* to advertise vacancies in their companies.




FIG 3 —Audit design: “C” refers to criminal record; “N” refers to no criminal record

size enables me to calculate more precise estimates of the effects under investigation.

Immediately following the completion of each job application, testers filled out a six-page response form that coded relevant information from the test. Important variables included type of occupation, metropolitan status, wage, size of establishment, and race and sex of employer.¹⁴ Additionally, testers wrote narratives describing the overall interaction and any comments made by employers (or included on applications) specifically related to race or criminal records.

One key feature of this audit study is that it focuses only on the first stage of the employment process. Testers visited employers, filled out applications, and proceeded as far as they could during the course of one visit. If testers were asked to interview on the spot, they did so, but they did not return to the employer for a second visit. The primary dependent variable, then, is the proportion of applications that elicited callbacks from employers. Individual voicemail boxes were set up for each tester to record employer responses. If a tester was offered the job on the spot, this was also coded as a positive response.¹⁵ The reason I chose to focus only on this initial stage of the employment process is because this is the stage likely to be most affected by the barrier of a criminal record. In an audit study of age discrimination, for example, Bendick et al. (1999) found that 76% of the measured differential treatment occurred at this initial stage of the employment process. Given that a criminal record, like age,

¹⁴ See Pager (2002) for a discussion of the variation across each of these dimensions.

¹⁵ In cases where testers were offered jobs on the spot, they were instructed to tell the employer that they were still waiting to hear back from another job they had interviewed for earlier. The tester then called the employer back at the end of the same day to let him or her know that the other job had come through and he was therefore no longer available.

is a highly salient characteristic, it is likely that as much, if not more, of the treatment effect will be detected at this stage.

TESTER PROFILES

In developing the tester profiles, emphasis was placed on adopting characteristics that were both numerically representative and substantively important. In the present study, the criminal record consisted of a felony drug conviction (possession with intent to distribute, cocaine) and 18 months of (served) prison time. A drug crime (as opposed to a violent or property crime) was chosen because of its prevalence, its policy salience, and its connection to racial disparities in incarceration.¹⁶ It is important to acknowledge that the effects reported here may differ depending on the type of offense.¹⁷

In assigning the educational and work history of testers, I sought a compromise between representing the modal group of offenders, while also providing some room for variation in the outcome of the audits. Most audit studies of employment have created tester profiles that include some college experience, so that testers will be highly competitive applicants for entry-level jobs and so that the contrast between treatment and control group is made clear (see app. B in Cross et al. 1989). In the present study, however, postsecondary schooling experience would detract from the representativeness of the results. More than 70% of federal and nearly 90% of state prisoners have no more than a high school degree (or equivalent).

¹⁶ Over the past two decades, drug crimes were the fastest growing class of offenses. In 1980, roughly one out of every 16 state inmates was incarcerated for a drug crime; by 1999, this figure had jumped to one out of every five (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2000). In federal prisons, nearly three out of every five inmates are incarcerated for a drug crime (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001). A significant portion of this increase can be attributed to changing policies concerning drug enforcement. By 2000, every state in the country had adopted some form of truth in sentencing laws, which impose mandatory sentencing minimums for a range of offenses. These laws have been applied most frequently to drug crimes, leading to more than a fivefold rise in the number of drug arrests that result in incarceration and a doubling of the average length of sentences for drug convictions (Mauer 1999; Blumstein and Beck 1999). While the steep rise in drug enforcement has been felt across the population, this "war on drugs" has had a disproportionate impact on African-Americans. Between 1990 and 1997, the number of black inmates serving time for drug offenses increased by 60%, compared to a 46% increase in the number of whites (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1995). In 1999, 26% of all black state inmates were incarcerated for drug offenses, relative to less than half that proportion of whites (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2001).

¹⁷ Survey results indicate that employers are substantially more averse to applicants convicted of violent crimes or property crimes relative to those convicted of drug crimes (Holzer et al. 2002; Pager 2002).

The education level of testers in this study, therefore, was chosen to represent the modal category of offenders (high school diploma).¹⁸

There is little systematic evidence concerning the work histories of inmates prior to incarceration. Overall, 77.4% of federal and 67.4% of state inmates were employed prior to incarceration (Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994). There is, however, a substantial degree of heterogeneity in the quality and consistency of work experience during this time (Pager 2001). In the present study, testers were assigned favorable work histories in that they report steady work experience in entry-level jobs and nearly continual employment (until incarceration). In the job prior to incarceration (and, for the control group, prior to the last short-term job), testers report having worked their way from an entry-level position to a supervisory role.¹⁹

DESIGN ISSUES

There are a number of complexities involved in the design and implementation of an audit study.²⁰ Apart from the standard complications of carrying out a field experiment, there were several specific dilemmas posed in the development of the current study that required substantial deliberation. First, in standard audit studies of race or gender, it is possible to construct work histories for test partners in such a way that the amount of work experience reported by each tester is identical. By contrast, the present study compares the outcome of one applicant who has spent 18 months in prison. It was therefore necessary to manipulate the work histories of both applicants so that this labor market absence did not bias the results.²¹ The solution opted for here was for the ex-offender to report six months of work experience gained while in prison (preceded by 12

¹⁸ In 1991, 49% of federal and 46.5% of state inmates had a high school degree (or equivalent, Bureau of Justice Statistics 1994).

¹⁹ Testers reported working either as an assistant manager at a national restaurant chain or as a supervisor at a national home retail store. While it is unlikely that the modal occupational attainment for high school graduates (with or without criminal records) would be a supervisory position, this feature was added to the tester profiles in order to make them more competitive applicants. The solid job histories of these applicants should affect the results in a conservative direction, offering cues about the tester's reliability and competence, which may offset some of the negative associations with a criminal background.

²⁰ See app. A for a discussion of additional methodological concerns.

²¹ Though time out of the labor market is in fact one component of the total impact of incarceration, this study sought to isolate the effect of criminal stigma from other potential consequences of incarceration. Again, an estimate of the total effect of incarceration would also need to take account of employment difficulties resulting from a prolonged labor market absence.

months out of the labor force, representing the remainder of the total prison time). The nonoffender, on the other hand, reported graduating from high school one year later (thereby accounting for 12 months) and, concurrent to his partner's six months of prison work time, worked for a temporary agency doing a similar kind of low-skill work. Thus, the actual amount of work experience was equivalent for both testers. The effect of having the noncriminal graduate from high school one year later should impose a conservative bias, as graduating from high school late may indicate less motivation or ability.

A second major difference between audit studies of race or gender and the present study is that criminal status is not something that can be immediately discerned by the employer. The information had to be explicitly conveyed, therefore, in order for the interaction to become a "test." In most cases, the tester was given the opportunity to communicate the necessary information on the application form provided, in answer to the question "Have you ever been convicted of a crime?"²² However, in the 26% of cases where the application form did not include a question about criminal history, it was necessary to provide an alternate means of conveying this information. In the present study, testers provided two indirect sources of information about their prior criminal involvement. First, as mentioned above, the tester in the criminal record condition reported work experience obtained while in the correctional facility. Second, the tester listed his parole officer as a reference (calls to whom were recorded by voicemail). These two pieces of evidence provided explicit clues to employers that the applicant had spent time in prison; and both of these strategies are used by real ex-offenders who seek to account for empty time by reporting work experience in prison or who wish to have their parole officer vouch for their successful rehabilitation.²³ Pilot tests with employers in a neighboring city suggested that this strategy was an effective means of conveying the criminal record condition without arousing suspicion.

STUDY CONTEXT AND DESCRIPTIVES

The fieldwork for this project took place in Milwaukee between June and December of 2001. During this time, the economic condition of the met-

²² To the extent that real ex-offenders lie about their criminal record on application forms, this approach may lead to an overestimate of the effect of a criminal record. See app. A for a discussion of this issue.

²³ This approach was developed in discussion with several Milwaukee employment counselors and parole officers and is based on a composite profile of resumes belonging to real ex-offenders.

ropolitan area remained moderately strong, with unemployment rates ranging from a high of 5.2% in June to a low of 4% in September.²⁴ It is important to note that the results of this study are specific to the economic conditions of this period. It has been well-documented in previous research that the level of employment discrimination corresponds closely with the tightness of the labor market (Freeman and Rodgers 1999). Certainly the economic climate was a salient factor in the minds of these employers. During a pilot interview, for example, an employer reported that a year ago she would have had three applications for an entry-level opening; today she gets 150.²⁵ Another employer for a janitorial service mentioned that previously their company had been so short of staff that they had to interview virtually everyone who applied. The current conditions, by contrast, allowed them to be far more selective. Since the completion of this study, the unemployment rate has continued to rise. It is likely, therefore, that the effects reported here may understate the impact of race and a criminal record in the context of an economic recession.

As mentioned earlier, the job openings for this study were selected from the Sunday classified section of the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* and from *Jobnet*, a state-sponsored Internet job service. All job openings within a 25-mile radius of downtown Milwaukee were included, with 61% of the resulting sample located in the suburbs or surrounding counties, relative to only 39% in the city of Milwaukee. Because a limited boundary was covered by this project, the distribution of jobs does not accurately represent the extent to which job growth has been concentrated in wider suburban areas. According to a recent study of job growth in Milwaukee, nearly 90% of entry-level job openings were located in the outlying counties and the Milwaukee county suburbs, with only 4% of full-time openings located in the central city (Pawasarat and Quinn 2000).

The average distance from downtown in the present sample was 12 miles, with a substantial number of job openings located far from reach by public transportation. Again, testers in this study represented a best case scenario: all testers had their own reliable transportation, allowing them access to a wide range of employment opportunities. For the average entry-level job seeker, by contrast, the suburbanization of low wage work can in itself represent a major barrier to employment (Wilson 1997).

²⁴ Monthly unemployment rates followed a U-shaped pattern, with higher levels of unemployment in the first and last months of the study. Specifically: June (5.4%), July (5.2%), August (4.8%), September (4.4%), October (4.7%), November (4.9%), December (4.5%). National unemployment rates were nearly a point lower in June (4.6%), but rose above Milwaukee's unemployment rate to a high of 5.8% in December (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002).

²⁵ The unemployment rate in Milwaukee had been as low as 2.7% in September of 1999 (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002)

Similar to other metropolitan labor markets, the service industry has been the fastest growing sector in Milwaukee, followed by retail and wholesale trade, and manufacturing (Pawasarat and Quinn 2000). Likewise, the sample of jobs in this study reflects similar concentrations, though quite a range of job titles were included overall (table 1).

The most common job types were for restaurant workers (18%), laborers or warehouse workers (17%), and production workers or operators (12%). Though white collar positions were less common among the entry-level listings, a fair number of customer service (11%), sales (11%), clerical (5%), and even a handful of managerial positions (2%) were included.²⁶

Figure 4 presents some information on the ways employers obtain background information on applicants.²⁷ In this sample, roughly 75% of employers asked explicit questions on their application forms about the applicant's criminal history. Generally this was a standard question, "Have you ever been convicted of a crime? If yes, please explain."²⁸ Even though in most cases employers are not allowed to use criminal background information to make hiring decisions, a vast majority of employers nevertheless request the information.

A much smaller proportion of employers actually perform an official background check. In my sample, 27% of employers indicated that they would perform a background check on all applicants.²⁹ This figure likely represents a lower-bound estimate, given that employers are not required to disclose their intentions to do background checks. According to a national survey by Holzer (1996), 30%–40% of employers perform official background checks on applicants for noncollege jobs. The point remains,

²⁶ As noted above, this sample excludes health care workers—which represented the largest category of entry-level job openings—and other occupations with legal restrictions on ex-felons (see app A).

²⁷ These are nonexclusive categories and are thus not meant to sum to 100.

²⁸ An overwhelming proportion of employers used generic questions about criminal backgrounds (with the only major source of variation stemming from an emphasis on all prior convictions vs. felonies only). A handful of large national companies, however, used questions that reflected a more nuanced understanding of the law. One company, e.g., instructed applicants *not* to answer the question if they were a resident of certain specified states; another asked only about prior convictions for theft and burglary, ignoring all other possible offenses.

²⁹ The issue of official background checks raises some concern as to the validity of the experimental condition, given that the information provided by testers can be (dis)confirmed on the basis of other sources of information available to employers. In cases where employers in this study did perform background checks on testers, the check would come back clean (none of the testers in this study actually had criminal records). It is my expectation that because employers would not expect someone to lie about *having* a criminal record, and because employers know that criminal history databases are fraught with errors, they would be inclined to believe the worst case scenario—in this case, the self-report.

TABLE 1
OCCUPATIONAL DISTRIBUTION

Job Title	%
Waitstaff	18
Laborer/warehouse .	17
Production/operators ..	12
Service	11
Sales	11
Delivery driver	9
Cashier	7
Cook/kitchen staff . . .	5
Clerical	5
Managerial	2

NOTE—An excluded "other" category combines the remaining 3% of job titles

however, that fewer than half of all employers check criminal background information through official sources.³⁰

Finally, reference checks were included as an outcome in this study with the belief that, for applicants with criminal records, having former employers or a parole officer willing to vouch for the reliability and competence of the individual would be critical. Additional voicemail boxes were set up for references, such that each application could provide numbers for two functioning references. As it turns out, however, employers seemed to pay virtually no attention to references whatsoever. Over the course of the 350 audits completed, only four separate employers checked references.³¹ Employers would frequently tell testers, "I'll just check your references and then give you a call," or leave messages saying, "I'm going to call your references, and then I'd like you to come in for a training [session]," and yet no calls were registered.³²

This finding emphasizes the point that employers do not go out of their way to solicit nuanced information about applicants for entry-level jobs. Rather, it is up to the applicant to convey the important information on

³⁰ There is some indication that the frequency of criminal background checks has increased since September 11, 2001. First Response Security, Inc., for example, saw a 25% increase in employers conducting background checks since that time (see http://www.maine.rr.com/Around_Town/features2001/jobsinme/11_01/default.asp [last accessed March 1, 2003]).

³¹ Two additional employers made calls to the number listed for the parole officer on the testers' applications. These calls, however, were not for the purpose of obtaining additional background information about the candidate. Rather, in both cases, employers had made several calls to the tester about the job opening and, reaching only his voicemail, were thus looking for an alternative way to track down the applicant.

³² The voicemail system was set up in such a way that even hang-ups could be detected.




FIG 4.—Background checks

the written application or during a brief interview. It is possible that a larger number of employers do check references at a later stage of the employment process (see Pager 2002). By this point, however, the ex-offender has already likely been weeded out of the pool under consideration.

The question now becomes, To what extent are applicants with criminal records weeded out of the process at this initial stage? To answer this question, I turn to the results of the audit study.

THE EFFECT OF A CRIMINAL RECORD FOR WHITES

I begin with an analysis of the effect of a criminal record among whites. White noncriminals can serve as our baseline in the following comparisons, representing the presumptively nonstigmatized group relative to blacks and those with criminal records. Given that all testers presented roughly identical credentials, the differences experienced among groups of testers can be attributed fully to the effects of race or criminal status.

Figure 5 shows the percentage of applications submitted by white testers that elicited callbacks from employers, by criminal status. As illustrated below, there is a large and significant effect of a criminal record, with 34% of whites without criminal records receiving callbacks, relative to only 17% of whites with criminal records. A criminal record thereby reduces the likelihood of a callback by 50% (see app. B for coefficients from the logistic regression model).

There were some fairly obvious examples documented by testers that illustrate the strong reaction among employers to the signal of a criminal




FIG 5.—The effect of a criminal record on employment opportunities for whites. The effect of a criminal record is statistically significant ($P < .01$).

record. In one case, a white tester in the criminal record condition went to a trucking service to apply for a job as a dispatcher. The tester was given a long application, including a complex math test, which took nearly 45 minutes to fill out. During the course of this process, there were several details about the application and the job that needed clarification, some of which involved checking with the supervisor about how to proceed. No concerns were raised about his candidacy at this stage. When the tester turned the application in, the secretary brought it into a back office for the supervisor to look over, so that an interview could perhaps be conducted. When the secretary came back out, presumably after the supervisor had a chance to look over the application more thoroughly, he was told the position had already been filled. While, of course, isolated incidents like this are not conclusive, this was not an infrequent occurrence. Often testers reported seeing employers' levels of responsiveness change dramatically once they had glanced down at the criminal record question.

Clearly, the results here demonstrate that criminal records close doors in employment situations. Many employers seem to use the information as a screening mechanism, without attempting to probe deeper into the possible context or complexities of the situation. As we can see here, in 50% of cases, employers were unwilling to consider equally qualified applicants on the basis of their criminal record.

Of course, this trend is not true among all employers, in all situations. There were, in fact, some employers who seemed to prefer workers who had been recently released from prison. One owner told a white tester in the criminal record condition that he "like[d] hiring people who ha[d] just

come out of prison because they tend to be more motivated, and are more likely to be hard workers [not wanting to return to prison]." Another employer for a cleaning company attempted to dissuade the white non-criminal tester from applying because the job involved "a great deal of dirty work." The tester with the criminal record, on the other hand, was offered the job on the spot. A criminal record is thus not an obstacle in all cases, but on average, as we see above, it reduces employment opportunities substantially.

THE EFFECT OF RACE

A second major focus of this study concerns the effect of race. African-Americans continue to suffer from lower rates of employment relative to whites, but there is tremendous disagreement over the source of these disparities. The idea that race itself—apart from other correlated characteristics—continues to play a major role in shaping employment opportunities has come under question in recent years (e.g., D'Souza 1995; Steele 1991). The audit methodology is uniquely suited to address this question. While the present study design does not provide the kind of cross-race matched-pair tests that earlier audit studies of racial discrimination have used, the between-group comparisons (white pair vs. black pair) can nevertheless offer an unbiased estimate of the effect of race on employment opportunities.³³

Figure 6 presents the percentage of callbacks received for both categories of black testers relative to those for whites. The effect of race in these findings is strikingly large. Among blacks without criminal records, only 14% received callbacks, relative to 34% of white noncriminals ($P <$

³³ Between-pair comparisons provide less efficient estimators, but they are nevertheless unbiased, provided that there are no systematic differences between the sample of jobs assigned to each pair or between the observed characteristics of the black and white pair (apart from race). In this study, jobs were randomly assigned to tester pairs such that no systematic differences should be observed between samples. Of course, it is impossible, even in an experimental design, to rule out the possibility that unmeasured differences between the black testers and the white testers systematically bias the results (see Heckman and Siegelman 1993). This problem is one of the key limitations of the audit design. In the present study, several attempts were made to minimize this source of bias: first, testers were chosen based on similar physical and dispositional characteristics to minimize differences from the outset; second, testers participated in an extensive training (including numerous role plays) in which they learned to approach employers in similar ways; third, testers used identical sets of resumes to ensure their comparability on objective dimensions, and finally, the fact that this study tests only the first stage of the employment process means that testers had little opportunity to engage in the kind of extensive interaction that might elicit systematic differences in treatment (based on factors other than race).




FIG 6.—The effect of a criminal record for black and white job applicants. The main effects of race and criminal record are statically significant ($P < .01$). The interaction between the two is not significant in the full sample. Black bars represent criminal record, striped bars represent no criminal record.

.01). In fact, even whites *with* criminal records received more favorable treatment (17%) than blacks *without* criminal records (14%).³⁴ The rank ordering of groups in this graph is painfully revealing of employer preferences: race continues to play a dominant role in shaping employment opportunities, equal to or greater than the impact of a criminal record.

The magnitude of the race effect found here corresponds closely to those found in previous audit studies directly measuring racial discrimination. Bendick et al. (1994), for example, find that blacks were 24 percentage points less likely to receive a job offer relative to their white counterparts, a finding very close to the 20 percentage point difference (between white and black nonoffenders) found here.³⁵ Thus in the eight years since the last major employment audit of race was conducted, very

³⁴ This difference is not significantly different from zero. Given, however, that we would expect black noncriminals to be *avored* (rather than equal) relative to criminals of any race, the relevant null hypothesis should be positive rather than zero, thus generating an even larger contrast.

³⁵ Here, I am relying on percentage point differences in order to compare equivalent measures across studies. As I discuss below, however, I find it useful to rather calculate relative differences (ratio tests) when comparing the magnitude of an effect across two groups with different baseline rates. Unfortunately, the Bendick et al. (1994) study does not include the raw numbers in its results, and it is thus not possible to calculate comparative ratios in this case. Note also that the Bendick et al. (1994) study included an assessment of the full hiring process, from application to job offer. The fact that the racial disparities reported here (at the first stage of the employment process) closely mirror those from more comprehensive studies provides further reassurance that this design is capturing a majority of the discrimination that takes place in the hiring process.

little has changed in the reaction of employers to minority applicants. Despite the many rhetorical arguments used to suggest that direct racial discrimination is no longer a major barrier to opportunity (e.g., D'Souza 1995; Steele 1991), as we can see here, employers, at least in Milwaukee, continue to use race as a major factor in hiring decisions.

RACIAL DIFFERENCES IN THE EFFECTS OF A CRIMINAL RECORD

The final question this study sought to answer was the degree to which the effect of a criminal record differs depending on the race of the applicant. Based on the results presented in figure 6, the effect of a criminal record appears more pronounced for blacks than it is for whites. While this interaction term is not statistically significant, the magnitude of the difference is nontrivial.³⁶ While the ratio of callbacks for nonoffenders relative to ex-offenders for whites is 2:1, this same ratio for blacks is nearly 3:1.³⁷ The effect of a criminal record is thus 40% larger for blacks than for whites.

This evidence is suggestive of the way in which associations between race and crime affect interpersonal evaluations. Employers, already reluctant to hire blacks, appear even more wary of blacks with proven criminal involvement. Despite the fact that these testers were bright articulate college students with effective styles of self-presentation, the cursory review of entry-level applicants leaves little room for these qualities to be noticed. Instead, the employment barriers of minority status and criminal record are compounded, intensifying the stigma toward this group.

The salience of employers' sensitivity toward criminal involvement among blacks was highlighted in several interactions documented by testers. On three separate occasions, for example, black testers were asked in person (before submitting their applications) whether they had a prior

³⁶ This interaction between race and criminal record becomes significant when estimated among particular subsamples (namely, suburban employers and employers with whom the testers had personal contact). See Pager (2002) for a discussion of these results.

³⁷ Previous audit studies, focusing on one comparison only, have often relied on net differences in percentages as the primary measure of discrimination. Extending this approach to the present design, it would likewise be possible to compare the percentage point difference in treatment among white nonoffenders relative to offenders and that of blacks (a difference in differences approach). Given that the baseline rate of callbacks is substantially different for blacks and whites, however, this measure would be misleading. In an absolute sense, whites have greater opportunity overall and thus have more to lose. Taking into account this differential baseline, we see that the *relative* effect of a criminal record is in fact smaller among whites than it is among blacks.

criminal history. None of the white testers were asked about their criminal histories up front.

The strong association between race and crime in the minds of employers provides some indication that the "true effect" of a criminal record for blacks may be even larger than what is measured here. If, for example, the outcomes for black testers *without* criminal records were deflated in part because employers feared that they may nevertheless have criminal tendencies, then the contrast between blacks with and without criminal records would be suppressed. Evidence for this type of statistical discrimination can be found in the work of Bushway (1997) and Holzer, Raphael, and Stoll (2001).

DISCUSSION

There is serious disagreement among academics, policy makers, and practitioners over the extent to which contact with the criminal justice system—in itself—leads to harmful consequences for employment. The present study takes a strong stand in this debate by offering direct evidence of the causal relationship between a criminal record and employment outcomes. While survey research has produced noisy and indirect estimates of this effect, the current research design offers a direct measure of a criminal record as a mechanism producing employment disparities. Using matched pairs and an experimentally assigned criminal record, this estimate is unaffected by the problems of selection, which plague observational data. While certainly there are additional ways in which incarceration may affect employment outcomes, this finding provides conclusive evidence that mere contact with the criminal justice system, in the absence of any transformative or selective effects, severely limits subsequent employment opportunities. And while the audit study investigates employment barriers to ex-offenders from a microperspective, the implications are far-reaching. The finding that ex-offenders are only one-half to one-third as likely as nonoffenders to be considered by employers suggests that a criminal record indeed presents a major barrier to employment. With over 2 million people currently behind bars and over 12 million people with prior felony convictions, the consequences for labor market inequalities are potentially profound.

Second, the persistent effect of race on employment opportunities is painfully clear in these results. Blacks are less than half as likely to receive consideration by employers, relative to their white counterparts, and black nonoffenders fall behind even whites with prior felony convictions. The full effects of race thus continue to direct employment decisions in that contribute to persisting racial inequality. In light of these find-

ings, current public opinion seems largely misinformed. According to a recent survey of residents in Los Angeles, Boston, Detroit, and Atlanta, researchers found that just over a quarter of whites believe there to be "a lot" of discrimination against blacks, compared to nearly two-thirds of black respondents (Kluegel and Bobo 2001). Over the past decade, affirmative action has come under attack across the country based on the argument that direct racial discrimination is no longer a major barrier to opportunity.³⁸ According to this study, however, employers, at least in Milwaukee, continue to use race as a major factor in their hiring decisions. When we combine the effects of race and criminal record, the problem grows more intense. Not only are blacks much more likely to be incarcerated than whites; based on the findings presented here, they may also be more strongly affected by the impact of a criminal record. Previous estimates of the aggregate consequences of incarceration may therefore underestimate the impact on racial disparities.

Finally, in terms of policy implications, this research has troubling conclusions. In our frenzy of locking people up, our "crime control" policies may in fact exacerbate the very conditions that lead to crime in the first place. Research consistently shows that finding quality steady employment is one of the strongest predictors of desistance from crime (Shover 1996; Sampson and Laub 1993; Uggen 2000). The fact that a criminal record severely limits employment opportunities—particularly among blacks—suggests that these individuals are left with few viable alternatives.³⁹

As more and more young men enter the labor force from prison, it

³⁸ In November 1996, California voters supported Proposition 209, which outlawed affirmative action in public employment, education, and contracting. In the same year, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals suspended affirmative action in Texas in the case of *Hopwood vs. University of Texas Law School*.

³⁹ There are two primary policy recommendations implied by these results. First and foremost, the widespread use of incarceration, particularly for nonviolent drug crimes, has serious, long-term consequences for the employment problems of young men. The substitution of alternatives to incarceration, therefore, such as drug treatment programs or community supervision, may serve to better promote the well-being of individual offenders as well as to improve public safety more generally through the potential reduction of recidivism. Second, additional thought should be given to the widespread availability of criminal background information. As criminal record databases become increasingly easy to access, this information may be more often used as the basis for rejecting otherwise qualified applicants. If instead criminal history information were suppressed—except in cases that were clearly relevant to a particular kind of job assignment—ex-offenders with appropriate credentials might be better able to secure legitimate employment. While there is some indication that the absence of official criminal background information may lead to a greater incidence of statistical discrimination against blacks (see Bushway 1997; Holzer et al. 2001), the net benefits of this policy change may in fact outweigh the potential drawbacks.

becomes increasingly important to consider the impact of incarceration on the job prospects of those coming out. No longer a peripheral institution, the criminal justice system has become a dominant presence in the lives of young disadvantaged men, playing a key role in the sorting and stratifying of labor market opportunities. This article represents an initial attempt to specify one of the important mechanisms by which incarceration leads to poor employment outcomes. Future research is needed to expand this emphasis to other mechanisms (e.g., the transformative effects of prison on human and social capital), as well as to include other social domains affected by incarceration (e.g., housing, family formation, political participation, etc.);⁴⁰ in this way, we can move toward a more complete understanding of the collateral consequences of incarceration for social inequality.

At this point in history, it is impossible to tell whether the massive presence of incarceration in today's stratification system represents a unique anomaly of the late 20th century, or part of a larger movement toward a system of stratification based on the official certification of individual character and competence. Whether this process of negative credentialing will continue to form the basis of emerging social cleavages remains to be seen.

APPENDIX A

Methodological Concerns

Below I discuss some of the limitations of the audit methodology and ways in which findings from an experimental design may conflict with real-life contexts.

Limits to Generalizability

Reporting criminal backgrounds.—In the present study, testers in the criminal record condition were instructed to provide an affirmative answer to any question about criminal background posed on the application form or in person. Employers are thus given full information about the (fictional) criminal record of this applicant. But how often do real ex-offenders offer such complete and honest information? To the extent that ex-offenders lie about their criminal background in employment settings, the results of this study may overestimate the effect of having a criminal record. If employers do not know about an applicant's criminal record, then surely it can have no influence on their hiring decisions.

⁴⁰ For promising work in these areas, see Uggen and Manza (2002), Western and McLanahan (2000), and Travis, Solomon, and Waul (2001).

Before starting this project, I conducted a number of interviews with parolees and men with criminal records. When asked how they handled application forms, the majority of these men claimed to report their criminal record up front. There are a number of reasons motivating this seemingly irrational behavior. First, most men with criminal records believe that the chances of being caught by a criminal background check are much higher than they actually are. While a majority of employers do not perform background checks on all applicants, there is the perception that this practice is widespread. Second, most men coming out of prison have a parole officer monitoring their reintegration. One of the most effective mechanisms of surveillance for parole officers is to call employers to make sure their parolees have been showing up for work. If the individual has not reported his criminal history, therefore, it may soon be revealed.⁴¹ There is thus a strong incentive for parolees to be up front in their reporting.

A second source of information on this issue comes from interviews with employers. In a second stage of this project, the same sample of employers were interviewed about their hiring practices and experiences (see Pager 2002). During these conversations, the employers were asked to report what percentage of applicants over the past year had reported a prior conviction and, among those employers who performed official criminal background checks, what percentage were found to have criminal records. According to the employers, roughly 12% of applicants over the past year reported having a prior record on their application form. Of those employers who perform official background checks, an average of 14% of applicants were found to have criminal records. The disparity between self-reports and official records, therefore, is a minimal 2%. In fact, one manager of a national restaurant chain mentioned that sometimes applicants report *more* information than they need to. While the question on the application form only asked about felony convictions over the past year, this employer revealed that some applicants report misdemeanors or felony convictions from several years back. Whatever the reason, there seems to be evidence that far more ex-offenders report their prior convictions than “rational actor” models might predict. While surely some ex-offenders do lie on their applications, there is reason to believe this is far from the norm.

A related issue of study design concerns the reporting of criminal background information even when not solicited by the employer. Recall that roughly one-quarter of employers did not ask explicit questions on their

⁴¹ This is particularly consequential for employees in states such as Wisconsin, where employers are not allowed to fire someone for *having* a criminal record, but they are allowed to fire him for *lying* about his record.

application forms about an applicant's criminal history. In order to make sure the experimental condition was known to all employers, testers also reported work experience in the correctional facility and listed their parole officers as references. While this strategy was based on a composite profile of a number of real ex-offenders, in no way does it represent a modal application procedure. In most cases, if employers do not ask about (or check) criminal histories, they will never know. It is possible that in conveying the information artificially, the level of measured discrimination is inflated. To address this concern, a direct test is possible. Figure A1 presents the callback rate for employers who did and did not solicit information about prior convictions.⁴²

As is clear from this graph, employers who did not solicit information about criminal histories were much less likely to use the information in their hiring decisions. The disparity in treatment of ex-offenders relative to nonoffenders among employers who did request the information (12% vs. 35%) is more than twice as large as that among employers who did not ask (25% vs. 33%). In terms of its correspondence to the "real world," therefore, providing unsolicited information about criminal backgrounds did little to affect employer responses.

Representativeness of testers.—The testers in this study were bright, articulate college students with effective styles of self-presentation. The interpersonal skills of the average inmate, by contrast, are likely to be substantially less appealing to employers. The choice of testers in this respect was deliberate, as a means of fully separating the signal of a criminal record from other correlated attributes to which employers may also respond. It is nevertheless important to consider the extent to which these testers can be considered accurate representatives of the ex-offender experience. On one hand, it may be the case that the testers in this study represent a best case scenario. Because their interactional style does not correspond to that of a stereotypical criminal, employers may be more willing to consider them as viable candidates, despite their criminal background. In this case, the present study design would underestimate the true effect of a criminal record. On the other hand, for individuals with poor interpersonal skills, a criminal record may represent just one additional—but less consequential—handicap to the already disadvantaged candidate. If this is the case, the effect of a criminal record may be overestimated by the testers in the present study.

One approach to investigating this problem is to analyze those applications submitted with no personal contact with the employer.⁴³ In these

⁴² This figure presents the results for white testers only. Similar patterns are found for black testers, not shown here.

⁴³ Over 75% of applications were submitted with no personal contact with the employer




FIG. A1 —Differences by whether criminal history information was solicited. black bars represent criminal record; striped bars represent no criminal record

cases, the interpersonal skills of the testers should have no influence on the employer's consideration of the applicant. In the analysis reported in figure A2, I find that the effect of a criminal record is even greater in the absence of personal contact, relative to the overall findings reported earlier.⁴⁴ Personal contact appears to mediate the effect of a criminal record, reducing its negative impact. These results are suggestive of the former hypothesis: the interpersonal skills of testers in the present study, to the extent that they are noticed by employers, serve to weaken the effect of a criminal record. The estimates reported here, therefore, likely represent a lower-bound estimate of the true effect of a criminal record.

The case of Milwaukee.—One key limitation of the audit study design is its concentration on a single metropolitan area. The degree to which the findings of each study can be generalized to the broader population, therefore, remains in question. In the present study, Milwaukee was chosen for having a profile common to many major American cities, with respect to population size, racial composition, and unemployment rate. There are, however, two unique features of Milwaukee that limit its representativeness of other parts of the country. First, Milwaukee is the second most segregated city in the country, implying great social distance between blacks and whites, with possible implications for the results of the audit study. If race relations are more strained in Milwaukee than in other parts of the country, then the effects of race presented in this study may be larger than what would be found in other urban areas. Second, Wisconsin had the third largest growth in incarceration rates in the coun-

⁴⁴ This figure presents the callback rates for white testers only.




FIG. A2.—The effect of personal contact. black bars represent criminal record; striped bars represent no criminal record.

try (Gainsborough and Mauer 2000) and currently has the highest rate of incarceration for blacks in the country (Bureau of Justice Statistics 2002*b*). If the statewide incarceration rates are reflective of an especially punitive approach to crime, this could also affect the degree to which a criminal record is condemned by employers, particularly among black applicants.

Of course, the only way to directly address these issues is through replication in additional areas. With respect to the main effect of race, previous audit studies have been conducted in Washington, D.C., Chicago, and Denver, confirming the basic magnitude of the effects reported here (Bendick et al. 1994; Turner et al. 1991; Culp and Dunson 1986). Likewise, a recent correspondence of the effects of race on a more restrictive sample of occupations in Boston and Chicago produced strikingly similar estimates (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2002). These results, therefore, provide some indication that Milwaukee is not a major outlier in its level of racial discrimination in hiring.

In the case of the criminal record effect, only future studies can confirm or contradict the results presented here. As the first study of its kind, it is impossible to assess the degree to which these findings will generalize to other cities. Looking to existing survey research, however, we can gain some leverage on this issue. According to a recent survey conducted by Holzer and Stoll (2001), employers in Milwaukee reported substantially greater openness to considering applicants with criminal records relative to their counterparts in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Cleveland. If these self-reports accurately reflect employers' relative hiring tendencies, then we would expect the results of this audit study to provide conservative

estimates of the barriers to employment faced by ex-offenders in other metropolitan areas.

Sample restrictions.—The present study was intended to assess the effect of a criminal record on employment in entry-level jobs. In order to obtain a sample of such positions for use in this study, however, it was necessary to impose certain sample restrictions on the categories of entry-level employment to be included. The degree to which these restrictions affect the generalizability of these findings to real employment searches therefore warrants careful consideration.

Virtually all employment audits have relied on samples of job openings identified through ads in metropolitan newspapers. Though want ads provide an easily accessible listing of job vacancies, research on actual job search behavior demonstrates that only a minority of jobs are found through this source. Holzer (1988) estimates that roughly 20%–25% of search time is spent on contacts generated by newspaper advertising; friends and relatives and direct contact of firms by applicants represent a much more common sources of new employment.

Though it would preferable to include job vacancies derived from representative sources, it is difficult if not impossible to map the network of informal contacts that lead to most job opportunities. Instead, researchers have relied upon sources that allow for systematic and consistent sampling schemes, despite the reduction in representativeness. Following previous research, the present study relies upon a random sample of job openings from advertised sources (the *Milwaukee Journal Sentinel* and *Jobnet*). Fortunately, there is compelling research to suggest that the restricted sample provides a more conservative estimate of racial discrimination. Firms who wish to discriminate, it is argued, are more likely to advertise job openings through more restrictive channels than the metropolitan newspaper, such as through referrals, employment agencies, or more selective publications (Fix and Struyk 1993, p. 32). Indeed, this argument is indirectly supported by research showing that minorities are more successful in job searches generated by general newspaper ads than through other means (Holzer 1987). Further, pilot audits conducted by the Fair Employment Council in Washington, D.C., also indicate lower rates of discrimination against minorities in jobs advertised in metropolitan newspapers than those advertised in suburban newspapers or through employment agencies (Bendick et al. 1991, 1994).

In the case of ex-offenders, personal networks may represent a more important source of employment. Though there have been few systematic investigations of the search methods of individuals coming out of prison, small-scale case studies indicate that personal referrals can be extremely important for the job placement of this population (Nelson, Deess, and Allen 1999; Sullivan 1989). Because of the pervasive discrimination faced

by ex-offenders in the labor market as a whole, personal networks can direct individuals to specific employers who are willing to hire applicants with criminal records. In this case, ex-offenders may be likely to queue for lower-quality jobs that accept applicants with criminal histories rather than applying for the wider range of (higher-quality) employment among which they are likely to face more severe discrimination. If this is the case, incarceration effects would be more likely to show up in estimates of earnings and job security, rather than employment probabilities as measured here (see Western 2002). Future research mapping the search patterns of ex-offenders would provide useful information with which to evaluate the types of jobs in which ex-offenders are most at risk of discrimination.

It is important to note, however, that the importance of social networks for ex-offenders seeking employment may differ across racial groups. Sullivan (1989), for example, reports that, among juvenile delinquents, whites and Hispanics were readily placed in employment through relatives or extended networks following release from incarceration; blacks, by contrast, benefited much less from social networks in finding work. These informal methods of job search behavior, therefore, may in fact result in greater evidence of racial disparities in employment following incarceration than what is reported here.

Prior to sampling, the following additional restrictions were imposed (for reasons discussed below): not hiring through employment agency, no more than high school degree required, no public sector positions, no health care positions, no jobs related to the care of children or the elderly, and no jobs whose announcements explicit stated security clearance required.

The restrictions with the largest effect on my sample are those related to employment agencies and the health care industry. Employment agencies are becoming increasingly dominant in regulating the market for entry-level labor. Between 35% and 40% of jobs advertised through *Jobnet* (the Internet employment bulletin) were temporary to permanent positions through an employment agency. There exists quite a bit of literature on the quality of temporary employment and the treatment of workers hired through employment agencies (Henson 1996). An audit of employment agencies, however, warrants an independent study, given the very different hiring processes operating in such establishments.

The elimination of health care positions from my sample was due to the extensive legal restrictions in this sector barring the employment of individuals with criminal records.⁴⁵ This sample constraint eliminated a

⁴⁵ Such restrictions also apply to occupations involving care for children or the elderly and many public sector positions.

huge number of jobs otherwise available to entry-level job seekers without criminal records. The health services sector represents 8.3% of total employment in the Milwaukee region (COWS 1996), and a much larger share of new employment. Hospitals alone were the fourth largest employers in Milwaukee in 1995 (COWS 1996). These are some of the highest-wage jobs in the service sector (COWS 1996).

Other occupations were likewise eliminated from the sample, not because of blanket legal restrictions, but because their job announcements explicitly stated that applicants must pass a criminal background check or that security clearance was required. While it is not clear that blanket exclusion of all criminal convictions in these cases was defensible under the law, the employers' policies were made explicit. While one cannot always assume that stated policies will be enforced, in the case of criminal records, these jobs are unlikely to demonstrate much variance.

A true estimate of the collateral consequences of a criminal record on employment opportunities would take into account the large number of jobs formally closed to ex-offenders (rather than just those demonstrating a preference for or against applicants with criminal records). The estimates produced from the audits, therefore, represent only part of the total effect of a criminal record of the likelihood of finding employment.

Experimenter Effects

One potential weakness of the audit study methodology is that the expectations or behaviors of testers can influence the outcome of results in nonrandom ways. In the course of this research, it became apparent that testers may in fact (unconsciously) behave differently depending on the experimental condition. With respect to the criminal record condition, several testers commented that they felt irrationally bad about themselves when presenting themselves as ex-offenders. If it is the case that these feelings made them more self-conscious or more reticent or nervous when speaking with employers, then this behavior in itself may lead to spurious outcomes. These psychological reactions may be even more pronounced in the case of black testers. One tester early on reported feelings of discouragement and frustration that he had received very few responses from employers. As a successful, bright college student, the change in status to a young black criminal was extreme, and the difference in treatment he received seemed to take a toll. Fortunately, after gaining more experience with the project, this tester (and others) seemed to feel more comfortable in their interactions and better able to perform in their assigned roles.

It is certainly the case that the psychological experiences of testers can influence the outcome of audit studies in nontrivial ways. It is unlikely, however, that these internal dynamics are the driving force behind the

results reported from this study. As noted earlier, in a vast majority of cases, testers had little if any contact with employers. Given that a majority of callbacks were made on the basis of applications submitted with little or no personal contact, the internal disposition of the tester is unlikely to exert much influence. The finding that personal contact actually served to weaken the effect of a criminal record (see fig. A2 above) provides further evidence that the friendly, appealing qualities of the testers were apparent to employers, even among applicants in the criminal record condition.

APPENDIX B

TABLE B1
LOGISTIC REGRESSION OF THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL RECORD
AND RACE ON APPLICANTS' LIKELIHOOD OF RECEIVING A
CALLBACK

	Coefficient	Robust SE
Criminal record	-.99	.24***
Black	-1.25	.28***
Criminal record × black . . .	-.29	.38

NOTE.—SEs are corrected for clustering on employer ID in order to account for the fact that these data contain two records per employer (i.e., criminal record versus no criminal record). This model also controls for location (city vs. suburb) and contact with the employer, variables that mediate the relationship between race, crime, and employer responses.

*** $P < .001$.

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Neighborhood Mechanisms and the Spatial Dynamics of Birth Weight¹

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This study addresses two questions about why neighborhood contexts matter for individuals via a multilevel, spatial analysis of birth weight for 101,662 live births within 342 Chicago neighborhoods. First, what are the mechanisms through which neighborhood structural composition is related to health? The results show that mechanisms related to stress and adaptation (violent crime, reciprocal exchange and participation in local voluntary associations) are the most robust neighborhood-level predictors of birth weight. Second, are contextual influences on health limited to the immediate neighborhood or do they extend to a wider geographic context? The results show that contextual effects on birth weight extend to the social environment beyond the immediate neighborhood, even after adjusting for potentially confounding covariates. These findings suggest that the theoretical understanding and empirical estimation of "neighborhood effects" on health are bolstered by collecting data on more causally proximate social processes and by taking into account spatial interdependencies among neighborhoods.

A long history of research shows that health status (e.g., mortality, morbidity, birth weight) and other aspects of individual well-being and behavior vary strongly across neighborhood ecological settings (Robert 1999; Yen and Syme 1999). Most of this research has been based on aggregate-level relationships between the social and economic characteristics of local community contexts and health-related outcomes. More recently, so-called neighborhood effects studies have shown that these associations persist

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even after controlling for individual-level socioeconomic status (Diez-Roux 2001; Ellen, Mijanovich, and Dillman 2001; Pickett and Pearl 2001).

Although the cumulative weight of this evidence is impressive, it offers a limited perspective on how the local social environment is related to health. First, previous studies limit their analysis mainly to the association between socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhood environments and health, but they do not consider more proximate contextual mechanisms that might explain why the local socioeconomic environment may be related to health. Second, previous research on neighborhoods and health focuses exclusively on the "internal" properties of neighborhoods but does not consider the possible influences that the wider social environment surrounding a given neighborhood may have on the health of its residents.

Focusing on the phenomenon of low birth weight, this article addresses each of these limitations by showing that the theoretical understanding and empirical estimation of neighborhood effects can be improved through better specification and measurement of proximate contextual factors and broader spatial relationships. Two classes of neighborhood mechanisms are considered: social conditions that foster stress, such as high rates of violent crime; and the informal resources that are generated by social relations and social engagement among neighbors. This article also expands the neighborhood-effects paradigm by considering not only the local neighborhood but also the wider spatial context within which that neighborhood is embedded, and how both the local and more distal social contexts are related to health. Methodologically, this is accomplished by using a combination of multilevel hierarchical models and spatial regression models of birth weight.

Birth weight is an important early-life health outcome that is especially well-suited for studying the effects of neighborhood context because it is sensitive to short-term influences on maternal health during the length of pregnancy. A research design in which characteristics of the neighborhood environment are measured very close in time to the health outcome is more sustainable for birth weight than it is for many other health outcomes. Low birth weight is also an important outcome because it presents considerable risks for children's health and development. For example, Conley and Bennet (2000) find that children born at low birth weights are much less likely to complete high school by age 19, even after controlling for family socioeconomic status and other demographic characteristics. Other studies have linked low birth weight to developmental setbacks in childhood such as illness, subnormal growth, neurological impairment, intellectual and cognitive delays, behavioral problems, the early onset of antisocial behavior (Boardman et al. 2002; Donker et al. 1997; Hack, Flannery, and Schluchter 2002; Hack, Taylor, and Klein 1994; McCormick, Brooks-Gunn, and Workman-Daniels 1992); and also to

health problems later in life, such as coronary heart disease in adulthood (Barker 1995). Low birth weight could thus be a precursor to health inequalities in childhood and beyond.

PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON NEIGHBORHOODS AND BIRTH WEIGHT

Current interest in neighborhood effects throughout the social sciences is reflected in a rapid escalation in the number of neighborhood studies published in social science journals during the mid-1990s (Sampson, Morenoff, and Gannon-Rowley 2002). The term "neighborhood effects" generally refers to the study of how local social context influences the health and well being of individuals in a way that is not reducible to the properties of the individuals themselves. One of the hallmarks of this research is its attention to the potentially confounding influences of individual-level attributes in making neighborhood-level inferences, either through the use of multilevel research designs and statistical methods or through randomized experimental designs. Most of this research has focused on social and behavioral outcomes, including child cognitive and behavioral development, school dropout, educational attainment, crime and delinquency, substance use, sexual activity, contraceptive use, childbearing, income, and labor force participation (Gephart 1997; Leventhal and Brooks-Gunn 2000; Sampson et al. 2002).

Until very recently, health had been relatively neglected in this literature, but multilevel studies are now becoming increasingly popular in health research. One review (Pickett and Pearl 2001) identified 25 multilevel studies of local area effects on health, of which 23 reported at least one statistically significant association between health and local social context. This research covers a wide range of health outcomes, including mortality (e.g., all-cause, heart disease, cancer), infant and child health (e.g., birth weight, infant mortality, child illness), adult physical health status (e.g., self-rated health, heart disease, hypertension, chronic conditions, height), mental health (e.g., depression, anxiety, mental disorders), and health behaviors (e.g., smoking, diet and nutrition). This set of studies has garnered wide attention in social epidemiology, as evidenced by the publication of at least four reviews of this literature in the past several years (Diez-Roux 2001; Ellen et al. 2001; Pickett and Pearl 2001; Robert 1999).

A small number of multilevel studies have focused on the association between local area characteristics and birth weight, including city-specific studies of Chicago (Buka et al. 2002; Roberts 1997), Baltimore (O'Campo, Xue, and Wang 1997), Los Angeles (Pearl, Braveman, and Abrams 2001), and New York (Rauh, Andrews, and Garfinkel 2001), one national study

of the United States (Gorman 1999), and one national study of the United Kingdom (Sloggett and Joshi 1994). All of these studies report significant associations between at least one measure of local area socioeconomic composition and birth weight, after controlling for an individual-level measure of socioeconomic status. However, this evidence is hardly conclusive.

Most of this research focuses exclusively on socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods and does not consider mechanisms that might explain why more disadvantaged neighborhoods are associated with lower birth weights. Some studies consider other measures of neighborhood composition drawn from the census, such as racial/ethnic composition (Roberts 1997), immigrant composition (Gorman 1999), and age structure (Roberts 1997). Thus far, very few studies have used non-census-based neighborhood measures of community context (Buka et al. 2002; O'Campo et al. 1997), and none have advanced a coherent theoretical framework that considers the relationships among various neighborhood characteristics and, in turn, how they may be related to birth weight.

As a result, this group of studies has shed very little light on the question of why low birth weight is more common in more disadvantaged neighborhoods. Moreover, much of the evidence they present linking neighborhood disadvantage to low birth weight is questionable on methodological grounds because the findings are based on conventional regression methods that are inappropriate for multilevel data (for two exceptions, see Buka et al. [2002] and Rauh et al. [2001]). Finally, all of these prior studies of birth weight confine their purview to the "internal" properties of local areas and neglect potential effects of social context beyond the geographical boundaries of the neighborhood.

WHAT MAKES A PLACE (UN)HEALTHY?

Recent developments in the sociology of urban communities provide some guidance for better understanding how neighborhoods come to affect health. First, the sociological literature on neighborhood effects has taken a "process turn" in recent years and has begun to focus more on the mechanisms that explain *why* neighborhoods matter (Sampson et al. 2002). Much of this literature has been driven by interest in social capital, which is generally defined as a resource that is realized through social relationships (Kawachi and Berkman 2000; Portes 1998; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999). To build on these advances in neighborhood research and bring them to bear on the study of health, I present a conceptual framework for thinking about the relationship between neighborhoods and health, which is outlined in figure 1. Consistent with a stress and adap-




FIG. 1.—Conceptual framework for neighborhood effects on health

tation perspective on how social environments come to affect health (House 2002; Lin and Ensel 1989), this framework highlights the importance of stressful neighborhood conditions that may deleteriously affect the health of mothers and children, and it also highlights the availability of resources from social relationships and collective engagement in community life that may counteract or buffer the impact of contextual stressors on health. Not all possible pathways to health are depicted in figure 1, nor does this conceptual framework serve as an exact empirical model for the analyses that follow. Rather, it is a heuristic device for delineating key dimensions of neighborhood environments and pathways through which they may be related to health.

A second important development has been the increasing popularity of spatial perspectives in social science research (Goodchild et al. 2000). As noted earlier, the conventional approach to studying neighborhood effects focuses solely on the internal properties of neighborhoods, ignoring any influences on health that may emanate from the wider social environment, and it assumes that for analytical purposes neighborhoods can be treated as independent entities. This tendency to abstract the idea of “neighborhood” from its broader spatial context runs counter to the long theoretical tradition in urban sociology, dating back to the Chicago School, that views neighborhoods as spatially interrelated parts of a broader social system that Park and Burgess and their colleagues characterized as a “moving equilibrium of social order” (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie 1967, p. 54).

Thus far, only a few studies have explored the wider spatial context of neighborhood effects (e.g., Baller, Anselin, and Messner 2001; Morenoff and Sampson 1997; Morenoff, Sampson, and Raudenbush 2001; Sampson et al. 1999; Smith, Frazee, and Davison 2000), and most of these are ecological-level studies that do not control for characteristics of individuals. Before expounding a broader spatial perspective on neighborhood environments and health, it is necessary to elaborate the key theoretical dimensions of neighborhood environments outlined in figure 1.

Structural Characteristics

Structural characteristics refer to properties of a neighborhood's population or physical infrastructure that are typically measured as aggregations of individual-level attributes. The most commonly analyzed structural factors in previous research are indicators of socioeconomic composition. The geographical concentration of socioeconomic disadvantage is tied to multiple health risks such as dilapidated and overcrowded housing, poor recreational facilities, fewer stocks of nutritional food in local stores, inadequate municipal services and amenities, and exposure to environmental toxins (Sooman, Macintyre, and Anderson 1993; Sooman and Macintyre 1995; Wallace 1990; Williams and Collins 2001). However, the concentration of poor people in a neighborhood does not necessarily make it an unhealthy environment. For example, some disadvantaged neighborhoods may produce social conditions that are more conducive to stress, while others may not. Likewise, some poor neighborhoods may foster informal social resources that offset some of the deleterious effects of stressful conditions and material deprivation.

Another key aspect of neighborhood structure is racial/ethnic composition. Residential segregation imposes multiple health risks on residents of predominantly minority areas, many of which overlap with the health risks associated with concentrated disadvantage. However, segregation imposes an additional psychological toll in the form of racial discrimination, which a growing body of evidence indicates can have adverse consequences for physical and mental health (Jackson et al. 1996; Williams and Collins 2001). On the other hand, some aspects of neighborhood racial/ethnic homogeneity may be health promoting. For example, in a national multilevel study, Gorman (1999) finds that the county-level percentage of foreign-born residents is a protective factor against the risk of low birth weight. There is also some evidence that birth weights to Mexican women are higher in predominantly Mexican immigrant neighborhoods (Morenoff 2000), perhaps because, as some scholars have argued, Mexican culture reinforces healthy behaviors and promotes group resources such as social

support from family and friends (Balcazar, Aoyama, and Cai 1991; Scribner 1996).

Stressful Social Conditions

One of the main reasons that lower SES neighborhoods may be unhealthy places to live is that they expose residents to stressful conditions, such as violent crime. Repeated exposure to stress fosters a condition known as *allostatic load*, which refers to the physiological costs of chronic overactivity or underactivity of systems within the body (e.g., the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenal axis or the autonomic nervous system) that fluctuate to meet demands of repeated exposure to environmental stressors (McEwen 1998). Geronimus (1992) argues that prolonged exposure to high-stress neighborhood environments can take a cumulative toll on maternal health in the form of “weathering.”

There are strong theoretical reasons to believe that violent crime is a primary source of stress in many urban neighborhoods. First, research on the fear of crime shows that people tend to perceive crime largely in geographic terms (Warr 1994), which makes the neighborhood environment a particularly salient context for generating fear and, hence, stress. Moreover, neighborhood crime can be stressful not only for people who perceive high personal risks of victimization, but also for those who fear for the safety of family members and friends, which Warr and Ellison (2000) call “altruistic fear.” Women tend to be more fearful of crime than men (Warr 1994), which makes neighborhood crime particularly important for maternal health, and there is some evidence that the risk of low birth weight is greater in high-crime neighborhoods (Collins and David 1997; Zapata et al. 1992). Second, research shows that people who perceive more crime and disorder in their neighborhoods have a higher risk of mental health problems related to stress, such as anxiety, depression, powerlessness, fear, and mistrust (Aneshensel and Sucoff 1996; Cutrona et al. 2000; Geis and Ross 1998; Ross and Jang 2000; Ross, Reynolds, and Geis 2000). By promoting distrust of others, neighborhood crime can also lead to social isolation from close social relationships (Krause 1991), which in turn has been linked to adverse physical health outcomes (Berkman and Glass 2000; House, Landis, and Umberson 1988). Third, research on exposure to violence among children and adolescents has linked repeated encounters with violence (both direct and indirect) to the development of emotional problems, post-traumatic stress syndrome, substance use, and increasing pessimism in one’s own ability, and that of health professionals, to improve health (Fick and Thomas 1995; Margolin and Gordis 2000; Selner-O’Hagan, Kindlon, and Buka 1998). Finally, some scholars suggest that in addition to fostering stress, neighborhood crime also promotes

risky behaviors, such as substance use, because residents of crime-ridden neighborhoods perceive themselves to have relatively short life expectancies, which leaves them less concerned with the long-term health consequences of their actions (Ellen et al. 2001; Ganz 2000).

In figure 1, crime is viewed as a potential mediator of both structural characteristics and social relations/engagement on individual health outcomes. There is a long line of studies on the predictors of crime, most of which focuses on structural factors, such as concentrated disadvantage and racial/ethnic composition and their connection to violent crime rates (e.g., Krivo and Peterson 2000; Land, McCall, and Cohen 1990), but which also includes recent studies of neighborhood social processes (Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997), as discussed in more detail below. There is also some evidence that perceptions of crime and disorder may mediate the effects of neighborhood structural factors on physical and mental health outcomes (Aneshensel and Sucoff 1996; Cutrona et al. 2000; Geis and Ross 1998; Ross and Jang 2000; Ross and Mirowsky 2001; Ross et al. 2000).

Social Relations/Engagement

How people adapt to stressful environments depends, in part, on their access to informal resources such as those produced through social relationships and institutions (i.e., social capital). In places where neighbors are more engaged in the social life of their community, residents are more likely to generate informal resources by assisting one another with favors; providing each other with health-related advice and other information; aiding one another with everyday tasks, such as child care; monitoring each others' property; and participating in local voluntary associations, such as block clubs, tenants' associations, and religious organizations.

Thus far, most of the research on social relations/engagement and health has focused on individual-level measures of social ties and social support. A major finding from this research is that social isolation—the relative lack of social relationships—is a risk factor for mortality, with a relative risk ratio comparable to that of cigarette smoking (Berkman and Glass 2000; House et al. 1988; Singer and Ryff 2001). A related line of research finds that participation in voluntary organizations, a form of social engagement, may promote both physical and mental health (Wilson and Musick 1999).

There are relatively few studies that have analyzed the connection between neighborhood-level measures of social relations/engagement and health. These studies have focused mainly on mental health (Aneshensel and Sucoff 1996; Cutrona et al. 2000; Geis and Ross 1998; Ross and Jang 2000; Ross et al. 2000), and most of them characterize neighborhood social

processes by relying on only a single individual's report of what happens in his or her neighborhood. A more reliable approach to measuring neighborhood social processes is to aggregate the reports of multiple respondents living in the same neighborhood (Raudenbush and Sampson 1999), but this strategy has only been used in a few health studies to date (Buka et al. 2002; Cutrona et al. 2000). Sampson and colleagues use such an approach to measure neighborhood "collective efficacy," defined as the shared willingness of residents to actively cooperate in pursuit of commonly held goals (Sampson et al. 1999; Sampson et al. 1997), but most of their research focuses on crime-related outcomes, not health. This research shows that neighborhoods with higher levels of collective efficacy have lower levels of violent crime (Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1997) and disorder (Sampson and Raudenbush 1999) and that collective efficacy—as well as other social processes, such as reciprocal exchange—is predicted by structural factors, such as concentrated disadvantage and residential stability (Morenoff et al. 2001; Sampson et al. 1999). Thus, in terms of the paths displayed in figure 1, previous research has focused on the association between neighborhood social resources and crime and on the connection between structural factors and social resources, but there has been very little research on the association between neighborhood social relations/engagement and health.²

THE SPATIAL DYNAMICS OF HEALTH

The social environment and context in which individuals live their lives comprises not only their own immediate neighborhood, but also surrounding neighborhoods in which people work, shop, attend school, visit with friends, travel, and so on in the course of their daily lives. Further, the way a person experiences her or his neighborhood may be influenced by the wider context of surrounding neighborhoods. For example, if a neighborhood has a low crime rate but the areas around it all have high crime rates, then crime in the surrounding areas could still be an important source of stress for people who live in the low-crime neighborhood. In this case, there is a spillover effect, whereby crime in surrounding neighborhoods produces a negative "spatial externality" for the low-crime neighborhood (Anselin, *in press*). Spatial externalities can also be positive, as in the case of social networks and voluntary associations that spread resources to multiple neighborhoods within a geographic area. In general, the point is that neighborhood conditions may be reinforced, exacerbated,

² One exception is a recent study of neighborhood support and birth weight in Chicago by Buka and colleagues (2002)

moderated, or counteracted by the characteristics of adjacent and proximate neighborhoods.

The embeddedness of neighborhoods within a larger social environment is usually neglected in analyses of neighborhood effects on health, even though spatial methods have become more widely used in social science research (Goodchild et al. 2000). A key issue in spatial analysis is how to conceptualize and model the spatial process under study (Anselin 2002; Anselin, in press). Some outcomes diffuse over space, such as acts of violence in one neighborhood that instigate retaliatory acts in nearby neighborhoods, or an infectious disease that is spread from one area to another through social networks (Cohen and Tita 1999). Noninfectious health outcomes, such as low birth weight, do not diffuse over space, because an occurrence of the outcome in one neighborhood does not increase the likelihood that a similar outcome will occur in a geographically proximate area. However, a noninfectious health outcome may still be spatially conditioned—meaning that the occurrence of the outcome in a given place is related to what happens in nearby places—if there are spatial processes operating in the causes of that outcome. For example, a pregnant woman may experience stress from high crime rates in neighborhoods surrounding hers, even if the crime rate in her own neighborhood is relatively low. In this example, high crime rates in surrounding neighborhoods represent negative spatial externalities that, in a sense, spill over neighborhood boundaries and affect health outcomes in adjacent neighborhoods. Thus, there is an important theoretical distinction between *diffusion*, which describes a spatial process intrinsic to a given outcome (e.g., a contagious disease) such that once the outcome occurs in a geographic area it is also likely to occur in surrounding areas, and *spatial externalities*, which are generated by social processes that spill over multiple geographic areas, generating a wider spatial context for risk and protective factors than just the immediate neighborhood. This theoretical distinction has important methodological implications for how to model and interpret spatial effects, which are considered below in greater detail.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The ensuing analysis addresses three central questions about neighborhoods and birth weight. First, do associations between neighborhood structural characteristics—such as poverty, racial/ethnic composition, and residential stability—and birth weight persist after controlling for individual-level attributes in a multilevel model? I examine a broad array of neighborhood characteristics, including measures of neighborhood structure and neighborhood mechanisms related to stress and social resources.

A related second question is whether or not two hypothesized neighborhood mechanisms, violent crime and social exchange/voluntarism, are associated with birth weight after controlling for both individual- and neighborhood-level confounders, and if they are associated, do they mediate the effects of structural factors such as poverty, racial/ethnic composition, and residential stability?

Third, is there evidence that birth weight is also related to the wider spatial context within which neighborhoods are embedded? I address this question through multilevel spatial models of birth weight. If indeed there is evidence that the health of individuals in a given neighborhood is related to characteristics of adjacent neighborhoods, then it is also important to investigate which characteristics of the surrounding areas are most likely to spill over neighborhood boundaries and produce health-related spatial externalities. Moreover, it is important to know whether such spillover effects are additive or multiplicative—that is, for a given risk/protective factor, is there a statistical interaction between exposure to that factor in the proximal and distal social environment? For example, living in a place where neighbors generate informal resources through social relations and participation in local organizations may offer more protection against low birth weight if that neighborhood is also surrounded by other neighborhoods where neighbors engage in similar practices and thus reinforce this type of behavior. Each of these questions is addressed in the multilevel spatial analysis below.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND MEASUREMENT

This study uses a multilevel data set that combines individual-level data from the 1995–96 Chicago vital statistics with contextual data from the 1990 U.S. census, 1995 Chicago Police Crime Statistics, and the 1995 Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods (PHDCN). The two years' worth of cases from the Vital Statistics yield a total sample size of 101,662 live births.³ For the purposes of this study, "neighborhoods" are defined operationally as the sampling units for the PHDCN Community Survey, which are called neighborhood clusters (NCs) and consist of one or more geographically contiguous census tracts. The PHDCN team cluster analyzed 1990 census data in order to determine which tracts could be combined to form relatively homogenous NCs with respect to

³ There were 107,346 live births registered in Chicago from 1995 to 1996. Cases of multiple births (2.75%) were dropped from the analysis, as is conventional in birth weight analyses. Cases with missing birth weights (.37%) or missing geographic identifiers (2.55%) were also excluded from the analysis, yielding a final sample size of 101,662 women.

distributions of racial/ethnic mix, SES, housing density, and family structure. They then fine-tuned these combinations to ensure that the final NC boundaries would be consistent with major ecological barriers (e.g., railroad tracts, parks, and main thoroughfares) and local knowledge of neighborhood borders. Chicago's 865 inhabited census tracts were combined to form 343 NCs.⁴

Measures of Infant Health

There is disagreement in the health literature over how to construct birth outcome measures. Most studies rely on a dichotomous measure of low birth weight, which is conventionally defined as a birth weight of less than 2,500 grams (5 pounds and 8 ounces). This convention of measuring low birth weight dates back to 1919, when Arvo Ylppo proposed that birth weights of 2,500 grams or less be adopted as a standard because infants born below this weight were not mature enough to survive the first year of life (Kline, Stein, and Susser 1989, p. 166). Ylppo's standard gained wider acceptance in 1950, when it was adopted by a committee of the World Health Organization (Kline et al. 1989). More recent research has shown that low birth weight is only a serious threat to infant health and development when it results from intrauterine growth retardation (IUGR)—the condition of a baby being small in size for her or his gestational age—as opposed to less harmful cases of low birth weight when babies are fully grown for their gestational age but simply born prematurely (Kramer 1987). Thus, some births that are categorized as non-low birth weight can still be “compromised” in terms of the development of the fetus (Frisbie, Forbes, and Pullum 1996), and vice versa.

In this study, I use multiple specifications of birth outcomes. To maintain comparability with previous studies, I use the conventional measure of low birth weight as one outcome. However, to more directly tap into the notion of IUGR, I also use a linear specification of birth weight that adjusts for gestational age.⁵ This linear specification of birth weight has

⁴ The NC containing O'Hare Airport was dropped from the analysis because the sample size was insufficient to generate reliable neighborhood measures, leaving a total of 342 NCs. The average NC contains 7,950 people. In comparison, the average census tract contains 3,156 people, while the Local Community Area, another commonly used geographic unit in Chicago that is aggregated from census tracts, has an average of 35,415 people. More details about the PHDCN sample design are available in previous publications (e.g., Sampson et al. 1997).

⁵ In the interest of showing how robust the findings are across multiple model specifications, I also present results from models of dichotomous low birth weight that are adjusted for gestational age. Thus, the ensuing analysis consists of models for both continuous birth weight and dichotomous low birth weight, with and without controlling for gestational age.

both substantive and statistical advantages. Substantively, it is a more direct indicator of IUGR than the conventional low birth weight threshold because it captures potentially critical variation across the distribution of birth weights that cannot be explained simply by the length of gestation. Statistically, a continuous specification of birth weight is preferable to the dichotomous measure of low birth weight in a multilevel framework, because low birth weight is a rare outcome (it occurs in 9% of the births in this sample), making it difficult to detect variation even with relatively large within-neighborhood sample sizes (the average neighborhood in this sample contains 297 births).⁶ Descriptive statistics for both the continuous and dichotomous measures of birth weight are presented in table 1.

Measures of Neighborhood Context

Measures of neighborhood context were constructed to reflect each of the categories in the conceptual framework. Descriptive statistics on these variables are also presented in table 1. Indicators of neighborhood structural composition consist of the following census variables: the percentage of neighborhood residents that are African-American, the percentage that are of Mexican origin, the percentage of poor families, the percentage of residents who have lived at the same location for at least five years, and the percentage of homes that are owner occupied.⁷ The latter two items are collapsed into a scale of residential stability ($\alpha = .75$), to reduce problems of multicollinearity.

As an indicator of social environmental stress, I use the 1995 violent crime rate, calculated from the Chicago police statistics as the total number of violent crimes (murder, rape, robbery, and aggravated assault) that occurred in a given NC and were reported to the police in 1995, divided by the 1990 census population count for that area.⁸ I used the violent crime rate rather than the total crime rate because violent crimes are

⁶ One problem with adjusting birth weight for length of gestation in a regression framework is that gestational age is likely brought about by many of the same factors that are causally related to birth weight, making it an endogenous variable. From the standpoint of estimating neighborhood effects on birth weight, this is a conservative strategy, because if gestational length is a pathway through which some neighborhood characteristics affect birth weight, then controlling for gestational age may eliminate or attenuate neighborhood effects on birth weight.

⁷ In supplemental analysis, the neighborhood poverty indicator was replaced with a scale of concentrated disadvantage that included not only the family poverty rate but also rates of unemployment, family public assistance, and female-headed families ($\alpha = .98$). Although the results of this analysis were not reported in the tables because this scale was too highly correlated with other predictors discussed below, the results were entirely consistent with the models that are reported.

⁸ The official police data were provided to PHDCN by Richard Block.

TABLE 1
PERSON- AND NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Birth outcomes:				
Birth weight	3,229.39	611.29	10	6,673
Low birth weight09	.29	0	1
Neighborhood:				
%African-American	41.21	43.67	.00	99.81
%Mexican	12.92	20.03	.00	91.48
%poor families	20.43	17.31	.23	88.18
Residential stability00	1.00	-2.07	2.32
1995 violent crime rate (per 1,000)	65.63	42.68	4.38	237.37
Exchange/voluntarism00	1.00	-2.49	3.32
Race/ethnicity:				
Non-Hispanic white20	.40	0	1
Non-Hispanic black42	.49	0	1
Mexican origin26	.44	0	1
Puerto Rican origin05	.21	0	1
Other Hispanic origin03	.17	0	1
Non-Hispanic other race04	.19	0	1
Foreign born33	.47	0	1
Sociodemographic:				
Maternal age	25.77	6.34	12	53
Birth order	2.64	1.79	1	17
Maternal education	11.72	3.02	0	17
Marital status45	.50	0	1
Health behaviors during pregnancy				
Smoking10	.30	0	1
Drinking01	.11	0	1
N of doctor visits	10.39	4.31	0	80
Weight gain (pounds)	29.51	12.72	-82	186
Biomedical characteristics during pregnancy:				
Anemia01	.11	0	1
Diabetes02	.12	0	1
Herpes00	.05	0	1
Hypertension03	.16	0	1
Previous low-birth-weight baby01	.09	0	1
Previous pregnancy termination26	.44	0	1
Female infant49	.50	0	1
Length of gestation	38.68	2.43	18	51

NOTE.—Summary statistics for $N = 101,949$ women in 342 neighborhood clusters. Data are from 1995-96 Chicago vital statistics, the 1990 census, 1995 Chicago police statistics, and 1995 PHDCN Community Survey.

likely to be more widely publicized and treated as serious threats to personal safety, but the results are consistent with either measure.

I also constructed two indicators of neighborhood social relations/engagement from the PHDCN community survey.⁹ The first, reciprocated exchange, is a five-item scale measuring how often neighbors provide mutual support, exchange advice and information, and socialize with one another. Respondents were asked how often (on a four-point scale) they engage in the following activities with their neighbors: exchanging favors for each other, such as watching each other's children, helping with shopping, lending garden or house tools, and other small acts of kindness; watching over each other's property; having parties or other get-togethers where other people in the neighborhood are invited; visiting in each other's homes or on the street; and asking each other advice about personal things such as child rearing or job openings. The second, participation in local voluntary associations, is a six-item index that measures residents' involvement (yes or no) in the following types of associations: local religious organizations; neighborhood watch programs; block groups, tenant associations, or community councils; business or civic groups; ethnic or nationality clubs; and local political organizations. Each of these scales has been used in previous research and has been shown to be highly reliable (Sampson et al. 1999). However, preliminary analysis revealed that the colinearity between these two variables ($r = .60$) produced unstable estimates, and so they were collapsed into a single index, exchange/voluntarism, using factor analysis. Exploratory analysis also suggested that the resulting factor is more predictive of birth weight than either of the two separate scales by themselves.

Individual-Level Controls

The individual-level variables come from the Chicago vital statistics data and are treated as control variables in the analysis. Descriptive statistics

⁹ These scales were constructed using methodology developed by Raudenbush and Sampson (1999) for measuring neighborhood processes with survey data. This method adjusts for measurement error through a three-level model with separate variance components for items in the scale, persons, and neighborhoods. Although these scales are measured with more precision than one constructed by simply averaging responses to survey items across neighborhoods, they nonetheless yield the same results in the analysis of birth weight.

for these variables are provided in table 1.¹⁰ The individual-level controls are classified into four groups. The first group, indicators of maternal *race, ethnicity, and nativity*, consists of dummy variables for women who are non-Hispanic African-American, of Mexican origin, of Puerto Rican origin, of other Hispanic origin, and non-Hispanic other races (the reference category is non-Hispanic white), and a dummy variable for foreign-born women. Maternal *sociodemographic* characteristics include continuous variables for maternal age, birth parity, and highest grade of education,¹¹ and a dummy variable for those women who were married at the time of the birth. Measures of *maternal health behavior* include dummy variables for women who smoked or drank during pregnancy, continuous measures of weight gained during pregnancy and the number of visits to the doctor, and a dummy variable for women who had over 20 doctor visits during their pregnancy (the ninety-ninth percentile).¹² Finally, *biomedical* measures include dummy variables for women who experienced anemia, diabetes, herpes, or hypertension during pregnancy, dummy variables for women who reported at least one previous birth resulting in low birth weight or a previous pregnancy termination, and a dummy variable indicating whether the infant was a female.¹³

It is important to note that many of these individual-level covariates could be endogenous in the sense that they may, in part, reflect the effects of prior social context. In other words, it is possible that a woman's sociodemographic characteristics, health behaviors, and biomedical conditions were all influenced by neighborhood environments in which she once lived or perhaps continues to live. In this sense, the associations

¹⁰ Missing values were imputed for the continuous independent variables using stepwise regression procedure (best-subset regressions) in Stata (2001). In the case of categorical variables, separate dummy variables were created for the missing cases on each independent variable. These dummy variables were included as control variables in all of the regression models reported in this article. However, in the interest of parsimony, the coefficients for these missing-data control variables are not reported in the tables.

¹¹ I considered nonlinear specifications of all the individual-level covariates, such as natural logs, quadratic terms, and dummy variables, and none of these changed the results of the neighborhood-level variables. In the interest of parsimony, only the linear specifications are reported in the tables.

¹² The smoking and drinking dummy variables were constructed from measures of the number of cigarettes and drinks consumed during pregnancy. In these data, less than 1% of all cases had values of zero for either variable, so missing values were also recoded as zero, under the assumption that being missing meant that the mother refrained from the behavior in question. This means that estimates of the prevalence of smoking and drinking from this data set are probably biased downward.

¹³ The dummy variable for hypertension is coded as "1" if the birth certificate reports an incidence of chronic hypertension, pregnancy-associated hypertension, or pre-eclampsia; and "0" if none of these conditions are reported.

between current neighborhood environments and birth weight could be conservative estimates of the total effects of neighborhood context.

METHODS

Multilevel analyses for continuous birth weight and dichotomous low birth weight were conducted using hierarchical modeling techniques (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002) realized through HLM software (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, and Congdon 2001). Hierarchical models for multilevel data consist of two equations estimated simultaneously: a level-1 (individual-level) model and a level-2 (neighborhood-level) model. The level-1 model is either a linear model (for continuous birth weight) or a generalized linear model (for low birth weight). The linear model is written as

$$Y_{ij} = \beta_{0j} + \sum_q \beta_{qj} X_{qij} + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where Y_{ij} is the infant's birth weight for mother i in neighborhood j ; β_{0j} is the intercept; X_{qij} is the value of covariate q ; and β_{qj} is the partial effect of that covariate on birth weight. The person-specific error term, ε_{ij} , is assumed to be independently, normally distributed with constant variance σ^2 . The generalized linear model for a binary outcome has the same structure, but it replaces Y_{ij} with the logit link function, $\eta_{ij} = \left(\frac{\Phi_{ij}}{1-\Phi_{ij}}\right)$, where Φ_{ij} is the probability that an infant will be born below 2,500 grams and η_{ij} is the log-odds (or logit) of low birth weight.

The level-2 model is the same in both cases. The intercept from level 1, β_{0j} , is allowed to vary randomly across NCs:

$$\beta_{0j} = \gamma_{00} + \sum_s \gamma_{0s} W_{sj} + \mu_{0j},$$

where γ_{00} is the average birth weight across all neighborhoods, γ_{0s} are the neighborhood-level regression coefficients, W_{sj} are the neighborhood-level predictors, and μ_{0j} is the unique increment to the intercept associated with neighborhood j (i.e., the random effect), assumed to be normally distributed with variance τ .

Spatial Models

A distinctive methodological feature of this analysis is that it combines multilevel and spatial modeling techniques. Spatial effects on birth weight

are estimated through an autoregressive process in the dependent variable known as a "spatial lag" model,¹⁴

$$Y = \rho WY + X\beta + \varepsilon, \quad (1)$$

where ρ is the spatial autoregressive parameter, W is a weights matrix that expresses a form of spatial association among each pair of neighborhoods (in the analysis below it is a binary contiguity matrix), X is a matrix of exogenous explanatory variables with an associated vector of regression coefficients β , and ε is a vector of normally distributed, random error terms.

Because equation (1) has an endogenous variable on the right-hand side, WY , it must be estimated using either a maximum likelihood (ML) or two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach (Anselin 1988; Anselin 1995b), neither of which can currently be estimated in HLM. However, using a two-step procedure, it is possible to approximate a hierarchical spatial model of either continuous birth weight or dichotomous low birth weight by first constructing a neighborhood-level birth weight measure that is adjusted for the potentially confounding effects of individual-level covariates using coefficients from multilevel models, and then regressing this adjusted neighborhood birth weight score on neighborhood-level covariates and a spatial lag term in a spatial regression model.¹⁵

The spatial lag model is commonly interpreted as a diffusion model, wherein the value of Y at one location is related to values of Y in contiguous neighboring locations through ρ . This interpretation is problematic for two reasons. First, diffusion is a process that unfolds over time and cannot be captured with cross-sectional data. Second, the ρ coefficient not only captures the effects of spatial proximity to Y in other locations, but also spatial proximity to the observed and unobserved *covariates* of

¹⁴ There is also a spatial error model, in which the autocorrelation process is modeled in the error term, as follows: $Y = X\beta + \lambda\varepsilon + \xi$, where X is a matrix of exogenous explanatory variables with an associated vector of regression coefficients β , λ is the autoregressive coefficient, ε is a vector of error terms, and ξ is a random error term (Anselin 1988; Anselin 1995b). Anselin (1995b) has developed regression diagnostic tests to determine whether spatial dependence is better captured by a lag or error process.

¹⁵ The hierarchical model of birth weight used in the first step contains only individual-level covariates, which are all centered around their neighborhood means in order to derive their *within* neighborhood estimates (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, p. 33), using the following equation: $Y^* = Y_j - \bar{Y} - [\sum \beta_{w,j} \times (X_{j,i} - \bar{X}_j)]$, where $Y_j - \bar{Y}$ represents the deviation of Y in neighborhood j from the overall sample mean, $X_{j,i} - \bar{X}_j$ represents the deviation of X in neighborhood j from the sample mean, and the $\beta_{w,j}$ are the HLM within-neighborhood slope parameters from a regression where the $X_{j,i}$ covariates are centered around their *group*, means. In short, this process adjusts the value of Y for neighborhood j according to the biasing effects of *individual-level* covariates, weighted by the neighborhood's relative composition on those covariates.

Y . This point rests on a subtle but very important interpretation of equation (1), which is that if values of Y in a "focal" neighborhood are a function of Y in its first-order neighbors (i.e., the neighbors of the focal neighborhood), then it follows that values of Y in the first-order neighbors are, in turn, functions of X and ε in the first-order neighbors and of Y in the second-order neighbors (i.e., the neighbors of the first-order neighbors). This process—known as a "spatial multiplier" (Anselin, in press; Morenoff et al. 2001)—continues to expand until it reaches the border of the city, because Y in a given neighborhood is always a function of X and ε in that neighborhood and as Y in its neighbors (which in turn is a function of X , ε , and neighboring values of Y , etc.). The spatial multiplier process can be expressed mathematically by rewriting equation (1) in its reduced form (where all endogenous variables are written as functions of exogenous variables):

$$Y = X\beta + \rho WX\beta + \rho^2 W^2 X\beta + \dots + \rho^m W^m X\beta \\ + \varepsilon + \rho W\varepsilon + \rho^2 W^2 \varepsilon + \dots + \rho^m W^m \varepsilon, \quad (2)$$

where $m \rightarrow \infty$. This equation clearly shows that the spatial effect represented by ρ in equation (1) actually operates through the observed X variables and the unobserved error term, ε . Thus, the spatial lag effect in equation (1) is consistent with any of the following mechanisms: (a) spatial externalities from the observed X variables, (b) spatial externalities from unobserved factors that are not in the model (i.e., the error term), or (c) a feedback or diffusion effect in Y (which is conceived as an unobserved process that is captured by the error term).

In the case of birth weight, diffusion is not a theoretical possibility, so the interpretation of the spatial lag term hinges on the operation of spatial externalities. These externalities can be estimated more directly with a less frequently used model in which all spatial effects operate through the X variables (or a subset thereof) (Anselin, in press):

$$Y = X\beta + \rho WX + \varepsilon, \quad (3)$$

which is identical to equation (1) except that WX is substituted for WY . This model assumes that spatial effects operate only through the observed X variables, whereas the spatial lag model in equation (1) allows the spatial process to operate through either observed or unobserved variables.¹⁶ Whether equation (3) is more appropriate than equation (1) is an empirical question that can be resolved by examining diagnostic tests for residual spatial autocorrelation (Anselin 1995b, in press).

¹⁶ Another important difference between eqq. (1) and (3) is that unlike WY , WX is not endogenous, so eq. (3) can be estimated directly in HLM

RESULTS

The results of the multilevel analysis for continuous birth weight are presented in table 2. The neighborhood-level variables in all of the models have been standardized around a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one to place the coefficients on a common metric. Models 1 and 2 estimate neighborhood effects before adjusting for individual-level covariates. The reason for showing unadjusted neighborhood estimates is that many of the individual-level controls (introduced in model 3) may actually be reflecting the effects of prior neighborhood conditions, and so the unadjusted neighborhood coefficients represent, in a sense, an upper bound on the estimates of neighborhood effects. Model 1 includes only structural characteristics and shows that neighborhood racial composition (%African-American), poverty, and residential stability are all significantly related to birth weight in the expected direction. Model 2 adds the two hypothesized neighborhood mechanisms: violent crime and exchange/voluntarism. Both crime and exchange/voluntarism are significantly related to birth weight in the expected direction, and their inclusion in the model reduces the effects of poverty and residential stability to nonsignificance. Adding crime and exchange/voluntarism also reduces the effect of percentage black (although it remains statistically significant) but increases the percentage Mexican coefficient, which becomes significant in model 2.¹⁷

Adding individual-level controls in model 3 reduces the effects of all the neighborhood structural characteristics to nonsignificance. Birth weight's association with violent crime, though also reduced, remains significant, as does its association with exchange/voluntarism. These results support the theoretical argument that indicators of neighborhood stress and social resources are more causally proximate to birth weight than are structural compositional factors. Although these effects are relatively small in substantive terms (e.g., a 1-SD increase in violent crime is associated with only a 10.4 gram decrease in birth weight), some of the individual-level controls included in model 3 (e.g., smoking and drinking) may themselves be affected by prior neighborhood conditions, and in this sense, some true contextual effects could be attributed to individual-level factors when these controls are introduced. Hence, the estimates of neighborhood effects in model 3 are arguably lower bound estimates.

There are substantial correlations among some of the independent variables in model 3—as detailed in the correlation matrix provided in the

¹⁷ The protective effect of Mexican neighborhoods is enhanced in model 2 because Mexican neighborhoods tend to have relatively high rates of violent crime (compared to white neighborhoods) and low levels of exchange/voluntarism. After adjusting for these risk factors, Mexican neighborhoods appear to be more protective.

TABLE 2
NEIGHBORHOOD- AND PERSON-LEVEL PREDICTORS OF BIRTH WEIGHT FROM HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	1		2		3)	
	Coefficient	t-ratio	Coefficient	t-ratio	Coefficient	t-ratio
Neighborhood:						
%African-American ..	-112.18	-24.12***	-81.88	-15.57***	.71	.18
%Mexican	2.04	.72	10.35	4.18***	2.92	1.58
%poor families	-24.24	-5.25***	-8.25	-1.93	3.15	1.01
Residential stability ..	12.52	3.42***	-2.09	-.62	3.29	1.33
ln violent crime rate			-41.24	-7.36***	-10.41	-2.80***
Exchange/voluntarism			13.04	4.00***	6.71	2.81**
Race/ethnicity:						
Non-Hispanic black					-134.02	-18.36***
Mexican origin					-5.92	-.97
Puerto Rican origin					-83.61	-10.51***
Other Hispanic origin					-29.43	-2.94**
Non-Hispanic other race					-173.28	-21.04***
Foreign born ..					2.77	.52
Sociodemographic characteristics:						
Maternal age					2.74	7.00***
Birth order					22.20	15.82***

Maternal education	1 19	1.77
Marital status	47.69	12 90***
Maternal behaviors:		
Smoking	-188.92	-34 60***
Drinking	-123 00	-8 23***
N doctor visits	4 90	12.46***
> 20 doctor visits	-107 55	-5.72***
Weight change during pregnancy lbs . .	6.05	47.91***
Biomedical characteristics:		
Anemia	-14.35	-1 24
Diabetes	197.20	13.84***
Herpes	-26.62	-1.11
Hypertension	-104.89	-10 24***
Previous low birth weight baby	29.78	1 52
Previous pregnancy termination	-25 36	-5.99***
Female infant	-112 97	-37 99***
Length of gestation	149 07	195.24***
Intercept	3,231 90	1,327.55***
%Variance explained	3,232 67	1,327.55***
Neighborhood level	95 96	98 49
Individual level	NA	45.72

SOURCE — 1995-96 Chicago vital statistics, 1990 census, 1995 Chicago police statistics, and 1995 PHDCN Community Survey

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

appendix—which could produce multicollinearity and thus distort some of the estimates. Violent crime, for example, is highly correlated with both percentage poor ($r = .76$) and percentage African-American ($r = .75$), and exchange/voluntarism is correlated with residential stability ($r = .58$). A series of robustness checks revealed that both violent crime and exchange/voluntarism remain significant predictors of birth weight when any of the other independent variables (or combinations of them) are removed from the model.¹⁸ These correlations become particularly problematic in trying to disentangle the effects of violent crime on birth weight from those of percentage poor and percentage African-American. Figure 2 provides more intuitive evidence that higher crime is associated with lower birth weight even after holding levels of neighborhood poverty and racial composition constant. The top portion of figure 2 shows that within almost every poverty quartile, the mean birth weight decreases significantly at higher levels of violent crime, and the bottom portion of figure 2 shows that the same association between crime and birth weight holds within most quartiles of percentage African-American.

The same sequence of models was run on a dichotomous measure of

¹⁸ In supplemental analysis, I used a “propensity score” approach, which some statisticians argue is a better way to control for potentially confounding covariates in estimating a “treatment” effect because it eliminates the correlation between the treatment variable(s) and the error term (Winship and Morgan 1999). In this case, neighborhood violent crime and exchange/voluntarism (both measured in 1995) are conceived as treatments, and structural characteristics from the 1990 census are “pretreatment” covariates. The strategy behind the propensity score approach is to control for the propensity of a neighborhood to have a given level of crime or exchange/voluntarism in estimating these so-called treatment effects. To do this, I regressed each treatment variable on a wide array of neighborhood-level covariates from the U.S. census that might affect levels of crime and social resources, including additional census variables that are not used in the birth weight models, such as population density, the ratio of children to adults, the proportion of vacant houses, the percentage of adults employed in professional and managerial occupations, and the percentage of adults who have graduated from college. The predicted values from these first-stage regressions (i.e., the propensity scores) were then included as neighborhood controls in the birth weight equation. Because these first-stage regressions explained much of the variance in crime and exchange/voluntarism (the R^2 was .88 for violent crime and .60 for exchange/voluntarism), it is reasonable to assume that when the propensity scores are included as predictors in the birth weight equation, any remaining unobserved neighborhood factors that predict birth weight are probably not highly correlated with either violent crime or exchange/voluntarism, thus eliminating the correlation between the treatment and the error term. The results showed that both violent crime and exchange/voluntarism remain significant predictors of birth weight even after controlling for propensity scores (where propensity scores are specified either as continuous variables or as dummy variables marking quartiles of each propensity measure to allow for nonlinear effects). This same procedure was used to test each of the models presented in subsequent tables and any significant changes to coefficients are reported below.

Spatial Dynamics of Birth Weight




FIG 2.—The top chart represents neighborhood mean birth weight by quartiles of violent crime and poverty. The bottom chart represents neighborhood mean birth weight by quartiles of violent crime and racial composition. The asterisk (*) signifies that mean birth weight is significantly lower ($P < .01$, Bonferroni test) compared to first (or lowest) quartile of violent crime within the same quartile of %poor (top chart) or %African-American (bottom chart). $N = 0$ indicates that category contains no neighborhoods.

low birth weight, and the results are displayed in table 3.¹⁹ The coefficients in table 3 are presented as odds ratios, obtained by exponentiating the raw logistic coefficients. The neighborhood-level results for low birth weight are similar to those from the continuous birth weight models, but with two main differences. First, although violent crime is significantly associated with low birth weight before adjusting for individual-level covariates, in model 2, the association does not remain significant after introducing the individual-level controls in model 3. Exactly the opposite is true for exchange/voluntarism, which is nonsignificant before adjusting

¹⁹ Table 3 reports a percentage of variance explained statistic for each model at the neighborhood level but not the individual level because the individual-level variance component heteroscedastic in nonlinear models (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, p. 298).

TABLE 3
NEIGHBORHOOD- AND PERSON-LEVEL PREDICTORS OF LOW BIRTH WEIGHT FROM HIERARCHICAL GENERALIZED LINEAR MODELS

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Odds Ratio	t-ratio	Odds Ratio	t-ratio	Odds Ratio	t-ratio
Neighborhood						
%African-American	1.50	19.44**	1.36	11.06***	1.01	.26
%Mexican98	-1.00	.96	-2.54*	1.04	1.75
%poor families	1.07	3.77***	1.02	1.00	.98	-.57
Residential stability97	-1.67	1.01	.74	1.00	.20
In violent crime rate			1.16	4.52***	1.05	1.12
Exchange/voluntarism98	-1.38	.96	-1.95*
Race/ethnicity						
Non-Hispanic black					1.58	5.97***
Mexican origin75	-3.95***
Puerto Rican origin					1.24	2.57**
Other Hispanic origin89	-1.11
Non-Hispanic other race					1.59	5.81***
Foreign born99	-.12
Sociodemographic characteristics:						
Maternal age					1.02	5.95***
Birth order93	-6.93***
Maternal education99	-1.56
Marital status76	-7.12***
Health behaviors during pregnancy:						
Smoking					2.06	15.09***
Drinking					1.68	5.05***
N doctor visits98	-4.94***
> 20 doctor visits					1.85	4.31***

Weight gain (in pounds)98	-19.44***
Biomedical characteristics during pregnancy		
Anemia91	- 87
Diabetes49	-5.74***
Herpes	84	- 72
Hypertension	2 18	11 84***
Previous low-birth-weight baby	1.50	3.14**
Previous pregnancy termination	1.17	4.18***
Female infant	1 35	10 21***
Length of gestation50	-67.68***
Intercept09	-688.23***
%variance explained:		
Neighborhood level ..	94.61	93.57

Note.—Data are drawn from 1995-96 Chicago vital statistics, 1990 census, 1995 Chicago police statistics, and the 1995 PHDCN Community Survey

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$

for individual-level covariates, in model 2, but becomes significant after the controls are added, in model 3.²⁰ As was the case with continuous birth weight, introducing violent crime and exchange/voluntarism in model 2 mediates the effect of neighborhood poverty, and none of the structural predictors remain significant once the individual-level controls are introduced. Thus, the evidence for neighborhood mechanisms affecting low birth weight is somewhat weaker than was the case with continuous birth weight, probably because the dichotomous measure of low birth weight has a low variance and is perhaps also less reliable.²¹

Spatial Analysis

The analysis up to this point has restricted the exploration of contextual effects to the immediate neighborhood environment and ignored the wider spatial context within which neighborhoods are embedded. This stage of the analysis begins with an examination of birth weight maps. If spatial context does matter, then maps should reveal evidence of birth weight clusters, such that neighborhoods next to each other have similar levels of birth weight—that is, positive spatial association. If the maps show that birth weight is not spatially clustered, then there would be very little support for the spatial externalities hypothesis.

To indicate the extent of significant spatial clustering of similar values around a given observation, Anselin (1995a) has developed the local Moran statistic, part of a larger set of statistics called local indicators of spatial association.²² In addition to testing the significance of spatial clus-

²⁰ Further analysis revealed that the increase in the exchange/voluntarism coefficient in model 3 is related to the introduction of individual-level controls for race/ethnicity. One potential explanation for why exchange/voluntarism only becomes significant after introducing these controls is that Mexican women have the lowest rate of low birth weight of any racial/ethnic group but also live in neighborhoods with relatively low levels of exchange/voluntarism.

²¹ When model 3 is rerun using the propensity score approach described in n. 18, the effect of exchange/voluntarism becomes nonsignificant. Thus, the neighborhood-level results are somewhat weaker and less clear in the case of dichotomous low birth weight than they were with continuous birth weight.

²² The local Moran statistic is defined as $I_i = (z_i/m_i) \sum_j w_{ij} z_j$, with $m_i = \sum_j z_j^2$, where the observations z_i and z_j are standardized values of y_i and y_j , expressed as deviations from the mean (Anselin 1995a). I use Anselin's (1995b) conditional randomization approach to estimate the local Moran statistic, where the value of z_i at location i is held fixed, and the remaining values of z_j over all other neighborhoods in the city are randomly permuted in an iterative fashion. With each permutation, a new value of the quantity $\sum_j w_{ij} z_j$ is computed, and the statistic is recalculated. This permutation operationalizes the null hypothesis of complete spatial randomness. A test for pseudo significance is then constructed by comparing the original value of I_i to the empirical distribution that results from the permutation process (Anselin 1995a).

tering, the local Moran statistic can be used in tandem with the so-called Moran scatterplot typology to provide information on the nature of spatial association around any given neighborhood (Anselin 1995a, 1995b). The Moran scatterplot classifies each neighborhood based on whether it is above or below the mean on a variable, Y , and its spatial lag, WY (in this case, the weighted average value of Y in the adjacent neighborhoods), yielding the following categories: (1) "low-low" neighborhoods with low (i.e., below the mean) levels of Y that are surrounded by neighborhoods with low levels of Y (i.e., WY is also below the mean); (2) "low-high" neighborhoods with low levels of Y that are surrounded by neighborhoods with high levels of Y (i.e., WY is above the mean); (3) "high-low" neighborhoods with high levels of Y (i.e., Y is above the mean) surrounded by neighborhoods with low levels of Y ; and (4) "high-high" neighborhoods with high levels of Y that are also surrounded by neighborhoods with high levels of Y .

Figures 3–5 display maps of the Moran typology for birth weight, violent crime, and reciprocal exchange, respectively. Figure 3 shows that birth weight is strongly clustered—in fact, it has the most significant clustering of the three variables. The map is dominated by large low-low and high-high neighborhoods, both of which are forms of positive spatial association.²³ Figure 4 shows that there is also a strong pattern of positive spatial association in violent crime and that many of the so-called crime hot-spots (high-high crime areas) are in the same neighborhoods as the low-low birth weight clusters from figure 3. In fact, 91% of the neighborhoods that are in the significant high-high category on the violent crime map—the so-called crime "hot-spots"—are also in the significant low-low category on the birth weight map, while 77% of the significant low-low crime neighborhoods are also significant high-high clusters of birth weight. Figure 5 shows that reciprocal exchange is less clustered spatially than birth weight and violent crime, but there are still many significant local clusters. Also, exchange/voluntarism clusters do overlap with birth weight clusters (particularly the high-high categories of each variable), but not as much as was the case with violent crime.

There could be several reasons why birth weight is so strongly spatially clustered in figure 3. One possibility is that birth weight appears to be spatially clustered only because its predictors are also spatially clustered. For example, two adjacent neighborhoods could each have low mean birth weights because they also have high crime rates, and thus the apparent clustering in birth weight would be an artifact of the clustering

²³ Using neighborhood rates of low birth weight instead of mean birth weight generated a very similar spatial pattern. I only present the results for mean birth weight in the interest of parsimony.




FIG. 3.—Local Moran for birth weight

of crime. This hypothesis suggests that after controlling for the effects of crime and other individual- and neighborhood-level covariates in a regression model, there should no longer be significant spatial autocorrelation in birth weight. An alternative hypothesis is that even after controlling for potentially confounding neighborhood predictors in a spatial regression framework, birth weight will still be significantly spatially autocorrelated because the spatial clustering observed in figure 3 is driven by




FIG. 4.—Local Moran for ln violent crime rate

true spatial processes, such as externalities. Thus, the two adjacent neighborhoods described above may have similar levels of birth weight because crime in one of the neighborhoods actually creates stress (a negative externality) for women living in the other neighborhood, regardless of whether the latter neighborhood has a high crime rate.

These competing explanations for the spatial clustering of birth weight are tested in spatial lag regression models presented in table 4. Both the




FIG. 5.—Local Moran for exchange/voluntarism

ML and 2SLS estimates are presented for the continuous birth weight model, but only the 2SLS approach is used for the low birth weight model because the ML approach assumes normality, and diagnostic tests revealed that the adjusted neighborhood mean for low birth weight was nonnormal. The ML estimates of spatial lag dependence for continuous birth weight in model 1 confirm that there are significant spatial effects on birth weight even after adjusting for individual-level covariates (using

Spatial Dynamics of Birth Weight

TABLE 4
COEFFICIENTS FROM SPATIAL LAG REGRESSION MODELS OF CONTINUOUS BIRTH
WEIGHT AND LOW BIRTH WEIGHT (ADJUSTED NEIGHBORHOOD MEANS)

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONTINUOUS BIRTH WEIGHT				LOW BIRTH WEIGHT	
	ML		2SLS		2SLS	
	(1)		(2)		(3)	
	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE	Coefficient	SE
%African-American .	2.43	3.36	2.58	3.38	-.02	.03
%Mexican	3.01	2.04	2.89	2.05	.02	.02
%poor families	1.73	2.64	1.02	2.77	-.02	.02
Residential stability	2.37	2.28	1.55	2.43	.00	.02
ln violent crime rate	-9.16	3.57*	-7.50	3.96	.04	.03
Exchange/voluntarism	6.30	2.30**	5.46	2.47*	-.02	.02
Spatial lag term (<i>W</i> <i>y</i>)33	.07***	.53	.21*	.69	.35*
Intercept	74.69	8.18***	52.91	23.42*	-.08	.09
<i>R</i> ²24		.29		.18	

NOTE.—ML is maximum likelihood and 2SLS is two-sided least squares. Data are from 1995-96 Chicago vital statistics, 1990 census, 1995 Chicago police statistics, and the 1995 PHDCN Community Survey.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

the procedure described in note 15) and neighborhood-level covariates. Violent crime and exchange/voluntarism are the only significant neighborhood predictors of birth weight other than the spatial lag term. When the same model is estimated using the 2SLS approach, in model 2, the spatial lag effect becomes 59% larger ($\rho = .53$) and remains significant, while the violent crime rate becomes marginally nonsignificant ($P = .06$).²⁴ When the spatial lag term is introduced into the low birth weight model, as shown in model 3, none of the other neighborhood covariates remain significant. Nonetheless, the spatial effect is quite large in model

²⁴ The 2SLS approach is used to remove the correlation between *WY* and the error term of the birth weight equation. In the first-stage regression, the spatial lags of the *X* variables, *WX* serve as instruments for *WY*. Anselin (1995b) argues that the *WX* variables make ideal instrumental variables because they are strongly related to the endogenous variable, *WY* (i.e., if *X* is related *Y* in the focal neighborhood, then *WX* is related to *WY* in first-order neighbors), but they are uncorrelated with the error term in the birth weight equation because the *X* variables are already assumed to be uncorrelated with the error term, and the *WX* variables are nothing more than the *X* variables in the first-order neighbors. The 2SLS estimates are less efficient than the ML estimates, as evidenced by their higher standard errors (particularly on the spatial lag coefficient) in model 2 compared to model 1.

3 ($\rho = 0.69$), indicating that spatial externalities for low birth weight accrue mainly from unobserved factors in surrounding areas.²⁵

The ρ coefficient for the spatial lag term, WY , represents the change in a focal neighborhood's birth weight associated with a one-unit change in the birth weight of adjacent neighborhoods, and it is constrained to be between 0 and 1. The ρ coefficient also conveys information about the strength of spatial externalities, as shown in equation (2), the so-called spatial multiplier process. For example ($\rho \times \beta$) represents the effect of a one-unit change in WX on the mean birth weight of the focal neighborhood. In substantive terms, the ρ coefficient represents the rate at which spatial externalities—i.e., effects from the observed and unobserved characteristics of adjacent neighborhoods—contribute to birth weight in the focal neighborhood. For continuous birth weight, ρ is estimated to be between 0.33 (using ML) and 0.53 (using 2SLS), meaning that the total effects of observed and unobserved neighborhood-level causes of birth weight are about one-third to one-half larger when we take into account the effects of externalities from surrounding areas. For low birth weight, the effects of observed and unobserved causes in adjacent neighborhoods is an astounding 69% as large as it is in the focal neighborhood.

One drawback of the spatial lag regression model is that the ρ coefficient combines spatial effects from all of the X variables with those from the error term. To isolate the contribution that specific X variables make toward spatial externalities, it is possible to run a model that contains WX variables but no WY , as described in equation (3). However, since most of the independent variables are highly correlated with their corresponding spatial lag terms, multicollinearity is a big problem in these models.

Table 5 presents the neighborhood-level results from multilevel models of birth weight that contain a spatial lag term for exchange/voluntarism. The spatial lag for violent crime could not be included in this model because it was very highly correlated with the unlagged violent crime rate ($r = .87$), so these models include only the spatial lag for exchange/voluntarism (the correlation between exchange/voluntarism and its spatial lag is 0.67).²⁶ The results in model 1 show that although the level of

²⁵ When the models in table 4 are rerun using the propensity score approach described in note 18, the effects of violent crime and exchange/voluntarism are reduced (the latter becomes nonsignificant in models 1 and 2), but the spatial effects remain strong and significant.

²⁶ Adding the spatial lag of crime to either continuous or low birth weight model does not change the significance of any of the coefficients. The effect of lagged crime is nonsignificant, but the sign on its coefficient is in the opposite direction of violent crime in the focal neighborhood, an indication that colinearity is a problem. It was not possible to reliably estimate potential spatial externalities from any of the other neighborhood variables due to multicollinearity.

TABLE 5
NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL PREDICTORS AND SPATIAL EFFECTS FROM HIERARCHICAL MODELS OF CONTINUOUS BIRTH WEIGHT AND LOW BIRTHWEIGHT

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE	CONTINUOUS BIRTH WEIGHT				LOW BIRTH WEIGHT			
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Coefficient	t-ratio	Coefficient	t-ratio	Odds Ratio	t-ratio	Odds Ratio	t-ratio
Neighborhood.								
%African-American ..	93	.23	1.16	.29	1.01	.30	1.01	.20
%Mexican	3.86	2.15*	4.19	2.27*	1.05	2.08*	1.03	1.48
%poor families	2.50	.80	.36	.11	1.00	.04	1.00	-.09
Residential stability	1.36	.53	-.71	-.27	1.01	.43	1.02	.94
In violent crime rate	-8.50	-2.38*	-5.86	-1.59	1.05	1.10	1.03	.59
Exchange/voluntarism.								
Focal NC	4.28	1.67	4.37	1.78	.96	-1.64	.96	-1.86
First-order neighbors ..	6.86	2.55*	5.61	2.11*	.98	-.85	.99	-.48
Focal NC x first - order neighbors			6.98	3.63***			.95	-2.10*
Intercept	3,231.19	1,946.91***	3,231.05	1,961.00***	.04	-147.44***	.04	-147.88***
%variance explained:								
Neighborhood level	98.64		98.77		93.56		93.55	

NOTE: Data are from 1995-96 Chicago vital statistics, 1990 census, 1995 Chicago police statistics, and the 1995 PHDCN Community Survey

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

exchange/voluntarism in the focal neighborhood is not significantly associated with birth weight, the spatial lag of exchange/voluntarism has a positive and significant effect on birth weight, meaning that proximity to social resources is a protective factor, above and beyond the level of resources in the focal neighborhood. Model 2 adds an interaction between exchange/voluntarism and its spatial lag to the model, and it is also significant, which indicates that spatial proximity to social resources is most important when the neighborhood itself has a high level of exchange/voluntarism. Adding this interaction term to the model also reduces the effect of violent crime to nonsignificance. Models 3 and 4 present the same models for dichotomous low birth weight. Although more neighborhood variables are significant in these models, the findings on the spatial context of exchange/voluntarism remain very similar: proximity to higher levels of social resources is protective against low birth weight, and this protective effect is stronger when the focal neighborhood is also high in exchange/voluntarism.

The results from table 5 add more insight into the spatial dynamics of birth weight, by showing more clearly that neighborhood social processes produce positive spatial externalities for birth weight and that the protective effects on birth weight are multiplicative when social resources are abundant in both the focal neighborhood and surrounding areas. However, analysis of the residuals from the models in table 5 revealed that there was still residual spatial autocorrelation, meaning that the spatial lag of exchange/voluntarism does not fully capture all of the spatial processes that were estimated by the ρ coefficients in table 4.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results suggest that neighborhood mechanisms and spatial externalities are both important for understanding the influence of the social environment on maternal and infant health. One major finding is that violent crime and the combined scale of reciprocal exchange and participation in voluntary associations are the two most robust neighborhood predictors of birth weight, even after controlling for the potentially confounding individual-level covariates. These neighborhood mechanisms also appear to mediate the effects of structural factors, such as poverty and residential stability. The frequent occurrence of violent crime in a neighborhood may provoke fear and concern for safety that could induce stress among neighborhood residents, while social resources that accrue from relations among neighbors and collective engagement in local organizations provide a means of adapting to stressful aspects of neighborhood life. This is not to say that structural factors, such as the con-

centration of disadvantage, do not matter for health, but rather that they are important precursors that create conditions in which sources of stress and modes of adaptation differentially flourish.

Another major finding is that there are significant and quite strong spatial effects on both continuous and low birth weight. Even after adjusting for potentially confounding covariates at both the individual and neighborhood levels, the correlation between the mean birth weight of a focal neighborhood and that of its adjacent neighbors was estimated to be as high as 0.53 for continuous birth weight and 0.69 for low birth weight. This suggests that analysts who focus only on properties of a person's immediate neighborhood are missing potentially strong contextual influences from the wider social environment. It is difficult to pinpoint which neighborhood factors produce the strongest spatial externalities, in part because of the multicollinearity that results from strong correlations between the characteristics of a focal neighborhood and its surrounding areas, but also because some of the spatial effect is attributable to spatial externalities from unobserved factors. There is, however, evidence that neighborhoods with reciprocal exchange and participation in local voluntary associations do produce positive spatial externalities that are beneficial for the health of women not only in those areas, but also to those living in adjacent neighborhoods. Moreover, there is evidence of an interaction between the proximal and distal social environment in that the protective effect of neighborhood social processes is strongest when women are exposed to it both in their neighborhood and in surrounding areas.

These findings of both proximate and distal social environmental influences on health have three major implications for future research. First, this study calls into question the conventional strategy for analyzing social environmental effects on health, which is to collect data, usually from the census or administrative sources, on the structural composition of neighborhoods and to focus exclusively on the internal properties of a given place. These results suggest that collecting more data on neighborhood mechanisms and expanding the scope of the analysis to take geographic location more seriously would enhance our understanding of the social environment and health and perhaps lead to stronger evidence that social context does indeed matter for infant and maternal health. The same logic extends to other forms of individual health, well-being, and behavior.

Second, although the finding that there are strong spatial effects on birth weight is intriguing, more needs to be learned about spatial externalities both from a research and a public health perspective. From a research perspective, the results indicate that there are spatial processes not only in the observed *X* variables, but also in the error term, which suggests that there are potentially important sources of spatial externalities

for health that are currently unobserved. The findings also suggest something important about what these unobserved factors may be: characteristics of a wider spatial region rather than a particular area. Perhaps if we had more data on environmental features that span multiple neighborhoods—such as the physical environment, proximity to medical care, and the quality of local services, stores, institutions, and infrastructure, and social networks that cut across geographic neighborhoods—we might be able to explain more of these spatial effects, which should ultimately be the analytical goal. From a public health standpoint, understanding how and why spatial externalities occur may be critical in designing community intervention strategies. One major implication for public policy is that treating neighborhoods as “islands unto themselves” for the purposes of intervention is potentially misguided. However, the findings also have promising implications for neighborhood intervention efforts, because they suggest that if interventions can foster social processes that are protective against adverse health outcomes, they may spawn positive spatial externalities that could benefit the health of individuals in a wider geographic area.

Finally, although there have been many calls for neighborhood research to give greater attention to the microcontext of neighborhood environments, primarily by using smaller units of analysis to operationalize the idea of a neighborhood (Bond Huie, Hummer, and Rogers 2002), these findings are a reminder that research must also not neglect more macro-level concerns about the interdependence of neighborhoods and how entire regions of the city are shaped by broader social forces, such as residential segregation. In short, the idea that health outcomes in a given neighborhood may be affected by what happens in the neighborhood next door suggests new research directions that could combine both micro- and macrolevel perspectives on neighborhood environments and could add new meaning to the old real estate adage that “location matters.”

APPENDIX

TABLE A1
CORRELATIONS AMONG NEIGHBORHOOD-LEVEL COVARIATES

Variable	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. %African-American						
2. %Mexican	-.45*					
3. %poor families54*	.02				
4. Residential stability10	-.18*	-.39*			
5. ln violent crime rate75*	-.10	.76*	-.29*		
6. Exchange/voluntarism	-.22*	-.19*	-.55*	.58*	-.53*	

* $P < .001$

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Robust Identities or Nonentities? Typecasting in the Feature-Film Labor Market¹

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This article addresses two seemingly incompatible claims about identity: (a) complex, multivalent identities are advantageous because they afford greater flexibility versus (b) simple, focused identities are advantageous because they facilitate valuation. Following Faulkner, it is hypothesized that a focused identity is helpful in gaining entrée into an arena but subsequently leads to increasing limitations. The labor market for feature-film actors is analyzed via career patterns recorded in the Internet Movie Database and interviews with key informants, allowing the article to distinguish between typecasting effects and those due to underlying skill differences or social networks. Important implications are drawn for research on identity formation in various social arenas, on categorical boundaries in external labor markets, and on the actor-position interplay inherent in market dynamics.

Is it better to have a simple identity or one that is more complex? The influential notion of “robust action” suggests that assuming a narrowly

¹ Thanks to Pierre Azoulay, Rob Faulkner, Roberto Fernandez, Bob Gibbons, Paul Ingram, Eddie Lazear, Damon Phillips, Jesper Sørensen, Toby Stuart, Brian Viard,

defined identity is problematic because it lowers an actor's freedom of action (Padgett and Ansell 1993; cf. Leifer 1988, 1991; Stark 1996). As represented by Cosimo de' Medici in Padgett and Ansell's (1993, pp. 1262–65) account, actors who could potentially be associated with multiple roles or groups retain flexibility in responding to interactants whose more narrowly defined identities induce commitments to restricted lines of action. Earlier versions of this idea may be found in role theory and symbolic interactionism.² For example, Goffman (1961) introduced the concept of role distance to describe how a role occupant may demonstrate that her identity is not fully encapsulated in the role. Similarly, labeling theory (e.g., Becker 1973) is predicated on a self-fulfilling prophecy whereby the application of an (negative) identity tag to an individual restricts his ability to act in a way that is inconsistent with that attribution. Conversely, successful avoidance of a label means that one may potentially be accepted in other (positively valued) roles. Whereas simple identities introduce constraints on future courses of action, complex identities entail greater flexibility and therefore seem preferable.

But this conclusion runs counter to theories that analyze the sources of order in markets and organizational fields. As Zuckerman (1999, p. 1403) points out, common to such different perspectives as neoinstitutionalism (Meyer and Rowan 1977; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2001), White's (2002) market model, and marketing theory (e.g., Bronnenberg and Vanhonor 1996; Urban, Hulland, and Weinberg 1993) is the assumption that actors face pressure to demonstrate adherence to the forms, roles, or categories that guide valuation.³ Each of these theories implies that an actor who defies prevailing sociocognitive frames risks sowing confusion among relevant audiences, thereby producing social penalties in the form of lack of attention or outright rejection (Zuckerman 1999; see also Polos, Hannan, and Carroll 2002). As a result, actors are pressured to conform in a way that may be purely symbolic (Meyer and Rowan 1977) but may include substantive change as well (e.g., Zuckerman 2000). By trying to broaden their identity to include multiple and diverse

three *AJS* reviewers, and seminar participants at Columbia University, University of Chicago, and MIT for guidance and feedback. We also greatly appreciated Ravi Pillai's help in compiling the data set. We take full responsibility for remaining errors. Direct correspondence to Ezra Zuckerman, Sloan School of Management, MIT, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142. E-mail: ewzucker@mit.edu

² The idea that multivalence is beneficial is also related to the theme in the network and exchange-theoretic traditions that brokerage—i.e., being able to bridge between divergent constituencies—provides negotiating leverage (e.g., Burt 1980, 1982, 1992; Cook, Emerson, Gillmore, and Yamagishi 1983; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).

³ Research on role conflict and strain is also relevant here, though this literature focuses more on internal, psychological consequences faced by actors who attempt to maintain complex identities (Merton 1968, pp. 424–40; Stryker and Macke 1978).

roles, actors thus risk being devalued and even rejected. As such, it might be preferable to assume a simple, focused identity.

There are several ways one might reconcile these seemingly contradictory views. One approach is to recognize that the relative stability of a role or classificatory structure accounts for differences in the relationship between complexity and success. For example, niche width theory (Hannan and Freeman 1977; Freeman and Hannan 1982; Péli 1997; cf. Levins 1968) suggests that a generalist identity is advantageous in a volatile environment yet disadvantageous if environmental resources are stably concentrated in a single category (see also Pinch and Bijker 1987; Rosa et al. 1999). Another solution is to identify environments that support the coexistence of both generalists and specialists, as do the environments analyzed by resource partitioning theory (Carroll 1985; Péli and Nooteboom 1999; Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; cf. Peterson and Berger 1975). Yet such models are less useful for elucidating the tensions in identity construction outlined above because they treat the assignment of actors to generalist and specialist roles as unproblematic. Since actors may successfully assume a role only when accepted as a legitimate role occupant by key audiences (Stone 1962), and since role structures typically invalidate certain role transitions and combinations (see Zuckerman and Kim 2003, pp. 28–29), fundamental and opposing constraints operate on generalist and specialist identities. In particular, actors often face the following dilemma: whether the constraints that result from attempting to assume a specialist identity (that one will be consigned to an identity that is more limited than the set of roles that one could potentially play) are more or less serious than those faced by a would-be generalist (that one be regarded as too much of a dilettante to be accepted in any particular role).⁴

In this article, we erect a framework for understanding this dilemma by building on Faulkner's (1983) insights into the typecasting process

⁴ Note that the problem is potentially solved by keeping the audiences for each of one's roles separate from one another. This strategy sometimes works, but it (a) is risky because the audiences may eventually come in contact with one another, and (b) sacrifices some of the main advantages identified by Padgett and Ansell (1993). In particular, while the ability to play multiple roles to different audiences is useful as a form of hedging as in the generalists in niche width theory, one does not thereby achieve multivocality. Rather than having each audience strive to discern one's true identity in the face of multiple, contradictory affiliations and commitments, each remains ignorant of the other roles that one plays and assumes that such roles do not exist. In order to achieve the robust action described by Padgett and Ansell, one's audience must *know* that one has a complex identity and therefore be forced to guess one's "true" identity and corresponding interests. What makes such a strategy difficult is that audiences will generally avoid such guesswork and favor actors whose identities are easier to interpret.

among Hollywood composers. The phenomenon of typecasting highlights a core sociological claim about markets generally and labor markets in particular—that an actor's position in the market and the rewards associated with it cannot be reduced to individual attributes or preferences (e.g., White 1970; Sørensen 1977; Podolny 1993). In particular, typecasting is typically understood to involve a curtailment of the opportunities available to job candidates based either on social attributes such as gender (Bielby and Bielby 1992, 1996) and age (Bielby and Bielby 2001; cf. Reif and Strauss 1965) or on past work. The latter type of typecasting formed the focus of Faulkner's analysis, which stressed its double-edged nature: "It's good, because at least people make a link between the composer [and his work]. It's bad, because producers and directors tend to confuse what a composer *does* with what he *can* do" (1983, p. 79). That is, typecasting encompasses the twin implications of assuming a simple, focused identity as reviewed above. While becoming typecast introduces limitations on one's identity—often experienced as arbitrary and only loosely related to one's true skills (Faulkner 1983, pp. 78–79), it at least carries the recognition necessary for securing future work.

In the first part of this article, we follow Faulkner in developing a theoretical framework that illuminates the fundamental trade-off pertaining to the complexity/simplicity of labor-market identities. We argue that, to the extent that employers screen candidates according to recognized categories, candidates who succeed in associating themselves with one such category enjoy greater success in attracting employers' attention—even though they thereby accept significant restrictions on their future identities. Limiting oneself to a simple identity means that one will at least retain that identity in the future. Conversely, one who attempts to assume a broad identity risks losing the opportunity to have *any* standing in the market. However, once the candidate has achieved sufficient recognition to obtain a sustainable line of work in a particular category, the value of having a strong association with that category begins to be dwarfed by its cost. The question of whether simplicity or complexity is more advantageous turns on whether one has established oneself beyond the point at which a multivalent identity is construed as no identity at all.

After introducing our theoretical framework, we attempt to validate it by analyzing the labor market for actors in the feature-film industry. We summarize interviews conducted with key participants in this market, interviews that echo the themes reported in Faulkner's research on composers. In addition, our quantitative analyses allow us to gain a systematic understanding of the implications of typecasting and, more generally, how the assumption of a more or less simple identity influences future career outcomes.

Our analysis has two notable features beyond illustrating the trade-offs associated with assuming a simple versus a complex identity. First, our theoretical framework is unusual in that it posits a general process by which labor-market boundaries structure work careers. Theorists in the sociology of work have long maintained that careers are structural entities that route individuals through the labor force in characteristic patterns (e.g., Weber 1978; Hughes 1937; Spilerman 1977; Abbott and Hrycak 1990). And yet, while there has been much research on the structure of internal labor markets (e.g., White 1970; Rosenbaum 1984; Stewman and Konda 1983; Stovel, Savage, and Bearman 1996), there exist few comparable models for the external labor market—and perhaps no *general* models that posit a common structural constraint producing similar career patterns in different markets.⁵ Rather, there appears to be wide agreement that careers in the external labor market, which have apparently become more common in the contemporary economy, are relatively unstructured or “boundaryless” (Arthur and Rousseau 1996). We argue that, in fact, the tendency by employers to screen workers by category induces career lines that either remain within the boundaries of market categories or are unsustainable. Indeed, our analysis of acting careers, which play themselves out entirely in the external labor market, suggests that, for many workers, “boundarylessness” may be a significant liability.

A second noteworthy feature of our analysis is our attempt, both theoretically and empirically, to distinguish processes associated with typecasting from alternative models that imply similar empirical patterns but rely on different theoretical assumptions. One set of alternatives takes issue with our premise that a wedge may be driven between skill and identity. In particular, the two principal labor-economic models for labor turnover in the firm (see Topel and Ward 1992, pp. 440–41)—firm-specific human capital and matching—could explain attachment to labor-market categories and to the market generally. These alternatives are especially important to consider when analyzing market behavior because typecasting should emerge only when employers regard past work as an indicator of a worker’s skill. Indeed, the difficulty of adjudicating between typecasting and processes based on underlying skill differences represents in microcosm the larger challenge faced by structural sociology: to demonstrate that structural position can have causal force even though oc-

⁵ Various studies have illustrated the idiosyncratic patterns characteristic of particular professions and labor markets (e.g., Hall 1948; Smith and Abbott 1983; Abbott and Hrycak 1990; Blair-Loy 1999). In addition, structuralist approaches to labor markets have demonstrated that barriers between economic sectors govern cross-sectional differences in worker experiences (e.g., Beck, Horan, and Tolbert 1978). But there exist no general models for the sequences of shifts among jobs or sectors that govern experience in any external labor market.

cupancy of a particular position is, at least in part, endogenously determined by endowments and preferences.

While definitive tests are unavailable, our theoretical framework identifies the ways that a typecasting process differs from one based on matching or human capital. First, we argue that employers' revealed preference for specialists cannot be completely reduced to the value placed on category-specific training. Rather, it is (at least in part) a reflection of the difficulty of filtering the unskilled from the multitalented when no other indicators of skill are available. Second, we argue that employers' hiring practices systematically curtail the amount of matching that takes place and that this limits the extent to which generalists might emerge. We present empirical tests of these claims, each of which indicates the salience of typecasting processes. In addition to these tests, we also present qualitative data that strongly point to the importance of typecasting. In particular, labor-market participants on both the demand and supply sides of the market acknowledge that typecasting drives a wedge between skill and identity.

While the first set of alternative models assumes that structure can be ignored in favor of underlying skill differences, a second alternative is that structure is all that matters. In particular, one might suppose that employers in fact do not care about skill (and do not engage in typecasting as a crude attempt to discern it) but merely hand out jobs to candidates to whom they have some (preexisting) social tie. One might then hypothesize (cf. Burt 1992, 1998) that a candidate needs a focused set of ties to gain access to a stream of jobs that are located in a particular "clique" and that mobility across cliques becomes possible only once one has established such a foothold. Such an hypothesis is reasonable, and we find some evidence of it in our analysis, though it is weaker than that for the typecasting process we describe below.

Yet a more important reason to deemphasize social networks is that an account of identity construction in a given social or economic arena that relies solely on social networks-based processes will be fundamentally incomplete. Of course, it is possible in any given case that there are exogenous or "primordial" (see Zuckerman 2003a) networks that shape the observed structure (e.g., concentration in particular career paths). But it is unreasonable to assume that behavior in various domains can usually be fully reduced to the acting out of particularistic commitments. Rather, it is more productive to at least begin by considering the domain in question as a system with its own endogenous logic. In particular, the sociological study of labor markets should begin by assuming that employers in fact care about skill and take it into account in making hiring

decisions. Thus regarded, the extent of particularism becomes an empirical issue.⁶

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR TYPECASTING

Labor-Market Classification

We begin then with some observations about labor-market classification and its origins in lay theories of skill. These then serve as the foundation for our understanding of typecasting. As with product or asset markets, labor markets tend to be divided into relatively discrete categories such that competition by sellers (employees) and selection by consumers (employers) generally occurs within but not across category boundaries. Examples from professional labor markets illustrate such structures. For example, the market for physicians may be decomposed into sets of distinct market segments such that access to jobs in a particular specialty is restricted to doctors with the relevant background and training.⁷ The market for attorneys displays similar patterns, though they are somewhat looser. The critical boundary divides higher-status corporate work, which is generally open only to graduates of elite law schools, and lower-status work for individual clients, usually performed by graduates of lower-tier schools (e.g., Heinz and Laumann 1982; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001). Each of these sectors contains a wide variety of specialties, such as bankruptcy and patent law on the one hand and family and personal injury law on the other, which channel subsequent career mobility. Academic labor markets are even less well organized, though they are also subdivided in consequential ways. For example, of the 46 job openings for sociologists listed in the American Sociological Association Employment Bulletin in December 2000, 41 were restricted in terms of the area of specialization and 20 were open only to candidates in one or two fields.

Two features of these classificatory structures merit attention. First, categories are not arbitrarily constructed. Rather, as with any system of classification, categorical boundaries reflect the dominant theory of value used by labor-market participants. For example, how a society distinguishes among animals in terms of the purposes for which they may be

⁶ For instance, Granovetter's (1973, 1974) observations about the importance of weak ties in transmitting information about job opportunities are relevant for the allocation of jobs *on the margin*. Knowing about a job or having a social connection with the employer will be of limited help if the candidate's skills are significantly (though perhaps not if only somewhat) at variance with job requirements.

⁷ Physicians such as internists or pediatricians, who treat patients across a variety of categories, may be thought of as specialists who focus on a certain type of patient and on a particular link in the chain of referrals.

used—as food, as pets, or as religious totems—reflects its reigning cosmology (Douglas 1966). Similarly, the stock market's division into industry-based sectors reflects the general theory that a firm should be valued according to its earnings power together with the premise that firms in different industries experience distinct environments that shape their earnings prospects (Zuckerman 1999, 2000, 2003*b*).

In the same fashion, labor-market categories reflect dominant beliefs about the distribution of skill. To the extent that the same skills may be applied in two different areas of work, employers are unlikely to distinguish between the two categories in their hiring efforts and job candidates will not take pains to advertise their suitability for one relative to the other. Conversely, one category will be distinguished from others when it is thought to represent a skill set that is distinct from that covered by other categories. Moreover, it is at least a good first approximation to presume that a given category captures a unique combination of abilities. Accordingly, a distinct submarket exists for each medical specialty, since each requires would-be practitioners to make significant investments in specialized training and to forgo the opportunity to be trained in other specialties. By contrast, the relative permeability of categories in the sociological labor market reflects the fact that sociological skills are more readily transferable from one subfield to another.

Second, labor-market categories do not necessarily coincide with product- or service-market categories. Examples of such noncorrespondence include occupations where the work performed occurs at several removes from the buyer of the product or service. For example, while competition in the market for engineers is organized by such specialties as mechanical and electrical engineering, both types of engineers contribute to such products as automobiles or airplanes. A related point is that labor-market categories do not necessarily map into distinct locations in the division of labor. For example, employers in many different industries may hire from the same pool of unskilled workers for a wide variety of jobs. Similarly, workers who have generalist credentials, such as the MBA degree, may vie for jobs in many industries.

Emergence of Typecasting

Employers' tendency to sort skills into relatively discrete categories is necessary for (work-based) typecasting to emerge. To see how typecasting operates, we consider the interaction between employer and potential employee as an interface between a set of candidates who compete with one another to be selected by an audience (Zuckerman 1999; Phillips and Zuckerman 2001; cf. White 2002). In this role relationship, audience members engage in two ideal-typical stages of choice, which correspond to two

phases of candidate behavior. The second stage is the familiar process by which audience members (who are often represented by a market intermediary rather than by the ultimate buyer) select among competing offerings presented by candidates. Yet with the myriad of options potentially available, which offerings merit consideration? This question implies that the selection stage is logically preceded by a prior stage during which the boundaries of the competitive field are set. Audience members first identify the set of offerings that will be considered and then select from among the members of this consideration set. This two-stage process of choice on the part of the audience induces two stages of competition among candidates. First, candidates demonstrate that their offerings *conform* to the basic criteria that render them worthy of consideration; next, they labor to *differentiate* their wares from the rival offerings that have been so recognized (cf. Urban et al. 1993).

Thus, in order to be selected, a candidate must first show that she merits consideration in one of the available categories. In considering the implications of this imperative for labor markets, we must ask how employers determine whether a job candidate belongs to a given category. As with other valuation or investment situations in the context of significant uncertainty, three factors generally guide such determinations (Faulkner and Anderson 1987; Bielby and Bielby 1994; Zuckerman and Kim 2003): (a) how that candidate is perceived by others, particularly those making the same valuation; (b) the identities of the individuals and institutions that have sponsored, trained, or affiliated themselves with the candidate; and (c) the candidate's past track record. The first factor is important in understanding the decisions made by any individual evaluator, though it cannot explain the aggregate evaluation. The second factor is important in many labor markets, especially in occupations where the attainment of a particular credential establishes the candidate as having the necessary training to do the relevant work. Even if the training does not involve much preparation for the specific job to be done, the credential may still be a useful signal if the cost of acquiring it is inversely correlated with fitness for that job (e.g., Arrow 1973; Spence 1974).

However, let us assume for the present discussion that signals such as credentials and endorsements are either unavailable or weak and that employers have access to only one kind of information about job candidates: the set of jobs performed in the past that met some threshold of competence. In such a context, the third factor obviously looms large. Indeed, a short answer to the question of what it takes to be recognized as a candidate in a labor-market category is that one must already have experience in that category (or some related set of categories that involve similar or transferable skills). And more experience in the category is a stronger indicator of relevant competence. Conversely, experience in other

categories suggests incompetence at the work in question. To the extent that employers believe that labor-market categories represent distinct skills, experience in one category will be regarded as *prima facie* evidence that the candidate does not have the necessary skills to participate in another category. For instance, a qualitative sociologist who applies for an opening in quantitative sociology must contend with the perception that qualitative and quantitative sociology involve distinct skills and that experience in one field indicates that the candidate does not have the skills associated with the other.⁸ This mobility barrier is a hallmark of type-casting based on past work, which we may define as the employer's tendency to consider (and eventually hire) for jobs in a particular labor-market category only those candidates who have demonstrated competence in that category and to avoid candidates who have demonstrated competence in other categories (cf. Faulkner 1983, p. 79).

The tendency to typecast is neither irrational nor arbitrary. Rather, it reflects the general belief that labor-market categories effectively represent the distribution of skill, coupled with the practice of using past work as an indicator of underlying ability, which is typically hard to discern. Since it is generally true that sociologists are successful in either quantitative or qualitative sociology but not in both, a straightforward rule of thumb is that one screens out candidates that have experience in one area when they apply for jobs in the other. Such a heuristic is necessarily crude. Clearly, it is possible for a scholar to excel at both qualitative and quantitative sociology. But a scholar who is indeed multitalented faces an uphill battle in demonstrating her range of skills if others typecast her in the first category in which she demonstrates competence. Accordingly, as illustrated below in the case of feature-film actors, typecasting is frequently experienced as a constraint whereby one is prevented from moving beyond a single category of work.

The Problem with "Robust Action": Main Hypotheses

It would seem that a straightforward strategy for removing this constraint is to spread one's work over multiple categories from the outset. This is the approach implied by the notion of "robust action" (Padgett and Ansell 1993; cf. Leifer 1988, 1991; Stark 1996). By remaining unattached to any one category, a candidate should be less likely to be labeled in a way that limits mobility across the market. Yet the problem with this approach as a general prescription is that such a candidate could be confused with

⁸ If such an example seems far-fetched, consider instead the suspicion by which a qualitative sociologist would be met were she to apply for a National Science Foundation grant to do quantitative work

someone who remains unattached to a particular category as a consequence of failure rather than choice. To the extent that, for example, it is generally hard for scholars to excel at both qualitative and quantitative sociology, those who work in both areas risk signaling that they cannot do either at an acceptable level. Such a signal logically follows from a belief that each labor-market category represents a distinct skill. Where such a belief prevails and it is difficult to distinguish high from low performance, candidates who wish to do a variety of work face a more serious problem than the frustration of being confined to one category—the threat that their participation in multiple categories is construed as indicating that they lack the skills to perform *any* type of work.

In sum, we hypothesize that candidates who are typecast in a single category of work will generally achieve greater attachment to the labor market than those who have spread their work across multiple specialties—despite the fact that assuming a simple identity reduces chances for broadening that identity in the future. If we define a typecast candidate as one who has become recognized as possessing the necessary skills for a particular category of work, our argument includes three testable predictions:

HYPOTHESIS 1a.—*Ceteris paribus, candidates who are typecast in a given category of work will be more likely to obtain future work in that category than are candidates who are not so typecast.*

HYPOTHESIS 1b.—*Ceteris paribus, candidates who are typecast in a given category of work will be less likely to obtain future work in other categories than are candidates who are not so typecast.*

HYPOTHESIS 1c.—*Ceteris paribus, the positive effect of typecasting on obtaining work in the original category will be greater than the negative effect on obtaining work in other categories, which results in typecast actors obtaining future work at a higher rate than nontypecast actors.*

Scope Conditions and Contingency Hypotheses

These hypotheses need qualification. Clearly, their scope is circumscribed by the assumptions stated above that candidate quality is difficult to discern and that the only available information consists of the types of work the candidate has performed in the past. To the extent that either of these conditions does not hold, we should not expect the hypotheses to be valid. In particular, if skill is not difficult to evaluate or if credentials and affiliations are available to signal ability, the valuation problem that underlies typecasting—that is, the difficulty of distinguishing the multi-talented from the untalented—diminishes in salience. Typecast candidates would therefore have less of an advantage. In addition, we have implicitly assumed that a candidate's full résumé is observable by employers or

their representatives. To the extent that the candidate can present a separate résumé for each category, she may avoid emitting ambiguous cues.

It is also reasonable to expect that typecasting processes would be *more* salient in markets where the candidate and employer are separated by layers of intermediaries that seek and screen possible matches. Recent research on search firms or “headhunters” (Finlay and Coverdill 2002; Khurana 2002) suggests that the screening function that such intermediaries fulfill involves the search for generic attributes that they perceive are sought by their clients. That is, it may be more efficient for a headhunter to present employers with a set of candidates she can be very certain the employer will consider to be appropriate. She then tends to define the scope of consideration more narrowly than the employer might. Similarly, it is more efficient for candidate representatives such as talent agents to select from their portfolio of clients those who clearly fit each job rather than present employers (or their representatives) with a more complex set of options that include candidates who have less relevant experience. Thus, the intermediaries on both sides of the market likely reinforce typecasting processes that might otherwise have less of an impact.

Two additional scope conditions seem especially important. First, the hypotheses assume that the theory of skill that governs the hiring decision regards skill in one category of work as useful in that category alone. Yet employers may employ a different theory that implies a very different relationship among categories. For instance, the job categories may comprise an institutionalized career ladder that involves the accumulation of various specialist skills. Thus, a restaurateur may consider a pastry chef for an opening as a chef de cuisine because the former is regarded as a stepping-stone for the latter.⁹ Similarly, a consulting firm may seek Ph.D.’s in the sciences who have no business experience because it believes that Ph.D. training cultivates general problem-solving skills or because it feels that knowledge of the sciences may be useful in a business context. A more stark departure from the assumptions that underlie our hypotheses occurs in cases where employers seek to introduce a new culture or new work practices and they deliberately seek candidates who have no experience in the domain because past experience is believed to hinder the inculcation of new skills (see, e.g., Finlay and Coverdill 2002, p. 8; O’Reilly and Pfeffer 1995). Indeed, such practices suggest a reverse form of typecasting whereby it is assumed that old dogs cannot learn new tricks. The larger point suggested by these examples is that one must understand the

⁹ Thanks to Richard Locke for suggesting this example and for presenting the larger issue that it implies. Thanks to Vishwanath Kanda for the example of the consulting firm.

larger theory of skill that drives hiring decisions before formulating expectations about the implications of labor-market classification. Our hypotheses applies to settings in which employers believe that past work in a given category implies skill in that category alone.

A related scope condition concerns the porousness of category boundaries. Typecasting should be especially noticeable in markets (or in any submarket comprising two or more categories) where categories are used by employers to distinguish among different types of skills, but only those categories that are so used. Thus, if a label is essentially a residual or "catchall" category and does not represent a recognized skill set, it would not occasion typecasting. Furthermore, boundaries between categories that do represent a specialty must not be so sharply drawn that employers and their representatives never face the question of whether a candidate belongs in one or another category. For example, our hypotheses are probably not relevant to the market for physicians, at least after their training is over.¹⁰ Indeed, markets with sharply bounded specialties tend to involve one or more institutionalized screening processes, which work to eliminate any ambiguity as to a candidate's category by the time she reaches the market (cf. Reif and Strauss 1965, pp. 300–301). Thus, the mechanisms posited by our hypotheses should be operative only where prescreening of candidates is relatively limited and where labor-market categories involve different skills, but not so different that generalism is essentially impossible.¹¹

Finally, the possibility of generalism also raises a key contingency factor that should moderate our hypotheses: the candidate's tenure on the market. Consider our assumption that employers regard experience in other job categories as suggesting a lack of competence in the focal category. While reasonable, this preference would seem to contradict the well-known ideal of the multitasked "Renaissance man," which is often ascribed to the most highly regarded workers. Indeed, while participation in a wide array of categories potentially signals a lack of ability, it might also suggest a rare person who is especially talented. How then do em-

¹⁰ This discussion ignores the institutionalized matching system in place to match physicians with jobs. Such a system obviously makes the boundaries between specialties even more rigid than they would otherwise be.

¹¹ One might think that this scope condition builds in a circularity such that one *necessarily* finds typecasting, in the sense discussed here, in markets where generalism is uncommon but not impossible. We do not believe that this is the case. In particular, neither of the two labor-economic models discussed below would expect to find typecasting regardless of the porousness of categories. They would argue that the level of generalism that is observed reflects the distribution of relevant skill endowments and/or the optimal allocation of human capital investments. Our typecasting framework suggests that the observed level of generalism is reduced by the screening processes that govern labor-market matching.

players distinguish between the two conflicting signals (in the absence of more direct evidence)? When might a multit talented worker be recognized as such?

Faulkner's (1983) analysis of typecasting over the Hollywood composer's career helps address these questions. According to Faulkner, becoming typecast is an asset at the beginning of a career because it confers a recognizable, if category-specific, identity and thus serves as the basis for securing a sustainable line of work. Yet as the candidate moves beyond the novice stage, the question of whether he has any of the required skills recedes. At that point, the threat commonly associated with typecasting—that one will be prevented from demonstrating skills beyond one's original category—increases in salience as the candidate is more strongly identified with that category. Specialization in a single category of work by the veteran sends an even stronger signal than when sent by the novice: that one has sufficient skill to perform one type of work but not others. Conversely, the advantages enjoyed by specialists in obtaining work in their specialty should be reduced among veterans. As Phillips and Zuckerman (2001) argue, once having gained admission to a market or interface, better-established candidates (for which tenure is a proxy) can afford to deviate from the behavior that typically defines members of a given category.¹² Such deviance is especially likely in labor markets where generalists are regarded as superior to specialists because the former may often have an advantage over the latter even in a given specialty.

Thus, robust (simple) identities are more (less) valuable among veteran candidates, because employers are more likely to interpret participation in multiple categories by such workers as signifying broad skills rather than a lack of skill; employers are also more likely to interpret a veteran's specialization in a single category as indicating a narrow skill set. Accordingly, we hypothesize the following contingency effects:

HYPOTHESIS 2a.—*Ceteris paribus, the positive effect of typecasting on obtaining work in the original category is lower (greater) among veteran (novice) candidates.*

HYPOTHESIS 2b.—*Ceteris paribus, the negative effect of typecasting on*

¹² Rather than tenure, one could consider status or prestige as an indicator of how established a candidate is in a given interface, as do Phillips and Zuckerman (2001). In the present case though, the main boundary appears to pertain to the division between the large majority of actors who remain at the periphery of the feature-film labor market and those that achieve a sufficient foothold to maintain a sustainable career. Traditional measures of status in this market (e.g., billing order, Academy Award nominations) distinguish among veterans who are already so established. They also pose difficulties for use as general indicators of status because they either apply to a very few actors (Academy Awards) or do not have the same meaning across films (billing order) and therefore do not lend themselves to the construction of a general prestige hierarchy

obtaining work in other categories is greater (lower) among veteran (novice) candidates.

HYPOTHESIS 2c.—*Ceteris paribus, the overall positive effect of typecasting on obtaining future work is lower (higher) among veteran (novice) candidates.*

ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES

Typecast or Networks?

The typecasting process emphasized in our account is likely to be intertwined empirically with two related patterns. First, whereas we have argued that typecasting emerges from crude attempts to summarize a candidate's skill set, one may alternatively suppose that skill is irrelevant to labor-market identities, which are actually derived from social affiliations. In particular, a diffuse (concentrated) résumé could suggest that the candidate is an outsider (insider) to a clique or group within which jobs are handed out. Further, one could consider our contingency hypotheses as a form of the contingency argument proposed by Burt (1992, 1998), whereby an actor benefits from a social network that is high in structural autonomy only if she has established herself as an insider. Yet, if what appears to be typecasting in a given case is merely a matter of networks, that does not mean that typecasting can never be operative. Rather, the network alternative is simply a process that produces similar patterns to that generated by typecasting. Moreover, reliance on a "pure" network account of patterning in labor markets is theoretically problematic because it is obvious that labor-market participants' attempts to discern, adjust for, and invest in skill play a significant role in structuring careers. The challenge posed by the network alternative is thus purely empirical: to show that (the effects of) career structure cannot be reduced to (the effects of) network structure.

Typecast or Specialist?

A second set of alternatives to our framework is rooted in a premise that denies the importance of typecasting, entailing that career structure reflects nothing more or less than the efficient allocation of investments in human capital and of jobs to candidates.¹³ In particular, note the similarity

¹³ Note that our model of typecasting is broadly consistent with various models in labor economics that depict employers as relying on crude screening devices when it is costly to use more refined methods. For example, models of statistical discrimination (e.g., Phelps 1972; Arrow 1973; Aigner and Cain 1977, cf., Bielby and Baron 1986) posit that employers who have difficulty ascertaining a candidate's skills appeal to

between hypothesis 2b, which states that mobility barriers for typecast candidates are greater among veterans, and the observation that the hazard of a job separation decreases with tenure on the job (see, e.g., Mincer and Jovanovic 1981; Topel and Ward 1992; Farber 1994).¹⁴ Labor economists have proposed two processes that might account for the latter pattern, neither of which depends on the use of screening devices that resemble typecasting: firm-specific capital and matching. According to the former, tenure reflects greater investment in firm-specific training; such models also assume that the costs of termination for both employer and employee increase as such investments are made (e.g., Becker 1962; Parsons 1972). A matching model assumes that, even before hire, there is variation in the quality of the potential match between candidates and jobs. If it takes time for a candidate and an employer to recognize whether they are well matched (relative to alternative matches for each), this uncertainty should decrease over time, thereby reducing the hazard that either the employer or the employee will terminate the relationship (Jovanovic 1979a).¹⁵

It is not difficult to sketch an extension from these models of turnover in firms to produce a pattern consistent with hypothesis 2b. Rather than analyze attachment to one of the array of possible firms, we may consider attachment to one of the labor market's categories. In matching terms, a worker's seniority might indicate a reduction in the uncertainty regarding the match of a worker to a category. Alternatively, seniority might indicate

their membership in a recognized social category and determine job assignments based on aggregate differences in skill among the members of such categories. Perhaps more relevant to typecasting based on past work are screening models such as those presented by Greenwald (1986), McCormick (1990), and Gibbons and Katz (1991), who respectively describe the scarring or stigmatizing implications of job changing, acceptance of unskilled work during periods of unemployment, and discretionary layoffs. In addition, the "bandit models" studied by statisticians (Berry and Fristedt 1985) and introduced into economics by Rothschild (1974; see also Schmalensee 1975; McCall and McCall 1987; Bolton and Harris 1999) are germane here because they posit rational limits to the process of experimentation by which decision makers (e.g., employers) attempt to discern the underlying quality of their options.

¹⁴ The decreasing hazard of termination with tenure may follow a short initial period in which the hazard of tenure rises (see Farber 1994, pp. 590–91). This initial period of low turnover may be interpreted as a trial period during which the option value of remaining on the job exceeds the costs of reentering the labor market (see Jovanovic 1979b).

¹⁵ Jovanovic (1979a) presents an alternative matching story in which jobs are search goods rather than experience goods (cf. Nelson 1970). According to this model, it does not take time for the employer and employee to evaluate the quality of the match. As soon as a better alternative emerges, the relationship is terminated. This negative relationship between tenure and the likelihood of termination is spuriously generated as a consequence of the fact that longer-lived matches are those for which all other alternatives have been exhausted.

that more category-specific human capital has been invested in the match. By either logic, we would see a reduction in cross-category mobility among veterans.

Hypothesis 1a may also be restated in these terms. From a matching perspective, assume that each candidate cycles through the categories in the labor market until it is known which match the candidate's skills. To say that a given candidate is typecast in a given category is merely to say that she has matched in that category. Alternatively, we may say that typecast candidates are those who have received category-specific training in a particular category. And workers whose skills are best suited for a particular type of work, either owing to natural endowments or past training, should be more likely to work in that area in the future. These alternative foundations for hypothesis 1a demand consideration because they underlie the very heuristic that any account of typecasting must attribute to employers: the assumption that past work in an area indicates the possession of category-specific skills. Thus, it is possible to construct matching and human-capital models that account for typecast candidates' tendency to be rehired in the same category and for cross-category mobility to be reduced among veterans. How then may we adjudicate between these models and the framework we developed above?

Consider first what distinguishes typecasting from a pure matching process. Matching models assume that employers and employees continuously experiment with matches until the best match is found. In markets in which a worker could potentially match multiple categories of work, this means that workers cycle through the various categories until the worker and the candidate discover which set of categories constitute good matches. By contrast, the process of experimentation is limited in two ways if typecasting is operative. First, a catch-22 besets the novice: since he does not yet have any experience, he will tend to be screened out of consideration. Moreover, once a candidate achieves recognition in a given category of work, employers continue to give him work in that area but consider it too costly to try him out in other categories. *In a labor market marked by significant typecasting, employers' hiring practices systematically reduce opportunities, particularly for potential generalists.* Thus, hypothesis 1b is inconsistent with a pure matching process, particularly when applied at the beginning of a career. As long as generalism is possible, such a process means that matching with one category should not prevent a worker from having an opportunity to match with other categories: he should cycle through all categories until the full range of matches is discovered.

While a test of hypothesis 1b helps us judge whether typecasting is operative even in the presence of matching, hypothesis 2a helps distinguish

an account based on typecasting from one based on human capital.¹⁶ In human capital terms, this hypothesis implies that the value of category-specific relative to general human capital is lower among veteran workers. Yet the logic of a human capital approach would, if anything, imply the opposite (see, e.g., Neal 1998): veteran status should reflect a greater stock of the category-specific skills that make specialists more valuable than generalists.¹⁷ By contrast, our interpretation of typecasting suggests that the advantage of being typecast is reduced among veteran workers because employers are more likely to regard them as no more qualified than veteran generalists for a given job.¹⁸ This contrasts with the situation for novices, among whom generalism resembles failure or dilettantism. *In a labor market marked by significant typecasting, employers' revealed preference for specialists (at least in part) reflects the difficulty of filtering the unskilled from the multitalented.* Thus, a test of hypothesis 2a helps distinguish a typecasting process from one based on category-specific human capital.

Finally, it is useful to note what is distinctive about the felt experience of workers and employers in a labor market governed by typecasting. *In a labor market governed either by matching or human capital processes, there should be little reason for candidates and (especially) employers to*

¹⁶ One might also claim that hypothesis 2a is inconsistent with a matching account. However, it can be made consistent with matching by making the following reasonable assumptions. First, there are three types of workers in terms of their natural endowments: the unskilled, the singly skilled or specialists, and the multiskilled or generalists. Second, as the matching process unfolds, the unskilled are eliminated from the market, leaving specialists and generalists. Under these assumptions, typecast candidates should be more likely to obtain future work than those who are not typecast because the latter group includes both skilled and unskilled people. But if the matching process has already followed its course—that is, if the candidates are veterans—this effect will disappear because the only workers who remain are those who have the required skills. Note, however, that this hypothesis is consistent with a matching process only if we assume that generalism is possible. If we prefer to assume that generalism is impossible—an assumption that would make hypothesis 1b consistent with matching—there would be no bases for postulating hypothesis 2a. Hypotheses 2a and 1b are thus mutually inconsistent in matching terms.

¹⁷ There are interesting exceptions to this. Consider, e.g., a field such as engineering in which one's knowledge quickly becomes outdated. There may also be an aging effect such that older workers are regarded as less fit for the job (see, e.g., Bielby and Bielby 2001). However, we restrict attention here to the beginning of actors' careers, where such skill atrophy is unlikely to be operative. Thanks to Ron Burt for pointing out this possibility.

¹⁸ Hypothesis 2a might be made consistent with a human capital account if we relax the assumption that category-specific skills are important. However, this would imply that hypothesis 2b, which implies greater limits on inter-category mobility among established specialists, could not hold. Thus, just as a matching approach cannot simultaneously imply both hypotheses 1b and 2a, a human capital approach cannot imply both hypotheses 2a and 2b.

complain. These processes ensure that workers will (eventually) be paired with the jobs for which they are suited or which are most efficient in how human capital investments have been allocated. Moreover, even if we think that workers will generally be dissatisfied because they overvalue their talents or hold weak bargaining positions relative to employers, we would expect employers to be satisfied with the results of these processes. By contrast, participants in a labor market governed by typecasting are more likely to express feelings of alienation from the labor-market identities to which they have been assigned. Indeed, even employers may recognize that they use past work as a crude screening mechanism, which thereby limits the opportunities for candidates to broaden the type of work they may perform.

In the following, we analyze typecasting in the feature-film labor market in an effort to test the hypotheses delineated above regarding the implications of robust versus simple identities. In addition, we try to distinguish the typecasting story from those implied by matching and human capital perspectives by examining each of the distinguishing elements discussed above: the extent of the experimentation that takes place; whether there is a reduction in the advantages of typecasting/specialism among veteran candidates; and the felt experience of labor-market participants. First, we describe the labor market and interviews we conducted with key informants. Second, we analyze the aggregate degree of concentration of work in acting careers by film genre. Finally, we present logit models that predict the likelihood of future work (in a given genre) based on the degree of genre-based concentration.

TYPECASTING IN THE FEATURE-FILM LABOR MARKET

Choice of Feature-Film Market

Several considerations motivate our choice of the feature-film labor market as the setting for our analysis. First, this labor market falls within the scope conditions delineated above: skill is difficult to discern, as it is for performances in any cultural industry; the boundaries among categories (generally discussed in terms of genre) are salient but not so sharply defined that generalism is impossible; and the relevant credentials or institutional affiliations (e.g., graduation from an acting school) are relatively unimportant. Another key feature of the market, which reflects such low institutional barriers to entry, is that it includes a very large pool of peripheral participants who vie to establish a foothold in the industry. Thus, the issue that forms the basis for our main hypotheses—how the novice may gain a foothold in the market—is quite relevant. Indeed, while typecasting is most often associated with the difficulty faced by various

stars to broaden the range of roles they play (e.g., Jimmy Cagney's desire to shed the tough guy image and to star in a musical [McCabe 1998]), the role of typecasting in facilitating entry into the industry by unknown actors is less commonly recognized.

As illustrated in figure 1, the highly mediated nature of this labor market, which constitutes a "brokerage system of administration" (DiMaggio 1977), is bridged by talent agents (or managers), who represent the seller (actor) and casting directors (CDs), who are retained by the employer (producer and director). Except for the biggest stars (whose participation in the film project may even precede the hiring of a CD) or for low-budget, nonunion productions, these brokers mediate the relationship between buyers and sellers. In general, a CD, who may be an employee of a production company or an independent contractor, is generally given responsibility for finding actors to fill the roles in a film. CDs make openings known to talent agents and managers, who present clients that they think will fit with one of the available roles.

A second motivation for studying the feature-film labor market is that it provides an opportunity to examine the constraints that shape market-based careers. Since jobs under the "short-term production system" (see Faulkner and Anderson 1987) are contracted almost entirely via the market, we may investigate whether such careers really are "boundaryless" (Arthur and Rousseau 1996) or are more structured, in the manner of careers within internal labor markets (e.g., Stovel, Savage, and Bearman 1996; Rosenbaum 1984; Stewman and Konda 1983). A third and final reason for choosing this labor market is pragmatic: owing to the great demand for information about the feature-film industry, comprehensive data are available on the hundreds of thousands of actors who have ever acted in a feature-length film.

Background: Key Informant Interviews

While information on the market for acting services is abundant, we sought to gain greater insight by interviewing key informants. In the first of two waves of interviews, conducted in autumn 2000, we interviewed three agents, four CDs, ten individual actors, and a group of four student actors. The actors we interviewed spanned the gamut of career success, from Academy Award winners to novices. All respondents had careers based in film, television, or both. Most interviews were approximately 20 minutes in length and followed the same, loosely structured format. In a small subset of interviews (one agent, one CD, and three actors), interviewees were given more time to give in-depth answers, and these interviews were up to 1.5 hours in length.

The image of typecasting that emerged from these interviews resonated




FIG. 1 —The market for acting services: principals and intermediaries

strongly with what Faulkner (1983) found among Hollywood composers. In particular, most participants recognized both advantages and disadvantages to being typecast, with the former predominating before an actor becomes established. It appears to be widely recognized that typecasting plays an important role in developing a preliminary body of work that allows an actor to get a foothold in the industry. Without an initial set of credits to an actor's name, she has difficulty obtaining membership in the Screen Actors Guild, representation by an agent, and the attention of CDs. In short, typecasting provides a route into the industry by conferring the minimum level of recognition necessary to continue to obtain work, even if this recognition involves the adoption of a circumscribed identity. Thus, one talent agent pointed out that "in show business, most actors and actresses only get 15 minutes of fame. Being typecast is a way . . . to extend those 15 minutes into a possible career. I'd swear by typecasting, especially just starting out. Typecasting can be just like a foot-in-the-door. It's great to be known and consistently hired."

A casting director expressed the advantage of typecasting in similar fashion: "An actor can be more comfortable or more interested in a particular character or playing a personality type. If he ends up successful with that part, it's hopefully easy to get steady work because people know what you can do."

Various actors echoed this sentiment in response to the question of what are the benefits of typecasting to an actor's career. For example, one said that "a major benefit, at first blush anyway, . . . is recognition. You are a known quantity. People know what you can do, what you are good at. It comes down to the elimination of risk. An actor becomes typecast because he is good at playing a character." Another actor reported that "you'd immediately come to mind to whomever was doing the hiring—producer, director, casting agents, et cetera—assuming the role was there, of course."

While informants generally described the advantages of typecasting in gaining initial recognition, a consensus prevailed that typecast actors were limited in the opportunities they are given to obtain roles that are "against type." As one well-known actress told us, "Without great effort, I don't believe you can break out of a typecast once it's been established." Most of the actors reported that this limitation is felt acutely because they grow bored from repeatedly playing the same kinds of roles. They also generally consider actors who have succeeded in "breaking" a typecast as the most successful. Jim Carrey's success in broadening his repertoire to include dramatic as well as comedic parts was the most commonly cited example. At the same time, several informants acknowledged that many of Hollywood's most successful actors were typecast (Lucille Ball, Jerry Lewis, and Harrison Ford were common examples), and they also cited many

examples of actors who were failures at broadening the range of characters they played. Sylvester Stallone, who had acted against his action image in several comedies and dramas, was often mentioned as an example of the latter. Informants also cited numerous examples of actors who had never received an opportunity to play roles that departed from the ones in which they had originally become typecast.

Our interviews highlighted two related aspects of typecasting among actors that are not present in many other markets, including the one for Hollywood composers studied by Faulkner (1983). First, while the CD or director may make the hiring decision, this choice is influenced by consumer reaction. This is thought to play a particularly important role in the constraints experienced by stars, whom the public seems unwilling to accept in roles that go against type (see Goldman 2000). Second, in addition to typecasting based on roles played in the past, informants emphasized the importance of physical appearance as a basis for typecasting. More generally, societal stereotypes get enacted in casting decisions because it is assumed that audiences prefer to see characters and behavior consistent with such stereotypes. One might thus conjecture that constraints against playing multiple roles may be stronger in this industry than in some others because they are partly shaped by societal stereotypes as to what type of person belongs in a particular role. As one novice actress reported, "Because I am a large, black woman . . . I will always play someone's mother, someone poor, the neighbor. Shakespeare? Yeah, right. Next!" Physical characteristics mentioned by respondents as being the basis for typecasting included various visible ethnic identities, blond hair (on actresses), age, size, and scars.

The most intriguing finding from our initial wave of interviews was the tendency for CDs to describe the typecasting process in terms that were quite similar to those used by actors and talent agents. As argued above, there would be no reason for labor-market participants, and especially employers, to express any ambivalence if typecasting were simply a reflection of an efficient process of labor-employer matching or of the allocation of human capital investments. One CD was particularly outspoken in describing the CD's role in perpetuating typecasting:

It's hard all the time to, you know, be open-minded about everything. I think we're all *guilty* of, you know, playing the typecasting part, for sure . . . It's an advantage on one side of it just because . . . timing-wise it just helps to know that there's people out there that can fit certain characteristics. And you know on the other side, the disadvantage is you're not giving the people that are typecast a chance to try something different. (It's) not necessarily (a disadvantage to me though). It's a disadvantage to the actor (*italics added*).

In summer and autumn 2001, we conducted 13 additional interviews with CDs to get a better understanding as to whether the quoted CD's sense of guilt and her recognition that typecasting placed limits on actors' careers were widespread. These interviews did not constitute a representative sample of CD opinion. At the same time, a considerable range of views was expressed, and several noteworthy themes emerged. First, virtually all the CDs that we interviewed saw typecasting as a real phenomenon that restricts actors' ability to find work in a wide array of jobs. Even the three CDs who were least sympathetic to actors acknowledged that typecasting is a barrier that demands considerable effort to overcome.¹⁹ Generally, the other CDs differed not on whether there are extensive barriers associated with typecasting (as well as the advantages in the form of recognition at the outset of an actor's career, which virtually all acknowledged), but on whether these barriers should be construed as unfair. On the one hand, five informants answered in the affirmative when we asked them whether actors were right to "complain that being typecast prevents them from exhibiting or developing the full range of their talents." As one such CD explained, "Sure. . . . The problem is that no movie wants to be the test ground that an actor/actress uses to learn skills. If I were a business exec in charge of movie investment, I would want to minimize my risks and hire people who could play the roles perfectly."

The remaining five CDs used similar language to depict typecasting as a feature of the "business" that actors needed to accept and that, rather than complain, they needed to work harder (by turning down typed roles, getting additional training, or taking stage roles) if they want to overcome it. Perhaps most representative of this view was the 26-year veteran of the industry who said that actors' complaints about being prevented from exhibiting or developing their talents "[may be] valid, but then again it's their career, not the agent's, not the casting director's. If all they are being offered is the same parts over and over again, then it's time to turn them down and maybe take a small role in a big picture. . . . It's their career, they have to take control."

¹⁹ One such CD said, "Most actors are hacks. In movies and in life, those people who complain about the lack of opportunity most often deserve nothing more." Yet the same CD also answered emphatically in the affirmative (and gave an example) when asked if he had "ever been involved in a situation where [he] felt that an actor had been unfairly denied a role due to typecasting." A second CD said, "Most actors have limited themselves . . . by not putting in the effort . . . Everyone has limitations, but they can be worked within to expand opportunity." At the same time, this CD noted that the drawback of typecasting to an actor "is that for other roles, the actor won't even be considered." Finally, a third CD, who said that "if they were really talented, they wouldn't be typecast to the point that they couldn't develop further as actors," also conceded that typecasting has "drawbacks [that] come when an actor wants more variety in acting jobs and can't get them."

At the same time, this CD said,

[I've] been involved in a situation where I felt that an actor had been unfairly denied a role due to typecasting . . . more times than I even think about. I once worked on a picture where the actress I presented from the day I started was who I wanted for the lead. . . . I pushed and pushed and they resisted and resisted. She did not get the role even though the part was written with her name all over it. Now, she wins awards almost every year. But they didn't think she could be sexy or believable. An actor has to prove themselves every day, sometimes through their work or by other means. But typecasting will go on as long as there are people making the decisions.

To summarize, our interviews with key informants in the feature-film labor market suggests that typecasting acts as a double-edged sword here just as it does in the labor market for Hollywood composers (Faulkner 1983) and as expected by our theoretical framework. The advantages of typecasting consist largely in the foothold that it provides to aspiring actors by giving them a viable, if circumscribed, identity to assume. The main drawback is that the identification with a particular character often prevents typecast actors from being considered for other roles. We have also seen that this view of typecasting is common even among representatives of the purchasers of acting services. It is striking that many CDs recognize typecasting as posing constraints on actors' careers. While this does not provide definitive proof that a typecast identity cannot be reduced to underlying skills, it strongly suggests that (a) employers' tendency to use crude screening devices systematically limits the experimental process assumed by matching models; and (b) in addition to any value attributable to category-specific training, employers' seeming preference for specialists reflects the difficulty of discerning generalist ability.

ANALYTIC STRATEGY

Data Set

We use data from the Internet Movie Database (IMDB) to test our hypotheses. Our analytic strategy is to investigate the implications of an actor's degree of concentration in a particular genre during a defined period of time (1992–94) on the future likelihood that she will work in that genre and other genres during 1995–97.²⁰ We focus on the probability

²⁰ We adopted this time frame for several reasons. First, we wanted contemporary data so that the dynamics captured by our interviews would speak to our quantitative results. In addition, box-office data are limited before the mid-1990s. Yet the time frame is not so recent that we could not observe the consequences for an actor's career

of obtaining work because it is a career outcome that is easily measurable, is desired by all actors, and is in fact achieved by a small minority of them. Only about 30% of the actors who appear in (a credited role in) films released over 1992–94 have ever done so again. This skewed distribution of participation in the industry, which has been noted by Faulkner and colleagues (Faulkner 1983; Faulkner and Anderson 1987), provides powerful evidence that matching processes are limited in this labor market: it can hardly be said that actors are cycled through different types of roles to find the best match.

Several additional aspects of our approach should be noted. First, while appearance-based typecasting is reportedly very common, we do not examine it here for two reasons: (a) it is less relevant to other labor markets and social arenas than is typecasting based on past work; and (b) IMDB data do not include the textured data on appearance that would be necessary to conduct such an analysis. However, it is reasonable to assume that, to the extent that we find a given actor specializes in a particular genre, this is at least partly due to particular aspects of her appearance that are considered to be suited to that type of film. Second, a significant drawback to our analysis is that, while the IMDB data include information on jobs performed, they do not include offers made. This is potentially problematic insofar as a failure to obtain work (in a particular genre) could reflect a decision not to accept jobs that were offered. However, based on our interviews, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that actors generally wish to continue working and to broaden their careers beyond a restricted set of roles. A third and related issue is that we do not have data on how casting directors and others view the actors and thus cannot construct direct measures of labor-market identity, typecast or otherwise. We instead measure the degree to which an actor has concentrated in a particular genre and assume that greater concentration is associated with a greater likelihood that the actor is regarded as having demonstrated competence in that genre. This assumption makes it particularly important that we try to distinguish the typecasting process from those based on matching and human capital, which would interpret concentration of candidates in particular categories somewhat differently.

Finally, we assume that the genre categories used by IMDB may usefully proxy for the labor-market categories by which actors are classified and in which they may potentially be typecast. That is, we use genre to measure role. As pointed out earlier, it is often problematic to assume that

over more than a year or so (we found similar patterns when we examined our dependent variables over a five-year period). Finally, a three-year period offered the advantage of a relatively short snapshot of an actor's career but not so short that there would be few actors who had worked in enough films to produce variation in our concentration variables.

product categories correspond to skill categories because there are many instances in which multiple types of work contribute to a given product. At the same time, it seems likely that many film roles are associated with particular genres. The question then becomes, How reasonable is it to assume, for purposes of this analysis, that genre may represent role? We must address this issue before analyzing the relationship between specialization and future career outcomes. In particular, we must examine the extent to which actors' careers tend to be significantly concentrated in particular IMDB genres. Insofar as careers occur within genres, this will give us greater confidence in the use of genre categories as proxies for categories in the market for acting services. Further, since the assignment of works of art to genres is necessarily subjective (DiMaggio 1987), this analysis gives us greater confidence that the IMDB assignments are reasonable approximations for those in use by industry participants.²¹

Concentration in Actors' Careers: Genres and Networks

For this analysis, we use information from IMDB on all credited actors in a given film, the year it was completed, and the various genres (up to five) that it was assigned by IMDB. We restrict our data set to films in which speaking parts were primarily in English, and we exclude all films in the adult-film industry. We divide the data into three-year periods. We then assess, for each genre in every period, whether work in that genre was concentrated among a smaller number of actors than would be expected to occur under random assignment of actors to genres. This approach involves the following steps. First, for actor a in film f in year y , a dummy variable is computed that indicates whether the role was in the genre under consideration: $D_{afy} = 1$ if one of the genres assigned to film f is the genre under consideration, and $D_{afy} = 0$ otherwise. The total number of roles in which the actor was cast in that genre over the three-year period is thus:

$$g_a = \sum_y^3 \sum_f^F D_{afy},$$

where F is the total number of films in year y . Note that, because most films are assigned to multiple genres, the same film role may increase the

²¹ Genre classifications as well as all other information on IMDB are produced in a collaborative process among a community of on-line film enthusiasts who make contributions and corrections according to the information at their disposal.

g_a for multiple genres. Next, a Herfindahl score is generated over the three years:

$$H = \sum_a \left(\frac{g_a}{G} \right)^2,$$

where G is the total number of roles in movies that were classified in that genre over the three-year period. The Herfindahl score for any genre should be much lower than that observed in industry market shares—after all, one actor cannot obtain a large share of all the roles in most movies, let alone in all the movies in a genre. Moreover, the Herfindahl scores of various genres cannot be compared in a straightforward way because a genre that has many films assigned to it and, hence, many roles associated with it, will generally have a lower Herfindahl score. However, it is possible to ascertain whether the observed level of concentration for each genre is significantly greater than that which can be attributed to random chance. To do this, we take 1,000 samples of each D_{fy} vector, randomly matching actors with roles within each of the three years. For each sample, we calculate a Herfindahl score based on the random vectors, thus generating a sampling distribution against which we may compare the observed score. For example, the observed Herfindahl for the Action genre over the years 1992–94 was 0.01289. While this number appears to be quite low, it exceeds the mean Herfindahl of the 1,000 random samples, which was 0.01184. Indeed, in none of these random samples was the Herfindahl score as high as the observed score. The extent of the departure from random chance can be compared through the following Z-score:

$$Z = \frac{H - \mu}{\sigma},$$

where μ is the mean Herfindahl and σ is the standard deviation taken over the 1,000 random samples. Since σ in the case of the Action genre was 0.0000399, the difference between the observed Herfindahl and the mean of the random samples (0.00105) is actually quite high, as indicated by its Z-score of 26.16.

Table 1 presents the results from this procedure for all 17 genres applied by IMDB to the period 1992–94. Several interesting patterns emerge from this table. First, we observe significant concentration among all but four genres. Excluding Film Noir, which did not have enough roles during this period to obtain meaningful results, the average Z-score obtained by the genres was 7.8. Thus, the labor market for feature-film actors appears to be significantly structured by genre. In addition, there is interesting variation across genres in their degree of concentration. Notably, despite the fact that it was the largest genre during this period, Drama does not

TABLE 1
DEGREE OF CONCENTRATION OF FILM ROLES FOR 17 GENRES IN ENGLISH-SPEAKING FEATURE FILMS, 1992-94

GENRE	% MOVIES (N = 2,253)	% ROLES (N = 68,003)	OBSERVED HERFINDAHL	RANDOM HERFINDAHLs			Z-SCORE
				Mean	SD	% High as Observed	
Drama	34.29	39.82	.00796	.00797	.00004	64.7	-.36
Comedy	27.64	33.47	.01014	.00939	.00005	0	13.95
Action	20.4	20.92	.01661	.01402	.00009	0	28.64
Thriller	18.45	16.75	.01853	.01659	.00011	0	18.39
Romance	7.95	9.74	.02669	.02585	.00016	0	5.20
Horror	7.67	6.28	.04048	.03892	.00027	0	5.76
Science fiction	6.19	5.38	.04786	.04496	.00030	0	9.60
Crime	4.11	5.17	.04831	.04640	.00031	0	6.07
Adventure	5.35	4.51	.05528	.05272	.00033	0	7.66
Mystery	2.41	2.88	.08208	.08164	.00061	25.8	.72
Documentary	5.61	1.82	.1354	.1273	.00072	0	11.33
Western	1.46	1.8	.1367	.1314	.00089	0	5.47
War	1.24	1.7	.13918	.13589	.00094	.3	3.51
Children	1.5	1.58	.15772	.14680	.00082	0	13.28
Fantasy	1.37	1.5	.15562	.15351	.00099	2.1	2.13
Music78	.63	.35971	.36189	.02409	100	-.90
Film noir	33	.17	NA	NA	NA	NA	NA

represent a salient category in the labor market for actors—at least, as it is measured by IMDB. By contrast, several genres display significant concentration despite their small size. This underscores the general point that the mere existence of a categorical label does not mean that it is understood to capture a distinct set of skills such that it should be expected to structure careers.

While our analysis below focuses on the contemporary film labor market, it is instructive to observe how the patterns observed in table 1 have changed over time. Figure 2 presents historical patterns for four notable genres—Western, Action, Drama, and Comedy. The figure charts both the proportion of all roles that were associated with a given genre and the Z-score for the difference between the observed Herfindahl and the mean of the random samples for the three-year periods that ended in 1954, 1959, 1964, 1969, 1974, 1979, 1984, 1989, and 1994. A comparison of the trends for Western and Action suggest the rise of one genre and its replacement by a second. In 1954, the Z-score of 43.6 obtained by the Western genre was by far the highest of all genres, with the second highest obtained by Comedy (10.55). Over the next 40 years, the Western genre declined both in its share of film roles and in its degree of concentration while the Action genre saw a steady rise on both counts. Yet note that Action had a significant Z-score (4.3) in 1954, when it accounted for only 3.27% of all film roles, while Western had a significant Z-score (5.86) in 1994, when its share of roles was just 1.8%. This illustrates that what determines the level of concentration in a genre is less the sheer size of the genre than whether it captures patterns in actors' careers. The contrast between Comedy and Drama reinforces this point. While 20% to 40% of all roles are typically in one or both of these genres, Comedy has historically displayed a high level of career-based concentration while Drama has not.

Finally, we consider how concentrated were actors' careers during 1992–94 in terms of their relationships with particular directors.²² As discussed above, it is possible that genre-based typecasting actually reflects the presence of social boundaries around cliques of actors and directors (who may focus on the genre). A necessary condition for this to be true is that there be significant concentration in actors' tendency to work with particular directors. To calculate such concentration, we use a variant of

²² Unfortunately, data on casting directors are not available. However, since we do not believe that casting directors specialize by genre—whereas directors clearly do evince such specialization—we believe that the actor-director network is more likely to produce observed patterns of genre-based concentration.




FIG. 2.—Size and aggregate concentration of four genres, 1954–94

the procedure deployed above. First, we calculate a Herfindahl score for the actor's concentration of work with a small set of directors,

$$hd_a = \sum_d^D \frac{w_{ad}^2}{N_a},$$

where a indexes actors, d indexes directors, w_{ad} is the number of films directed by d in which a appeared, and N_a is the total number of films in which a appeared. We then take the mean Herfindahl over all actors in the sample to generate our measure of aggregate concentration of relationships with particular directors:

$$HD = \frac{\sum_a hd_a}{A}.$$

The observed score for this measure is 0.8872, which suggests a very high level of concentration. However, since 80% of the 32,141 actors in our 1992–94 sample appeared in only one film, they all have an unmeaningful concentration score of 1. It is, then, more informative to observe the level of concentration when controlling for the number of films in which actors appeared, as presented in table 2. As may be expected, the level of concentration declines with increases in the number of films in which she appeared. However, at each number of films, the mean Herfindahl exceeds what would be observed were actors to work with a different director in every film ($1/N_a$). To test whether the observed concentration in actor-director ties significantly exceeds what would be found through random pairings, we follow a similar resampling procedure to that used for genre-based concentration.²³ In particular, we conduct 1,000 random permutations of the actor-director vectors for each of the three years under observation and compute HD for each iteration. Results from this method revealed that the observed concentration in the actor-director network significantly exceeded the level that could be due to random chance (mean sample: $HD = 0.8831$, $SD = 0.0354 \times 10^{-3}$, $Z = 114.447$). This finding reinforces the need to control for such network ties in our analysis of the

²³ It might appear that, since the observed level of concentration is always within two standard deviations of the sample mean, it is not significant. However, the distribution of hd_a is not normal, but skewed with a structural limit at $1/N_a$. In addition, $1/N_a$ is not an appropriate criterion, because it assumes that there are as many directors as there are films. One reason there would be concentration greater than $1/N_a$ is that directors are associated with multiple films. Hence the need for the bootstrapping procedure that avoids making parametric assumptions and takes into account the observed distribution of films per director.

TABLE 2
CONCENTRATION IN WORK WITH DIRECTORS BY NUMBER OF
FILMS, 1992-94

<i>NF</i>	<i>N</i> (Actors)	HERFINDAHL		<i>1/NF</i>
		Mean	SD	
1	25,613	1.000	.000	1.00
2	3,599	.526	.005	.5
3	1,330	.360	.006	.333
4	687	.268	.003	.25
5	312	.220	.007	.2
6	159	.183	.002	.167
7	91	.162	.007	.143
8	57	.137	.001	.125
9	29	.129	.002	.111
10	15	.105	.000	.10
11+ . . .	27	.093	.001	.081

effect of typecasting on career outcomes.²⁴ In particular, we must make sure that actors who are presumed to be categorized in a particular genre are not simply connected to a director (or, more generally, to an employer) who specializes in that genre.

HYPOTHESIS TESTS

The previous analysis demonstrates that there has been and continues to be a significant degree of concentration in feature-film careers by genre (as measured by IMDB), although the degree of concentration varies by genre. This gives us greater confidence that we may use the IMDB data to test the hypotheses stated above, at least for the more structured genres. In particular, we seek to verify whether actors whose past work displays a high level of concentration in a given genre are (a) more likely to obtain work in that genre in the future; (b) less likely to obtain work in other genres; and (c) more likely to obtain work in general because the first effect outweighs the second effect. We also examine whether these effects interact with an actor's tenure such that the advantages of concentration are greater for novices and the disadvantages greater for veterans.

²⁴ It is tempting to conclude from the size of this Z-score relative to those in table 1 that network-based concentration is greater than genre-based concentration. Such a conclusion would be premature, however, because the genre-based Z-scores apply to each genre but not to the overall level of genre-based concentration. Note as well that an analysis of the latter is made difficult by the tendency for films to be assigned to multiple genres (whereas there is a single director for each film).

The Models

We present results from two types of models. First, we estimate logit models that predict whether an actor who found work in any of the years 1992–94 (“the current period”) will work during 1995–97 (the “next period”). These models take the following form:

$$\ln\left(\frac{p}{1-p}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \cdots + \beta_n x_n + \beta_{n+1} v + \beta_{n+2} c + \beta_{n+3} v^* c + \epsilon,$$

where p is the probability of obtaining work in a film during the next period; x_1, \dots, x_n represents a set of control variables measured in the current period; v is a dummy variable for veteran status in the current period—specifically, whether the actor had appeared in any films released prior to 1992; and c is the actor’s maximum concentration score across the largest and most significant genres during the current period, as described below. The last two terms of the equation allow us to test hypotheses 1c and 2c: we expect concentration to increase the probability of obtaining work in the future and for that effect to be significantly reduced for veterans. Preliminary analyses revealed that a simple dummy denoting whether the actor worked in a film released prior to 1992 is a better predictor of obtaining future work than is any other specification of tenure that we have estimated, which included a model with linear, quadratic, and cubic terms. This reinforces our claim that the key challenge for most actors involves gaining a foothold in the industry beyond participation in a single film or period.

In addition to the binomial logit models, we also estimate multinomial logit models that divide future work between roles that occur in a genre of interest and those that are in films assigned to other genres. These models, which help us to test hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2c, take the following form (where $i = 1, 2$):

$$\ln\left(\frac{p_i}{p_0}\right) = \beta_0 + \beta_1 x_1 + \cdots + \beta_n x_n + \beta_{n+1} v + \beta_{n+2} c^G + \beta_{n+3} gc + \beta_{n+4} v^* gc + \epsilon,$$

where p_0 is the probability of not working in a film released during the next period; where p_1 is the probability of working during the next period in one or more films, at least two-thirds of which were classified in genre g ; where p_2 is the probability of working during the next period in one or more films, more than one-third of which were not classified in genre g ; where c^G is the actor’s maximum concentration score across the largest and most significant genres during the current period, but excluding genre g ; and where gc is a measure of an actor’s concentration in genre g during

the current period. We expect results from this model to reveal that concentration in a given genre increases the odds of p_1 versus p_0 and reduces the odds of obtaining p_2 versus p_0 ; further, the positive effect on p_1 should outweigh the negative effect on p_2 . We also expect the slope for each equation to be more negative among veteran actors. Finally, we examine whether there is evidence of a negative effect of concentration on p_2 even among novice actors, which would provide compelling evidence that matching processes are limited, at least with respect to the genre in question.²⁵

A note on selection.—One could object that our models are beset by a selection problem. Since veterans have already survived through one or more periods, they are likely to be different from novices on some unmeasured dimensions. In particular, it is possible that whereas novices include both skilled and unskilled actors, veterans are likely to include only the skilled. However, this is precisely our interpretation of the difference between veteran and novice: that while the latter may potentially be regarded as unskilled, the former are less at risk of such a perception. We believe employers (directors or casting directors) to be suspicious of novices because they have yet to be subject to the selection processes that presumably cull the skilled from the unskilled. Whether such selection processes efficiently remove the chaff and preserve only the wheat is a separate matter. Thus, rather than being a problem, selection effects are precisely what we wish to measure with the dummy variable for an actor's veteran status.

Control Variables

We include six control variables in all models, each measured during the current period. These are the natural logarithm of the number of films to which the actor was credited, the most recent year that a film featuring the actor was released, the highest billing that the actor received in any of her films, the square root of the highest box-office gross (in millions) of the actor's films, the actor's concentration of work with particular directors, and the actor's level of concentration in the documentary genre. The last variable is included because participants in a documentary are typically not dramatic actors and thus are unlikely to have career lines that resemble those of other actors.

Measurement of each of the first two variables is straightforward. The

²⁵ Note that a potentially appealing modeling framework—estimating a single equation for the probability of appearing in each of the IMDB genres—is not available to us. Since each film may be (and typically is) classified in two or more genres, this makes it impossible to partition the likelihood into mutually exclusive categories.

box-office variable is also unproblematic. Note however that we code as having a box-office gross of zero all films for which box-office data are missing in the IMDB files. We make this imputation because, under the period under study, the absence of box-office data indicates that the film was not exhibited at theaters but probably released straight to video or some other nontheatrical release. Approximately one-third of the actors in our sample appeared in a film that had no recorded box-office data. Thus, while we remove skewness from the number of films in which an actor appeared by logging it, we achieve the same objective with the box-office gross variable by taking its square root because this transformation allows those films with a box-office gross of zero to take on a defined value.

In measuring the prominence of an actor's roles, we use information from IMDB on the order of the casting credits at the end of a film. Specifically, we take the first position that an actor was listed in any of the films released during the current period. In general, the actor playing the lead role will appear first, and so on. This variable is measured with some degree of imprecision, however, because some films list credits in order of appearance rather than in terms of the prominence of their roles in the film. In addition, films with larger casts generate a higher mean placement in the credits listing than those with smaller casts. Moreover, it is unlikely that the credit order is meaningful as one descends the list: the difference in prominence between an actor listed first and that listed fifth should be much greater than those listed twentieth and twenty-fifth.

To address these issues, we cross-classified the highest billing in a given year with highest billing in the prior year across a 10-year period, 1985–94, and fit log-multiplicative association models to this contingency table (see Goodman 1979; Clogg 1982). Results from this analysis, which is not included owing to space constraints, (a) demonstrate that there is highly significant association in highest billing from year-to-year, which suggests that these data are a reliable measure of the prominence of an actor's role; (b) provide a more appropriate scaling of billing order; and (c) show that one may collapse the lowest positions. In our analysis below, we use the rescaled variable, which runs from -0.353 for actors who appeared no higher than sixteenth in the list of credits in any of the films released during 1992–94 to 0.5692 for actors who were listed first in at least one such film.

Concentration Variables

We create measures of genre- and network-based concentration using the resampling procedures described above. For the genre-based concentration scores, we first register the number of random samples from the

D_{jg} vectors (out of 1,000 in total) the actor was found to have acted in a particular genre as often as was observed. We then take the mean over all actors who had the same number and proportion of films in a particular genre. This corrects for the presence of random noise that generates variation even among actors with exactly the same profile of participation in a particular genre. Finally, we subtract this mean value from 1,000 and then divide the result by 1,000. This normalization transforms the variable from an indicator of how *rare* a given profile is to a measure of concentration and expresses it as a percentage.

Table 3 illustrates this procedure with the 20 actors who had the highest concentration scores in the Action genre for this period. We see that there were 4 actors who appeared in 7 films that were classified as Action movies and no films that were classified exclusively in other genres. On average, this profile occurred 1.25 times out of 1,000 random samples. Note that working entirely within the Action genre is more likely if an actor did not appear in many film roles. Thus, the concentration score for the 284 actors who were in 2 films, both of which were classified as Action, was 0.714. By contrast, even though half the films in which he acted were not classified as Action, Samuel L. Jackson exhibited a high concentration score because the probability of that high a proportion among his 12 films was quite low. Thus, the genre-based concentration scores are a function both of the number and the proportion of genres in a given role.

We measured an actor's concentration of work with particular directors in similar fashion. In particular, we count the number of iterations in which the actor displayed as high a concentration level (hd_a) as was observed.²⁶ We normalize this measure as above, such that the concentration score varies from 0 (for which actors achieved the observed level of concentration or exceeded it in all 1,000 samples) to 1 (where the actor never achieved such a high degree of concentration through random chance). There were 104 actors who had a score of 1, among whom were a few well-known stars, such as Woody Allen, Tommy Lee Jones, and Emma Thompson, and many lesser-known actors who tended to do all or most of their work with a particular director.²⁷

²⁶ Unlike the genre-concentration scores, we do not correct for the random variation generated among actors with the same profile of relationships with directors. In this case, such a correction is unavailable because the vast majority of such profiles is unique.

²⁷ These examples suggest some variation in the etiology of such director-actor relationships. Allen is an unusual example because he is a director who acts in the films he directs. Jones is a star who acted in nine films during this period but displayed an elevated tendency to work with two directors, with each of whom Jones worked twice: Andrew Davis and Oliver Stone. Emma Thompson appeared in seven films during this period, two directed by her then-husband Kenneth Branagh and two by James Ivory.

TABLE 3
ACTORS WITH HIGHEST CONCENTRATION IN ACTION GENRE, 1992-94

NAME	PROFILE		AVERAGE PREVALENCE OF PROFILE (1,000 Resamples)	CONCENTRATION SCORE
	NF	N (Action)		
Ciarfallo, Carl	11	10	0	1.0000
Jackson, Samuel L.	12	6	1	.9990
Lamas, Lorenzo	10	9	1	.9990
Asinas, Ronald	7	7	1.25	.9988
Strzalkowski, Henry	7	7	1.25	.9988
Wilson, Don "the Dragon"	7	7	1.25	.9988
Thorsen, Sven-Ole	7	7	1.25	.9988
Okamura, Gerald	5	5	3.6	.9964
Adamos, Archie	5	5	3.6	.9964
Aleong, Aki	5	5	3.6	.9964
Van Damme, Jean-Claude	5	5	3.6	.9964
Rogers, Steve	5	5	3.6	.9964
Obata, Toshirō	5	5	3.6	.9964
Nicholson, Nick	5	5	3.6	.9964
D'Salva, Ramon	5	5	3.6	.9964
Holmes, Paul I.	5	5	3.6	.9964
Phelan, Mark	5	5	3.6	.9964
Moss, Jim I	6	6	3.67	.9963
Norton, Richard I.	6	6	3.67	.9963
Daniels, Gary	6	6	3.67	.9963

In table 4, we provide descriptive statistics and a correlation matrix for the regressors used in the analyses below. Association among the variables follows expectations. In particular, there are positive and moderate to high correlations among the variables measuring the number of films in which an actor appeared, how recently he appeared in a film, whether he was a veteran, and his highest billing. Each of these variables is also associated with the actor's maximum concentration score, which is the maximum taken over the 10 largest genres (at least 4% of all film roles during the current period) but excluding those that did not display significant aggregate concentration (see table 1): Action, Adventure, Comedy, Crime, Horror, Romance, Science Fiction, and Thriller. The significant association between maximum concentration and the number of films reflects the difficulty of separating level or size from pattern: distinctive patterns are only recognizable once a certain scale has been achieved (cf. Zuckerman 2003b). Nevertheless, this association is not so high that collinearity poses a problem.²⁸ Finally, note that actors who concentrated

²⁸ The VIF (variance inflation factor) statistic for maximum concentration in table 5, model 4, is only 1.18

TABLE 4
SUMMARY STATISTICS AND CORRELATION MATRIX AMONG REGRESSORS

Variable	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Ln (<i>NF</i>)19	.42	...										
2. Most recent year	1993.16	.82	.29	..									
3. If veteran35	.48	.39	.08	...								
4. Highest billing	-.19	.25	.47	.16	.33	..							
5. Highest box office	2.71	3.34	.32	.10	.17	.04	...						
6. Concentration (director)01	.12	.29	.08	.09	.12	.05	..					
7. Concentration (maximum)41	.25	.38	.15	.17	.18	.16	.14	...				
8. Concentration (documentary)01	.09	-.00*	.02	-.02	.02	-.08	-.00*	-.19	..			
9. Concentration (action)12	.21	.27	.11	.11	.10	.10	.11	.02*	-.07	.		
10. Concentration (comedy)16	.21	.27	.12	.13	.09	.27	.05	-.15*	-.06	-.15	.	
11. Concentration (thriller)10	.20	.29	.13	.13	.17	.09	.09	-.02*	-.06	.19	-.17	.

NOTE: $N = 32,141$.

* Shows the correlation between concentration for the genre in question and the lowest concentration across all 11 genres with significant aggregate concentration (Table 1) but excluding the genre in question

* Not significant at $P < .05$

their work with particular directors also tended to display higher concentration in a particular genre, though the association is relatively moderate.

RESULTS

Binomial Logit Models

In table 5, we present the binomial logit models that test hypotheses 1c and 2c. Results from the baseline equation presented as model 1 show that each of the covariates has a substantial impact on the probability of working during the next period. As may be expected, veterans are much more likely than novices to work again: when all other covariates are evaluated at their mean values, veterans enjoy an estimated probability of working in the next period of 38.2% versus 16.4% for novices.²⁹ The recency of an actor's last film is also an important factor: those for whom their most recent film was in 1992 were estimated to have only a 17% likelihood of finding work again in the next period versus 27% among those who worked in a film released in 1994. The effect of the number of films is also quite strong. An increase from the mean (which corresponds to 1.22 films) of just one film brings about a rise in the estimated probability of working in the next period from 22.6% to 36.4%. A similar increase is also brought about by a rise in highest billing from the mean (about 12th) to about 4th. Finally, the effect of box-office gross is significant as well, though less substantial. It takes an increase from the mean (about \$7 million) to mega-blockbuster status (about \$450 million) to produce a rise to 36% in the estimated probability of working in the next period.

In model 2, we add two additional control variables: concentration in work with particular directors and concentration in Documentary. Each of these has a significant effect, though that for the former is relatively slight. This indicates that, in general, strong ties with a small number of directors reduces the likelihood of working in the future, perhaps because it reflects an overdependence on jobs provided through a small number of sources. The significant negative coefficient on concentration in Documentary confirms the distinctiveness of this category from the dramatic genres.

Results from model 3 provide support for hypothesis 1c. Controlling for the various factors found to have a significant impact on the probability of obtaining future work, the more concentrated an actor's résumé during the current period is, the more likely she is to find work in a film

²⁹ In all subsequent calculations, we also assess the effect of a given variable while all others are evaluated at their mean values

TABLE 5
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD BINOMIAL LOGIT MODELS OF LOG-ODDS OF OBTAINING WORK
IN A FILM RELEASED IN 1995-97

VARIABLE	MODEL				
	1	2	3	4	5
Logged <i>NF</i>	1.11** (.04)	1.14** (.04)	1.14** (.04)	1.11** (.04)	1.15** (.04)
Most recent year28** (.02)	.28** (.02)	.28** (.02)	.28** (.02)	.28** (.02)
Veteran	1.15** (.03)	1.14** (.03)	1.14** (.03)	1.15** (.03)	1.16** (.03)
Highest billing	1.61** (.06)	1.61** (.06)	1.61** (.06)	1.61** (.06)	1.62** (.06)
√Highest box office07** (.00)	.06** (.00)	.06** (.00)	.06** (.00)	.06** (.00)
Concentration:					
Director		-.29* (.12)	-.30* (.12)	-.00 (.20)	-.18 (.20)
Documentary		-1.04** (.19)	-.96** (.20)	-.96** (.20)	-.96** (.20)
Maximum16* (.07)	.16* (.07)	.65** (.09)
Veteran × director . . .				-.46 (.24)	-.17 (.24)
Veteran × maximum ...					-1.08** (.13)
Constant	-561.16** (38.62)	-565.86** (38.64)	-561.01** (38.68)	-561.84** (38.70)	-566.23** (38.76)
χ^2 (df)	8,204.64 (5)	8,241.84 (7)	8,247.39 (8)	8,250.90 (9)	8,321.31 (9)
Δ in χ^2 (df)*		37.20 (2)	6.19 (1)	3.41 (1)	70.41 (1)

NOTE: $N = 32,141$

* Relative to model that excludes the boldface covariates

* $P < .05$, two-sided t -tests** $P < .01$

released during the next period. The particular impact of this variable is not as great as the other covariates apart from director-concentration, which should not be surprising: after all, prominence, tenure, recency, and present level of current participation in the industry should be much more powerful predictors of future participation than the pattern of current participation. Thus, an increase in maximum concentration from the mean level (0.41) to 0.90—where there is a 10% probability of observing a level of concentration that high—brings about a rise in the estimated probability of obtaining work from 22.6% to 24.0%.

However, as predicted by hypothesis 2c and demonstrated in model 5, this effect is much more pronounced among novice actors—and is reversed among veterans. Among novices, an increase in maximum concentration to 0.90 raises the estimated probability of working during the next period from 16.4% to 21.3%. Among veterans, the same increase in concentration reduces this estimated probability from 38.4% to 33.5%. These findings support our attempt to reconcile the notion that multivalent identities are robust with the claim that focused identities are necessary to gain recognition. The evidence we have provided suggests that, before an actor has become established in the market, it is advantageous to assume an identity that falls within the confines of existing categories. But, as argued by Faulkner (1983), the limits inherent in a simple, focused identity outweigh the advantages among actors who have already established themselves in the market. Since the vast majority of actors never achieve a foothold in the labor market, the downsides of a typecast identity pale in comparison to the advantages it holds.

In addition, we see from model 5 that it is unlikely that these patterns are spuriously produced by concentration in actor-director ties. We observe a negative interaction effect between veteran status and director-concentration in model 4, a finding that is broadly consistent with Burt's (1992, 1998) argument that structural autonomy is more advantageous once one is accepted as an insider. Yet this is a relatively weak effect that disappears in model 5. It is clear that maximum concentration and its interaction with veteran status have a much more notable impact on future career outcomes. This does not mean that social networks are unimportant in obtaining work in Hollywood but that a different type of structure is more relevant. Indeed, our genre concentration scores can be considered networks of attribution to a set of categories. They reflect the tendency for certain people to work in particular types of jobs and for industry participants and observers to then identify a linkage between certain categories and not others. That this structure appears more important than one based on social networks reinforces our argument that it is often more revealing to focus on structure that arises endogenously from the process of selecting and rating alternatives in the markets ("prisms" in the terminology of Podolny 2001) than to analyze structure that derives from "primordial affiliations" (Zuckerman 2003a).

Multinomial Logit Models

Next, we present results from multinomial logit models, which help to test hypotheses 1a, 1b, 2a, and 2b, and which help distinguish between typecasting and alternatives based on category-specific human capital and matching processes. Rather than present the models for each genre, we present results in tables 6, 7, and 8 for the three largest genres that were

TABLE 6
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD MULTINOMIAL MODELS OF LOG-ODDS OF WORK IN ACTION AND OTHER GENRES VS NOT WORKING IN 1995-97

VARIABLE	MODEL 1 ALL ACTORS		MODEL 2 ALL ACTORS		MODEL 1A NOVICE ACTORS ^a	
	Action vs No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c	Action vs No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c	Action vs No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c
Ln(NF)76** (.07)	1.17** (.05)	.77** (.07)	1.18** (.05)	1.22** (.14)	1.54** (.08)
Most recent year32** (.04)	.27** (.02)	.31** (.04)	.27** (.02)	.35** (.06)	.40** (.04)
If veteran	1.12** (.06)	1.15** (.03)	1.18** (.06)	1.14** (.03)		
Highest billing	1.17** (.11)	1.72** (.06)	1.16** (.11)	1.73** (.06)	1.41** (.19)	1.89** (.10)
Highest box office02** (.01)	.07** (.00)	.02** (.01)	.07** (.00)	.04** (.02)	.08** (.01)
Concentration:						
Director	-.05 (.17)	-.40** (.12)	-.05 (.17)	-.41** (.13)	-.28 (.33)	-.55** (.23)
Documentary	-1.36** (.46)	-.89** (.20)	-1.34** (.46)	-.89** (.21)	-1.99* (.85)	-1.08** (.31)
Maximum ^d07 (.12)	.06 (.07)	.08 (.12)	.07 (.07)	-.02 (.17)	.39** (.10)
Action	2.08** (.11)	-.27** (.08)	2.43** (.17)	-.08 (.11)	2.27** (.17)	-.21 (.12)
Action x veteran			-.64** (.22)	-.39** (.15)		
Constant	-635.54** (75.76)	-540.46** (41.89)	-631.80** (75.74)	-539.88** (41.91)	-705.13** (113.78)	-797.60** (61.60)
χ^2 (df)	8,782.96 (18)		8,795.54 (20)		2,124.67 (16)	
Δ in χ^2 (df)	428.27 (2)		12.58 (2)		175.50 (2)	
N	32,141	32,141	32,141		20,877	

^a Excludes veterans—includes only those actors whose first film was released during 1992-94

^b At least two-thirds of the films in which the actor appeared were classified as Action

^c More than one-third of the films in which the actor appeared were classified in genres other than Action

^d Maximum concentration score across the largest eight genres but excluding Drama and Action

^e Relative to model that excludes the boldface covariates

* $P \leq .05$, two-sided t -tests

** $P \leq .01$.

TABLE 7
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD MULTINOMIAL MODELS OF LOG-ODDS OF WORK IN COMEDY AND OTHER GENRES VS. NOT WORKING IN 1995-97

VARIABLE	MODEL 1: ALL ACTORS		MODEL 2: ALL ACTORS		MODEL 1A: NOVICE ACTORS ^a	
	Comedy vs No Work ^b	Other Genres vs. No Work ^c	Comedy vs No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c	Comedy vs. No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c
Ln(NF)74** (.07)	1.23** (.05)	.75** (.07)	1.24** (.05)	1.17** (.12)	1.62** (.08)
Most recent year30** (.03)	.28** (.02)	.30** (.03)	.28** (.02)	.48** (.05)	.37** (.03)
If veteran	1.07** (.05)	1.17** (.03)	1.07** (.03)	1.17** (.03)		
Highest billing	1.42** (.09)	1.68** (.06)	1.42** (.09)	1.68** (.06)		
√Highest box office07** (.01)	.06** (.01)	.07** (.01)	.06** (.01)	1.74** (.16)	1.81** (.10)
Concentration					.09** (.01)	.06** (.01)
Director	-.43* (.19)	-.30* (.13)	-.43* (.19)	-.30* (.13)	-.37 (.36)	-.53* (.22)
Documentary	-.83** (.32)	-1.02** (.21)	-.83** (.32)	-1.02** (.21)	-1.07** (.49)	-1.38** (.36)
Maximum ^d	-.35** (.09)	.23** (.06)	-.35** (.09)	.22** (.06)	-.42** (.14)	.59** (.09)
Comedy	1.31** (.12)	-.54** (.09)	1.39** (.17)	-.28** (.12)	1.08** (.19)	-.36** (.13)
Comedy × veteran			-.28 (.21)	-.46** (.16)		
Constant	-595.93** (65.32)	-563.70** (43.20)	-595.22** (65.31)	-563.71** (43.22)	-953.80** (99.98)	-735.64** (63.47)
χ ² (df)	8,712.17 (18)		8,720.90 (20)		2,075.43 (16)	
Δ in χ ² (df) ^e	222.45 (2)		8.73 (2)		47.40 (2)	
N	32,141		32,141		20,877	

^a Excludes veterans—includes only those actors whose first film was released during 1992-94

^b At least two-thirds of the films in which the actor appeared were classified as Action

^c More than one-third of the films in which the actor appeared were classified in genres other than Action.

^d Maximum concentration score across the largest eight genres but excluding Drama and Action

^e Relative to model that excludes the boldface covariates

* $P \leq .05$, two-sided t -tests

** $P \leq .01$.

TABLE 8
MAXIMUM-LIKELIHOOD MULTINOMIAL MODELS OF LOG-ODDS OF WORK IN THRILLER AND OTHER GENRES VS. NOT
WORKING IN 1995-97

VARIABLE	MODEL 1 ALL ACTORS		MODEL 2 ALL ACTORS		MODEL 1A NOVICE ACTORS ^a	
	Thriller vs No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c	Comedy vs. No Work ^b	Other Genres vs No Work ^c	Comedy vs. No Work ^b	Other Genres vs. No Work ^c
Ln(NF)88** (.08)	1.14** (.05)	.88** (.08)	1.16** (.05)	1.23** (.14)	1.54** (.08)
Most recent year31** (.04)	.27** (.02)	.31** (.04)	.27** (.02)	.40** (.06)	.39** (.03)
If veteran	1.13** (.06)	1.14** (.03)	1.16** (.06)	1.14** (.03)		
Highest billing	1.07** (.11)	1.71** (.06)	1.08** (.11)	1.72** (.06)	1.39** (.20)	1.87** (.10)
√Highest box office04** (.01)	.07** (.00)	.04** (.01)	.07** (.00)	.05** (.01)	.08** (.01)
Concentration:						
Director	-.20 (.19)	-.32** (.13)	-.19 (.19)	-.31** (.12)	-.67 (.42)	-.40 (.12)
Documentary	-1.80** (.53)	-.84** (.20)	-1.79** (.53)	-.84** (.20)	-2.16** (.97)	-1.11** (.31)
Maximum ^d49** (.13)	.08 (.07)	.49** (.12)	.08 (.07)	.92** (.19)	.22** (.10)
Thriller	1.00** (.13)	-.05 (.08)	1.46** (.19)	.27** (.11)	1.39** (.20)	.13 (.12)
Thriller x veteran			-.86** (.25)	-.63** (.15)		
Constant	-622.12** (78.66)	-545.34** (41.46)	-617.70** (78.71)	-543.21** (41.50)	-794.73** (120.60)	-778.69** (60.62)
χ^2 (df)		8,380.87 (18)		8,404.16 (20)		1,973.34 (16)
Δ in χ^2 (df) ^e		68.04 (2)		23.29 (2)		44.21 (2)
N		32,141		32,141		20,877

^a Excludes veterans—includes only those actors whose first film was released during 1992-94
^b At least two-thirds of the films in which the actor appeared were classified as Action
^c More than one-third of the films in which the actor appeared were classified in genres other than Action
^d Maximum concentration score across the largest eight genres but excluding Drama and Action
^e Relative to model that excludes the boldface covariates
* $P \leq .05$, two-sided t -tests
** $P \leq .01$

shown to have the most significant aggregate concentration—Action, Comedy, and Thriller—and discuss how they compare with findings from the models on the five other genres that had significant aggregate concentration and that represent at least 4% of all film roles during the current period: Adventure, Crime, Horror, Romance, and Science Fiction.

Results from the first model in table 6 show how the relationship between concentration and future work may be decomposed between work in Action and all others.³⁰ As illustrated in figure 3, concentration in Action produces a significant increase in the likelihood that the actor will work in Action in the next period: an increase from the mean concentration (0.12) to 0.90 causes a fourfold rise in the estimated probability of working in two-thirds or more Action films during the next period: from 5.3% to 22.7%.³¹ Such a rise in Action-based concentration also increases the probability that the actor will work at all in the future (from 22.6% to 34.5%) because, while the probability of working outside Action is reduced (from 17.4% to 11.8%), this reduction is exceeded by the increase in the likelihood of working in Action. Similar patterns are observed for seven of the eight genres. With the exception of Crime, the expectations stated in hypothesis 1a were met for each genre: actors who display significant concentration in a genre during the current period are more likely to work in a set of films, more than two-thirds of which are in that genre, than they are not to work during the next period. Furthermore, such success in obtaining work in a particular genre is responsible for the general effect, which was observed in table 5, whereby genre-based concentration increases the likelihood of obtaining any kind of work in the future. Only in the cases of Comedy and Action was there an overall negative effect on the odds of obtaining work in other genres, as postulated in hypothesis 1b, versus not working at all. However, for all other genres but Crime, this effect was insignificant such that the advantages of concentration outweighed any disadvantages.

Moreover, the trade-off between simple and robust identity is greater among novice actors, as expected. The results in table 8 illustrate the pattern in the case of Thriller. We see in model 2 that veteran status provides a significant and negative slope adjustment to the effect of concentration in Thriller on the odds of working in Thriller versus not work-

³⁰ Tests for the independence of other alternatives (see Long 1997, pp. 182–84) were ambiguous. However, binary logit models estimated for each of the two alternatives produced results that were substantially the same as those generated by the multinomial logits. Also, it is clearly the case that, from the standpoint of the concentration variables, the outcome categories are not substitutes for one another.

³¹ We thank Simon Cheng and J. Scott Long for providing their “xpost” tools for analyzing the results of categorical regression models. See <http://www.indiana.edu/~jsl650/xpost.htm>.




FIG. 3.—Effect of concentration in Action on work in 1995–97 (from table 6, model 1)

ing and on the odds of working outside of Thriller versus not working. This indicates that the advantage of concentrating in the Thriller genre for obtaining work in the next period is greater among novice actors and more attenuated among veterans. The graph in figure 4 illustrates the contrast between the two groups. We see that, while there is no effect of concentration in Thriller on the likelihood of novices' obtaining work outside of Thriller, this effect is negative and significant among veterans. With all other variables held at their means, an increase of Thriller-based concentration from the mean (0.10) to 0.90 reduces the estimated probability of working in non-Thriller films in the next period from 0.42 to 0.36. In addition, the advantages of concentrating in Thriller are lower for veterans. While for both groups, a rise in Thriller-based concentration from the mean to 0.90 increases the probability of working largely in Thriller in the next period, the effect is more dramatic among novices than among veterans: the rise in the estimate probability is from 0.022 to 0.066 for the former and from 0.08 to 0.139 for the latter.

Both the first interaction effect (whereby veterans enjoy less advantage at obtaining work in the genre of interest) and the second (whereby veterans suffer greater disadvantage at obtaining work outside that genre) are negative and statistically significant (at least at the 0.06 level) in six of the eight genres.³² The former is more noteworthy. This reduced ad-

³² The former interaction effect is not significant in the case of Comedy (see table 7) and the latter in the case of Horror. Neither interaction effect is observed for Romance.

Feature-Film Labor Market




FIG. 4—Effect of concentration in Thriller on work in 1995–97 for novices and veterans (from table 8, model 1a).

vantage for veterans, which is consistent with hypothesis 2a, suggests that a human capital perspective cannot easily explain our results. The rewards for specialism seem to be greater before a significant stock of specialist skills have been accumulated—that is, for actors at the beginning of their careers. A human capital perspective affords one possible explanation for this finding: that specialist skills actually depreciate over time to the degree that the same level of specialism is less valuable for veterans (relative to other veterans without such skills) than for novices. Such a possibility might be produced by a tendency for senior actors to become overexposed in a particular type of role. However, note that more than half of the veterans in our sample are within 10 years of the release of their first film. Further, only a small proportion (about 5%) of the veterans are household names or faces. It seems unlikely that specialist skills would be less valuable among this group of actors than among novices. Rather, our results are more consistent with the rationale we provided above: that employers' revealed preference for specialists reflects (at least in part) their attempts to find candidates who can fit a particular category of work. Since employers face particular difficulty in discerning whether a novice is multit talented or unskilled, the novice benefits when he can at least present himself as someone with category-specific skills. But since the veteran is less likely to be regarded as unskilled, the advantages of a simple identity are reduced.

Finally, our results on the constraining aspect of typecasting give us confidence that a matching perspective cannot fully account for the patterns we observe. We argued above that the experimentation characteristic of matching processes appears to be limited in this market, as indicated by the tendency for most careers to be highly episodic. Most aspiring feature-film actors are prevented from getting a chance to showcase and develop their skills because it is less costly for casting directors to hire known quantities than to experiment with actors with no feature-film experience. In addition, it also appears that, at least for Comedy, experimentation tends to be curtailed after the first match is consummated. Consider the right columns in the models presented in table 7. As expected, concentration in Comedy leads to a lower likelihood of working during the next period in other genres—and this effect is stronger for veterans. Yet while weaker, the effect is also significant for novices, as illustrated in figure 5. Concentration in Comedy even at the earliest career stage reduces the likelihood of working in other genres rather than not work at all. And note (from the coefficient on maximum concentration in the left column) that the converse is true as well: concentration in any genre other than Comedy reduces the probability that the actor will work in comedic films.

This curtailment of experimentation among novice actors is not observed for Thriller or for any of the smaller genres and is only marginally significant for Action ($p = .07$). However, this should not be surprising: as hypothesis 2b suggests, we expect the constraining effect to become notable only as an actor becomes identified with the category in question. That we find *any* evidence for such a constraint among actors who have just begun their careers provides strong evidence for the salience of typecasting in structuring the careers of feature-film actors. Specifically, our results point to the boundary between comedic and noncomedic genres as having particular importance. While our interpretation of this result can only be suggestive, it is instructive to consider both that "Comedy" is a genre as old as the arts and that it has exhibited a significant degree of aggregate coherence as a labor-market category for at least 40 years. In addition, our informants typically made reference to the comedy/drama boundary as particularly difficult to cross. Thus, our results reinforce our argument that typecasting processes are stronger where genre boundaries are sharper (but not so sharp that mobility is precluded). Once they are identified as belonging to one or the other side of the boundary between the comedic and noncomedic, it appears, feature-film actors are systematically constrained from crossing it to broaden their repertoires. Such an actor must confront the assumption, routinely applied but rarely tested, that one cannot perform skillfully in both comedic and noncomedic roles.




FIG. 5.—Effect of concentration in Comedy on work in 1995–97 for novices (from table 7, model 1a).

DISCUSSION

The prospect of assuming a complex, multivalent, or “robust” identity holds great appeal. Who would not prefer to move across domains as one sees fit without being committed to any one? As Marx and Engels (1988, p. 97) put it, it seems more fulfilling to “do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.”

However, two factors prevent this generalist ideal from becoming reality. First, to the extent that various tasks require (investments in) highly specialized skills, we are greatly limited in the extent to which we may be generalists. As Freidson (1980) points out, it is hard to conceive of an advanced economy (or industry) without highly developed specialism.³³ In addition, where skill is hard to determine and the prevailing belief holds that specialism is more common than generalism, opportunities for true generalists to emerge will be limited. Without any other evidence of skill to the contrary, a worker who attempts to be a generalist faces the threat that she will be regarded as a dilettante who is not competent at any type of work. As a result, assuming a simple, focused identity is a more viable strategy at the inception of one’s career or, more generally, when one is at risk of being screened out of consideration. When this risk recedes, however, generalism becomes a more attractive strategy—though

³³ “How can we conceive of the possibility of someone being a good tool-and-die maker in the morning, a competent oboe player in the afternoon, an up-to-date linguist in the evening, and a creative research physicist after dinner, without ever being any one of them full-time?” (Freidson 1980, par 25).

a path that is difficult to follow once one has become identified with a particular specialty. Thus, the seeds are sown for feelings of alienation as workers are systematically constrained to become more circumscribed, commodity-like products than they would be on the basis of their skills alone.³⁴ At the same time, such alienation does not stem simply from the elaboration of a division of labor, as Marx and Engels argued, but rather from the labor market's limited ability to identify and develop workers with generalist skills.³⁵

Accordingly, the patterns that we hypothesize and observe in the case of feature-film actors should be less apparent in many other contexts. As argued above, in a labor market such as that for physicians, where the boundaries between specialties are typically deep and job assignments are based on years of dedicated training, there will be little ambiguity as to a candidate's identity by the time she reaches the market. Our framework is applicable only where generalism is sufficiently rare that it is costly for employers (and the intermediaries who act on their behalf) to experiment in identifying such workers but is not so rare as to be unobserved. In addition, we expect that in many contexts candidates may avail themselves of other signals of quality (e.g., credentials) that allow employers to code their generalism as indicating multiple talents rather than none. Finally, we believe that typecasting processes operate more strongly in markets that are mediated by multiple layers of brokers, each of whom acts to screen out candidates who do not fit generic criteria.

While delimited in scope, we believe that our framework sheds light on the trade-off between complex and simple identities in a variety of social contexts, well beyond the example of labor markets. In general, diffuse identities are hard to assume, both because they require difficult psychological adjustments (Merton 1968, pp. 424–40; Stryker and Macke 1978) and because audiences and interactants typically discipline actors to play roles that they understand (e.g., DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Scott 2001; Urban et al. 1993; White 2002; Zuckerman 1999, 2000). As Padgett and Ansell (1993, p. 1264) point out, "Robust

³⁴ It is interesting to link this discussion with Podolny and Hsu's (2002) discussion of variation in the simplicity and complexity of quality schemas across arenas, with the "Market" typified by simple schemas and "Art" characterized by more complex schemas. Making the link to the current context, one might say that, within a given labor market, most workers (including in an artistic field such as acting) are evaluated as simple, focused commodities but that a more complex, "artistic" identity becomes possible once one has become sufficiently established that the threat of being disregarded recedes.

³⁵ We refer here only to the type of alienation that Marx and Engels (1988) discuss in *The German Ideology* as resulting from a highly elaborated division of labor. Other forms of alienation, such as that which results from a lack of autonomy, do not concern us here.

action will not work for just anyone.” Indeed, the case of Cosimo de’ Medici is instructive because his success in achieving a network position that spanned multiple factions was the result of a series of largely contingent events that transpired over the course of decades (Padgett and Ansell 1993, pp. 1286–1306). And the Medici were alone in achieving such a position in Florentine networks despite the benefits that would accrue to those who might emulate them. We argue that, in general, the difficulties of assuming a “Renaissance man” identity generally outweigh its advantages, but that this balance is moderated by the degree to which one has already achieved a degree of acceptance that allows audiences to interpret deviation from category- or role-specific behavior as broadening one’s identity rather than as sullyng it (Phillips and Zuckerman 2001). Most actors in most arenas most of the time have not achieved such acceptance. Thus we typically adhere to the behavior characteristic of a particular category or role.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In closing, we note several other features and limitations of our analysis. First, our analysis suggests that (a) career structures in the external labor market may not be as “boundaryless” (Arthur and Rousseau 1996) as is often believed and (b) careers marked by a low degree of coherence are likely to face greater difficulty than those that are more clearly defined. The latter observation leads to an expectation that there exists a general sequence to the early stages of a worker’s career in a given labor market: an initial stage during which the actor either assumes a simple, focused identity or fails to achieve sustained participation in the market, and a second stage during which the worker either remains focused or broadens his or her identity. We believe that, owing not only to the rarity of generalist potential but to the tendency for labor markets to favor specialists, careers that are curtailed at the first stage are more common than careers that graduate to generalism.

A second feature of our analysis has been our attempt to distinguish a typecasting process from alternatives based on human capital and matching. While our results are not definitive, we think they are more consistent with a typecasting framework. It is awkward to depict the feature-film labor market as characterized by anything approaching the type of experimentation (in terms of actor to genre matches) that is posited in matching models. It is also unlikely that a human capital approach could account for the finding that novices enjoy more advantage from their relatively limited stock of specialized skills than do specialists from their more elaborated skills. Finally, our interviews with agents, actors, and casting di-

rectors testify to the ways in which a wedge is driven between an actor's labor-market identity and her skills. Alienation is common—and, to the extent that employers identify with candidates, they recognize and express such alienation as well. Together, these three pieces of evidence provide strong motivation for considering the possibility that the typecasting processes first described by Faulkner (1983) and elaborated upon here are at work.

Yet the objective is not to reject labor-economic models and, more specifically, to claim that skill is irrelevant to the labor-market positions that workers attain. Rather, while positions in labor markets are defined by skill differences and the assignment of workers to position is conducted on the basis of a candidate's past, the difficulty of measuring skill introduces systematic bias into the process, which works to break the link between skill and position. This does not mean that workers are assigned to positions to which they are not suited. Rather, it implies that many workers occupy positions that are narrower than they would achieve if their (potential) skills were more readily discernible. We hope we have shown how structural sociological accounts of labor markets may begin with skill but emerge with a more complex picture, one in which position cannot be reduced to underlying ability (cf. Sørensen 1977; Podolny 1993; Gould 2002).

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Economic Interests and Sectoral Relations: The Undevelopment of Capitalism in Fifteenth-Century Tuscany¹

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Many preconditions for a rapid transition to industrial capitalism existed in Tuscany in the late medieval/early modern period, including relatively efficient agricultural production; a well-developed, commercial manufacturing sector; the absence of a powerful feudal nobility and feudal obligations; a large, precocious urban economy; and the development of a territorial state. No such transition occurred, however. Previous explanations for this are inadequate, because they discount the strength of the Tuscany economy or downplay the presence of these preconditions. To explain the Tuscan outcome, this article draws on sectoral theories (agriculture vs. manufacturing) from the neoclassical and Marxist literature. Since these theories often give the wrong prediction, because they are based on formal attributes of actors, the author combines them with a Weberian conceptualization of substantively specific economic interests.

The medieval and Renaissance splendor of northern Italian cities stands in stark contrast to their later economic decline. This is perhaps most obvious in Florence, a great medieval power and the birthplace of the Renaissance later relegated to a relatively minor historical role. There is considerable contemporary interest in resolving this paradox (Aymard 1982; Cipolla 1975; Cohen 1980, 1983; Epstein 1991; Holton 1983; Lachmann 1990) and well-reasoned calls for theories of transitions to capitalism to account for this case (Epstein 1991; Lachmann 1990). This article addresses this paradox. It develops sectoral theories (which explain the interaction between rural agricultural sector and the urban manufacturing

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sector) by replacing microlevel economic interests based on formal attributes of actors (which undergird most current sectoral theories) with a Weberian conceptualization of economic interests based on substantive, historically specific attributes. This expanded theory is developed in the context of explaining Tuscan history.

Cities are alternatively the villains or heroes of the economy. Does urban air lead to freedom, as Weber suggested, or is the Marxist interpretation of cities as integral parts of feudal economies correct? The same sort of debate continues unabated in the contemporary literature: Are cities sites of modernization, technological innovation, and economic development or do they inevitably lead to "urban bias" (Lipton 1977) or "overurbanization" (Gugler 1982), thereby stifling overall economic growth? The debate itself, of course, illustrates that cities can have both positive and negative effects on economic growth, but it underspecifies these divergent outcomes. This article extends the understanding of the relation between cities and economic growth by reexamining historical transition debates; that is, the sociological debate over the "transition from feudalism to capitalism" and the role that cities played in it.

TUSCANY AS A NEGATIVE CASE

The anomalous economic development of Tuscany, in particular, and of northern Italy, in general, is a puzzle for theories of transitions to capitalism. Its historical trajectory is paradoxical because many of the preconditions for a rapid transition to full-scale, industrial capitalism existed in the late Middle Ages, including relatively efficient agricultural production, a well-developed commercial manufacturing sector, the absence of a powerful feudal nobility and feudal obligations, and a large, precocious urban economy. However, these preconditions did not produce a rapid transition to capitalism. Tuscan economic development is, therefore, an example of a "negative case," where the expected outcome did not occur (Emigh 1997a). It can be used in conjunction with "negative case methodology" to develop the content of sociological theory. Negative case methodology focuses on a single case, one in which the empirical outcome does not match the theoretical prediction. The historical details of this case are compared to a theoretical explanation that embodies knowledge of numerous cases. Because the evidence and the theory are not easily reconciled, the content of the theory must be expanded to resolve the anomaly, leading to an empirical explanation of the case and an expansion of the theory's range of explanatory power. This methodology leads to theoretical development under two conditions: first, the negation—the gap between the expected outcome and the theoretical explanation—must be

large, and, second, a detailed examination of the empirical evidence must expand the theory's content (Emigh 1997a). Negative case methodology is deployed within a Lakatosian "research programme" (Lakatos 1970) in which anomalous or, here more narrowly, negative cases play a particularly important role in the growth of knowledge. Such cases are not used to disprove theories (as in the positivist use of a disconfirming or falsifying case). Instead, they develop the theory's substantive content to increase its explanatory range.

Northern Italy's overall historical trajectory is well known. Its medieval city-states were sites of European economic power. Over the centuries, the center of economic and political power gradually shifted northward, away from the Mediterranean toward the Netherlands and then to England. Of course, the reasons England experienced the first full-scale transition to industrial capitalism are complex and multifaceted, conjunctural, contingent, and, perhaps, even accidental (Goldstone 2000; Pomeranz 2000). Nevertheless, the examination of highly developed regions in which capitalism did not emerge is an important way to develop theories of capitalism (Aymard 1982; Goldstone 2000; Lachmann 2000; Krantz and Hohenberg 1975). The northern Italian city-states, of which Tuscany was one of the most advanced, are perhaps the most dramatic examples of the nonemergence of capitalism. In contrast to the Netherlands, where an advanced economy led to a relative early transition to capitalism, even if it did not produce the first such transition, Italy was a "late developer" (Gerschenkron 1962).

Tuscany remains a negative case even from the point of view of the best-developed theories that attempt to explain its economic history.² Most previous explanations attempt to resolve the Tuscan case by arguing that the transition did not occur because the preconditions for capitalism were absent. However, as I argue below, a careful examination of recent his-

² I do not review general theories of transitions to capitalism, a lengthy task beyond this article's scope and the subject of multiple reviews (e.g., Emigh, in press; Holton 1985; Lachmann 1989). Such a review would be necessary to use negative case methodology when theories have not been applied to negative cases or when little high-quality empirical work exists. For Tuscany, however, considerable research already exists. Thus, I review the best Weberian, Marxist, and neoinstitutionalist applications to Tuscany, showing that these still do not explain the case. This approach is useful because these applications already selected the most relevant dimensions of the larger theory and then applied them to the empirical evidence. Such applications reflect and incorporate the broader theoretical context (and the multiple cases these theories incorporate), but they are oriented toward the Tuscan case, thus preserving, as negative case methodology requires, the tension between the broad theoretical content and the empirical specificity. So my discussion of these theories is limited, since I am starting from these previous studies (and therefore, in the Lakatosian sense, expanding on a research program).

torical evidence suggests that these explanations are not sufficient. Instead, the capitalist dynamic was responsible. Marxist theories generally explain the Tuscan case either by showing that Florence as a city emerged as a collective "feudal lord" that extracted surplus from the countryside (Merrington 1975) or by arguing that the absence of fixed-term leasing assured that agrarian capitalism would not develop (Brenner 1985*a*, 1985*b*; Giorgetti 1974; Romano 1974).³ However, fixed-term leasing was widespread, and Florentines were not able to extract a surplus from the countryside through extraeconomic coercion (Emigh 1998*b*). Yet these preconditions did not produce a transition to capitalism, and, thus, Tuscany remains a negative case. Aymard (1982) also notes that Marxist theory does not explain the Tuscan case. He correctly emphasizes urban/rural relations in explaining both the strength and weaknesses of the Tuscan economy and the contradiction between rural and urban interests (p. 191). However, his explanation is not entirely satisfactory, as he also emphasizes extra-economic coercion.

Neoinstitutionalist economic theories examine transaction costs and property rights that shape economic action (Hopcroft 1999, p. 8; North and Thomas 1973). They are rooted in the work of Adam Smith, who emphasized the division of labor, the spread of market structures, and trade (cf. Hoffman 1996). Smith, in fact, argued ([1776] 1976, p. 432) that merchants were the best improvers of agriculture, because they were accustomed to investing money in profitable projects. He points to the Italian cities as examples (Smith (1976, pp. 427, 444). Cities produced economic growth because the urban sector created demand for agricultural products and spread market institutions (Pirenne 1925). The presence of Florence, a highly urbanized region, did not produce a transition to capitalism, however, and so it is clear that urban demand, in and of itself, does not have this effect.

A neoinstitutionalist argument can also explain why cities may prevent growth, if the concentration of urban power produces institutional arrangements that prevent the development of trade and markets. Epstein (1991) provides the best-developed version of this neoinstitutionalist argument for Tuscany, suggesting how urban regions may block economic growth. Beginning with the rational-choice assumption of utilitarian behavior, he argues that institutional structures shaped peasants' access to markets (p. 7). In particular, urban power affected the terms of trade between agricultural and manufactured products, thereby influencing the production of commodities and trade. Epstein (1991, p. 33) argued that

³ Marx ([1867] 1977*a*, p. 876, [1894] 1977*b*, p. 937) mentions Italy only in passing, but he points to tenurial relations and urban power, the same two elements that are important in later Marxist works

powerful Florentines adopted market restrictions that prevented agricultural innovation and investment, thus preventing the growth of a domestic market, preventing specialization, and reinforcing peasant subsistence agriculture. He suggests, then, that the preconditions necessary for further development (relatively unrestricted markets) were not present. Epstein's argument goes quite far in explaining the Tuscan case. He presents a balanced view that emphasizes the strength of the urban economy and notes the lack of rural autonomy (Epstein 1991, pp. 40–42, 45). But it is not clear that market restrictions were the culprit or that they had the hypothesized effect. Of course, such restrictions did exist, but they were not unusual for that time, nor particularly excessive in comparison, for example, to England (Hopcroft and Emigh 2000). Most importantly, these restrictions did not inhibit agricultural investment and innovations that increased agricultural productivity. Such improvements did not increase productivity merely by increasing the intensity of labor (Emigh 1999b, pp. 472–73). Therefore, Epstein's attempt to explain the case by arguing that the preconditions for such a transition did not exist (lack of an unrestricted market, lack of a productive agricultural sector) is not entirely successful. However, negative case methodology is again useful here because the evidence suggests that such preconditions did in fact exist but that they did not produce the predicted outcome.

Tuscany is also a negative case from the Weberian perspective. Weber (1978, pp. 1266–1339) argued that medieval cities, such as Florence, were important precursors to capitalist development but could not sustain a full-scale transition to capitalism, because they did not create a national market, which was possible only with the rise of a modern, bureaucratic nation-state (for similar interpretations see Anderson [1974, pp. 143–72], Collins [1997, p. 845, fig. 1], Tilly [1990], Wallerstein [1974, p. 148]). Of course, modern Italy was not a unified state until 1861, but arguing that the late unification of Italy was responsible for Tuscan economic development simply assumes that Italy was the only possible viable political unit. In fact, Tuscany was becoming a regional state during the early modern period (Becker 1968; Benadusi 1996; Ertman 1997, p. 10; Litchfield 1986; Stern 1994).

In contrast, the medieval Florentine commune was not a territorial state. Like many northern Italian regions, Tuscany developed out of a city-state with a high capital concentration (Tilly 1990) that was a major center for international trade, finance, and manufacturing. It was composed of several corporate groups only loosely held together by the Florentine government, which itself was composed of multiple judicial and executive bodies, most of which were composed of Florentines who held office for relatively short terms of several months. The government was not sovereign; many individuals fell outside of its jurisdiction (including

the few remaining feudal lords). Florence was surrounded by smaller, though still powerful cities, whose shifting alliances created instability (Stern 1994, pp. 2–3).

Beginning in the 1340s, however, perhaps spurred by the economic downturn, the Florentine government gradually, though unevenly, consolidated its jurisdiction throughout the surrounding territories and established uniform laws and taxation. Such actions diminished the powers of the guilds and the magnates (Stern 1994, pp. 3–4). Between 1385 and 1421, Florence militarily conquered the nearby cities and territories of Arezzo, Pisa, Cortona, and Livorno and incorporated them into its own region (Stern 1994, p. 5). Throughout the 14th and 15th centuries, Florence extended its hold over Tuscany by implementing fiscal and administrative reforms designed to secure more effective control (Becker 1968; Benadusi 1996, pp. 1–13; Chittolini 1979, pp. 293–352; Stern 1994). It dismantled local governments and administrative units in the surrounding countryside and subjected them to Florentine law and administration (Stern 1994, pp. 1–19). Formal citizenship rights were extended to some non-Florentines in the 16th century (Cochrane 1973, p. 65). Weber (1978, p. 1321) noted that Tuscan government tended to eliminate the exploitation of the countryside by the urban population. After a period of several decades of foreign invasions at the end of the 15th century and a period of French and Spanish rule, Tuscany became an independent entity, though allied with Spain. Ertman (1997, p. 10) calls Tuscany a “patrimonial absolutist” state (like France; a case usually cited to note the correlation between state formation and the transition to capitalism). Thus, although Tuscany was clearly not a modern nation-state during the Renaissance, its level of development was certainly comparable to, or even more advanced than, other states of this time.

Lachmann (2000, pp. 45–92) evaluated Weber’s other argument for Florence, that the economy was based on politically oriented, not economically oriented, capitalism. In *Economy and Society* and the *General Economic History*, Weber (1978, p. 1321; [1927] 1981, pp. 259–60, 326–27) focused on the political, organizational, and political determinants of the Tuscan “failure,” while in *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, he argued that Florentine merchants did not exhibit Protestants’ ethical orientation (Weber 1958, pp. 74–76, 194–98). As Lachmann (2000, p. 45) argues, however, Weber cannot explain why such conditions would have created both the rise and fall of Florence. Thus, Weber’s argument about politically oriented capitalism is incomplete.

Another critique of Weber’s application of the Protestant ethic to Tuscany posits that religious preconditions—either organizational or ethical factors that served purposes similar to the Protestant ethic—did exist in Florence and, therefore, their absence cannot explain delayed transition

to capitalism there. For example, Nuccio (1984) argues that Florentine merchants thought profits were sacred, thereby linking religious values and economic activities. Similarly, Collins's analysis (1986, pp. 45–76) implies that religious institutions provided preconditions for the rise of capitalism in northern Italy. Finally, Cohen (1980) claimed that capitalist rationality developed in pre-Reformation Italy and, therefore, the effect of the Protestant ethic on capitalist development must have been small. To recapitulate, Lachmann's analytical criticism casts doubt on Weber's thesis that a missing Protestant ethic was responsible for delayed transition to capitalism in Tuscany, while Nuccio, Collins, and Cohen provide some empirical evidence to the same effect.⁴

Drawing on elite theory, Lachmann (1990, p. 409; 2000, pp. 89–92) argued that the transition to capitalism did not occur because once a single elite gained control of Florence, they failed to transform economic relations, drawing instead on their political power to maintain economic advantage. Citing land as Florentines' "favorite investment," Lachmann (2000, p. 86) argues that sharecropping was an unproductive, exploitative tenurial form.⁵ Like Epstein, Lachmann explains well many dimensions of the Tuscan case. He emphasizes urban power and correctly notes urban elites' important economic role. However, contrary to Lachmann's argument, Florentines did control Tuscany through economic, market mechanisms. Their investments were primarily, in fact, driven by economic incentives (Emigh 1997*b*, 1999*b*). Furthermore, during the 15th century, sharecropping increased agricultural productivity and was a capitalist form of land tenure (Emigh 1999*b*, 2000*a*). Thus, it was precisely Florentine elites' investments that transformed agricultural production during this period of time.

⁴ This matter, however, is hardly settled. Holton (1983) disagreed with Cohen's (1980, 1983) analysis. I believe their debate ended largely in a draw, primarily because they, like Collins, Nuccio, and Weber, were drawing extensively on secondary sources and a limited number of published primary sources. This issue is not resolvable without extensive archival research directed explicitly toward it. In particular, it might be possible to use writings of merchants, as does Nuccio (but to draw on a larger number of manuscript sources), as evidence for the extent of their business orientation and then to match these writings to documents about their possessions and profits. Such detailed archival work is clearly beyond the scope of this article.

⁵ Lachmann also cites evidence about the decline of urban manufacturing. I agree with his summary of the standard explanation of Tuscan decline: that Florentines lost their competitive advantage with respect to the English wool trade because of high Florentine labor costs. Despite this overall trend, however, much historical research emphasizes the strengths of the Tuscan economy, not its failures. Epstein (1991), Hoshino (1980), Malanima (1988), and Sella (1969) all suggest that Florentine cloth production remained quite strong (see review in Brown 1989*a*, 1989*b*). As in the case of the evaluation of the "Protestant ethic" (see note 4 above), much more research with primary source material would be needed to adjudicate this point.

So, from the point of view of these theories, Tuscany is a negative case. Preconditions (territorial state development, fixed-term leasing, property rights, market structures, agricultural investment, etc.) existed during the 15th century suggesting that the transition to capitalism should have occurred, yet did not. The most promising works, however, by Lachmann (1989, 2000), Epstein (1991), and Aymard (1982) go far toward explaining Tuscan development, because they try to explain the strength of the economy as well its ultimate demise by looking at the relationship between the rural and urban regions. In fact, they discuss elements of sectoral arguments. Epstein considers the effects of Florentine power on rural institutions, while Lachmann considers the activities of elite, Florentine landlords in rural regions. Aymard (1982) also considers the aggregate patterns of rural/urban interactions. Negative case methodology can be fruitfully used here to develop the substantive content of sectoral theories by investigating further the empirical evidence and expanding on the work by Lachmann, Epstein, and Aymard.

INCORPORATING SECTORAL RELATIONS

Sectoral theories explain the interaction between urban and rural regions by describing the shift of resources from rural agriculture to urban manufacturing. They are particularly useful in explaining a specific aspect of capitalist development, the rise of industrial production after the establishment of market institutions.⁶ Sectoral theories note the general, though not complete, correspondence between location and type of activity: most agriculture is rural; most manufacturing is urban. In some sense, sectoral theories simply describe industrialization: as the manufacturing sector grows, the agricultural sector shrinks. To assure a food supply, the productivity of this smaller agricultural sector must increase while its relative economic contribution declines. Industrialization depends on this paradox: although the size of the agricultural sector declines as industrialization proceeds, the transition to an industrial economy relies on the strength and productivity of the agricultural sector, as well as on its contributions to manufacturing (Timmer 1988, pp. 276–79). For this dynamic to occur, there must be investments in agriculture that increase its productivity, along with some transfer of surplus to the manufacturing sector. Without investment, agricultural productivity does not increase. Without transfer of surplus, the agricultural sector grows instead of the manufacturing sector. These conditions can stimulate positive linkages between industry

⁶ Collins (1997, p. 843) describes this transformation as the shift from productive agriculture to industrial production.

and agriculture: (1) the increased capacity to feed an urban population, (2) the release of labor from agriculture to manufacturing, (3) increased agricultural income that creates a domestic market for manufactured goods, and (4) increased domestic savings available to finance industrialization (Matsuyama 1992).

Marxist and economic (both classical and neoclassical) sectoral theories draw on this underlying dynamic of a shrinking but increasingly productive agricultural sector, along with an expanding manufacturing sector. Beginning with Lewis (1954), a large neoclassical literature examines sectoral linkages and transfers and highlights agriculture's positive role. Before this time, agriculture's role in development had been undervalued, because some economists assumed that if its share of the economy decreased it must contribute little to development or that it must be deliberately squeezed to provide resources for industrialization (review in Timmer 1988, pp. 277–78). In contrast, authors such as Johnston and Mellor (1961) and Ranis and Fei (1961) suggested that optimal development strategies, especially for societies with large agricultural sectors and little industry, included the investment of resources and technology in agriculture and some transfer of surplus between the agricultural and the manufacturing sector, either through direct or indirect taxation or through terms of trade (prices) (Mellor 1995, pp. 5–8; Timmer 1988, pp. 278–80, 289; Varshney 1993, pp. 5, 11–12). Particularly in countries with subsistence agriculture and when the importation of food was difficult, policies harmful to agriculture led to economic stagnation (Timmer 1988, pp. 277–78, 289).

It is important to distinguish, at least conceptually, between transfer of surplus, which by definition is necessary for industrialization, and squeezing agriculture, which slows economic growth (Sah and Stiglitz 1984, p. 136; Varshney 1993, p. 12). The classic debate over Soviet agriculture revolved around this issue. Preobrazhensky ([1926] 1965), drawing on the Marxist idea of the necessity of primitive accumulation, argued that industrialization could be financed only by forced transfers of resources from the private, agricultural sector to the socialist, industrial sector. His main opponent, Bukharin ([1928] 1982), argued that the development of the industrial sector depended upon the development of the agricultural sector. He stressed that agriculture created a domestic market for industrial goods. The convergence between the Marxist literature and the neoclassical literature on these points is striking: they both stress the importance of investment in agriculture along with some transfers of surplus from agriculture to manufacturing. In general, then, sectoral theories illustrate the need to answer two questions: Is the agricultural sector becoming more productive and is surplus being transferred?

In their original formulation, sectoral theories were often simplistic

prescriptions, suggesting that investment in one sector or the other would automatically lead to industrialization. Of course, many factors influence industrialization, as well as alter the effect of investment on agricultural productivity and the transfer of surplus. Sectoral theories can be useful because they point to agricultural investment and transfer of surplus as key components in industrialization and because they show that other social processes impinge upon these components. Two related theories, based on sectoral analysis, urban bias and comparative advantage, illustrate this point.

Comparative advantage suggests that countries may benefit by specializing in the production of goods and services they produce efficiently. If countries are well endowed agriculturally, and this sector is very profitable, they have a comparative advantage in it. Under these conditions, further investment in already productive agriculture may prevent industrialization, by shifting resources away from manufacturing (Matsuyama 1992). In such cases, Preobrazhensky was probably correct, especially when agriculture produced a large surplus. A similar outcome occurs under the opposite conditions: when the possibilities of agricultural production are very limited, it is relatively inexpensive to import food, and the opportunities for manufacturing are great, comparative advantage suggests that investment in manufacturing is a good strategy, since agriculture may simply never be productive enough to produce a surplus. Food importation may be a better long-run solution.⁷ Thus, comparative advantage suggests reasons why, under some conditions, agricultural investment actually prevents the transfer of surplus from agriculture to manufacturing.

The urban bias literature, in a way, considers the opposite problem, suggesting why too much surplus may be transferred to the urban sector. The term "urban bias," first espoused by Lipton (1977), suggests that policies of taxation, investment, or pricing disproportionately benefit urban residents at the expense of rural ones (Bates 1981; Bradshaw 1985, p. 76; 1987, p. 225; London and Smith 1988, p. 45). Urban members of different classes have more in common with each other than they do with rural inhabitants, so align against them. This alliance creates an urban concentration of power that harms rural, and in the long run, more widespread economic development. In the short run, policies and other market restrictions are implemented that keep urban dwellers happy with low taxes and low food prices. These policies transfer surplus from agriculture to manufacturing, but they generally do so in such a way that harms

⁷ These cases, however, are not necessarily at odds with sectoral theory. They simply require that a country's "rural sector" be located outside of that country. Under these conditions, the rural sector is entirely autonomous

rural regions, decreases overall productivity, and slows economic growth (Bradshaw 1985; London and Smith 1988). In the long run, such policies create havoc because they lead to the underproduction of food, the overpopulation of the urban regions, and the underpopulation of rural regions. While Lipton (1977) focuses on the indicators or effects of urban bias, Bates (1981) and Mitra (1977) focus on social relations that produce different balances of urban and rural power, making either urban or rural inhabitants more influential or creating urban/rural alliances.

Urban bias is, in a way, similar to the Marxist argument that cities can be surplus extractors, except that it abandons the Marxist class dynamic (Bates 1981; Lipton 1977). In the Marxist formulation of transitions to capitalism (e.g., Merrington 1975), cities essentially coalesce into regions of power that extract a surplus from rural regions without developing productive relations (i.e., they remain feudal and do not introduce capitalist, fixed-term tenurial relations). Thus, cities transfer surplus from the agricultural sector but without investing in agriculture or increasing agricultural productivity. Urban centers may in the short run exist primarily by importing food from distant regions and/or external markets, but the long-run possibilities of this strategy of transferring surplus are prohibitive because of the costs of food transportation (especially in inland regions before modern transportation).

An important conclusion from this research on urban bias is that rural agricultural interests may be ignored by urban residents, especially when the latter are powerful and the representatives of the former are not. This view provides an important counterbalance to the neoclassical literature, which focuses on the importance of prices ("getting prices right") as impersonal mechanisms that coordinate the economy. In practice, decisions are shaped primarily by power relations and economic interests. Thus, factors that reduce or prevent urban bias essentially enable the representation of rural interests, through an alliance between rural and urban actors, including the existence of pro-rural urban actors, urban-centered agribusinesses whose primary economic interests lie with increasing agricultural production, or well-established democratic regimes allowing for political representation of the entire rural population (Varshney 1993). Where rural actors are powerless, they will have little impact and rural interests will not be represented.

The term "rural autonomy" is a useful way to capture this point and is analogous to the idea of state autonomy (Evans 1995, p. 45). For rural autonomy to exist, some actors must be free to pursue the rural interests of agriculture separately from other social interests, in particular urban interests. While Weber, for example, drew attention to the necessity of urban autonomy in creating the preconditions for the rise of market economy, it is clear that at least some degree of rural autonomy may be a

crucial necessity for agricultural development. It is also possible that rural autonomy has an effect independent from the deleterious policies associated with urban bias.

Indirectly, comparative advantage also points to the role of interests. This theory is underpinned by the idea that individuals choose in which sector to invest based on the possibilities for profits. If the agricultural sector is large, its representatives are powerful, and it is very profitable, individuals in that sector will want to make more investments in agriculture, not manufacturing. It is, therefore, unlikely that any transfer of surplus away from agriculture will occur.

Thus, sectoral theories provide useful ways to examine the role of cities in economic development, by pointing to the interaction between agriculture and manufacturing. Sectoral theories arise out of a number of theoretical contexts, most notably the economics literature, from Smith and Marx. As noted above, however, Weber's theory of the limits of urban growth is similar to a sectoral analysis. Of course, the most familiar sectoral theories, from Marxist and neoclassical theory, were actively developed and promoted as necessary and sufficient solutions to create economic growth in undeveloped countries. While all but the most dogmatic would today reject such monocausal models as outdated, underlying them, as well as their more sophisticated outgrowths, are well-developed models of urban and rural relations.

I apply this insight to explain the Tuscan historical trajectory and to expand upon theories of transitions to capitalism. Using a historical example, such as Tuscany, is also useful because the literature on urban bias and overurbanization usually assumes that this phenomenon is more pronounced in contemporary contexts than in historical ones. The Tuscan case shows, however, that sectoral differences were also important historically. In particular, I examine the two central dynamics: investment in agriculture and intersectoral transfers.

Economic interests and sectoral differences.—One crucial problem remains. As I noted above, sectoral relations are shaped by historically specific urban and rural economic interests. Both the Marxist and the neoclassical arguments, though, are based on interests that are derived from the formal attributes of actors, such as class position, urban or rural residence, or rational self-interest. Neoclassical economics begins with assumptions about utility maximization; Marxist arguments generally derive interests from class relations; that is, the relations of production. Thus, the actors themselves are interchangeable. These arguments miss the historically specific attributes of actors' interests that shape sectoral relations. As I reviewed them above, both the Marxist theory and the neoinstitutionalist theory fail to explain important dimensions of economic change in Tuscany.

Because it is difficult to incorporate historically specific economic interests in sectoral differences using the neoclassical or Marxist perspective, I use a Weberian one. Weber (1978, p. 927) defines interests by giving three characteristics of class: "(1) a number of people have in common a specific causal component of their life chances, (2) this component is represented by economic interests in the possession of goods and opportunities for income and (3) is represented under the conditions of the commodity or labor markets." Economic interests, then, according to Weber, arise out of the possession of goods and opportunities for income (not out of formal properties of the relations of production, as in Marx's argument, or utility maximization, as in neoclassical arguments). Classes form around these economic interests, and class interests flow out of classes. The effects of these interests are not predetermined, because individuals within this class may pursue their interests in different directions. I combine this Weberian conceptualization of economic interests with sectoral theories by noting that sectoral differences in agriculture and urban manufacturing are crucial determinants of economic interests, because these differences influence the possession of goods and opportunities for income and will explain Tuscan rural and urban interests, as I show below.

The following empirical section is organized according to this argument. The first two parts discuss sectoral relations, assessing the evidence for investment in agriculture and sectoral transfers. The next part examines the economic interests that underlay these sectoral relations. Finally, the last part applies this analysis to explain the lack of a domestic market in Tuscany to demonstrate the usefulness of the sectoral analysis.

THE TUSCAN CASE

I examine urban/rural relations in Tuscany roughly between 1350 and 1500. This was a critical period, during which the transition to capitalism could have, but did not, occur. The postplague period of late medieval history (after 1350) was often critical in establishing long-term economic patterns (Brenner 1985*a*, 1985*b*). Around 1500, the Tuscan historical trajectory was altered by foreign invasions.

During this period of time, regardless of how many capitalist elements existed in the economy or its continued strength, there is little doubt that modern, industrial capitalism did not first arise there. This can be illustrated by considering estimates of the ratio of urban to rural population, that is, roughly the size of the urban and rural sectors. The population in Tuscany, as in all Europe, declined dramatically in the mid-14th century after the bubonic plagues and then gradually increased again after the mid-15th century. The ratio of urban to rural population in Tuscany,

however, changed relatively little during this time. During the period of decrease, the population of Florence and the rural regions closest to it declined at roughly the same rate. The smaller cities and rural regions more distant from Florence seemed to have declined at a somewhat faster rate. During the recovery in the 15th century, urban and rural populations recovered at roughly the same rate. The increase in the urban population seemed to have preceded the rural rise by several decades, but by 1552 the rural regions had increased somewhat more than Florence. The increase in population in the towns and rural regions farthest from Florence was apparently strongest (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 69–78, esp. tables 3.4 and 3.5). While the details of these trends are impossible to determine, it is clear that they illustrate no decisive increase of the urban sector vis-à-vis the rural sector during the 15th century (i.e., no dramatic shift toward industrialization). To explain this outcome, I examine the components of sectoral transfers.

Agricultural Investment

One standard interpretation of the Florentine decline and loss of international advantage during the late Middle Ages was inadequate agricultural production, for which sharecropping was the culprit. Cipolla (1975, p. 9), for example, argues that inadequate domestic food production created high food and, thus, high labor costs, which made it difficult for Florentine goods to compete internationally. Food was frequently imported because of local shortages (Jones 1966, pp. 384–85; Pinto 1978*b*, pp. 73–106; Tangheroni 1978). Sharecropping is often assumed to have created such shortages because it was inefficient and unproductive, essentially a continuation of feudal agricultural relations that allowed Florentines to exploit rural regions (Epstein 1991; Giorgetti 1974; Lachmann 2000; Romano 1974). However, sharecropping was, in this context, a capitalist tenurial form that was accompanied by investment that increased productivity (Emigh 1998*b*, 1999*b*; 2000*a*). A sectoral analysis helps to unravel the more complicated role that sharecropping played, if indeed it had any detrimental effect on the Tuscan economy. I begin by considering the first element of sectoral theories, investment in agriculture.

Urban merchants commonly owned land in rural regions (Cherubini 1984; Jones 1956, 1969; Pinto 1982). Their investments in agriculture formed a specific part of their business activities by diversifying their investment portfolios. Profits were lower in agriculture but more secure (Goldthwaite 1968, pp. 246–51; 1980, pp. 49–50; Jones 1969, pp. 35–38; Martines 1963, pp. 35–37). Giovanni Rucellai, a wealthy Florentine of the early 15th century, claimed that land was an investment that should balance, not dominate, a portfolio (Goldthwaite 1980, p. 49; Perosa 1960,

pp. 8–9). Thus, both agricultural and manufacturing investments were driven by capitalist interests.

These Florentine rural investments shaped agriculture (Cherubini 1967; Pinto 1982, pp. 207–23). Florentines purchased land in rural regions and consolidated small, scattered plots into larger farms, providing capital inputs for the farms, cash loans, and livestock (Brown 1989a, p. 103; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 117–19; Imberciadori 1951; Jones 1956, pp. 194–96; 1968, pp. 224–28). Consolidation could require extensive amounts of investment, especially when landlords built outlying dwellings so tenants could move out of nucleated villages (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 117; Jones 1968, p. 228). As a result of consolidation, by the 15th century the land in many rural communities was owned primarily by wealthy landlords (Jones 1968, pp. 230–31). Migration to Florence seems to have been concentrated among the wealthiest and the poorest rural inhabitants (Herlihy 1968, pp. 266–68; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 112–15). Because many wealthy migrants owned rural properties, migration to Florence increased absentee landlordism and concentrated Florentine ownership of rural properties.

Landlords also invested in agriculture by loaning working capital to tenants. They customarily made loans to both share-term and fixed-term tenants when the tenants took possession of the farms (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 119). These loans, made by small and large landowners, were virtually inseparable conditions of share-tenancy (Jones 1968, p. 225; Pinto 1980, p. 307). Loans included cash, cattle and other livestock, seed, grain, farm implements, clothes, shoes, and food (Jones 1954, p. 177; 1968, p. 225; Kotelnikova 1974, pp. 20, 22; Mazzi and Raveggi 1983, pp. 28, 291–99; Piccinni 1982, pp. 56–59). These inputs could increase productivity, especially when smallholders had been working their plots without benefit of animals or the capital investments usually associated with consolidated farms (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 50).

Historians discuss the extent and effect of these investments in a forum called the “return to the land debate” (e.g. Cipolla 1949, 1970; Goldthwaite 1968, pp. 246–51; 1980, pp. 49–50; Herlihy 1981; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1978, p. 254; Jones 1969, pp. 34–38; 1978; Romano 1974). Some historians argue that Florentines were merely purchasing land in rural regions as a retreat from urban business activities and, therefore, making few investments, while others suggest that Florentines’ rural and urban activities were both driven by incentives for profit. Herlihy (1981) provides the best direct evidence for this debate, and he found little to suggest that Florentines withdrew from business ventures when they invested in land. In 1427, the upper 2%–3% of the city’s wealthiest families had no more invested in real estate than in business (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1978,

p. 254). Florentines apparently followed Giovanni Rucellai's advice that agricultural investments diversified portfolios, increasing along with investments in other business ventures. Thus, Herlihy (1981) argued that when the Tuscan economy was expanding, Florentines invested in both manufacturing and agriculture; when the economy was contracting, they invested in neither.

Although sharecropping is often considered to be an unproductive form of land tenure, both from a theoretical standpoint (see review in Emigh 2000a) and in the Tuscan context (Epstein 1991; Giorgetti 1974; Romano 1974), the neoclassical reinterpretation of sharecropping suggests that yields, income, and productivity vary little by land tenure (Byres 1983; Cheung 1969; Morooka and Hayami 1989; Otsuka and Hayami 1988; Pertev 1986; Reid 1973). In fact, detailed analyses comparing yields from sharecropped and owner-worked farms in several Tuscan parishes illustrate that Florentine investments and innovations increased agricultural productivity on shareholdings. Increases in productivity were not only the result of increasing the labor intensity of agricultural production but also increased the productivity of labor (Emigh 1999b, pp. 470–75). Sharecropping was more efficient because landlords made capital improvements to their properties, provided working capital to tenants in the form of cash and livestock, changed cropping patterns, and cultivated beans that increased the fertility of the soil. In other locations, the introduction of sharecropping was also associated with novel cropping patterns, including a mixed agriculture of wine, olives, mulberry trees, and grain (Brown 1989a, 1989b) that also increased agricultural income and productivity.

Furthermore, analyses of leases from locations throughout rural Tuscany indicate that sharecropping was systematically associated with Florentine investment. These analyses, which compare investment in fixed-term and share-term leases, show that, contrary to the Marxist expectation that fixed-term leasing provided the optimal conditions for investment, it was share-term leasing that was more often accompanied by investment in Tuscany (Emigh 1998b, p. 362). The vast majority of leases to share tenants who worked the land stipulated landlords' inputs, while only a minority of fixed-term leases provided such inputs.

Thus, in contrast to the historical literature, which suggests that sharecropping was an inefficient, unproductive feudal form of agricultural production, the bulk of the evidence suggests that, at least in the 15th century, it was accompanied by investment and could support increased productivity. If on aggregate, sharecropping did not support a transition to capitalism, it must have been for reasons other than lack of investment or its inability to increase agricultural production. This evidence addresses the first aspect of sectoral theories; the necessity of increased agricultural production created by agricultural investment. In this context, it took the

form of private, Florentine investment in rural farms, driven by urban, not rural needs. It is notable that there was little rural investment in agriculture.

Sectoral Transfers

Florentine investment in agriculture was, then, an intersectoral transfer from the urban to the rural sector. Sectoral theories point out that transfers must occur in the opposite direction—that resources, in fact, must be transferred to the urban manufacturing sector for industrialization to occur. Theories of urban bias also point out that the concentration of urban power can, in essence, divert too much surplus from rural to urban regions. Tuscany is, in fact, a likely setting for urban bias, given the preponderance of urban power (Aymard 1982; Epstein 1991; Lachmann 2000). This section examines these intersectoral transfers, from rural to urban regions.

Tuscany's political economy was principally characterized by the pre-eminence of Florence, both politically and economically. In the medieval and early modern period, Florence was a center for banking and cloth production. In comparison to the city, the countryside was relatively undeveloped. Although urban growth stimulated agricultural change, the gap between urban and rural development never closed. Florentine advantage was maintained because urban manufacturing, which primarily produced luxury goods, yielded higher profits than agriculture (Goldthwaite 1968, pp. 246–51; Jones 1969, pp. 35–38; Martines 1963, pp. 35–37). In 1427, for example, Florentines comprised 14% of the Tuscan population but held 65% of the total taxable wealth (Epstein 1991, p. 31; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 94–100). In turn, differential power relations stemming from differences in profits and wealth maintained Florentine control, including restrictions on trade in agricultural commodities, such as limitations on markets and requisitioning of grain (Britnell 1991, p. 32; Epstein 1991, p. 33; Herlihy 1958; Pinto 1978*b*, 1978*a*; Polica 1980, p. 670). These restrictions gave Florentines control of the terms of agricultural production. Other laws upheld the landlords' position vis-à-vis their tenants (Jones 1956, pp. 195–96; 1968, p. 225). Florentines were also powerful because there were no rural centers of power. Seigneurial power was particularly weak in rural Tuscany and was vanquished at a relatively early point in time (Epstein 1991, p. 31).

While market restrictions imposed on agriculture clearly show that Florentines were more powerful than rural Tuscans, and may have had negative consequences, their effects should not be overdrawn. As illustrated above, they did not, in fact, prevent investment in agriculture or preclude increased productivity. Though the officials in charge of grain supplies tried to regulate the price of grain and secure the transport of

food from the *contado*, the area outside of Florence that was tied most tightly to its jurisdiction, they were largely unsuccessful (Goldthwaite 1975, pp. 25–27). Internal constraints on markets were also gradually relaxed over time. The tax on grain brought into Florence was eliminated in the course of the 15th century, or, at least, not enforced (Goldthwaite 1975, p. 27). Similarly, though guild regulations and restrictions are often blamed for the Tuscan economy's decline, they were not strong enough to prevent Tuscan wool merchants from relocating to rural regions (Brown 1989a, pp. 104–5). Furthermore, both the Florentine government and the guilds were quite flexible and took considerable steps to increase production and compete with foreign trade (see review in Brown 1989a, p. 107).

Rural regions were also subject to Florentine taxes, both direct taxes on individuals and assets and indirect taxes on agricultural goods. The differential effects of taxation on rural and urban inhabitants, however, is difficult to disentangle. For example, though Florentines were allowed more tax deductions than rural inhabitants were, they were taxed at a higher rate. In addition, because taxation was based primarily on assets, urban landlords paid tax on their agricultural holdings, though sharecroppers without holdings of their own paid few taxes at all and none on agricultural income (Emigh 1998b, p. 357). Thus, as sharecropping spread in the 15th century, the Florentines' share of taxation on rural products increased while the tenants' share decreased.

While taxation, prices, and market restrictions may have transferred some surplus from rural to urban regions, it is unlikely that such transfers reached a level detrimental to rural regions, given that the regulations were contradictory and difficult to enforce. In fact, given that the economic literature suggests that moderate sectoral transfers spur economic development, these practices may have stimulated the manufacturing sector. Certainly, such restrictions and policies—symptomatic of urban bias—did not have the effect of preventing investments in agriculture that increased productivity, as the previous section shows. While the detrimental effects of such markets cannot be completely ruled out, they did not work in the theorized way; that is, they did not prevent the adoption of capitalist agriculture. In fact, sectoral theories suggest that this transfer of surplus was necessary, especially in this context, because of the intersectoral transfers from the urban to the rural regions in the form of agricultural investment.

Economic Interests

This evidence, then, deepens the Tuscan paradox. The outcome—a sectoral shift that increased the size of the urban vis-à-vis the rural sec-

tor—did not occur, though both preconditions for it existed (rural investment, transfer of surplus to the urban sector). As noted above, however, without a consideration of historically specific economic interests, the sectoral theory remains indeterminate or gives the wrong prediction (capitalist development should have occurred). In the following section, I use the Weberian definition of economic interests, based on the possession of goods and opportunities for income, and show that Florentines had two opportunities for income: from urban manufacturing and commerce and from rural agriculture. Most rural inhabitants had only the latter. Florentines' principal economic activities were those of urban merchants. Their participation in agriculture was shaped primarily by interests based on these urban activities. Rural inhabitants, on the other hand, usually depended on agriculture, and their interests flowed from it. These interests underpinned sectoral relations.

Urban interests.—As noted above, Florence was a center for urban manufacturing, and Florentines were major landlords in rural regions, where they invested in agriculture and, to a large extent, controlled agricultural production. Tuscany's origin as a city-state and the well-developed Florentine economy based on urban manufacturing meant that the region's political and economic power was concentrated in Florence, among a large urban, landowning, merchant class. Urban merchants' primary occupations determined their residence in Florence, the relatively long distance between their urban residences and their rural properties, their inability to devote their entire energies to their agricultural properties, and their use of agricultural holdings to diversify their investments. Thus, to a large extent, rural agriculture was shaped by urban manufacturing (Emigh 1997*b*).

Previous research suggested that sharecropping spread as agricultural relations were refeudalized (Cipolla 1970; Giorgetti 1974; Jones 1978; Romano 1974). However, it is more likely that Tuscan sharecropping was a capitalist form of agricultural production that spread in response to two conditions (Emigh 1997*b*, 2000*a*). First, landlords' interests in supervising their properties and increasing their income made sharecropping attractive. Second, after the mid-14th century, there was a shift in the balance of power that gave tenants some bargaining power (though it did not erase the fundamental difference in power between urban and rural regions) and provided some representation of tenants' interests. Sharecropping began to spread well before 1350 (Jones 1968). Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber's data (1981;1985, pp. 115–19) suggest that, in 1427, 56.6% of rural families were smallholders (they may have leased a few additional plots), 18.9% were sharecroppers, and 4.3% were fixed-term lessees. Sharecropping continued to spread between 1427 and 1469 in the

four rural quarters of the Florentine *contado* (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, pp. 117–18).

The distribution of share-term and fixed-term leasing was a response to urban landlords' need to supervise and manage their properties. Where both landlords and tenants were rural inhabitants living in close proximity to each other, the supervision of wage labor and management of fixed-term lessees were relatively unproblematic. Such was not the case in Tuscany. Florentine landlords were not members of a rural landowning class, so they lived relatively far from their farms. They could not easily prevent damage to their properties or force tenants to work hard or carefully. Landlords used fixed-term and share-term leasing to lower these transaction costs of land management and labor supervision. Share-term leases incorporated some incentives for tenants to work hard because they received a share of the yield. Thus, sharecropping lowered the total costs of land management and labor supervision as distance from Florence and, therefore, distance from the site of landlords' principal business activities increased, as the size of farms increased, and when crops required extensive capital outlays that could be easily damaged by mismanagement. When tenants and landowners were Florentine and lived close to each other, the landlord could more easily assure that the holding was not being misused, land management costs were lower, and fixed-term leasing was more likely. Farms typically included vineyards and olive trees, which increased the sum of labor supervision costs and land management costs and therefore increased the use of sharecropping as a way to lower total transaction costs. In addition, share-term leases were used on large properties where transaction costs were higher. Similarly, landlords may have given long-term leases to fixed-term lessees to provide incentives for them to undertake expensive tasks of land management. Given that fixed-term lessees were often Florentine and leased nearby land, landlords could more easily supervise long-term leases (Emigh 1998*b*, p. 360). In sum, share-term and fixed-term leasing were used to lower total transaction costs that were associated with urban, absentee landlordism (Emigh 1997*b*; see also Akerberg and Botticini 2000; Galassi 1992).

Some authors interpreted the detailed prescriptions for working the land and maintaining the properties that were common to both share-term and fixed-term leases as feudal labor services (Jones 1968; Kotel'nikova 1974). It is more likely that they, like the use of fixed terms or share terms, were an aspect of landlords' management and supervisory practices. Therefore, contrary to arguments that Tuscan sharecropping was a feudal form of land tenure that did not substantially change productive relations (Cipolla 1970; Giorgetti 1974; Lachmann 1990; Jones 1978; Romano 1974), I argue that sharecropping, driven by the capitalist elements of the economy, fundamentally changed rural regions.

Florentines' economic interests are also clear in their choice of lessees. Landlords who wanted to invest in agriculture leased their property directly to share-term or fixed-term worker tenants and provided inputs for their farms (Emigh 1998*b*, pp. 361–63). Share-term leases and, to a lesser extent, fixed-term leases to worker tenants were accompanied by lessors'—most likely landlords'—investment. Landlords often hired managers to supervise directly their worker-tenants when they made capital investments and provided inputs (Jones 1968, p. 222; 1969, p. 37). Thus, the lessors who provided inputs for the farms were probably landlords, making investments to increase productivity on the farms and leasing directly to share-term or fixed-term worker tenants. In contrast, when landlords leased property to middle tenants, it seems that neither landlords nor middle tenants made investments. *Rentiers*, content with whatever rent or produce the farm would provide, apparently frequently leased their property to middle tenants, without making investments. When middle tenants were urban merchants, they were probably uninterested in making investments to rural properties that were not their own (Emigh 1998*b*, pp. 363–65). The farms were not their primary source of income or their principal business activity. Leasing a farm and subletting it to worker tenants may simply have provided a small profit or secured a fresh food supply for urban dwellers who owned no rural property of their own (Kotel'nikova 1985, pp. 752–58).

Fixed-term middle tenants were relatively common in 15th-century Tuscany (Emigh 1998*b*). Landlords, however, invested in properties leased to fixed-term and share-term worker tenants, not to middle tenants. By making such contracts, Florentines increased agricultural productivity and income. However, agriculture was not the primary source of income for Florentine landlords and tenants. Florentines' urban businesses diminished the amount of time they could devote to agriculture. Although Florentines responded to financial opportunities and invested in agricultural holdings, they were not compelled to do so, because they had other sources of income from urban activities. In addition, Florentines held agricultural property to diversify their investment portfolios: profits were lower in agriculture than in urban manufacturing, but they were less risky. Though landlords invested in agriculture, given this financial strategy, they were unlikely to make risky or expensive investments and technological innovations. Tuscan patterns of investment in agriculture occurred not because landlords and tenants were inherently risk averse, lacked entrepreneurial skill, or were disengaged from the market. On the contrary, Florentine investment was shaped by the risk diversification strategies of protocapitalist merchants. In fact, both urban and rural ventures of urbanites were shaped by the same profit motive.

In Tuscany, the urban and rural economy were tied together tightly.

Wages and prices of grain were strongly linked. Wages were high; there was relatively little difference between urban and rural wages because urban manufacturing used many rural inhabitants (Goldthwaite 1975, pp. 15–18; Malanima 1982; see review in Brown 1989a, pp. 110–11). Urban demand for food fueled investment in agriculture. Increases in agricultural productivity, therefore, were highly dependent upon continued urban inputs and on the strength of the Florentine economy. As Herlihy (1981) argued, when the economy was strong Florentines invested in both land and commerce, when the economy was weak they invested in neither. The urban and rural population trends given above also suggest this link between the two sectors. Agricultural productivity was thus tied both to urban demand for food and to urban investment. Both may have declined along with the loss of Tuscany's relative European power in the early modern period.

Rural interests.—Urban interests influenced the use of sharecropping, but rural interests were not irrelevant. Florentines used agriculture to balance their investment portfolios, and sharecropping lowered transaction costs, making absentee landlordism profitable. There was a second condition that allowed sharecropping to spread in the 15th century, a relative reduction in the power differential between landlords and tenants. The strength of the urban economy meant that Florentine landlords were generally more powerful than their rural tenants and usually controlled the terms of agriculture. However, rural depopulation after the 1350s gave tenants some bargaining power and diminished the overall influence of the landlords, even though it did not erase the fundamental power differential between them. Sharecropping often appears as a capitalist form under these conditions of declining landlords' power; landlords' investments are small but important concessions to attract tenants (Emigh 1997b, 2000a; Wells 1996, p. 232). Thus, the spread of sharecropping, was, at least partially, influenced by rural interests.

Rural residents almost certainly preferred to own property. In regions of smallholding, inhabitants bought, sold, and leased land to their advantage depending on their entrepreneurial skill and their families' needs (Emigh 2001, pp. 503–8). Where smallholders owned insufficient land to support a family, however, there were relatively few reasons for them to prefer share-term to fixed-term leasing, because the two types of leases were quite similar. Share-term and fixed-term leases to worker tenants contained similar elements, including cash loans, provisions for livestock, seed, and other supplies, stipulations to work and live on the property and provide labor services, and regulations to prevent misuse of the property (Emigh 1998b, pp. 361–63; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 50; Jones 1954, pp. 176–77; 1956, pp. 194–95; 1968, p. 223; Kotelnikova 1974, pp. 20–21; Piccinni 1985, p. 152; Pinto 1980, pp. 300–306). Urban and

rural Tuscans used and were familiar with both forms of leasing, which evolved slowly out of feudal rents (Jones 1968). Not only did urban landlords lease land to rural inhabitants in both share-terms and fixed-terms, rural inhabitants also frequently leased land from their rural neighbors using both forms of rent (Ackerberg and Botticini 2000; Emigh 2000*b*, 2001).

Sharecropping, however, had several advantages for the tenants. One major advantage of share-tenancy, as opposed to fixed-term leasing, is that it can distribute risks between landlords and tenants (Cheung 1969; Otsuka and Hayami 1988; Rao 1987; Reid 1975). Thus, to the extent that rural inhabitants exercised some bargaining power with respect to the terms of the leases, tenants may have preferred sharecropping because they were not responsible for the entire rent in the event of crop failure. Ackerberg and Botticini (2002) show that tenants' risk aversion affected tenancy choice in Tuscany. Furthermore, share-term leases were more often accompanied by landlords' investments than were fixed-term leases in Tuscany (Emigh 1998*b*, p. 362).

Rural residents probably had some influence over the terms of the lease. Labor shortages between 1350 and 1500 gave tenants some bargaining power in this respect, since landlords' control was diminished by high rural mobility and the scarcity of tenants (Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 73). While some lessees' attempts to improve the terms of their contracts were unsuccessful (Jones 1956, p. 195; 1968, p. 224) and some tenants' obligations may have even increased (Mirri 1959, p. 555), other factors mitigated landlords' abilities to increase labor services or rents. Some land was uncultivated because tenants were scarce and changes in tenancy were frequent. Some tenants never repaid their loans and abandoned their tenancies in response to the combined burden of rent and debt (Giorgetti 1974, p. 37; Herlihy 1968, p. 272; Herlihy and Klapisch-Zuber 1985, p. 119; Jones 1956, p. 196; 1968, p. 225; Mazzi and Ravaggi 1983, pp. 28, 291–99; Niccolini di Camugliano 1925, pp. 16–17; Pinto 1982, pp. 252–329, 423–24). Thus, during this period of time, although Florentine landlords were certainly much more powerful than rural tenants, the difference in power between them was relatively small (Emigh 1997*b*, p. 438).

Finally, sharecropping may have offered one additional advantage for rural inhabitants. Where sharecropping was accompanied by investment, the increased productivity it offered may have increased rural inhabitants' income, even though landlords received half of the harvest as rent. Sharecropped land could be more than twice as productive as land worked by smallholders (Emigh 1999*b*, p. 470). Thus, even half of the yield from a sharecropped farm may have provided a higher income than the income from smallholders' land. Furthermore, sharecroppers paid the lowest taxes

of all Tuscans, since taxation was based on assets, not income. Of course, disposable income was also influenced by debts, and, as the preceding sections indicate, loans from share landlords to tenants were customary. Tenants may have been required to return a considerable portion of their income to their landlords as repayment for their loans. This situation, however, was virtually the same for smallholders, because the overall magnitude of smallholders and sharecroppers' debts were similar (Emigh 2000a, p. 37) and rural indebtedness was widespread (Pinto 1982, pp. 207–23). Thus, it is possible that where sharecropping was a capitalist form, it increased the income of rural inhabitants, in addition to reducing their risks. In fact, sharecropping parishes may have attracted tenants over time. Though tenancy contracts were short-term, tenants often remained on sharecropped farms for long periods of time, especially if the farms were large, profitable, and accompanied by landlords' investments (Emigh 1998a, p. 58; 1999a, pp. 372–73).

In sum, these two sections illustrate how urban and rural inhabitants had different economic interests in agriculture. Urban economic interests were driven by two sets of opportunities for income: from urban manufacturing and from agriculture. The first was their primary and more profitable activity and thus shaped their other activities. However, both sets of activities were driven by urban capitalist, profit-making motives. Agricultural activities were important and taken seriously, though they were secondary activities. Most importantly, they were driven by Florentines' participation in urban manufacturing, which was highly profitable but very risky. Agriculture was more secure but less profitable. Florentines invested in agriculture, then, and indeed expected it to be profitable, but it was not their primary activity. It was not supposed to generate high profits; nor were Florentines entirely dependent upon it.

Rural economic interests lay almost exclusively in obtaining income from land, because rural inhabitants were dependent upon it. There was little rural manufacturing in the 15th century, so migration to a city provided the only other opportunities for income. Certainly, the interests of rural inhabitants lay in making agriculture as profitable as possible. In regions of smallholding, in fact, enterprising rural inhabitants used local markets to increase their income (Emigh 2001, pp. 503–8). While smallholding was certainly preferable to tenancy, many rural inhabitants did not own a sufficient amount of land to survive. Furthermore, rural inhabitants may have preferred sharecropping to fixed-term leasing or perhaps even, in some cases, to working marginally productive land of their own, because sharecropping may have distributed risks and attracted Florentine investment. Rural inhabitants certainly would have preferred to direct sharecropping, in particular, and rural agriculture, in general, to their own interests, and undoubtedly they would have done so if they

had the necessary capital. Florentines were simply much wealthier than rural inhabitants, and they, not rural inhabitants, had the capital to make investments that increased agricultural productivity (Emigh 1999*b*, pp. 472–74). Therefore, Tuscan sharecropping was controlled by Florentines and their managers.

Thus, under the conditions of a more powerful urban economy, the links between the urban and the rural sector reduced, practically to zero, rural autonomy. It is also quite possible that sharecropping drew labor toward it, again preventing the decline in the size of the rural sector. It would seem, then, that the urban and rural sector would have contracted and shrunk together, as Herlihy (1981) suggested and as the population trends presented above indicate. This dynamic was the opposite of the inverse relationship between the rural and urban sector necessary for industrialization to continue, in which the rural sector contracted as the urban sector expanded.

THE DOMESTIC MARKET

I illustrate the consequences of these economic interests, in combination with intersectoral transfers, by examining the domestic market. As noted above, sectoral theories predict that one consequence of investment in agriculture and the transfer of surplus is the creation of a domestic market; that is, local demand for commodities. This outcome, however, did not occur: there was no such domestic market in Tuscany (Epstein 1991, p. 41). To explain this phenomenon, Epstein (1991, p. 41) draws on something like a sectoral theory. He argues that urban exploitation prevented investment and, thus, no transformation of agriculture occurred that would have increased productivity. Consequently, rural income was also too low to support a domestic market for manufactured goods. As I argued above, however, the spread of sharecropping increased productivity, which in turn probably increased the income of sharecroppers. So, while Epstein correctly notes the lack of a domestic market, his explanation is inadequate. In essence, his neoinstitutionalist argument suggests that a precondition for sectoral change (investment in agriculture) was missing and as a result no domestic market was created.

Instead, I argue that the preconditions were present for the creation of a domestic market, yet such an outcome did not occur. Preconditions do not translate directly to outcomes, because sectoral theories are indeterminate without historically specific urban and rural interests. When individual-level interests are explained either by Marxist or neoclassical economic theories (based on formal properties of possession of the means of production or utility maximization), they miss Tuscany's historically

specific economic interests: urban and rural inhabitants owned land for different reasons and acted differently vis-à-vis their rural properties. The incorporation of these economic interests into the sectoral theory explains the outcome, because they assured that intersectoral transfers removed rural inhabitants from and destroyed outlying market structures, replacing them with Florentine markets within which rural inhabitants could not compete. Intersectoral transfers, driven by the growth of the Florentine market, actually destroyed rural markets, thereby undermining the structural basis for a domestic market.

Tuscan smallholding regions were characterized by what Polanyi ([1944] 1957*a*, pp. 43–55; 1957*b*, p. 250) called “local markets.” Though the economy was principally integrated by reciprocity, subsistence production organized by households, there were local, well-developed markets for land, labor, and capital. Partible inheritance, dowries, and local markets were mutually reinforcing. These practices divided the land into relatively small pieces, which were frequently bought and sold to adjust for the size of a family, to recombine pieces of land split apart by inheritance, to dispose of land at inconvenient locations, and to pay off debts. Though such markets were not primarily capitalist markets, coordinated by impersonal exchange based on price and profit, they were well developed and well functioning. They offered enterprising local inhabitants concrete ways to increase income (Emigh 2000*b*, 2001).

As Florentine capitalist markets expanded, they simultaneously spread through and destroyed these local markets, essentially creating a capitalist market that excluded rural inhabitants. This occurred because peasants were actively engaged in markets (not because they were disengaged from them). Within any particular region, the wealthier (or more enterprising) local inhabitants were more successful. Once Florentines entered local markets, however, they completely dominated them, because Florentines were much wealthier than local inhabitants and could generally outbid them. Florentines bought land from local inhabitants, who generally still sold land for the same reasons but were rarely able to purchase land. Thus, in regions of sharecropping, rural residents progressively lost their land (Emigh 1999*a*) and, therefore, their primary basis for engaging in markets. Consequently, local market structures, which might have developed into capitalist domestic markets, were largely eliminated.

As noted above, Florentines consolidated land in rural regions. They did so through multiple methods, by converting customary or feudal tenures or by purchasing land from smallholders (Jones 1968, pp. 225–28). Polica (1980) also argued that Florentines, as well as rural moneylenders, seized land after essentially forcing rural inhabitants to become excessively indebted. Of course, this undoubtedly occurred, but rural inhabitants did not lose land primarily because of forced sales through debt (Emigh 2000*a*,

p. 40). At least equally important were rural inhabitants' interests in selling their land as participants in markets.

Florentines' control of sharecropping also undercut the creation of a rural, domestic market in several other ways. First, the mixed agriculture (including grain, olives, and grapes) practiced on most sharecropped tenancies made the peasants virtually self-sufficient (Brown 1989a, p. 111; Epstein 1991, p. 39). The crop mix was not solely a result of urban control because smallholders also used it, but Florentine capital outlays may have expanded viticulture and olive production. Second, landlords may have matched the sizes of farms and families, limiting the amount of surplus the rural tenants could accumulate. Some landlords were certainly cognizant of their tenants' domestic arrangements (Emigh 1998a, pp. 57–58). Finally, it was probably Florentines who marketed the surplus agricultural produce. The most enterprising urban landlords, who raised agricultural productivity through their involvement in the production process and their investments in agriculture, were also likely to sell their crops on the market themselves (e.g. Emigh 1998a, pp. 54–55). This practice would have undermined rural inhabitants' participation in local commodity markets.

Thus, urban control of sharecropping—especially when it was a protocapitalist response by urban merchants to Florentine market conditions—actually limited rural inhabitants' involvement in markets, by reducing their needs and opportunities to buy and sell land and agricultural commodities on markets. Sometimes, the intensification of market activities turns local markets into capitalist ones. In Tuscany, however, the intensification of capitalist markets undermined local markets, inhibiting the growth of a widespread, domestic market.

Sectoral theories suggest that given agricultural investment, increased productivity, and intersectoral transfers to the manufacturing sector, a strong domestic market should have emerged. Such an argument, however, presumes neoclassical assumptions about interchangeable actors. In Tuscany, rural inhabitants had interests in engaging in markets and, in fact, did so. They were, however, much less powerful than Florentines and thus, when urbanites entered local markets because of their economic interests in expanding sharecropping, rural residents could realize only half of their interests. They could still sell land, but they could rarely buy it. Thus, the spread of the Florentine capitalist market eliminated local markets that could have supported a domestic market, not because preconditions specified by the sectoral theory were absent but because of the interaction between sectoral relations and economic interests.

These findings illustrate the importance of rural autonomy, discussed above. Instead of Florentines' being passive, uninvolved, *rentier* landlords, it is much more likely that they were too involved in agriculture,

tying it to urban fates and markets. Truly absentee landlordism might have created a domestic market, by creating a more autonomous rural sector that allowed rural residents to stay engaged in local markets, thereby strengthening them. Instead, Florentine involvement created a dependent agricultural sector. As the population trends above suggest, it simply contracted and expanded along with the urban sector, but it did not develop autonomously.

The historical evidence in the last few sections suggest that the preconditions existed for a sectoral shift that increased the relative size of the urban sector vis-à-vis the rural sector, yet no such shift occurred. There was investment in the agricultural sector, and, where it occurred, it increased agricultural productivity. At the same time, sectoral transfers, in the form of taxation, prices, and trade, shifted resources toward the urban sector. Some of the transfers stemmed from market restrictions that may have been detrimental to the economy, but it is unlikely that the latter were of sufficient size to have had a powerful effect. They did not, in fact, prevent rural investment. However, these preconditions did not produce a sectoral shift.

A consideration of rural and urban interests, combined with this sectoral theory, illustrates why these preconditions did not have the predicted effect. Urban interests primarily drove agricultural development and assured that the fate of the rural sector was tied to the urban one. Thus, the two sectors expanded and contracted together, not separately. In particular, the historical evidence shows that Florentine urban merchants were, to a large extent, protocapitalist actors and they were major landlords in rural regions. They had substantial economic interests in rural regions, but their agricultural interests were primarily shaped by their principal economic activities in urban manufacturing. Unlike rural inhabitants, Florentines were not entirely dependent upon agricultural income.

In Tuscany, there were no centers of rural power, and rural residents were much less influential, both economically and politically, than urban ones. Florentines, in general, controlled agricultural production. This control was not necessarily detrimental to rural inhabitants, nor was sharecropping necessarily a harsh form of land tenure. Nevertheless, Florentine investment in sharecropping tied agricultural development tightly to urban fortunes and did not create autonomous rural growth. Thus, when the urban economy lost relative power in Europe, the fate of the rural regions was tied to it. Agricultural investment was highly dependent upon the urban economy, both to generate demand for agricultural products and for investment.

These patterns of intersectoral transfers and economic interests explain both the considerable strength of the Tuscan economy and its delayed

transition to capitalism. Urban merchants were dependent upon the market to survive and tried to adapt to changing economic circumstances to maintain or increase their profits in the manufacturing sector. They also recognized financial opportunities in agriculture and tried to capitalize on them. Urban merchants did transform agriculture, but they did not create an autonomous rural economy. The detrimental impact of urban control in Tuscany was undoubtedly tempered by the fact that urban merchants were rural landowners, in contrast to settings where urbanites have little or no involvement with rural regions. The lack of rural centers of power and the dependence of agriculture on urban involvement did not create an autonomous rural economy, nor did it allow rural inhabitants to press for their own economic interests. In contrast to previous explanations of delayed transition that focus on the continuation or emergence of feudal relations in Tuscany, I argue that a capitalist, not a feudal, dynamic was responsible for this phenomenon.

CONCLUSIONS

The economic trajectory of Tuscany is paradoxical because many of the preconditions for a rapid transition to modern, industrial capitalism existed in the late medieval and early modern period, yet no such transition to capitalism occurred (Aymard 1982; Cipolla 1975; Cohen 1980, 1983; Epstein 1991; Holton 1983; Lachmann 1990). Previous explanations miss crucial dimensions of this paradox. Marxist explanations based on tenurial relations or cities as collective surplus extractors do not account for sharecropping's productivity, because they assume that it was an unproductive, feudal form of agricultural production. Interestingly, Smith's description (1976, pp. 432–45) of urban merchants as innovators and improvers best describes Florentines' activities in agriculture. But Smith's theory predicts the wrong outcome. The strong Florentine economy did not produce an early transition to a fully capitalist economy. Neither can a neoinstitutionalist account explain why agricultural investment occurred and increased productivity despite market restrictions. Finally, explanations of delayed transition to capitalism based on the lack of a nation-state also fails to explain the Tuscan case. Throughout the early modern period, the Florentine government undertook reforms that began to create a Tuscan territorial state. Although such reforms were far from complete, they were comparable, or more likely, superior to, developments in other European regions at this time.

To develop an alternative explanation, I combined insights from sectoral theories with a Weberian conceptualization of economic interests. Both the Marxist and neoclassical economic literature note the importance of

intersectoral relations: investment in agriculture and the transfer of surplus to the manufacturing sector without squeezing agriculture. Such preconditions, however, did not produce a transition to capitalism. Thus, without a reconceptualization of economic interests, it is impossible to understand this outcome. Both the Marxist and neoclassical theories link micro-, individual-level interests to macrolevel change. But, because they are rooted in formal properties of microlevel individual incentives, they miss the impact of historically specific economic interests. Marxist analyses based on the formal relationship to the means of production miss how urban and rural landlords' involvement in agriculture differed because of their different economic interests, though they both owned land. Similarly, neoclassical analyses that focus on the effects of abstract mechanisms such as prices miss the power configurations that predetermine their effects. Furthermore, theories based on formal properties of utility maximization miss the different incentives for agricultural investment based on the economic interests entailed in urban or rural residence. Florentines' economic interests as urban merchants were not interchangeable with rural ones. Florentines and rural inhabitants would not have made the same investments in agriculture because they had different economic interests, even if both were attempting to maximize profits.

Thus, I reconceptualize these individual-level interests using Weber, who defined economic interests as deriving from the possession of goods and opportunities for income. Such interests are historically specific; unlike interests given by formal properties, they yield no prediction outside of a historical context. Empirically, I explain the Tuscan case by showing how opportunities for income and the possession of goods were linked to sectoral differences. Urban inhabitants had opportunities for income from both manufacturing and agriculture, while rural residents had only the latter. Furthermore, urban residents had the capital—"possessed the goods"—to invest in agriculture to make it productive; rural residents did not.

The urban bias literature shows, in a somewhat different way, that economic interests and, in particular, their intersection with power relations are important in explaining sectoral patterns (Bates 1981; Lipton 1977; Mitra 1977). This literature shows that urban power can crystallize to squeeze rural regions, prevent investment, and decrease rural income, or decrease agricultural productivity. Urbanites, acting in their own interest, can implement price restrictions, policies of taxation, or market restrictions that prevent rural development. Where rural inhabitants are relatively powerless, they have little autonomy, and they cannot act in their own interest. The empirical evidence from Tuscany illustrates a different aspect of the importance of rural autonomy. There is no doubt that Tuscany exhibited some of the effects of "urban bias," and it is, of

course, possible that they had some detrimental effect, as Epstein (1991) argues. Nevertheless, they did not prevent investment or increased productivity. The lack of rural autonomy also had important effects. The review of Tuscan history illustrated that the rural sector was not at all autonomous but was tied to the urban sector. Although this was not necessarily detrimental in the short run for agricultural investment, productivity, or even peasants' incomes, in the long run it meant that the agricultural sector grew or declined along with the urban economy, not independently of it. Thus, even when urban predominance does not prevent agricultural development, it may eliminate rural autonomy. As is noted in the literature on urban bias, where urban interests are very strong and coalesce, rural interests may be ignored. While the historical evidence suggests that sharecropping may have partially coincided with rural interests, as Lachmann (2000) correctly explains, Florentine elites primarily directed rural development. So the Tuscan case reinforces the importance of rural autonomy, precisely because when it was not present there was no rapid movement toward industrial capitalism, even in the presence of numerous preconditions that might produce such a transition. In fact, this outcome occurred even when the effects of urban bias (such as market restrictions) on agricultural productivity were not particularly deleterious.

The causes of the lack of a domestic market illustrate this point about rural autonomy. The Florentine market spread through and simultaneously destroyed rural local markets. Rural inhabitants could not participate as equals with Florentines in capitalist markets, even when they had been active players in local markets, because Florentines were much more powerful and wealthier. Rural autonomy was therefore undermined by the spread of the Florentine market, as rural inhabitants' abilities to participate in local markets were eliminated.

In one sense, then, Weber was correct about Tuscany. A bureaucratic, national state can extend the privileges of urban residents to rural inhabitants (e.g., citizenship, access to markets, and opportunities for political participation). Formal rights, however, do not guarantee the equalization of power between the urban and rural sector or their equal market participation. By the time the territorial state developed in Tuscany, urban residents were already much more powerful than rural inhabitants and centers of rural power had been largely eliminated. Florentines' superior economic position could not be eliminated because their economic advantages in markets for land and labor allowed them to dominate rural regions. While such domination was not always detrimental, it moved the economy along a different direction than it would have taken if rural economic interests had been represented.

The comparison with England is striking (Hopcroft and Emigh 2000). The English gentry became a rural elite with a strong political presence

(Brenner 1985*a*, 1985*b*). These powerful rural inhabitants could press their economic interests; furthermore, they were completely dependent upon agriculture because they did not have opportunities for income from urban manufacturing. Thus, they created an agricultural sector that was autonomous from the urban sector, not tied to it, as in Tuscany. Rural economic growth was independent from urban growth. The explanation based on sectoral differences is, in fact, more robust than an explanation based on differences in land tenure. Although Marxist treatments focus on agrarian capitalist middle tenants as the force behind increased productivity in English agriculture (Brenner 1985*a*, 1985*b*), others argue that smallholding, not fixed-term leasing, increased agricultural productivity (Allen 1992; Hopcroft 1994). In either case, it was more important that rural inhabitants, dependent upon agricultural income, had the ability to pursue their economic interests.

This article employs negative case methodology to expand the context of sociological theory. As I argued above, Tuscan economic development is an example of a negative case because the expected outcome, a rapid transition to modern, industrial capitalism, did not occur. Although previous explanations try to resolve the Tuscan case by arguing that one of the preconditions for the emergence of capitalism did not exist, this article incorporates sectoral differences into theories of transitions to capitalism to explain this case and to expand the content of sociological theory. In fact, even when neoclassical and Marxist sectoral theories are applied to the Tuscan case, they predict the incorrect outcome (that agricultural investment and the transfer of surplus should have produced a transition to capitalism). Thus, a Weberian theory of economic interests was added to the sectoral theories. This explanation shows that even when actors act as capitalists and pursue their economic interests that are determined by their dependence upon the market, the transition to capitalism may not occur when the difference in power between urban and rural residents eliminates rural autonomy and prevents rural inhabitants from pursuing their own economic interests. This case is an important reminder that capitalism is not a naturally unfolding dynamic or an inevitable outcome. In this case, in fact, the capitalist dynamic underlying Florentines' investment in agriculture was the culprit of the eventual undevelopment of capitalism.

In the Lakatosian spirit of negative case theory, previous explanations of Tuscan economic development were not "disproved." Instead, the elements of sectoral theories from the strongest explanations of Tuscan development given by Epstein, Aymard, and Lachmann were examined. These theories were then expanded to explain the Tuscan case, by an examination of the anomalous evidence and by an investigation of the discrepancies between the preconditions and the predicted outcome. While

Epstein's neoinstitutionalist account does not explain why agriculture investment occurred despite market restrictions, he correctly points to the lack of rural autonomy and a domestic market. Similarly, Lachmann's elite theory does not explain why Florentines did, in fact, transform agricultural relations, but it correctly points out elite, Florentine control over rural regions. Likewise, Aymard correctly points to the relationship between the urban and rural sectors and the contradiction between their interests, though he, like Epstein and Lachmann, overestimates the extent to which Florentine control was directly deleterious. An expanded sectoral theory, drawing from these explanations, however, does explain Tuscan development. This Lakatosian perspective can be used, hopefully, in future research to apply this sectoral perspective to other historical and contemporary cases, either illustrating its usefulness or providing other negative cases that could further expand the content of this theory.

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Book Reviews

Heat Wave: A Social Autopsy of Disaster in Chicago. By Eric Klinenberg. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xvii+305. \$27.50.

John L. Jackson, Jr.
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Eric Klinenberg calls his ethnographic study of the 1995 Chicago heat wave a "social autopsy," which is a useful and suggestive way to describe both the horrific event itself and his holistic research methods. Using formal interviews, participant observation, archival research, and quantitative data analysis, Klinenberg paints a nuanced and multidimensional portrait of what happened in Chicago that fateful July. Over the course of less than one week, when temperatures in the city topped 100 degrees, many of the most vulnerable city residents were found dead and alone in their sweltering homes. City officials chalked this tragedy up to the freakish whims of meteorological excess, but Klinenberg refuses to let them off the hook so easily. Instead, he examines the social factors that helped contribute to and compound an already taxing situation.

Beginning his analysis with a discussion of Chicago's everyday social and ecological inequalities, Klinenberg argues for a "geography of vulnerability" linked to race, place, and the specificities of elderly living. Klinenberg offers historical and ethnographic evidence to explain the statistical differences between the high heat wave death rates of African-Americans in North Lawndale and the relatively lower heat-related mortality rates for Latinos in nearby Little Village. Why did so many more elderly African-Americans fall victim to the heat than did Latinos just "across the tracks"? Eschewing popular myths about Latinos having extraspecial cultural respect for their elderly or better-adapted physiological defenses against the heat, Klinenberg looks for other explanations—and finds them.

These two groups seem quite demographically similar in many respects, but Klinenberg finds important differences—and most of them are community specific. He argues that the Latinos of Little Village inhabited a vibrant neighborhood much more thoroughly populated and commercially developed than North Lawndale. The more sparsely populated, deindustrialized, and decidedly militarized landscape of North Lawndale discouraged elderly citizens from leaving their homes in search of air-conditioned safety. Many elderly residents did not trust their own neighbors, let alone strangers on city sidewalks. This distrust, far more palpable in North Lawndale than in Little Village, translated into a greater propensity to avoid the outside world. According to Klinenberg, it was this

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difference in “social ecology” that best explains what happened to so many people in July 1995.

Klinenberg also looks at late-20th-century familial dispersions that left many elderly residents farther away from relatives who might otherwise have looked after them. Without increased government resources, Klinenberg argues, many community organizations and church groups were unable to fill the void. In fact, sometimes such organizations could not even find these needy elderly residents hiding inside their apartments, residents who seldom answered their front doors when strangers came knocking anyway.

The author finds that much of the government’s response to the heat wave was slow and defensive, especially after dismissing advanced warning from the Emergency Response and Research Institute (a nongovernmental, privately held corporation) about the need to take aggressive steps against the meteorological threat. A spatial mismatch between the location of Chicago’s most vulnerable citizens on one side of the city and the concentration of medical treatment facilities on the other combined to overwhelm an already understaffed emergency service infrastructure with too few ambulances taking too long to arrive on the scene (even in normal circumstances). This argument is most compelling when Klinenberg allows the medical workers to describe their own experiences during the crisis.

By the time the city realized that it had to act (a realization borne of sensationalized television news coverage of dead bodies piling up inside the city morgue—as well as inside meat trucks parked in the coroner’s parking lot), it was, according to Klinenberg, already far too late. Chicago had an alternative policing strategy in place that was unable (some Chicagoans would even say unwilling) to successfully deliver needed protective services to the city’s elderly black residents in places like North Lawndale—places where, Klinenberg argues, everyday deprivation was tolerated and rendered invisible.

Klinenberg links his discussion of the crisis to additional structural factors such as energy and water rates that made air conditioners unaffordable luxuries for poorer elderly urbanites on fixed incomes. He ends with a sociological study of digital and electronic news gathering, the political implications of infotainment impulses in the mass media, and a far-too-brief analysis of post-heat wave changes in Chicago’s emergency response structure. Some readers might have gained a great deal more from Klinenberg had he rewired his comprehensive media analysis back into a discussion about how the most vulnerable senior citizens (who were also, according to Klinenberg, often trapped at home watching such news offerings) actually interpreted these media representations. He stops just a little short of adequately connecting those important nodes. Even so, Klinenberg creates a compelling sociological history that is in critical and productive conversation with current cultural analyses of catastrophe and contemporary urban sociologies of race, class, and marginality.

Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago. By David Naguib Pellow. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. Pp. ix+234. \$24.95.

Robert Futrell
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David Naguib Pellow's *Garbage Wars: The Struggle for Environmental Justice in Chicago* offers a rich social history of the U.S. waste industry and community efforts to confront the social and environmental inequalities endemic to waste disposal. He traces the politics of waste in Chicago from the Progressive Era to the present, concentrating on the primary environmental justice (EJ) issue—the unequal distribution of waste among society's least powerful socioeconomic and ethnic communities. His goal is not merely to document the existence of these inequalities and those who protest them, but to explain the process that leads to the unequal outcomes. It is this explanation that distinguishes *Garbage Wars* as innovative scholarship.

Most EJ research focuses on proving or contesting the existence of inequality in the distribution of environmental hazards and their impacts. The general conclusion that "the presence of affluence [is] marked by the absence of effluence" (p. 23) is explained by institutional classism and racism in housing patterns and zoning decisions, and by market imperatives that draw governments and industry toward the paths of least resistance. But these explanations paint an overly simplistic scenario in which the poor or people of color are unilaterally and uniformly dumped on or exposed to hazards due to their powerlessness vis-à-vis corporations and the state. For Pellow, these accounts do not fully capture the complex social, political, and economic dynamics that produce environmental inequities. Using historical and ethnographic methods, he develops a more nuanced explanation of the process by which "environmental inequalities are created, reproduced, and sometimes challenged" (p. 13). He emphasizes the historical origins of environmental injustice and the processes by which it unfolds, the roles of multiple stakeholders and their often conflicting and crosscutting allegiances in the creation of discriminatory siting patterns, and the efforts to resist these incursions by those with the least access to political and economic resources. This approach demonstrates "the way that class and political power often divide communities and racial groups, creating intra-racial, intra-community, and class tensions" (p. 7) that work against strong, comprehensive opposition to environmental injustice and divert attention away from the larger political and economic structures at the root of the problem.

The history of waste management in Chicago reveals an ongoing "movement-policy cycle" (p. 29) whereby a waste management or other polluting technology is introduced, community resistance ensues, then authorities or the industry respond by searching for new operating sites

or creating new regulations that, ostensibly, support cleaner practices. This history shows that EJ challenges have been successful in shaping policy over the last century, but have not significantly reduced environmental inequalities. Indeed, the outcomes of the garbage wars in 1880 bear a striking resemblance to the results of present conflicts. In Chicago, the city's waste continues to be imposed on people of color, immigrants, and the working poor. Part of the reason lies in what Pellow describes as the quasi-colonial dependency of marginalized communities of color on white-dominated business and political elites. In this relationship, environmental quality is often sacrificed for the jobs and investment promised by waste disposal operations that few other locales want. Yet, part of the reason also lies with EJ organizations that sometimes are unwittingly complicit in the imposition of environmental injustices in their own communities. Some of Pellow's most compelling insights on this are found in his analysis of Chicago's ill-fated privatized recycling scheme. On the heels of EJ activists' victory in closing Chicago's oldest solid waste-to-energy incinerator, the city expanded its recycling efforts with the Blue Bag recycling program operated by Waste Management, Inc., the world's largest for-profit waste hauler. The dire need for jobs and an uncritical perception of recycling as a clean industry led many EJ groups to support the program. Yet, Pellow explains, in many ways the Blue Bag program is as regressive as the incinerator for both the communities hosting the facilities and the workers toiling in recycling facilities. This highlights a crucial irony of unintended consequences: environmentalists resisting environmental injustices or trying to implement environmental justice projects sometimes help spawn new forms of environmental inequalities due to the institutional constraints they face.

Garbage Wars is an important addition to the scholarly literature on environmental justice and should be widely read. Pellow's stories of EJ struggles provide a clear view of those on the front lines of conflicts over who pays the price (and who profits) from society's wastes. His conceptual approach shows the importance of historically informed analyses for uncovering the root causes of environmental inequalities and the range of crosscutting interests that are often involved. Yet, it is clear that, for Pellow, this work is more than an academic endeavor. It is also a call to action for scholars and activists to increase their efforts in identifying and resisting the inequities that compromise social and environmental sustainability.

Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment: Institutional and Strategic Perspectives. Edited by Andrew J. Hoffman and Marc J. Ventresca. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002. Pp. xxxiv+489 \$70.00 (cloth); \$34.95 (paper).

Thomas D. Beamish
University of Georgia

This book marks an important addition to the literature concerning the interplay of organizations and the environment. Its origins lie in a conference held at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management in April 2000, which was organized by coeditors Andy Hoffman and Marc Ventresca. The papers generated from this conference are primarily authored by management scholars and by a sprinkling of sociologists. Both groups aim to broach organizational behavior, policy construction, and environmental matters from the perspective of the new institutional theory. According to the editors, this is a topical lacuna: little organizational research addresses environmental matters and fewer yet from what the editors term "field-level processes," where collective rationalities shape meaning and the actions of organizations. The book is an ambitious effort, with an excellent introduction, 15 empirical chapters arranged into five subsections, and two chapters of closing commentary by John Ehrenfeld and Richard Scott.

Institutional analysis has as its strength the capacity to examine organizations given the social world within which they exist (i.e., markets, governments, and civil society) and the socially constructed "control mechanisms" that characterize any field of organizational activity (i.e., regulation, normative, or cognitive [chap. 20]). These qualities are firmly exercised throughout this volume and are a testament to the field's analytic strengths. Overall, the contributions are good: a handful hold considerable promise and few are of incidental importance. I will focus my efforts on the general thrust of each section, since the chapters are too many and too varied to comprehensively evaluate, given reviewer constraints.

The first section, "Institutional Origins," addresses how environmentalism has been institutionalized (hereafter "environment-as-institution"), has been contested, and is currently structured at the level of fields. As an "institutionalized world frame" (chap. 2), environmental protection increasingly confronts contemporary firms and economic organization. The environment-as-institution reflects a range of influences; for example, the state establishment of rules and terms that have expanded markets, promoting the commensuration via monetary value of formerly incommensurable objects such as in the futures trading of air pollution (chap. 5) and also the part "subversive stories" play in institutional change (chap. 4). The environment-as-institution has also been shaped by commercial firms as they resist and cooperate, given the political environment and the corresponding nature of state interventions (chap. 3).

In "Beyond Isomorphism," the chapters focus on "collective rationality" and complexify the isomorphic predictions of new institutional theory (chaps. 6–7). Chapter 8 explores how well trends in voluntary environmental management conform to the ideals promulgated by environmental activists. The third set of chapters discuss "Institutional Processes of Negotiation and Narrative" as represented in Habitat Conservation Planning (chap. 10), in firm-based public relations (chap. 11), and in voluntary program participation (chap. 12). Each explores how economic organizations maneuver to have their interests incorporated into the discourses, idioms, and policies that compose the environment-as-institution.

The fourth section emphasizes "Field-level Analysis" with chapters contending that variegated organizational strategies and behavior are based in differing cognitive models (chap. 13), differing field-level discourses (chap. 14), and differing nation-based environment-as-institutional settings (chap. 15). In the fifth and final empirical section, the authors explore how divergent "Governance and Regulatory Structures," as reflections of distinct and institutionalized policy regimes, sponsor or impede more and less effective environmental outcomes (chaps. 16–18).

I must point out that, while there is power in unpacking institutional representations of the environment, there is also peril when institutions are analytically "decoupled" from materiality. That is, addressing the "natural environment" as an institution—and in this volume one that primarily reflects activities, actors, and conflicts in the market or economic sector—underemphasizes the "other" aspect of the environment: the real material threat its continued degradation poses to life. Emphasizing the power and discursive rise of the environment-as-institution on (mainly) economic organizations exaggerates the extent of environmental change and minimizes that production has changed very little, even if corporate "green ceremonial façades" (chaps. 3, 8, 11) and reactive regulatory mandates are rife. As the Worldwatch Institute (*State of the World* [W.W. Norton, 2003]) among others annually documents, the material basis of production (and consumption) continues to grow and with it parallel environmentally unsustainable withdrawals and additions accelerate. As such, when reified, the environment as an institution is reduced to "just another threat" to economic organizations, to the state, and to the public. Ehrenfeld correctly cautions that the environment is not only discourse or just another threat to the firm; harm to it reverberates well beyond "the firm" (chap. 19), any specific "field of firms," "the economy," or the "state." Any analysis of the "natural environment" and organizations must take this into account.

Notwithstanding these reservations, as an exploratory effort *Organizations, Policy, and the Natural Environment* should be judged not as the final statement, but as an "opening salvo" in the fomentation of environmentally sustainable practices. While most chapters are highly speculative, they do collectively show the important part organizations play in shaping the environment-as-institution and how it can in turn shape

them. What is more, they demonstrate that new institutional analysis has a contribution to make in better depicting and understanding what continues to be an enduring conflict: society and the environment.

Rationing: Constructed Realities and Professional Practices. Edited by David Hughes and Donald Light. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers. Pp. x+199. \$34.95 (paper).

Stefan Timmermans
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Health care sociologists have largely left the topic of rationing to economists, ethicists, and politicians. Economists equate rationing with resource allocation, rendering it an inevitable consequence of dividing scarce resources in a market system. Ethicists discuss rationing scenarios to demarcate equity and fairness criteria in health care systems. Politicians use the notion of rationing to justify or challenge allocative decisions in a time of escalating health care costs.

In their introduction to this edited volume, sociologists Donald Light and David Hughes intend to reclaim rationing for sociologists by offering a highly critical and ironic reading of the concept. They bracket the actual practices that are executed in the name of rationing and focus on the rhetoric construction implied in rationing. They argue that rationing "formulates a particular linkage between allocative decisions and resources which can work to support certain interests against others" (p. 2). In a health care system based on a market model (such as in the United States), inequities following the high cost of health care are often considered "natural," while allocating scarce resources through regulation is viewed as "artificial interference" or rationing. Yet, Light and Hughes point out that this distinction is dubious; only in health care systems with universal access does it make sense to use the term "rationing." They further question what actually occurs when health stakeholders claim that they ration: Are unnecessary services reduced or are necessary services inaccessible to underserved populations? In addition, they aim to reveal the power relationships hidden under the umbrella concept of rationing. Politicians use the term rationing to either portray themselves as rational regulators or to rile up opposition against unpopular health measures. Light and Hughes wonder whose interests and whose pockets are served by the battle cry of rationing. Finally, they question the preference of some health care sociologists for implicit rationing over explicit forms because the latter might lead to unwelcome standardization in health care and alienate the public. Light and Hughes instead worry about the abuse of trust that might fester in systems of implicit rationing. They prefer accountability to autonomy.

While such a critical deconstruction of the concept of rationing is long

overdue, its persuasive value is overshadowed by the empirical research of the other contributors to this volume. Particularly the chapters by Carine Vassy, Ivy Bourgeault et al., Gary Albrecht, and Lesley Griffiths are deeply disturbing. All document in great detail the systematic difficulties patients experience when seeking health care. In light of the emotional, financial, and physical burnout of both patients and care providers, Light and Hughes are insufficiently ironic because they analyze the rhetoric of rationing. The lived experience of making do when lives are at stake is even bleaker and more devastating than they suggest.

The research chapters emphasize the mixed loyalty—even complicity—of health care providers to rationing. The standard view is that rationing constitutes a structural policy of constraining health care resources. Economic hardship is imposed on health professionals by managed care or government regulators. This impression is confirmed in the chapter of Bourgeault and associates, who conducted group interviews with nurses in California and British Columbia. While the nurses in California complain about squeezing strategies to delay, deny, and speed up care, the Canadian respondents observe nothing more than a little pressure on their work practices. This chapter echoes the common view that a differential health care structure circumscribes the agency of the nurses. But Vassy and Griffiths in separate contributions note how physicians, nurses, and other care workers triage patients in part based on the patients' social worth, not simply on their clinical condition or their insurance status. Here, rationing originates from the care providers' cultural perceptions of their patients, and the providers actively shape informal rationing to serve their own interests. Patients are not the only target. Albrecht, discussing disability in the Chicago metropolitan area, notes how physicians deliberately overcharged both insurers and patients, even when payers had preexisting fee arrangements. The complicity of health care providers in rationing if it serves their interests points to the difficulty in implementing economic policies through rationing schemes. In a conversation analysis of calls between attending physicians and utilization reviewers, John Heritage, Elizabeth Boyd, and Lawrence Kleinman show both parties agreeing to unnecessary treatments based on scientific half-truths. More "rationing" might be in order.

The contributions to this excellent volume demonstrate the value of sociologically tackling economical and political buzzwords. The rhetoric of rationed resource allocation covers controversial inequities, contested power relationships, and basic assumptions about what kind of health care system we are living in. Let us hope this inspiring and provocative book marks the onset of a new sociological research tradition.

The Real World of Employee Ownership. By John Logue and Jacquelyn Yates. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi+247. \$45.00 (cloth); \$17.95 (paper).

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United States Air Force Academy

Two aspects of John Logue and Jacquelyn Yates's book immediately caught my attention and piqued my curiosity. The first was the book's foreward by William Greider, whose critiques of work and wealth systems I have long admired. The second aspect was the immediate question of why two political science professors would market a book for organizational sociology and management scholars. Greider's forward effectively set the stage for considering the implications of employee ownership today, and the answer to my second curiosity eventually unfolded as I concluded the book.

Analyses of employee stock ownership programs (ESOPs) and other forms of employee participation in work are certainly timely and quite necessary for today's scholarship. Logue and Yates present us with a powerfully detailed and, to use their words, "doggedly inductive account of what employee ownership is in practice: successes and failures, the good, the bad, and the indifferent" (p. 19), hence the book's title. What this means is that the authors drew on a long-term study of ESOPs in Ohio to describe what happens as these programs mature and evolve. They proceed by examining the role of employee participation, training, communication systems, and information acumen on ESOP performance, which is a setup that most organizational scholars will find enticing.

The book unfolds through an introduction, six chapters, and two appendixes (used to explicate methods and data). Besides setting the stage for their book, Logue and Yates's introductory chapter provides a highly useful historical account of ESOPs in the United States and argues the point of exactly how much influence employees should have in ESOPs. The authors conclude their introduction by sharpening its focus to the key issues of participation, training, communication, and information and by positioning the reader to understand the authors' focus on ESOPs in Ohio.

Chapter 1 presents an overview of the authors' multiyear (beginning in 1990) study and briefly describes the authors' survey methods and data collection. Logue and Yates detail how ESOPs in Ohio form and evolve and describe the issues they face. The authors conclude the chapter by describing their upcoming analysis of participation, training, and communication.

Next the authors detailed the role of communication and training (chap. 2) and participation (chap. 3) in the effective performance of ESOPs. In chapter 2, they draw on the "learning organization" concept as a focal point for their analysis of communication and training. Their analysis

begins with the premise that communication and training will be the two most important elements of ESOP success. However, they find that participation also plays an essential role. Chapter 3, then, presents the essential question, "Can employees actually run the firm?" and examines how various forms of participation have shaped ESOP success with a discussion on making participation work better.

In chapter 4 Logue and Yates engage issues surrounding a union's participation in ESOPs, with an interesting discussion of workplace democracy as a side theme. Next, in chapter 5, they detail the evolution of ESOPs and model ESOP performance in the competitive environment. Here, Logue and Yates demonstrate their solid grasp of the cross-disciplinary issues attending to ESOPs and their success.

Such a strong cross-disciplinary perspective aside, chapter 6 reveals the "real" answer to my question of why these political scientists are engaged in organizational sociology as here Logue and Yates enter into a discussion of the role of ESOPs in public policy. Having demonstrated the usefulness of ESOPs to our work environments, the authors now argue that governmental policy makers should work to encourage ESOPs and to help spread information regarding their best practices. Their advocacy fits nicely with the book's flow, and they again show their integrative perspective by concluding with a short section on ESOPs in the global economy.

Logue and Yates's account of ESOPs is quite compelling (from the wealth of data they collected) and well argued. As a scholar more used to mainstream organizational sociology monographs, I found their perspective refreshing and appealing. That said, mainstream organizational sociologists will probably find the book somewhat disappointing in that Logue and Yates do not provide the level of detail on worker interaction and intricacies to which we are accustomed. Here I am thinking of such books as Gideon Kunda's *Engineering Culture* (Temple University Press, 1992) and Tony Watson's *In Search of Management* (Routledge, 1994) as examples.

However, the importance and usefulness of Logue and Yates's book does stand well on its merits. I see their book as necessary reading for any scholar studying ESOP issues, especially doctoral students developing their expertise. Management scholars will find the modeling and the ESOP performance analysis quite useful as well. Finally, Greider's foreword calls us to consider ESOPs as a necessary transformation in our world of work. Logue and Yates certainly move us well in that direction.

Gifted Tongues: High School Debate and Adolescent Culture. By Gary Alan Fine. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. Pp. xi+301. \$59.50 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

Rob White
University of Tasmania

This fascinating book explores the dynamics and experiences of high school debating in the United States. Basing his work on a year (1989–90) of close interaction with two high school debate squads in the suburbs of St. Paul, Minnesota, the author gathered data from a range of sources, including ethnographic fieldwork, interviews, questionnaires, and document analysis.

The extensive knowledge and personal interest of the researcher (a former debater) makes for a book that provides a richly detailed portrayal of the phenomenon. The enthusiasm of the writer ensures that the book provides a qualitative, fine-grained description and analysis of the high school debaters' social world, as well as pondering the position of this world relative to wider school and adolescent processes. It is an ethnography of children of privilege—a portrait of the cultural capital and cultural domains of one section of the middle classes of middle America. It is a story of talking, of learning to speak in particular ways, and of achieving confidence through competitive debate.

The book begins with a description of the peculiarities of debate talk, both as a game and as a serious activity. Subsequent chapters examine the location of debate within the context of adolescence and as an activity situated within educational institutions. Specific chapters cover topics such as the nature of argument within debating circles, the use of evidence, the dynamics of competitive debating tournaments, team relationships and debate culture, the role of teachers and coaches, and the politics of debate as an educational tool. An appendix provides an extended discussion of the three main communities of debate in the United States—policy debate, Lincoln-Douglas debate, and national circuit debate—and of local variations in debate culture, histories, and ideologies.

Gifted Tongues can be read as an ethnography of discourse that offers a close dissection of debating as a specific cultural activity. It provides information about the words, rituals, and practices of policy debate, and the ways in which knowledge and truth are constructed via this form of languaging reality. Technique, jargon, and judgment criteria are explored in great depth, and the subtleties and complexities of the debating world are teased out. Yet the book is also about the human agents of debating, the students, teachers, parents, and peers who constitute the universe within which debating occurs. Here the emphasis is on status hierarchies, emotional states, learning experiences, frustrations and joys, life alone, and life in the team.

Underpinning the theoretical structure of the book is the theme that

adolescence is not primarily a stage, but a toolkit. As the author argues, "Adolescents can draw upon the tools of both childhood and adulthood in establishing who they are and creating an indigenous, authentic culture. This helps to explain how teens can seem simultaneously and alternately very sophisticated and very childish" (p. 163). The book uses this analogy to explore the various ways in which young debaters negotiate their lives inside and outside of the debating community.

Overall this is a well-written book that provides unique insight into the world of high school debating. While social difference is acknowledged (in the discussion of the gendered nature of debate strategies and tactics), as is social inequality (in relation to the class background of most debaters), there is nevertheless a tendency to refrain from value judgment, or sustained critique, in relation to these differences and inequalities. Conversely, there is a spirited defense of debating as a preferred form of speech education.

The notion of an adolescent toolkit is applied to the very specific and narrow domains of middle-class youth, although one wonders whether it has been sufficiently developed to cater fully for gender and socioeconomic difference, even within this target population. The reification of adulthood as a stable, fixed state of maturity and independence also seems to miss the variability, fragility, and insecurities of people who may well continue to draw upon the tools of childhood and adolescence as they negotiate their adult years.

Adolescent development tends to be conflated with peer activity to the extent that debating is presented as simply another youth subculture, "not all that different from mods and rockers, skinheads, hop-hoppers, hackers, and punks" (p. 243). But, unlike most subcultures, debating (as the author emphasizes earlier in the book) is intrinsically institutional in nature (it is wholly dependent upon the school as to whether or not it exists). Moreover, there are big social differences in youth subcultures, and the reaction of authority figures to these reflect differences in material and symbolic resources generally. Social inequality is never far from the surface, even if it is not treated as especially problematic in this book.

To privilege debate talk as the epitome of good speech education is to simultaneously ignore the distortions and noncommunication of the rapid-fire debate speech so vividly described in the text. Just as important, it is to undervalue through implicit comparison the power and eloquence of other people's languages, other modes of communication. Fine suggests that one way to institutionalize debating would be to set up a multitiered system that would cater to inner-city and rural teams, as well as suburban and private school teams. This, too, is about the reproduction of hierarchy. But, then again, debate is about winners and losers, and knowing one's place is partly a matter of how reality is discursively constructed within the academy as well as outside of it.

Voices of Collective Remembering. By James V. Wertsch. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. v+202. \$60.00 (cloth); \$22.00 (paper).

Steven Brown and David Middleton
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James Wertsch's *Voices of Collective Remembering* is a major statement within the sociocultural study of collective memory. Wertsch describes remembering as an active process, distributed between persons. In remembering, the individual responds to, accommodates, modifies, or even resists the memories of others. This responsiveness to others is entirely integral to the act of remembering itself. Although remembering is achieved by individuals, it is part of a distributed activity that is socially coordinated in every respect.

How then exactly are distributed acts of remembering bound to one another? Drawing on ideas from L. S. Vygotsky, Bakhtin, and others, Wertsch's solution is to focus on semiotic mediation and the "cultural tools" that persons employ in accomplishing remembering activities. What counts as a tool is quite broad—language qualifies, as do narrative texts and technologies such as web-based search engines. Since these tools are communally shared, coordination among users is built into their use. This shifts questions of the continuity and change of memory away from individual actors. For example, continuity does not necessarily indicate that the cognitive contents recalled by individuals are similar. It resides in the nature of the tools through which they collectively attempt to make sense of the past.

Wertsch examines generational differences in collective remembering. He argues that the continuity in the accounts of the past produced by the generation that grew up in post-World War II Soviet Russia can be directly linked to massive state control of history education in terms of curriculum content and time tabling. Control over mediational resources was a means of ensuring that what could be collectively remembered was shaped to fit official, state-sponsored versions of the past. In addition, mediational tools also exist in given contexts. These contexts are never neutral but are sites where collective remembering as a practice rubs up against the state production of "official history." In Soviet Russia this confrontation was often marked by an all-pervading sense of distrust of the narratives and resources provided by the state. This cynicism with regard to official narratives reflects what Wertsch terms a more general "tension" between individuals and the mediational tools that resource human activity.

Wertsch uses this tension as a way of describing how narratives may be consumed without invoking a problematic vocabulary of "internalisation." He investigates the dialectical relationship between the individual, endowed with sets of beliefs and values, and state control over the contexts and resources through which these beliefs might be shaped and expressed.

However, details of the informal and formal infrastructure that interacts with the activity of remembering merits more attention. For example, the widespread sense among Soviet citizens that counternarratives could not be voiced in public was founded on the operation of a massive system of monitoring, recording, reporting, and archiving information on individuals that was formalized through a party administrative apparatus. This colossal system of surveillance established a distributed set of contexts in which remembering might be conducted. What infrastructure might be required to produce state-sponsored versions of history though the coordination of class times across all time zones? Presumably something like a workable system of telecommunications; the hooking up of local education administration with centralized offices; the movement of books, materials, teachers, and so on.

These seemingly mundane details are important because if collective remembering is shaped by the contexts in which it occurs, then we not only need to grasp the contours of these contexts, we need to understand the ways in which contexts are linked and communicate with one another. Furthermore, if stability and change in collective remembering are indexed to the historical development of particular cultural tools, and if these tools are grounded in particular contexts, we also need a fairly detailed analysis of how these contexts and tools evolve together. Wertsch offers an example of this in his analysis of history textbooks, but is the textbook directly shaped by the context of official history teaching? Or does the textbook itself systematically shape the practice of teaching and what may be learned in such a way that we may say that it itself constructs the context of its use? For Wertsch the dialectical tension between individual and tool maps out a trajectory that can be usefully set against a historical chronology. However, our relationships with such "cultural tools" are varied and complex. Tools certainly do work in connecting together and affording a range of activities, and in so doing they tie together the fates of heterogeneous actors and materials. While such dense networks of relationships are not easily summarized in terms of distinct dialectical tensions, they certainly are an important resource in the study of collective remembering. Wertsch's book provides insightful and original scholarship on the dynamic of collective memory and makes a significant contribution to a wide range of disciplinary interests in the social sciences, education, and the humanities.

Museums and Modernity: Art Galleries and the Making of Modern Culture. By Nick Prior. New York: Berg, 2002. Pp. xii+258. \$68.00 (cloth); \$22.50 (paper).

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It should be said straightaway that Prior's study is pitched at a substantial and satisfying theoretical level; this is a serious piece of critical history, and it demands to be taken with corresponding seriousness. The book is divided formally into two parts, but in terms of subject matter actually into three. Part 1 comprises a discussion of the emergence of national art museums in continental Europe, primarily focusing on the Louvre in Paris and the National Gallery in London. Part 2 offers three chapters on the birth of the National Gallery of Scotland. All three narratives take a similar form: an analysis of the early modern scene is presented as the background to the emergence of the full-blown national museum in the 19th century.

Prior's heart is clearly with the sequence of events that led to the creation of the Scottish National Gallery. A treatment of affairs in Scotland, particularly Edinburgh, takes up half the book, and, more important, includes most of the new material. The chosen comparative method involves a retread of pretty familiar ground about princely galleries, the effects of the Revolution in France, and the importance of English country house culture, which has been treated in full elsewhere recently. More significantly, Prior's approach leads him into some rather naïve remarks. On page 22, for example, we are told "Eighteenth-Century Europe was fertile ground for the establishment of modern forms of thought, politics and culture." Then, on page 32: "Certainly this [the eighteenth century] is not the classic century of the national art museum in Europe. The 'golden age' is the nineteenth century." Such statements fit oddly into the strongly theoretical flow and seem to arise from the comparative approach just mentioned. One wonders if a single-strand, historically ordered but still critically informed account of the Scottish National Gallery might not have been more effective.

Prior takes as his underlying theme the very interesting idea that the modern museum offers us a platform from which to view the working out of the tension (or certainly a significant tension) at the heart of modernism between the demotic and the elite (there is the usual problem of whether we call the institutions museums or galleries, and what if any the difference is, but this is too boring to bother with). In its citizenship mode, particularly when this had a strong romantic coloring, modernism was, of course, determinedly democratic, but in its cultural (in the more limited sense) mode it projected into the present ideals of quality and virtue from the past. This explains why the major national galleries were founded to present accredited great art to the people, and why, in order

to resolve the tensions, 19th-century apologists had to create notions about the personally refining and enabling capacities of pictures.

Prior calls this tension “ambiguity” and features the problem particularly in an important section called “‘Aesthetical Idlers’ and the Dissonance of Dirt” (pp. 88–94) which shows that by the 1850s a “discourse of defilement” had “marginalized the optimistic rhetorics of national improvement” which had characterized the 1830s (p. 89). It began to be seen that, if art was to be situated at the heart of a great city where it was easily accessible to all comers, it was easily accessible to all dirt, especially that, of both body and mind, carried by indiscriminate crowds. The book documents this dilemma very well, and the ambiguity involved has not yet been worked out.

At the beginning of chapter 4, we are told, “At this point I want to effect a subtle change in the tempo and detail of the argument in order to focus on a particular study—not of Scotland” (p. 99). The next three chapters provide a detailed account of the rise of modern structures of artistic production in Edinburgh. The first, already referred to, considers the nature and the impact of the Scottish Enlightenment and has some interesting points to make about connoisseurship and collecting, and the characteristically modest stance of the Edinburgh artistically conscious classes. The next chapter traces the immediate institutional history behind the foundation of the National Gallery. Chapter 6, for me the most interesting chapter in the book, analyzes the nature of the National Gallery’s space in 1859 and the styles of behavior this invited and confirmed. Prior examines the external aspect of the Gallery by discussing the context of Prince’s Street, and examines the interior by imagining what it was like to go round it. This walk around the rooms gives vivid body to the theoretical analysis.

The book ends with a conclusion that considers the implications of what has gone before. In this, the juxtaposition of familiar and strange emerges as key. It is a tribute to Prior’s book that he makes us see just how strange, in a number of senses, the development of the National Gallery as a modernist institute was.

Enchanted Feminism: The Reclaiming Witches of San Francisco. By Jone Salomonsen. New York: Routledge, 2002. Pp. x+318. \$65.00 (cloth); \$20.95 (paper).

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Jone Salomonsen is a Norwegian theologian who uses anthropological methods in her in-depth study of the community of Reclaiming witches and their spiritual practices. She skillfully weaves together ethnographic description with rigorous discussions of context and meaning, creating a

book that is a pleasure for a scholar to read, even when the reader may have some reservations about her final conclusion.

Salomonsen began her research of *Reclaiming* in 1984, as part of her master's work in theology. At that time, she went through a series of classes in "women's magic" and ended up forming a coven with her classmates (she is still a member). She returned to San Francisco to resume research for her doctorate in 1988-89, returning again for a few months in 1990 and again in 1994. During her stay, she lived for six months in a *Reclaiming* community and participated in several magicopolitical "direct actions" for which the *Reclaiming* community is well known. She reports she was eventually accepted into the community "as a student in theology and social anthropology doing a piece of work and as a critical feminist on a religious journey" (p. 23). *Reclaiming* witches consider themselves to be mystics, thus fieldwork means more than simply participating. Salomonsen argues effectively that it entails engaging, taking one's own cognitive and emotional experiences seriously through what she calls a "method of compassion."

Part 1, "Guardians of the World," describes the *Reclaiming* community, who they are, their history and vision, and how their practice differs from that of other contemporary witches. The *Reclaiming* tradition began in 1979 as a small teaching collective of feminist witches in San Francisco, the most well known of whom is Starhawk. Their first public ritual was the Spiral Dance at Samhain (Halloween) in 1979. In 1997, the *Reclaiming* Collective dissolved and was replaced with local and transnational councils that better met the needs of a rapidly growing movement. Groups practicing in the *Reclaiming* tradition can now be found all over the United States, Canada, and Western Europe. Salomonsen presents this growth in detail that has not appeared elsewhere, and this section will serve as an important resource for those doing work in this area in the future. The author does an excellent job of examining Starhawk's writings over time and the ongoing development of *Reclaiming's* hermeneutics. This is particularly significant because Starhawk's books have been a major influence in the growth of contemporary witchcraft.

Part 2, "Priestesses of the Craft," incorporates ethnography to show how the practices developed in the *Reclaiming* tradition function on both spiritual and psychological levels. Salomonsen takes the reader to an introductory class in magic; a magical ritual that takes participants on a journey through "death" and rebirth; and rites of healing, passage, and personal growth. This section is particularly valuable for its discussion on the unique contributions of this spirituality; for its emphasis on human growth, the power of magical ritual, and its insistence upon recognizing "gendered subjectivity and its rootedness in the thresholds of the body" (p. 294).

Where the book will be controversial is in the author's claim that, although feminist witches believe they have created a new religion, it is more accurately identified as "a subcultural branch of Jewish and Chris-

tian traditions" (p. 297). Salomonsen bases her argument in great part upon Reclaiming belief that life is derived from a beneficent divine source, and the concept that the Goddess (holy spirit) is potentially within everyone, "which can be listened to beyond and in opposition to, the context of tradition . . . an autonomous veritable voice" (p. 125). She also points out that Reclaiming people tend to not acknowledge that their occult heritage goes back to Gerald Gardner, Aleister Crowley, and patriarchal secret societies from the turn of the last century, a heritage documented by British historian Ronald Hutton (*The Triumph of the Moon: A History of Modern Pagan Witchcraft* [Oxford University Press, 1999]).

While it will be argued that the author has overstated her case, she presents it forcefully and supports it with considerable detail. She is correct in stating that "many of the ideological elements in the ethos of feminist Witchcraft are similar to those expressed in the utopian strands of western religion in general" (p. 108)—but feminist witchcraft does not borrow from the West alone. In Reclaiming, "meanings of Self and unconditional forgiving inherited from western and Jewish and Christian traditions are reinterpreted in accordance with the karmic idea of taking responsibility for one's own actions, of using every mistake for an opportunity for growth" (p. 115).

The book is a unique study and presents a fascinating analysis. As a spiritual path, the Reclaiming tradition apparently works, regardless of its hereditary debts. Salomonsen deftly explains how and why, and in the process, asks some very provocative questions.

Body Work: Beauty and Self-Image in American Culture. By Debra L. Gimlin. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Pp. x+171. \$48.00 (cloth); \$16.95 (paper).

Maxine Craig
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Debra Gimlin's *Body Work* fills an important gap in the literature on women's bodies and beauty by articulating the meanings that women themselves give to their attempts to transform their faces, hair, and bodies. Gimlin interviewed women who had undergone plastic surgery and conducted fieldwork in beauty salons, aerobics studios, and in the meetings and dances of the National Association to Advance Fat Acceptance (NAAFA) to observe how women use body work to shape personal identity. She argues that each of these institutional settings provides women with different kinds of resources for establishing comfortable identities.

The book's title suggests a more universal analysis than Gimlin's research can provide. A more appropriate subtitle would have been: *Beauty and Self-Image among White (and a Few Immigrant) Middle-Class Women*. Nonetheless, Gimlin establishes a powerful conceptual frame for

her work by arguing that these women perform body work to achieve normality. Feeling that their quite normal aging, fleshy, or distinctively featured faces and bodies were deviant, her subjects engaged in body work and developed verbal accounts to distance themselves from the public failure of their bodies. Women accounted for the "deviance" of their appearance in terms of "accidents." One woman was beautiful until she had to change elementary schools; another explained that the constraints of marriage caused her body to deteriorate. Aerobics classes, beauty salons, plastic surgeons' offices, and NAAFA dances provide women with the restorative practices or discursive covers they need. Gimlin provides wonderfully clear analyses of the construction of "natural," of the fragile professional status of beauticians, and of the ways in which women choose haircuts, exercise, and undergo plastic surgery to mark social distinctions.

Gimlin describes the way stylists make claims about professionalism and engage in conversational intimacy, albeit of the unidirectional client and patron kind, to diminish the class differences between themselves and their customers. However, her attention to how class position shapes meaning slips out of her analysis when Gimlin describes what beauty shop interactions tell us about the importance of beauty in women's lives. Gimlin refers to the stylists as "priestesses" of a beauty "faith." Noting that customers reject beauticians' advice she concludes, "outside the hair salon, beauty does not reign supreme" (p. 27). It seems, however, that she has shown only that working-class stylists do not reign. Perhaps beauty stylists are not priestesses, but nuns or, more prosaically, women whose social location makes it appealing for them to make a career (and find meaning) by offering services within a socially devalued realm.

Does beauty reign supreme? Demonstrating the agency, pleasure, and growing self-confidence women enjoy in salons and exercise classes, Gimlin argues that through body work women "create space for personal liberation" (p. 2) and that beauty salons and aerobics classes provide a "conceptual space in which women may resist beauty ideology" (p. 145). Women use body work to diminish the place of aesthetic concerns in their lives, but is this resistance? We can only know if we have a definition of beauty ideology. Gimlin never fully addresses the content of beauty ideology, yet the concerns documented in her fieldwork suggest its complexity. Alongside expectations that women appear thin, young, and Western-European are contradictory, class-laden, moral expectations that women be natural, athletic, and unconcerned about their looks. These contradictions surface in the comments of the study's participants who say that they do not want to be "obsessed" with their bodies but also want to be "the kind of person who cares enough about herself" (p. 61). In the context of such contradictory demands frequent "carefree" haircuts, exercise that replaces a desire for thinness with a quest for endurance, and surgery that frees a woman from a prior obsession represent something more complicated and problematic than resistance.

Frequently Gimlin opposes herself to "feminist writers" who have por-

trayed women as victims of beauty culture. Gimlin rightly criticizes writers who have portrayed women as "cultural dupes . . . passively submitting to the demands of beauty" (p. 106). Gimlin's critique, however, lumps academic feminists, aspects of movement feminism, and journalistic popularizations of feminism together in a way that does not do justice to the nuanced ways that writers such as Susan Bordo, Kathy Peiss, and Sandra Bartky have written about women's bodies. Gimlin argues that women who perform body work are "savvy cultural negotiators" (p. 106). The evidence presented in her book suggests, perhaps, that as negotiators women actively submit to the demands of normativity. I question whether this submission should be considered liberation. Still, Gimlin's research advances scholarship on women and the body by presenting the meanings women themselves give to body work and the uses body work has in their lives. It is highly readable and led me to reflect on my own body work and that of my friends. I expect that it will stimulate lively classroom discussions, and I recommend this book for classes on gender, identity, the body, or work and professions.

Ain't I a Beauty Queen? Black Women, Beauty, and the Politics of Race. By Maxine Leeds Craig. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. viii+193. \$45.00 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

Rose Weitz
Arizona State University

In her book *Ain't I a Beauty Queen? Black Women, Beauty, and the Politics of Race*, Maxine Leeds Craig masterfully blends archival research and interviews to explore the changing meanings of black female beauty and to place these changes in the context of race, gender, and class politics. As interest in the sociology of culture and of the body have grown in the last quarter century, several books have appeared that explore issues related to the black female body. Of these, the most sociological are *Hair Matters: Beauty, Power, and Black Women's Consciousness* (New York University Press, 2000) by Ingrid Banks, and *Hair Raising: Beauty, Culture, and African American Women* (Rutgers University Press, 1996) by Noliwe Rooks. Rooks's book focuses on Madam C. J. Walker, an early 20th-century entrepreneur who earned millions selling hair care products to black women, while Banks's book provides an overview of the role hair plays in the lives of contemporary black women. Both of these books are well worth reading, and both nicely complement Craig's work.

Ain't I a Beauty Queen? opens by describing how, during the 1968 Miss America pageant, women's liberation activists protested its objectification of white women's bodies while, simultaneously, Civil Rights activists protested the effective exclusion of black women from the pageant by running their own Miss Black America contest. As Craig points

out, these two diametrically opposed protests highlight the different social positions of black and white women. At the same time, the Miss Black America contest highlighted how the fight for racial equality could reinforce gendered inequalities as well as specifically middle-class notions of what is a beautiful woman.

Craig grounds her argument in Omi and Winant's concept of racial "rearticulation," focusing on how social movements can create cultural change—in this case, changing the meaning of race and racial identity. By so doing, she argues (drawing on Bourdieu) that social movements have the potential to change the balance of cultural capital and to challenge ingrained social hierarchies. In this specific case, the Civil Rights and black power movements increased African-Americans' cultural capital by challenging the belief that black female bodies were inherently unattractive. As she shows, both black cultural activists and black nationalists found glorifying "natural" images of black female beauty a useful organizing tool for fighting racial hierarchies and developing a collective black identity among a population deeply divided by regional, cultural, and economic distinction. Yet in so doing, black activists reinforced gender hierarchies.

The book traces the history of the black beauty pageant from its origins in the late 19th century as a black community institution through the fight to include black women in previously white beauty contests as part of the Civil Rights movement. Similarly, it explains how, prior to the Civil Rights movement, straightened hair on women was viewed not only as most attractive, but also as a sign of middle-class status and respectability that "dignified" the race, whereas, during the heyday of that movement, straightened hair came to be seen by activists as a sign that a woman lacked pride and was conforming to middle-class white norms. A fascinating chapter explores the changing meanings of straightened hair among black men. Prior to the Civil Rights movement, middle-class black men wore their hair in short "naturals," while straightened "conks" were worn only by entertainers and those on the margins of respectability (rural migrants looking for a way to show they were moving up in the world and those in the criminal underlife). Not surprisingly, the conk held different meanings among different segments of the population: emphasized masculinity for those who linked it to rebelliousness and the criminal life, effeminacy and lower-class status for middle-class blacks who viewed it as foolish primping, and upward mobility for recent migrants to cities who viewed it as a sign that a man had spending money.

As the Civil Rights and then the black power movements grew, the meaning of straightened hair changed for both men and women. But for men, shifting from conks to Afros meant adopting a style that resembled that worn already by middle-class males, and thus integrated them into hegemonic masculine models. For women, adopting Afros meant a sharp break with middle-class norms of female respectability. As a result, early adopters faced considerable stigma within the black community (as well

as discrimination from whites), but once naturals became widely popular, their political meaning quickly dissipated and naturals soon became just one more dated style. This leads Craig to conclude that, although cultural change is important as a tool for improving individual lives, its significance is limited unless accompanied by broader political changes.

The book is impeccably researched and written, pulling together a wide range of materials into a coherent and convincing argument. It should be read by anyone interested in social movements, cultural change, racial politics, gender, or the sociology of the body.

Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. By Alejandro Portes and Rubén G. Rumbaut. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv+406. \$50.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Victor Nee
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Alejandro Portes and Rubén Rumbaut's *Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation* has received deserved acclaim for its thoughtful and probing analysis of the children of post-1960s immigration. It is an outstanding work of modern empirical sociology, illuminating with great clarity and rigor the experiences of both parents and children of the new Hispanic and Asian immigration. Its achievement is to integrate conceptually sociological understandings of assimilation and of social inequality by highlighting the unequal outcomes experienced by contemporary immigrants and their children. The book offers a remarkably rich and engaging study of the conditions and contexts that shape the diverse incorporation of immigrant families and groups, specifying and refining the concept of segmented assimilation, which in *Legacies* refers to the causes of unequal outcomes experienced by immigrant families and groups. Throughout the book one encounters a sensitive and nuanced treatment of conflicting expectations and tensions arising from assimilation. Portes and Rumbaut's sensitivity is reflected in their excellent discussion of bilingualism and selective acculturation, which they describe eloquently as a sensible and progressive social policy for the United States in an era of globalization. With *Legacies*, Portes and Rumbaut have written the benchmark study, reinvigorating empirical study of the experience of assimilation of the second generation, a field dormant since the seminal studies of the Chicago school of sociology, which pioneered the study of assimilation.

Portes and Rumbaut argue that the concept of segmented assimilation best captures the experiences of the new second generation. The idea was first introduced into the sociological literature in an influential article written by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou and published in 1993. This

earlier formulation of segmented assimilation heavily criticized the classical sociological literature on assimilation for its racism, emphasizing that the persistence of societal racism in the contemporary United States heightens the prospect for significant downward mobility of the children of poor immigrants. In *Legacies*, Portes and Rumbaut elaborate and defend segmented assimilation in light of the data from the Children of Immigrants Longitudinal Study. What emerges is a careful specification of segmented assimilation that spells out the background conditions and social contexts promoting assimilation and generating what they identify as "downward assimilation"—the merging of second-generation youths with the inner-city minority underclass.

The authors closely align the study of the second-generation experience with stratification research, a bedrock assumption of which is the view that social mobility entails unequal outcomes. The question the authors do not address, however, is why we should be surprised to learn that the immigrant second generation experiences both upward and downward intergenerational mobility. Like the second generation that Portes and Rumbaut study, non-Hispanic white youths, especially the children of the middle class, also face risks of downward mobility during a period of vast structural changes in advanced capitalism. Whether the children of immigrant minorities face a greater risk of downward intergenerational mobility is not addressed by the empirical analysis developed by Portes and Rumbaut. This brings up an important oversight in the conceptual specification of segmented assimilation: its failure to take account of the existence of a distinct third pattern of assimilation apart from upward and downward intergenerational mobility. This is *horizontal* mobility, wherein many in the second generation remain in the same or similar occupational categories as their immigrant parent(s). The concept of segmented assimilation appears to conflate horizontal mobility with downward assimilation. Yet horizontal mobility was a common intergenerational pattern for white ethnics descended from the earlier European migrations to North America. It often entailed finding jobs outside the immigrant ethnic economy secured through mainstream labor markets. These jobs entailed better conditions and terms of work than jobs available to the immigrant generation, and hence were perceived by the white ethnic second generation as an improvement over their parents' mobility experience. In sum, by emphasizing only downward and upward assimilation, Portes and Rumbaut overlook examining the social implications of what may likely be the dominant pattern, horizontal mobility for the new second generation, both of traditional labor migrants and human-capital immigrants.

Legacies' lasting contribution is to document how the social context of immigration shapes the experience of the second generation. The authors eloquently and persuasively highlight an emergent social problem arising from risks the children of poor nonwhite labor migrants confront growing up in America's declining central cities. The solutions that the authors

recommend are sensibly presented. They argue that selective acculturation optimizes the chances of a youth experience consonant with the values of an immigrant parent, which are directed toward upward intergenerational mobility. They write persuasively that the immigrant community offers important resources and the requisite social support to buffer the second generation from dangerous undercurrents of life in the inner city. They convincingly recommend building in public schools the capacity to provide for genuine bilingualism as a social policy in line with today's global capitalism. Yet they also provide data that show just how difficult it is to achieve genuine bilingual competence. They show in their sample that the most academically accomplished youths are either fluent in English or genuinely bilingual, but youths who lack competence in either English or their parents' native tongue fall between the cracks and perform poorly in school.

As a benchmark study, *Legacies* sets the bar at a very high level for all subsequent studies of the second generation. It is an exemplary model of rigorous and hard-hitting empirical research that will stand the test of time. It is an essential study for those who wish to understand the making of a multiethnic society in which unequal outcomes retain a racial underpinning.

Being Israeli: The Dynamics of Multiple Citizenship. By Gershon Shafir and Yoav Peled. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+397. \$65.00 (cloth); \$23.00 (paper).

Nils Butenschøn
University of Oslo

Being Israeli is one of the most important studies on the Zionist-Israeli state building endeavor to have been published internationally for years. It represents the latest contribution in a line of major works on the political sociology of the Israeli society, introduced by S. N. Eisenstadt in the 1950s and 1960s. A common theme in this literature is the ambition to identify the historical, social, political, and cultural conditions conducive for democratic incorporation of the diverse social categories of people living in or coming to Israel. But whereas Eisenstadt's functionalist approach was closely associated with the precepts of post-World War II Zionist state building itself (focusing on the development of a relatively homogenous Jewish-national identity in Israel), some of the more recent works have emphasized the persistence and even deepening of political cleavages along sociocultural identities, both within the Jewish-Israeli society and between Jews and non-Jewish Palestinians. What furthermore characterizes this literature is an increasingly critical approach to basic tenets of ethnonationalist Zionist state building. Sammy Smooha's work starting with *Israel: Pluralism and Conflict* (University of California Press, 1978)

is but one example; Baruch Kimmerling, with his emphasis on the significance of territorial control for the system formation of the Israeli polity (or "control system" as he calls it), is another (Baruch Kimmerling, ed., *The Israeli State and Society: Boundaries and Frontiers* [SUNY Press, 1989]).

Shafir and Peled build upon and develop their own approach in a critical dialogue with such earlier contributions (which also include pioneering works of Yonathan Shapiro, Dan Horowitz, Moshe Lissak, and others), and identify themselves with what they call the "new" or "critical" generation of Israeli social scientists. They explicitly share a number of "crucial basic assumptions" with these scholars, particularly "that as a unit of analysis, 'Israeli society' includes both Jews and Palestinians; that the boundaries of this unit should extend to the limits of Israel's effective rule; that interests, rather than ideas, are the prime moving power of history; and that social and historical analysis should focus, therefore, on actions and their results, rather than on intentions and their ideological justifications" (p. 33).

The authors' own contribution to the critical school of Israeli sociology is their reinterpretation of the sociopolitical history of the Yishuv (the Jewish society in Palestine), organized in terms of three distinct "discourses on citizenship"—the ethnonationalist, the liberal, and the republican (or communitarian) discourses. These discourses reflect basically different views on and justifications of what should constitute the organizing principles of state building, who should and who should not be included as legitimate full members of the political order, and how rights and obligations should be defined and institutionally implemented. Throughout the book the significance of these discourses in the formation of the Yishuv and later the State of Israel is discussed and analyzed with sober clarity and given a rich and space-effective empirical presentation.

The book could be seen as the most critical reappraisal by Israeli scholars to date of the political order and institutional patterns that were established by the Zionist Labor Movement (what the authors call "Labor Settlement Movement," hereafter LSM). The LSM was the movement of the pioneers and engineers of Israeli state building. But, "the LSM failed to assimilate the masses of Mizrachim [Jews from Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa], the Orthodox, and certainly the Palestinian Arabs, and assimilated women only in a limited fashion into its institutional domain. It failed to provide universal access to the rights ensured by its institutions, since its universalism was limited to gaining and providing national citizenship" (p. 71). Shafir and Peled insist that the success of the LSM in establishing a hegemony in the early years of Israeli statehood, and its failures to create real democracy, must be understood with reference to its nature as embodying a colonial frontier society: It was a settler nationalist movement in the first place, a socialist movement in the second. The authors pursue this perspective throughout the book and investigate how it impinges on discourses on citizenship and

its implications for the practical implementation of citizenship rights in the different segments of the population.

Two short points for critical remarks: First, the book should have included a more thorough analysis of the roots and expressions of right-wing and religious Zionism in order to better evaluate prospects for either "a democratic multicultural incorporation regime" (as the authors favor) or backlashes in a fascist ethnonationalist direction. Second, the book does not include a discussion of the Jewish diaspora and its role and significance for Zionist state building and conceptions of citizenship in Israel. Analyzing Zionist state building as a form of settler colonialist practice is of course nothing new in itself; this is the standard approach by anti-Zionist scholars. But the way in which this perspective ("Israel's underlying colonial character" [p. 203]) is now consistently applied in a major study "from within," that is, by scholars who see themselves as a product of mainstream Israeli political sociology, is new, at least as far as this reader is informed. Combining the historical-sociological frontier perspective on Israel with the citizenship approach is theoretically innovative and very instructive, and should be of interest for comparative research.

Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs: Gender Identity Politics in Nicaragua, 1979–1999. By Lorraine Bayard de Volo. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv+293. \$24.95 (paper).

Amy Lind
Arizona State University

How did a group of poor, primarily senior women establish the Matagalpa, Nicaragua, committee of the Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs and become a powerful force in Nicaraguan revolutionary politics from the 1970s to the 1990s? How were notions of gender, family, and motherhood invoked in leftist (i.e., Sandinista) political discourse to catalyze women to action and garner their support for state socialism? How did this group of mothers maintain its political identity both during and after the revolution, from a context of socialism and war to a context of neoliberal restructuring? These are some of the questions Lorraine Bayard de Volo asks in her comprehensive study of gender identity politics and revolutionary change in Nicaragua. A political scientist, Bayard de Volo draws from a variety of disciplines to analyze how cultural-political constructions of motherhood were employed to help catalyze women to action in Nicaragua's revolutionary process. This text is appropriate for undergraduate and graduate students as well as for scholars interested in gender politics, social movements, revolution, neoliberalism, and Latin American or Third World studies.

Bayard de Volo addresses maternal politics in Nicaragua on two levels. First, she addresses how "revolution, war, and democratic transitions"

themselves are gendered (p. xv). Second, she addresses how the Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs of Matagalpa negotiated these complex processes during the 1979–99 period, all the while maintaining their maternal political identity until the group's decline in the late 1990s. Drawing on and critiquing earlier studies that address how women have organized as “life-givers,” based on an essentialized notion of gender, the author argues that “supposedly ‘natural’ maternal traits . . . must be viewed in terms of cultural politics in the context of hegemonic struggle” (p. 239). She observes that maternal identity has both helped and hindered women's political participation and is not natural, but rather produced through specific discourses, strategies, institutions, and ideological movements.

This book is rich in detail and description, making it one of the best analyses of maternal gender politics in Nicaragua to date. She draws upon a year of fieldwork, three subsequent one-month trips to Nicaragua, extensive interviews with members of the Matagalpa group and other Nicaraguans, and a wide variety of secondary sources. Chapters 1–4 address how the Mothers utilized their maternal roles to affect political change and support the Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional (Sandinista National Liberation Front, FSLN) during the early years of the revolution; chapters 5–7 address the regime transition, President Violeta Chamorro's rise to power (1990–96), and the splitting of the Mothers of Matagalpa into two factions, one which continued to support only the FSLN, the other which began to support mothers whose children had died while fighting *against* the FSLN, in the U.S.-funded counterrevolutionary forces known as the *contras*.

One of Bayard de Volo's primary arguments is that conventional studies of politics in poor countries rarely address the gender dimensions of hegemonic power, nor do they address how conventional notions of motherhood and family shape broader struggles over national identity, survival, imperialism, and revolution. Although this argument is not new, the author's in-depth analysis of claims about women as political actors, including the Mothers' own claim, “We are mothers, not politicians” (p. 16), makes this book an important contribution to current debates about women's political participation, democracy, war, and economic restructuring.

The author suggests that while the Mothers were successful to the extent that they were seen as carriers and defenders of the nation and therefore as potential forces of revolutionary societal change, their efforts were trumped once the country underwent a transition to democratic rule, when the “war of bullets” became a “war of the stomach” (see chap. 5) and the feminist movement became more visible and institutionalized. Because many mothers' movements maintain women's conventional gender roles and status in the private sphere, she argues, they are more readily supported both by leftist and rightist political movements than are feminist movements; movements which tend to challenge male-based forms of power. It is not surprising then, she continues, that the FSLN mobilized

women as mothers, nor that President Violeta Chamorro, Nicaragua's first female leader, would herself mobilize men and women on this basis to oppose state socialism and garner support for her election. Bayard de Volo's conclusion and overall argument, that maternal politics must be seen through the lens of cultural politics, resonates with contemporary studies of new social movements, where identity-based groups strategically utilize their ascribed roles to affect change in society. The Mothers of Heroes and Martyrs poignantly show us the pain of motherhood as well as the beauty of transforming seemingly natural gender roles into a public challenge to the nation and the global community.

The Mobility of Workers under Advanced Capitalism: Dominican Migration to the United States. By Ramona Hernández. New York: Columbia University Press, 2002. Pp. vvi+227. \$49.50 (cloth); \$18.50 (paper).

Greta Gilbertson
Fordham University

There has been a good deal of sociological research on Dominican immigration over the past 20 years; the most recent studies adopt a transnational perspective. In her latest publication, Ramona Hernández continues an ongoing debate on the nature of the Dominican immigrant experience in the United States and provides valuable insights on the compelling issue of poverty in the Dominican community. In the book, Hernández seeks to reshape fundamentally the interpretation of the Dominican immigrant experience. Characterizing transnational research as misguided and situating Dominican immigrants firmly in the United States, Hernández's arguments are rooted in Marxist political economy. In chapters 1 and 2 she argues that Dominican migration provided a pipeline through which the country could systematically eliminate unwanted and unneeded surplus laborers (p. 8). Following a similar approach, chapters 3–5 argue that Dominicans are becoming marginal to the production process in the United States.

Her main argument is that "poverty and marginalization among Dominican migrants result from their migration and settlement into a society that has been unable to absorb them effectively in the process of production" (p. 118). The reasons for the predicament of Dominican migrants are primarily structural and correspond to the arguments of a mismatch hypothesis. Hernández consistently identifies the loss of blue-collar and unskilled jobs as the primary economic forces that account for the high rates of poverty among Dominicans. Moreover, she makes the more comprehensive claim that in the shift from a manufacturing to a service-oriented economy, unskilled and low-skilled workers increasingly become redundant (p. 5). The migration of Dominicans, then, was not a structural response to labor demand, as equilibrium or historical-structural theories

of migration would lead us to believe, but a response to the dire conditions in the sending country.

In my reading of her arguments regarding the situation of Dominicans in the United States, the data Hernández presents (mostly from the U.S. census and the Current Population Survey) do not support her larger claim regarding the nature of change in the postindustrial, restructured U.S. economy. Much research shows that demand-side explanations of poverty fail to capture the complexity of labor market dynamics of contemporary immigrants, or of other groups such as African-Americans or Puerto Ricans in New York City (e.g., Roger Waldinger, *Still the Promised City? African Americans and New Immigrants in Postindustrial New York* [Harvard University Press, 1996]). According to research from a globalization perspective, Saskia Sassen ("Global Cities and Survival Circuits," in Barbara Ehrenreich and Arlie Russell Hochschild, *Nannies, Maids, and Sex Workers in the New Economy* [Metropolitan Books, 2002]) and others argue there is continued demand for low-skilled immigrant labor in cities. The ongoing demand for low-skilled immigrant workers is also a function of informalization and downgrading of the manufacturing process. One wishes that Hernández had explored the contemporary literature on transformation of work and employment induced by globalization and facilitated by information/communication technologies, including the development of flexible work and the feminization of paid labor.

The data Hernández presents do suggest, however, that the economic situation of Dominicans has deteriorated over the last 20 years, or at least has improved very little. In my mind, the data lend themselves to a segmented assimilation argument that suggests that Dominicans will and are incorporating as disadvantaged minorities. Unfortunately, there is little data or discussion of differences between groups of Dominicans by generation or by years in the United States, nor is there a broader conceptual discussion of settlement, incorporation, or, for that matter, marginalization. This would help Hernández address what seems to me to be the most crucial question of the book, as when she asks, "whether Dominicans' present socioeconomic condition represents a typical and temporary stage . . . or whether we are witnessing a situation that . . . is likely to become permanent for the majority of the Dominican people" (p. 119). As Hernández argues, concentration in segregated New York City neighborhoods with poor schools, high rates of single parent households, and racial discrimination suggests that social mobility will not come easy to second-generation Dominicans.

All of these factors lend weight to Hernández's argument that the situation of Dominicans in the United States is dire. Yet, I think that there are several caveats. First, Dominicans have gained a modest number of jobs in the public sector and in professional and managerial positions, suggesting that there are significant variations in the labor market outcomes of this group (Waldinger, 1996). Second, small business activity is a significant dimension of Dominican incorporation in New York City.

Finally, on the issue of transnationalism, although I agree with Hernández that more attention to the problem of poverty among Dominicans in the United States is necessary, there is much evidence that many Dominicans live their lives across borders with an intensity made possible by developments in communication technology and transportation. Transnational ties facilitate new modes of resistance—in the form of diaspora communities, social networks, and political power—to help modify or circumvent the constraints that accompany incorporation in low-wage jobs, or state efforts in the late 1990s to restrict citizenship and the social rights of citizenship. These responses are important because they show how immigrants create alternative spaces and subjectivities that are not linked to economic and political structures in a single nation-state.

Hernández's agenda in *The Mobility of Workers under Advanced Capitalism* is to bring class back into the discussion. Although this viewpoint does not capture the complexity of Dominican immigration and settlement, Hernández succeeds in bringing to the reader's attention some of the very troubling dimensions of Dominican settlement and incorporation in New York City. This work provides a strong foundation for future research on Dominican immigration.

Challenging Immigration and Ethnic Relations Politics: Comparative European Perspectives. Edited by Ruud Koopmans and Paul Statham. New York: Oxford University Press, 2000. Pp. xi+443.

Stephen Castles
University of Oxford

Immigration and new ethnic minorities have been important issues in Western European societies since the 1970s. However, until recently, they have mainly been addressed by social scientists concerned with policy issues such as education, urban planning, and social policy. Moreover, most social scientists have accepted the idea that each country has a unique national immigration experience and a unique policy model. This rather marginal situation has been challenged recently by the successful mobilization of the extreme right around issues of immigration and national identity, especially in Austria, Italy, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. This has made it clear that immigration and ethnic relations are core issues of national and European politics. One result has been a spate of ostensibly comparative books, which, on closer examination, usually prove to be mere collections of national studies, with attempts at comparison in the editor's foreword.

By contrast, in this collection Koopmans and Statham attempt systematic multinational comparison by only including studies that cover two or more countries and by seeking dialogue between the authors. The aim is to develop methodological tools and to theorize developments in the

context of broader trends such as regional integration and globalization. This is a long volume with 16 contributions by sociologists and political scientists, all with claims to empirical and theoretical originality. It is impossible to address all the essays here.

The first three chapters are devoted to conceptual approaches. Koopmans and Statham insist on the need to link the politics of immigration with topics usually dealt with separately, such as ethnic relations and xenophobia. Drawing on recent debates on citizenship, they distinguish between formal rights and the cultural obligations that states put on access to citizenship. They advocate a political opportunity structure perspective borrowed from social movements research.

A second section focuses on institutional strategies in different countries. Han Entzinger criticizes typologies of national immigration and ethnic relations strategies put forward by a number of authors. Instead he argues for a sixfold typology based on the three dimensions of nation, state, and market. This allows classification of policies but not of countries, since some countries follow different approaches in various sectors. The implication is that there can be no universally valid policy model, since the tensions between nation, state, and market have deep and specific historical roots. Dietrich Thränhardt argues in a similar way when comparing the outcomes of Germany's exclusionary approach with the Netherlands's supposedly more open policies. The Dutch elite have been more willing to grant political rights to immigrants, yet the experience of immigrants has not necessarily been enhanced by this: the Netherlands has a much higher incidence of unemployment and segregation than Germany.

The book's third section focuses on political processes. Koopmans and Statham compare the United Kingdom and Germany and find that the nation-state continues to be the dominant frame of reference for the identities, organizations, and claims of minorities. Patrick Ireland gives brief accounts of ethnic mobilization and political outcomes in five countries. He finds that top-down institutional factors provide better explanations for the paths taken by migrant participation than bottom-up group characteristics of "class" or "ethnicity." Further chapters compare ethnic mobilization at the city level in various countries (Romain Garbaye), examine the causal relationship between anti-immigrant politics and riots (Roger Karapin), and look at the sources of youth violence (Tore Björge).

The final section is concerned with claims that transnational or post-national identity is replacing nation-state affiliations. Cathie Lloyd shows the limitations and barriers faced by antiracism movements in their efforts to mobilize across borders. Such movements arise in national political contexts and find it hard to transcend these, especially as the European Union (EU) offers little in the way of a transnational civil society. Similarly, Adrian Favell and Andrew Geddes argue that it only makes sense to look for a European "transnational opportunity structure" in areas where EU political power has actually become institutionalized. These areas are very limited and are so far open only to elites.

Overall this is a very useful collection for anyone concerned with the politics of immigration and ethnic relations in Europe. It advances both empirical and theoretical knowledge. It is hard going at times, and the editors are not averse to dense and sometime jargon-laden passages. There is no attempt at unity of approach, but this makes the debate between the various contributors all the more interesting. The diversity of the analyses makes it clear that this is an emerging area, still groping for shared concepts and agreed methodological tools. The importance of immigration and ethnic relations in contemporary European politics makes it essential to continue this endeavor.

Negotiating Identities: States and Immigrants in France and Germany. By Riva Kastoryano. Translated by Barbara Harshav. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+227. \$55.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

Renate Holub
University of California, Berkeley

It surely makes sense to focus on France and Germany when investigating the negotiation of identities between states and immigrants in Europe, as Riva Kastoryano has done. These two countries not only constitute the largest economies within the European Union (EU), they also functioned as principal actors in its formation. Policies in the areas of immigration law, citizenship, political integration, and multiculturalism as adopted in France and Germany function as the models, positive and negative, for all of the other member states of the EU. In the 1950s and 1960s only the large economies in Europe attracted immigrant populations, most notably in Northern and Western Europe. Since the early 1990s Southern European regions have also been receiving immigrants; hence all member states of the EU have to negotiate issues pertaining to the cultural and religious identities of arriving immigrants and their descendants.

In her discussion of these cultural negotiations, Riva Kastoryano adopts a substantive conceptual framework that has been developed in the context of the multicultural debates in North America over the past 30 years by such theorists as Michael Walzer, Will Kymlicka, and Charles Taylor. A key principle of these debates pertains to the right of recognition of minority groups. It is to Kastoryano's considerable credit that she recognizes the essential empirical differences between North America and Europe with respect to cultural rights and the nature of the state. In North America it is citizens, not noncitizens, who draw up their claims for the recognition of cultural rights and difference. In Europe (in Germany more so than in France) the struggle for the right to cultural identity accompanies the struggle for political rights. The pursuit of the right to a religious identity on the part of Muslim immigrants to Europe is waged

by social groups who are simultaneously striving for the right to full political membership in their respective polities. This type of membership hinges on immigration and citizenship laws. Legislators in democratic polities promote particular types of citizenship laws not independent from or outside of the cultural frameworks of the voting populations; thus requests by noncitizens for the right to cultural recognition can impact the success of their requests for political integration, that is, for the right to citizenship. Kastoryano provides plenty of evidence in this respect by tracing the history of German citizenship laws in the 1990s. She also takes the opportunity to underline the predominantly social character of the French and German democracies, whereby the state's historical tendency to grant social rights to its citizens *qua* workers has extended to socially protect workers who are noncitizen immigrants.

There have been a number of publications on German and French immigration over the past decade or so; Brubaker's *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Harvard University Press, 1992) is among the most well known. What Kastoryano's work shares with these studies is their historical character: they capture the position of the state with respect to immigrant demands at a particular moment in history. Kastoryano's project advances our understanding of the issues not by primarily linking a particular instance of the state's behavior in immigrant policy to the legacy of past political cultures, but rather by empirically tracing the continuous transformations in Europe regarding the integration of immigrants. She thereby methodologically and conceptually opens up the link between the present and the future. Students and researchers in comparative politics, comparative European studies, migration studies, comparative sociology and cultural geography will profit enormously from this book because the author's grasp of the historical nature of the relations between states and immigrants rights raises many important questions.

The predominant economic position of France and Germany within the EU will require these two states, more than others in the EU, to maintain the economic competitiveness of the EU on a global scale by maintaining (among many other economic policies) high levels of cheap labor in the economy. Immigrants in Europe, as in North America, provide cheap labor. What Kastoryano has captured in her study are the dynamics between state policies and immigrant demands in France and Germany at a moment in which these two economies successfully manage Europe's global competitiveness. What remains unclear is the extent to which states will feel compelled to respond to the cultural demands of immigrant groups should the affluence of the state diminish considerably.

Crony Capitalism: Corruption and Development in South Korea and the Philippines. By David C. Kang. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xv+203. \$60.00 (cloth); \$23.00 (paper).

Frederic C. Deyo
Binghamton University

This book refutes a frequently made assumption that South Korea's decades-long period of rapid economic growth must have been associated with relatively little corruption, or in any case must have occurred *despite* a degree of corruption and money politics. Instead, the author posits that constrained money politics in fact provided a political basis for development by inducing political elites to provide low-interest loans, export licenses, infrastructure construction contracts, and other economic "rents" to major corporations (*chaebol*) which facilitated their rapid (if unrestrained and ultimately self-destructive) growth. This economic outcome of corruption, Kang argues, was contingent on the relatively equal balance of bargaining power between chaebol and political elites such that corporations could not paralyze and incapacitate the state while the state, in turn, could not act in an uncontrolled and predatory manner toward business. The needs of a consolidated industrial sector in this case provided the basis for coherent probusiness policies that in turn fostered rapid growth. As important, an equally strong and consolidated state was able to hold business demands sufficiently at bay to permit sustained attention to larger national economic and security issues beyond the parochial demands of concentrated business groups.

Kang distinguishes the Korean experience from that of the Philippines, where business groups initially overwhelmed political leaders with rent-seeking demands during the pre-Marcos period, following which martial law reversed this earlier pattern of domination from below, substituting predation (and economic stagnation) from above. Thus, Kang argues, the structural context (here the nature of the relationship between state and business) determines both the extent and policy outcomes of money politics. Kang then notes that the mid-1980s democratic reforms had quite different consequences in Korea and the Philippines. In Korea, democratization had the effect of fragmenting the political leadership and creating a greater dependency for electoral success and patronage on business contributions, such that the chaebol began to dominate the state and undercut coherent economic policy. Conversely, post-Marcos democratization in the Philippines has eventuated in a more balanced relationship between business and the state (both now fragmented and dispersed) so as to facilitate ongoing economic reforms. This latter difference, Kang argues, in part explains the greater negative impact of the financial crisis of the late 1990s on Korea (with its severe, debt-based overcapacity, heightened business opposition to reform, and capital flight) than on the

Philippines (where more effective corporate and financial reforms reduced vulnerability to debt and capital flight).

This book usefully bridges two seemingly disparate literatures on Korea's economic miracle: one pointing to rampant corruption seen as ultimately precipitating crisis, the other (that of developmental state theorists) explaining the Korean miracle by reference to coherent economic policy on the part of a relatively autonomous state guided less by money politics than by economic vision. By situating money politics in a larger political structural context, Kang resolves a major quandary of developmental state theory: how to account for coherent and economically purposeful development policy on the part of the state while at the same time acknowledging the magnitude of state corruption.

To this reviewer, an important question hanging over the analysis relates to the assertion that balanced business-state relations, whether based on a conjuncture of unified business and state, as in 1970s Korea, or of business and state fragmentation, as in the post-Marcos Philippines, support greater economic policy coherence. In the Korean case, the author is impelled to invoke an outside factor, that of the external security risk from North Korea alongside uncertain continued U.S. military support, to explain Park's attention to economic priorities. How state fragmentation in the post-Marcos Philippines contributes positively to coherent economic policy (in this case economic reforms) remains problematic, especially given a seemingly easier explanation pointing to reform pressures associated with outside economic assistance (e.g., International Monetary Fund loans).

A final question relates to the role of nonbusiness sectors of society. There is very little reference to the role of labor and popular sector groups in defining the balance between state and society. In particular, what role has labor politics played, specifically during the democratic transitions of the 1990s, in moderating the heightened influence of chaebol money politics in Korea, or in destabilizing the delicate balance between state and society in the Philippines? While democratic reform has clearly increased the need for political fundraising from major business groups, it has also created new political space for social mobilization from below.

While the book seeks mainly to explain patterns and policy outcomes of money politics, it ventures as well into consideration of the developmental outcomes of ongoing corruption in these countries. While acknowledging the complex causal nexus of development, Kang argues that coherent economic policy, in part an outcome of a relatively balanced relationship between business and state, may sometimes link money politics to successful development. Such a view supports a more general proposition accepted by many who adopt a critical political economy perspective: that development may most usefully be viewed as an accidental outcome of the play of interests and power among strategically positioned and effectively organized groups or classes.

Markets, Class and Social Change: Trading Networks and Poverty in Rural South Asia. By Ben Crow. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. xvii+265. \$68.00.

Caleb Southworth
University of Oregon

Commodity markets handle trade in diverse ways, are far from homogeneous, and do not conform to universalistic expectations about credit, trust, and the quality of the goods being distributed—these appear to be reasonable assumptions any empirical researcher of market diversity would want to make. But these are not, as Ben Crow points out in his study of the social consequences of grain markets in Bangladesh, a standard point of departure for Western economists trained in the neoclassical tradition, for government officials and foreign advisers attempting to ameliorate the harms of price fluctuations, or even of scholars analyzing market development from the “new institutional economics” point of view.

Based on 10 years of extensive fieldwork in two distinct regions of Bangladesh, Crow, his colleagues, and his research team synthesized data from interviews with merchants in local grain markets, household surveys stratified by class, and ethnographic descriptions of the lives of exemplary individuals in different class locations. The findings reinforce the main justification for economic sociology. First, rural grain markets are internally heterogeneous in terms of contracts for an identical good (usually rice). Different classes of peasants—rich peasants hiring labor and landless agricultural laborers, for example—use barter, cash purchase, and “trade-tying” loans (obligating the borrower to sell through a specific agent) with radically different frequencies. These practices have implications for the level of competition and, thus, competitiveness cannot be deduced from the number of actors in a market. Second, there is temporal and spatial variation in market outcomes. In the “advanced” agricultural areas, successful grain merchants and processors use political connections and lending capital to earn high rates of return without relying on tied forms of finance. “Backward” areas are a sharp contrast, where large lenders and merchants use their position at the top of a hierarchy of interlocked loans and coercion of sharecroppers to earn a similar rate of return. Third, in each section of the analysis it is the main classes of capitalism that animate the particular outcomes in rice markets located far from any center of the world economy. Global ideas about markets, enacted through government policies on price supports and food procurement, interact with the local class structure to reduce the class position of millers in a poor region and offer high rates of return to millers in a rich region. In short, Crow shows us that economic outcomes depend on social structure.

The new institutional economics camp might reasonably counter that such diversity can be modeled by accounting for the costs of transactions (a partial measure of the level of risk involved) and by assessment of the

unequal distribution of information. Crow acknowledges that this is a substantial improvement over the assumption that all markets are essentially homogeneous. However, the theoretical import of his study of the economics of peasant grain markets is that the transaction itself cannot be abstracted from its social and political context. Assuming that markets are homogeneous, that prices have meanings independent of their social context, and that transaction costs can be assessed independently of the social power dynamics surrounding exchange rob much economic thinking of its explanatory power.

As in many economies with weak currency and complicated (nonuniversal) trust relationships, barter is an important component in Bangladeshi grain markets. Crow identifies two types of barter: commensurate barter and interlocked commodity relationships. The former designates in-kind payments that are given a monetary value; the latter, a contract that makes one exchange conditional on a subsequent set of terms. Neither are pure barter in the sense of "a double coincidence of needs," but specific types of exchange that depend on the social conditions and the identities of those involved in the transaction. A common example of commensurate barter is the exchange of labor for grain. A trade-tying loan would be an example of interlocked exchange. In that transaction, a peasant farmer might take a loan from a trader and subsequently be obligated to sell all of his crop through that broker until the loan was repaid.

Such barter restricts the geographic scope of exchange and lacks the universality of money. More important, the use of barter highlights the difference between the Green Revolution region—an area using power tilling, chemical fertilizer, and engineered seed—and a backward area of reclaimed land using more traditional agricultural techniques. The backward area, and particularly its poorest inhabitants, utilized many more trade-tied loans. Moreover, the circuits of exchange in the backward region were much longer and had greater numbers of intermediaries. Finally, in the advanced region, friends and relations were the main source of capital in contrast to merchant-lenders in the backward region.

Crow's study shows the potential of culturally and linguistically specific area studies projects to challenge and reformulate theories within social science generally. His combination of ethnographic, statistical, and time-ordered data produce a compelling argument within economic sociology that should be especially interesting to other scholars of market change.

The Globalization Syndrome: Transformation and Resistance. By James Mittelman. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000. Pp. xvi+286. \$49.50 (cloth); \$17.95 (paper).

David A. Smith
University of California, Irvine

There is a lot to like about this book. Globalization is an important and contentious topic. Indeed, the theme of living in an increasingly interconnected world fraught with danger and contradiction is probably *more* salient to many of us now than it was when the volume appeared, before the events of September 11. Mittelman addresses the key problems of contemporary globalization with an engaged (and engaging) critical perspective. He develops an interesting conceptual approach to "the global division of labor and power (GDLP)" and the potent resistance it engenders. He also offers rich illustrations of his theoretical frameworks with in-depth empirical case studies based on fieldwork done by himself and collaborators in places like the Philippines and Mozambique. The result is a well-written and researched book, nicely balanced between the abstract and concrete, that both informs and provokes. But, as a sociologist reviewing for a leading journal in my own discipline, I must point out one major limitation: the author, a political scientist who specializes in international relations, almost totally ignores relevant (sometimes extensive) sociological literatures.

Mittelman begins with the broad but crucial question: "Why does globalization enhance the lives of some people and diminish those of others?" (p. xi). He proceeds through an immense swath of variegated but vital terrain: the importance of "time-space compression," the limits and contradictions of global neoliberalism, the swirling debates about the supposed decline of states and sovereignty, the pivotal part played by international migration, the rise of global cities and transnational networks and communities, and so on. The author sees globalization as a "syndrome of processes and activities." In "rethinking of the international division of labor," he critiques both "realism" in international relations and world-system imagery, casts a skeptical eye toward the ideological functions of global neoliberalism, and develops a notion of the GDLP that stresses the complex weave of political and economic forces. He adopts a Polanyian view of the "double movement" of capitalism (creating polarization and resistance); wants to shift the empirical focus away from states and toward regions (both those larger and smaller than national territories); and stresses cultural forces and both individual and collective action as key components of a complete analysis. To capture globalization he proposes "multilevel" analysis, examining structures and various forms of resistance (both "latent and undeclared," as well as "open countermovements").

The book is divided up into three parts. The first focuses on the overall GDLP and includes chapters on international migration and poverty, as

well as the rather poignant story of "opening the market in Mozambique" (and the human suffering and loss of control that ensued). The second, on "regionalism and globalization," delves the most deeply into political science and international relations debates, arguing that there is renewed attention to the distinctive dynamics of certain world regions (like East Asia), but a growing awareness that the dominance of global neoliberal theory and ideology may snuff out the potential of even the most successful regional initiatives. The final section, on resistance to globalization, is of more general interest. It begins with a particularly useful chapter on "conceptualizing resistance to globalization" that draws on Karl Polanyi, Antonio Gramsci, and James Scott to review a contradictory but important emerging agenda for studying "counterhegemonic consciousness" and "submerged networks" of "everyday resistance." This is illustrated in the following chapter on environmental resistance politics and in an essay on global organized crime. The concluding chapter stresses the transitional, unsettled nature of contemporary globalization as an "interregnum." The sense that "no one is in charge" and tension and flux in the current system (including serious doubts about its sustainability) lead to a (perhaps optimistic) claim that there may be an aperture for democratic globalization.

Debates about "globalization" rage across academia today. This book is a constructive contribution, but despite (or perhaps because) of the strengths of the book, the lack of engagement with sociological literature is particularly vexing. The brief section on "sociological theory" is a one page gloss on Weber and Durkheim; we also get discussions of the world-system without any reference to Wallerstein, Arrighi, or Chase-Dunn; migration and citizenship (*jus sanguinis* vs. *jus soli*) without a mention of Brubaker or Soysal; and so on. My objection to this transcends disciplinary chauvinism: the incorporation of more sociological insights would have improved the substance of the book (particularly on international migration, global cities, transnational networks).

But we need to be fair. Sociology's participation in globalization debates tends to lag; many of my colleagues avoid it entirely. This is understandable since much of what is supposedly novel in today's globalized world does look like the continued operation of that old capitalist world-system we already know. Yet we have much to offer. So it may be time for sociologists to enter the fray and propose our own critical view of globalization.

Global Capital, Political Institutions, and Policy Change in Developed Welfare States. By Duane Swank. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi+333. \$60.00 (cloth); \$23.00 (paper).

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The impact of globalization on national welfare systems has been widely explored in recent years. The books edited by Esping-Andersen, by Scharpf and Schmidt, and by Sykes all improve our knowledge on this question. Some researchers, like Mishra, argue that globalization leads to welfare state retrenchment, but others, like Garrett, find little evidence for these arguments. Duane Swank's book clearly supports the last-mentioned view. What, then, is Swank's contribution to this globalization debate?

The book is both critical and constructive. The target of criticism is the view called "globalization thesis," which argues that the dramatic rise in the international mobility of capital influences elected governments to roll back the welfare state. The thesis contends that capital mobility effectively enhances the power of increasingly mobile business enterprises over governments that seek to pursue relatively generous social protection and the tax burdens needed to finance it. This power is achieved by both economic and political means: that is, the operation of markets and a credible threat of exit that may enhance the political resources of mobile asset holders. The heart of this thesis is thus an argument about "diminished democracy," or the declining capacity of democratic institutions to sustain public policies that depart from market-conforming principles. In the book, much evidence is presented to show the thesis to be false.

The constructive part of the study is Swank's alternative argument that democratic processes and national institutions are fundamentally important to determining how internationalization affects domestic policy change. These national institutions include collective interest representation and the system of electoral representation, as well as welfare state institutions themselves. Needless to say, this alternative argument gets more support than the globalization thesis. In particular, the political institutions of the larger welfare states in the Nordic countries and in continental Europe are those most likely to blunt the pressures of internationalization, whereas the political institutions of relatively small Anglo-liberal welfare states are those most likely to facilitate some retrenchment in the presence of economic and political pressures generated by globalization.

The merit of the book is a large and detailed empirical study that combines quantitative and qualitative analysis. The quantitative analysis in chapters 2 and 3 examines the direct welfare state effects of several dimensions of international capital mobility and the ways in which national institutions mediate these impacts. The more qualitative analysis

(chaps. 4–6) consists of case studies of internationalization, political institutions, and welfare state change in a number of countries. Although most Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development countries are briefly looked at, seven specific countries are selected for intensive case-study analysis. These include the Nordic “social democratic” countries of Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, as well as the continental “corporatist conservative” countries of France, Germany, and Italy. One could find this selection somewhat problematic, since these are the countries where welfare states have been maintained. The liberal and more vulnerable welfare states get less attention.

Overall, these analyses are a result of careful work, and the reader is inclined to believe in Swank’s argument. Many readers will learn much more about the extensive case studies, especially on the seven selected countries. As to globalization, it is again and again repeated that no significant direct retrenchment effects are detected.

Some critical remarks can be made, however. First, some key concepts like retrenchment and neoliberal restructuring are not clearly defined, and they seem to be too broad to describe possible welfare state changes. Second, and related to the first remark, most welfare state indicators are quantitative, such as social expenditure and its subcategories. Important as these are, I tend to find new directions in more qualitative issues like the move toward a “work approach” and the tightening of qualifying conditions. Third, it is regrettable that most statistics in a study published in 2002 and dealing with recent globalization processes end in the years 1992 or 1993, although it is true that the case studies contain more recent material. A skeptic might argue that the consequences of global capital mobility are really seen in the 1990s.

Fourth, and most important, one may ask how fruitful it is to distinguish direct and indirect effects of globalization. The major part of the book examines direct effects, and the conclusion that these are seldom detected is quite plausible. However, the interesting question is whether global capital movements are related to welfare state changes in combination with other processes; that is, indirectly. The indirect influences on taxation, social corporatism, and macroeconomic management are briefly examined in chapter 7, but much less systematically than the direct effects are.

Much has been written on globalization and welfare states, often with little evidence. Therefore, Swank’s book is an important contribution, containing both new theoretical insights and careful, empirical, comparative studies on the subject.

Democracy in Suburbia. By J. Eric Oliver. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. Pp. xviii+264. \$47.50 (cloth); \$17.95 (paper).

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Everyone who saw me reading this book chortled, "Democracy in suburbia? That's easy, there isn't any!" Actually, as J. Eric Oliver's stunning new book shows, it is much more complicated than that. For example, he shows that in the kind of suburbia that the chortlers have in mind—the white, middle-class, bedroom town of 1960s sitcom fame—people actually get together in civic groups more than people in more socially diverse places do. But while they are busily building social capital over local Spring Bloom Festivals, they are much less busy with specifically political forms of civic participation. On the other hand, a socially diverse suburb eggs citizens on to participate in more specifically political ways. By making these and many other fine but crucial distinctions—between different kinds of suburbs and different kinds of civic participation—the book offers a splendid lesson in methodology and a brilliantly useful, precise, and far-reaching theoretical contribution that inexorably points the reader to draw some clear conclusions for municipal policy.

Propelling the book is Oliver's crucial addition to the literature on civic participation: the concept of "civic capacity." Civic capacity resembles social capital in some ways, but unlike some prevalent uses of the term "social capital," civic capacity is a property of institutions and communities, not a property of individuals and their free-floating networks. Civic capacity is like a vessel that contains and shapes individuals' participation; it is hard to organize across races, for example, when the political boundaries of cities are racially divided.

The book constantly returns to the important distinctions that this concept allows us to notice. For example, Oliver shows that individual-level differences cannot account for differences in civic life between new Sunbelt towns and older towns in the Northeast. The difference is not just that different sorts of people move to the Sunbelt to begin with. Once you move to the Sunbelt, you are less likely to participate than if you had stayed in the snow. Although, within the Sunbelt, there are brand-new suburbs and older, poorer ones; whether you move to one or the other makes a difference, too.

The book makes another crucial move, by comparing different kinds of municipalities, rather than coming up with some a priori definition of suburbia that would include all of the varieties of towns, cities, and wealthy enclaves that cruder measures would all classify as "suburbia." The cruder measures would include almost all of New Jersey, for example, when it is plain to anyone who gets off the turnpike that there is tremendous variety. Oliver smartly compares municipalities on a range of

dimensions: population size, economic composition, racial homogeneity, land use, age of housing stock, and political institutions.

With the concept of civic capacity in mind, we can begin to understand why even the most community-minded denizens of economically and racially segregated districts end up working on supremely apolitical local projects. We can see that the very boundaries of their municipalities rule politics out of the local picture. Hot questions about inequality and injustice are not within most suburbs' jurisdictions, because the inequalities and injustices map onto political and legal boundaries between municipalities in the metropolitan area. In other words, if you want to help inner-city Chicago, it is hard to do that by participating in local politics in DuPage County. This should not be so, says Oliver. It dampens citizens' political imaginations if local participation must mean avoiding politics. Besides, the fates of the two places are intertwined, and tiny municipalities are too small to conduct big projects—like creating environmentally sound regional transit.

On the other hand, Oliver agrees with the many political theorists who have argued that democratic participation is most likely to spring to life in small face-to-face interaction. So, now we get to the policy implications: metropolitan areas need a kind of two-level political system (we're back to the split-level ranch in the sitcom of the 1960s), inviting citizens to participate in regional decision making while simultaneously retaining small-scale local control over issues that truly are local. More generally, the book shows yet another way that racial and economic inequality damages U.S. democracy. Segregation is bad in itself, but Oliver shows that it also deprives citizens of the ability to participate in decision making about regional issues. These are the issues that open the door to broader political questions, so segregation is actually bad for all citizens' political participation.

Politicians who extol the joys of the small town and the virtues of a homogeneous, close-knit community should read this book. All the social researchers who use the concept of social capital need to examine this book. It is important reading for anyone who studies democratic participation and urban life. Finally, anyone who has ever peered out the car window on the interstate between almost anywhere in the United States or almost anywhere else, wondering what it would be like to live in all those in-between places, should read this book.

Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400–1900.
By Lauren Benton. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp.
xiii+285. \$65.00 (cloth); \$20.00 (paper).

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This book is as ambitious in its aims as it is in its scope. Benton explores the “contested historical movement from truly plural legal orders to state-dominated legal orders” (p. 28). Through the development of an “institutional world history” approach, she demonstrates the ways complex, fluid, and multisided jurisdictional politics proved central to the construction of colonial rule and to the evolution of larger patterns of global ordering, the elements of which are discernable as early as the 14th century. It is Benton’s intention that, “by revealing modern state-centered legal pluralism as historically recent and contingent, we may perhaps help to make space for other frameworks that would allow for greater legitimacy for alternative political authorities without threatening the rule of law” (p. 30) and better address contemporary legal challenges relating to sovereignty, self-governance, and the reassertion of traditional moral or religious structures of authority that are firmly rooted in this history.

Benton analyzes specific cases and conflicts to illustrate the links between localized jurisdictional conflicts, broader patterns of colonial rule, and larger institutional shifts, and also to “resurrect” the role of culture in world history. In five chapters a phenomenal array of locations and historical periods is covered. The first chapter alone considers examples from the South Atlantic world, including Iberian law prior to overseas expansion, African legal systems in the European slave trade, European and diasporic African treaty negotiations between planter regimes and maroon communities, and captivity and captive rescue in New World contexts. Subsequent chapters draw on examples from religious tensions and minorities in the Portuguese and Ottoman empires, French and British colonialism in West Africa and India, the Khoi in South Africa and Aborigines in Australia, and, finally, mid-19th-century Uruguay.

This valuable compilation of contexts, examples, and analyses constitutes a fascinating and accessible read for scholars across disciplines. It highlights the dynamism of law and demonstrates the ways in which colonial law constituted an “iterative cultural politics” (p. 264), shaping and being shaped by tensions among competing colonial authorities and ruling powers as well as through the participation of indigenous and other colonized peoples. In so doing, Benton challenges mainstream perspectives (notably Eric Wolf and Andre Gunder Frank) that proffer a uniform and progressive evolution of European institutions and the nation-state, or that argue global change emanated exclusively from Western development, and seeks to overcome the “chicken or egg” dilemma of whether

institutional change facilitated the evolution of the global economy or vice versa.

In many ways, Benton's research is impeccable in its careful conceptualization and the breadth and depth of its analysis. Yet, it also illustrates the problematic nature of a "world" history project and the challenge of maintaining a close tension between micro and macrolevels of analysis without forfeiting the crucial detail that supports it. The vast array of examples and comparisons result in a somewhat uneven development of cases, some based on detailed primary data and others based more on a series of anecdotes. This unevenness is compounded by Benton's reliance on mainstream scholarship and official records, despite the increasing availability of materials and scholarship from indigenous sources.

There is also a notable absence of what may be broadly termed socio-legal scholarship across a range of perspectives, including critical, critical race, and postcolonial legal studies. All of these approaches have as their starting point the conceptualization of law as a social dialogue and cultural mediator, simultaneously a tool of resistance as well as oppression. Through engagement with this scholarship, Benton could have begun from, rather than ended on, this point, which would have greatly increased the impact and currency of the work and allowed for a deeper consideration of the contradictions inherent in law's Janus face. Although acknowledging the brutality of colonialism, Benton does not really address the horrific outcomes and legacies colonial law justified and institutionalized. While she may have chosen to bracket this out, many would argue that such analysis is essential to advance her approach and link these histories to the expansion of contemporary legal imaginations and alternatives. The work of indigenous legal scholars and practitioners would be particularly instructive as it explicitly links colonial histories and legal legacies with the current claims making and realities of indigenous peoples.

Thus it may not be enough to point to the inherent fluidity and constructive potential of colonial legal systems or to acknowledge the presence and participation of "conquered" peoples in them. The absence of such critical assessments runs the risk of developing a "weak multiculturalism" that fails to link the recognition and celebration of diversity to the circumstances that mediate the achievement of effective and equitable engagement of cultural "others" in productive change. Benton anticipates such critiques, as her concluding chapter is taken up by a (less than effective) defense of her work vis-à-vis the work of Ranajit Guha. Yet, perhaps if these issues and the related scholarship were dealt with more centrally throughout the work, her conclusions could have focused, instead, on the implications of institutional world theory for meeting the global legal challenges of today—without derailing the thrust of this highly impressive work.

Shaped by War and Trade: International Influences on American Political Development. Edited by Ira Katznelson and Martin Shefter. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+372.

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There is no better illustration of the famous U.S. exceptionalism than the belief that this country was *not* shaped by war and trade. How this could ever even be discussed is beyond me, but then again I am a native of Latin America, where the United States' role as the mercantile and military goliath has never been in question. *Shaped by War and Trade* will go far in consolidating the view that the United States, much like any other contemporary nation-state, is a product of international guns and butter. Those of us raised on Weber and Hintze and familiar with the contemporary exponents of what Philip Gorski calls the bellicist school may well wonder what the fuss is about, but that should not subtract from the merits of this book.

If there is any doubt about the centrality of international relations to U.S. development, then it is particularly important to assuage them now. As the uncontested global hegemon, the United States cannot afford to continue its intellectual or ideological isolationism. With the participation of an outstanding cast of contributors, *Shaped by War and Trade* systematically goes about demonstrating the international origins of not only U.S. power, but the very structure of its state. It makes a persuasive case that "international forces have profoundly influenced the character of the nation's governing institutions, the policies these institutions have pursued, and the conduct of American politics" (p. 333).

The introductory chapters by Ira Katznelson and Aristide Zolberg provide exceptional overviews of the debates on the origins and nature of U.S. power. Zolberg nicely analyzes the predicament of having to choose between national security and personal liberty. While this issue has obvious contemporary relevance, the argument goes back to the *Federalist Papers*. Mirroring the work of Barry Strauss on the Athenian navy, Zolberg contends that U.S. imperialism took forms that made it compatible with democracy. Nevertheless, the rise of the national security state and its post-Cold War successor have made this potential conflict ever more critical for U.S. politics.

Katznelson's chapter on the link between the military and early U.S. state building is a gem. Exploiting historical data on bureaucratic growth, he demonstrates the centrality of war to state development even prior to the Civil War (the great traditional dividing line between a "weak" and a "strong" U.S. state). The chapter by Theda Skocpol, Ziad Munson, Andrew Karch, and Bayliss Camp is an equally persuasive empirical analysis of the link between war and civic voluntarism. (I only wish the editors had commissioned a similar article on how war helped shape U.S.

national identity.) The Peter Gourevitch and Bartholomew Sparrow chapters do a good job of bringing the discussion up-to-date.

The chapters on trade are less successful. While Ronald Rogowski's contribution is an interesting discussion of the link between trade policy and electoral dynamics, the section is generally hampered by an overly institutionalist approach. A reader might be forgiven for wondering if capitalism had anything to do with shaping the interaction between trade and the state or whether the rise of industrial and, subsequently, finance capital made the slightest difference in U.S. policy.

In general, the volume suffers from too much of an emphasis on a unidirectional causal flow; the United States appears as a practically passive actor responding to international events. There is little discussion, for example, of how domestic priorities helped shape foreign policy. Aaron Friedberg's chapter is perhaps the only one that demonstrates how domestic considerations constrained U.S. involvement abroad and responses to external challenges. But even in this instance, the argument is too grounded in Washington.

It is a critic's prerogative to challenge authors to do more than they have already done. In this instance, I would ask the editors and contributors to consider how U.S. society helped shape war and trade. There is little mention here of social forces defining policies and excluding alternatives. For example, how did the rise of the multinational corporation help define the contemporary global order? How did U.S. perceptions of a Communist threat shape the developing world? How did the particular U.S. habit of promoting "know-nothings" to prominence in foreign affairs help determine the exercise of U.S. might? Given its current position, allowing the United States to shape the world arguably as much as the world shapes it, these are critical questions.

Overall, however, this is an excellent collection. While students of the relevant themes will find much in this book, I would also urge the use of some chapters, particularly those by Katznelson and Skocpol et al., as examples of excellence in historical sociology.

God Is Dead: Secularization in the West. By Steve Bruce. Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishers, 2002. Pp. xv+269. \$24.95 (paper).

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Those familiar with Steve Bruce's writings in the sociology of religion will be aware that the theme of secularization is very dominant. It features prominently in his useful book *Religion in the Modern World* (Oxford University Press, 1996), and forms at least a backdrop to most of his 12 other books. At a time when many British and U.S. sociologists of religion have become skeptical about whether or not the West is ubiquitously

involved in some ongoing process of secularization, Steve Bruce (professor of sociology at Aberdeen University) remains an articulate defender of the paradigm.

God Is Dead is likely to be popular with students. It is clearly written; it provides useful summaries at the end of each chapter; it is informed at both theoretical and empirical levels; and it is endlessly provocative. Read in conjunction with one of the numerous critics of the secularization paradigm it provides an ideal book for lively sociology of religion classes. The first chapter sets out his version of the secularization paradigm. He insists that this paradigm is not intended to depict some universal or inevitable social process. His concern is emphatically only with the West since the Reformation. Nonetheless, within this specific geographical context and historical frame he argues that industrialization brought with it social changes—cultural and social fragmentation together with bureaucratic rationality—that have made religion less plausible at a social level and less compelling at an individual level. Within the West, he argues in later chapters, there is empirical evidence that religion is increasingly irrelevant within the public forum and a matter of indifference to an increasing number of individuals. What is more, in countries such as Britain the primary means of religious socialization (such as Sunday schools) are now so attenuated that the survival of many religious organizations in the next generation is questionable.

He is fully aware that such a thoroughgoing secularization paradigm faces many criticisms and sets out to challenge them in the chapters that follow. Chapter 2 examines the criticism that the paradigm presupposes some golden age of faith, chapter 3, that statistics of religious decline are not uniform even in Britain, and chapter 4, that the New Age movement constitutes a reverse of secularization. Chapter 5 then attempts to state carefully what he sees as the link between the rise of science and secularization (for him it is more to do with bureaucratic rationality than particular scientific discoveries). Later chapters examine in turn the charismatic movement, the rise of postmodernity, and religion in the United States.

There is much that is convincing in this book. Most sociologists of religion in Britain would now acknowledge that there is clear evidence of decline among Christian churches in Britain and in many other European countries, as well as growing skepticism about Christianity, especially among the young. Where they will differ from Bruce is whether this constitutes secularization as such, or, if it does, whether secularization is ubiquitous throughout the West. It is interesting that a powerful critic such as José Casanova is cited in the bibliography but not in the text. Grace Davie, in contrast, does appear in both, but her arguments about European or U.S. exceptionalism are not fully faced. Indeed, Bruce struggles hard to show that his secularization paradigm applies as much to the United States as it does to Europe. Like many polemicists, the thinner his argument gets the more selective his use of empirical data becomes.

For example, he uses the familiar argument that opinion polls tend to exaggerate levels of regular churchgoing in the United States, so that what appears to be an exceptionally religious country is in reality much closer to the secular Britain. Yet, he fails to mention that exactly the same finding has been made about British opinion polls or that the latter consistently show a rate of churchgoing half that of U.S. opinion polls. Again, in attempting to demonstrate longitudinal trends he does not always compare similar data. For example, he claims that only 7% of scientists in a 1998 poll believed in God compared with 90% of the general population: In reality the 7% refers to the specific belief in a personal God (which compares with levels of about 30% in the general population) whereas the 90% refers to belief in any god at all.

None of this detracts from my overall admiration for the book. It admirably fulfils the overall aims of the Blackwell series Religion in the Modern World, namely to "present clear and non-technical contributions to contemporary thinking about religion in the modern world" (flap text). It deserves a wide, albeit skeptical, readership among students and specialists alike.

Personality and Dangerousness: Genealogies of Antisocial Personality Disorder. By David McCallum. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. ix+193. \$60.00 (cloth); \$22.00 (paper).

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What kind of person is so incapable of showing respect for others that he or she will commit terrible offenses with reckless abandon and a lack of remorse? For contemporary psychiatry the answer is likely to be someone diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder. This type of individual once bore the name "moral imbecile," then "psychopath," and later "sociopath." David McCallum's *Personality and Dangerousness* analyzes the complex genealogies of this particular disorder as an effect of administrative strategies aimed at managing a troubling population at the administrative crossroads between the criminal justice and mental health systems.

McCallum's suggestive history of antisocial personality disorder, while specific to Australia, provides an analytic framework for studying the relationship between classificatory technologies and social governance in other contexts. McCallum cautions against interpreting antisocial personality disorder as either an advance in clinical scientific risk management or as the pernicious effect of repressive social control. He argues, instead, "that personality disorder, and indeed the larger concept of personality, arose as the product of efforts to know and govern certain categories of disordered persons who came to be seen . . . as particularly dangerous"

(p. 5). Inspired in part by Michel Foucault's examination of the productivity of disciplinary practices and Nikolas Rose's history of "political technologies of individuality," McCallum contends that psychiatric calculations of danger are the outgrowth of practical efforts to sort and manage troublesome populations within modern liberal societies.

Theorizing governance as a dynamic "'contact point' where techniques of domination and techniques of the self interact" (p. 79), McCallum traces a history of Australian legal, medical, and educational efforts to "bring the whole population onto a grid of calculability" (p. 93). Beginning with a 1788 distinction between lunatics and idiots, McCallum's history includes an examination of mid-19th-century "moral treatment" and the new category of person it produced—the mental patient. Shortly after the birth of moral treatment a new "borderline" category of patient emerged within spaces at the periphery of the mental asylum—the reception house and the refractory house. The artifact of orchestrated sorting practices, this new group of "impossible patients" was considered to be both dangerous and difficult to manage. McCallum interprets this administrative "discovery" of borderline mental defects as prefiguring the construction of antisocial personality disorder itself.

Another administrative space facilitating the production of personality as a locus of danger involved the eugenics movement of the early 20th century with its focus on "mental fitness." In the 1920s the mental hygiene movement directed attention to problems in early childhood development, further singling out disordered personality as a source of danger. In discussing these matters, McCallum is careful to note professional territorial disputes between psychiatrists and the emerging discipline of psychology, which contributed to the spatial disaggregation of asylum patients into two groups—acutely disordered patients in need of treatment and chronic defective-types, whose education became the business of psychology. In the space between these two categories, a third, more troubling type emerges—the "morally defective" patient. This new classification is accompanied by "a different grid of calculation" produced in psychology laboratories and court psychological clinics. It is within these new "zones of governance" that McCallum locates the organizational construction of antisocial personality disorder. New technologies produced by these sites (personality tests of various sorts) represent a shift from an earlier focus on the internal characteristics of mental pathology to calculations of problematic familial and interpersonal relations. These site-specific technologies are also said to have led to the invention of personality itself as a "distinctive feature of calculable individuality" (p. 133).

Personality and Dangerousness is a well-researched exploration of the synergy between classificatory psychiatric technologies and institutional conditions of governance. Despite its multiple strengths, there are also problems with McCallum's analysis. The most prominent is the assertion that, in addition to antisocial personality, "the space of personality" in general ("how people make themselves up") emerges from the adminis-

trative targeting of dangerous individuals. In this, McCallum distinguishes his analysis from those, such as Kurt Danzinger, who contend that cultural conceptions of personality derive from tests administered to the "normal" public. McCallum argues instead that personality, as a concept, comes into existence "as an index of risk management" (pp. 32, 108). However, McCallum makes his case without addressing the empirical specificity of Danzinger's claims. Nor does he show how institutionally situated psychiatric ideas about personality enter public discourse. This is unfortunate because both Danzinger and McCallum make important contributions to the analysis of personality as a cultural construct. In addition, the insights of each might be fruitfully related to overlapping evocations of personality in consumer society, popular culture, the organization of business, elite and public education, and religion.

Critical scholars will find much to value in McCallum's work. Many will also be puzzled by McCallum's one-dimensional depiction of social control theory as a top-down functionalist paradigm of repressive power and self-interest. This ignores numerous more subtle studies of hegemonic control work and resistance, whose complexities belie McCallum's simplistic characterization. Nor does McCallum examine such matters as the role of pharmaceutical interventions or how gender and the racialized colonial legacy of Australia might influence judgments about dangerousness and personality. Furthermore, despite beginning with an account of the highly publicized Port Arthur killings of 1996, *Personality and Dangerousness* pays little attention to the influence of mass media in shaping perceptions of dangerousness. Nevertheless, McCallum's book provides a valuable sociological history of institutional practices leading to the managerial production of antisocial personality disorder and, as such, deserves careful reading by scholars concerned with the governance of madness, violence, and troublesome persons by modern liberal societies.

From Newspeak to Cyberspeak: A History of Soviet Cybernetics. By Slava Gerovitch. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. Pp. xiv+369. \$37.95 (cloth); \$25.95 (paper).

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"We have created in our press . . . the language of a socialist citizen" (Soviet propaganda expert speaking in 1946; p. 11). The all-pervasive effect of socialist language has become a self-fulfilling prophecy and a canon of not only socialist but also Western scholarly articles about the Soviet Union. Many historians discuss Soviet scientists as being "blinded by Marxist ideology" (p. 5) and as failing to adhere to the norms of science. This is not true of Slava Gerovitch's exemplary history of cybernetics in the Soviet Union between the 1940s and 1970s. His book provides in-

depth insight into the intricate nature of Soviet science and the complex relations between science and technology, and society and politics. The development of cybernetics exemplifies how Soviet scientists, caught between often-contradictory political and economic agendas, straddled the fine line between dogma and dissent by resisting, recreating, and accommodating state-backed programs.

Cybernetics is the analysis of humans and machines using concepts of information, feedback, and control. Gerovitch traces its roots to Norbert Wiener's *Cybernetics, or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine* (MIT Press, 1948). Cybernetics was at the research frontier of Soviet science until the early 1950s. Then at the height of Stalinism and the Cold War, it became entangled with the ideological warfare against the West. In order to build "scientific Marxism," "reactionary" Western theories had to be "criticized and destroyed." This ideological warfare often served scientists' own purposes, which differed from party leaders. The rhetorical techniques of "quotation mongering" (citing Marx, Engels, Stalin, and Lenin to support an argument) and "label sticking" (discrediting an opponent's argument as politically deviant) (p. 171) turned "scholarly debates into ideological and political conflict" (p. 27). Soviet military experts, however, continued to read Western professional literature in order to "overtake and surpass" Western advances in computing and military cybernetics. Because of the Cold War and interagency competition, their efforts, however, remained a secret monopoly of the defense sector.

With the dawn of the Khrushchev era, scientists increasingly challenged the division between "socialist" and "capitalist" science. Their growing attendance at international conferences brought into relief the gaps between Soviet and Western science. Concurrently, some reform-minded scientists rehabilitated cybernetics as an objective, quantitatively precise, and exact science that could be opposed to the ideologically laden Soviet public discourse of "newspeak." The rhetorics of quantification and objectivity were to be the weapons in this fight for intellectual freedom. What started off as a dissident approach followed by a few became increasingly institutionally established. Cybernetics became legitimized as Lenin's heir and was "tamed," "domesticated" (p. 258), politicized, and ideologized to be consistent with Soviet goals and aspirations. Now "cyberspeak" started to resemble newspeak.

Scientists increasingly embraced cybernetics and computer technology as cross-disciplinary projects that could revolutionize Soviet science, technology, economics, and politics. However, ambitious plans to revolutionize everything from economic planning to transport largely faltered as cybernetic ideas encountered the practical reality of communist bureaucracy, political hierarchies, and interagency rivalries. With Brezhnev's rise to power in 1964, the drive to reform gave way to the strengthening of existing bureaucratic and hierarchical structures within which cybernetics

was accommodated. The result was a hybrid science, disowned by its original fathers but refashioned by its new masters.

No book is perfect. Certain questions remain unanswered, such as how extensive and prominent cybernetics was as a dissident and subsequently as a mainstream approach. Gerovitch argues that orthodox Pavlovians, linguists, and biologists turned to cyberspeak, but he refers to cyberneticians as "reform-minded," "unorthodox," and "liberal" throughout. Where did these categories come from? Are they the scientists' self-definitions *after* the transition from state socialism, when being dissident and unorthodox became equated with scientific integrity? Where, then, is the line between dogma and dissident? Also, Gerovitch often notes parallels between the development of cybernetics in the Soviet Union and the United States. However, at certain key junctures in Soviet science, such as in the mid-1950s when cybernetics became heralded as an exact science, Gerovitch's long view across the Atlantic diminishes. Did the Soviet love affair with quantification in the 1950s maybe mirror scientific developments in the United States? At times, also, plowing through the biographical details of various scientists can be dense and slightly repetitive. On the other hand, the attention to detail pays off when Gerovitch points to how individual personalities and their institutional positions and networks brought about scientific shifts.

Overall, Gerovitch provides an insightful, meticulously researched, and fascinating account of Soviet science. He demonstrates the coproduction of science and technology, the politics of science, and the politics of governance. Just as cybernetics itself became a cross-disciplinary project, Gerovitch's book is relevant to disciplines across academe from the social to the natural sciences.

Connecting: How We Form Social Bonds and Communities in the Internet Age. By Mary Chayko. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. xi+239. \$65.50 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

Lori Kendall
SUNY, Purchase College

As increasing numbers of people use new communications technologies to contact and interact with others, sociologists have begun investigating crucial questions concerning the potential impact of such mediated connections on identity and community. In *Connecting*, Mary Chayko makes an important theoretical contribution to such investigations. Chayko introduces the term "sociomental connections" to refer to "connections formed with 'others' who are not physically present" (p. 187). This includes not just on-line relationships but also connections with a wide range of others such as absent relatives, famous people, and characters from television programs and books. Her most important insight concerns

the relationship between these mediated relationships and face-to-face connections. She argues that while some might question the healthiness or authenticity of relationships that do not include face-to-face interaction, sociomental connecting in fact underlies all relationships. "For since virtually all social connections and communities are characterized by periods of absence among their members, all social connections can be considered largely sociomental" (p. 102).

Chayko draws upon Durkheim, symbolic interactionist theory, and cognitive sociology to elaborate on the prevalence and importance of sociomental connections, sociomental bonds (stronger and longer-lasting than sociomental connections), and communities of the mind (sociomental bonds among three or more people). Such connections require a means of communication, mental similarity between the connected individuals, and a conceptual "space" within which such connections can form. Chayko details the ways in which people keep their connections alive through the use of symbols, talk, rituals, and memory. She provides examples using quotes gathered from semistructured interviews, on-line questionnaires, and previously published materials such as autobiographies.

In anticipation of objections that connections between people who never meet face-to-face are not authentic relationships, Chayko discusses four axes upon which to evaluate properties of sociomental connections, and by extension, all social relations. These include the strength or intensity of the relationship, the degree of bidirectionality or reciprocity, authenticity, and intimacy. Some of these discussions work better than others. She correctly points out that many face-to-face associations are neither strong nor intimate. Her measure of authenticity, however, seems to hinge primarily on the depth of emotion engendered by a connection, which seems insufficient for gauging the existence of a "real" relationship.

Chayko makes several important points in the final chapter, in which she discusses the social effects of sociomental connections. First, she rejects the technological determinism of many accounts of the social effects of technology by pointing out that people approach mediating technologies from various backgrounds and with different needs, and use such technologies for disparate purposes. Therefore, the effects may not be uniform. Chayko also cautions against sentimental or nostalgic understandings of the self and of community. Rather than making simplistic comparisons between face-to-face relationships and those formed on the Internet, or "real" communities and virtual ones, she suggests that researchers explore how people integrate new ways of connecting into their existing networks and relationships.

At times, Chayko overstates the similarities between different kinds of connections. In particular, I am bothered by her reluctance to differentiate between reciprocal relationships and those that exist only in the mind of one person. The latter category would include all sociomental connections with the dead or unborn, with fictional characters, and most connections with famous people. Not only do these two categories of relationships

seem sociologically distinct, but even some of Chayko's own interview quotes seem to indicate that people do distinguish between them, considering them to be different kinds of connections.

Chayko also makes the interesting suggestion that, following Mead's concept of the generalized other, increasing opportunities for sociomental connections will potentially increase tolerance and acceptance of diversity. However, given that on-line people can pick and choose with whom they relate to a greater degree than is possible in many face-to-face settings, the opposite might as easily be true. Indeed, Chayko defines sociomental connections as based upon *similarities* between people, and her examples do not include relationships based on antipathy or which construct and reinforce differences. (I am thinking of connections such as those described by Barrie Thorne in her discussion of "borderwork," as well as of the existence of entire on-line communities dedicated to the antagonistic art of "flaming.")

Despite these shortcomings, Chayko's book provides a timely and thoughtful contribution to the study of mediated relationships. By pointing out the common ground between mediated and face-to-face relationships, Chayko provides scholars with a powerful tool for researching a wide range of social connections. Her book will be of interest to scholars interested in social interaction, mass media and popular culture, and the Internet, among others. It would be appropriate for upper-level and graduate classes in these areas, and might also be useful in sociological theory classes, particularly for its interesting extension of Durkheimian theory.

Theories of Distinction: Redescribing the Descriptions of Modernity. By Niklas Luhmann. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2002. Pp. x+226. \$49.50 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

Mathieu Deflem
University of South Carolina

This collection of selected writings by the German social theorist Niklas Luhmann is one of now several in a series published by Stanford University Press. This volume is not a translation of a German original published during Luhmann's lifetime (Luhmann died on November 6, 1998). Instead it is a collection brought together by the editor, William Rasch, around the themes of modernity, observation, and communication. Rasch introduces the volume in a very dense and philosophical introduction that contemplates epistemological questions in Luhmann's oeuvre. It concludes by suggesting the Weberian rationality model as Luhmann's unacknowledged guide, although Luhmann himself explicitly rejected a comparison of his work to Weber's.

The first set of papers in this work concerns the state of modern science, especially the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl, which Luhmann re-

interpreted in his familiar systems-theoretical model of autopoiesis. Intentionality, for instance, becomes the positing of a difference. Consciousness dehumanized—that is Luhmann. Next, there are a number of essays on observing, most of which have already been published elsewhere. They repeat and clarify the paradoxes of observing (and self-observing). One of these papers includes Luhmann's musings on the work of Jacques Derrida and his notion of deconstruction. Luhmann playfully introduces this chapter by recounting how he watched on TV the debate in the United States on the admission of homosexuals into the army. Deconstruction can show, to Luhmann rightly, that the difference homosexual and heterosexual changes in its use value as it is employed in different contexts and at different times, but it is not possible, according to Luhmann, to ever overcome this heterogeneity of contextualized meanings. Deconstruction and postmodernism suggest we can, which "may appeal to the pragmatic sense of Americans" (p. 112). Elsewhere in the book, Luhmann comments favorably on Jean-François Lyotard's contention that there is no more unified narrative, but that each singular narrative produces its distinct difference. Luhmann, however, rejects the label "postmodern."

The next set of essays deals with the central concept of communication in Luhmann's work. Evidently sharing an interest with his main adversary, Jürgen Habermas, Luhmann conceived of communication in a very distinct way that established that "only communication can communicate" (p. 156). There is no subject. Communication comes about through the synthesis of information, utterance, and (mis)understanding. Systems of communication are closed and communications have no goal. Distinct systems of communication are not accessible to one another.

A final essay in this book is a coda on the Frankfurt school. Luhmann once quipped that the answers to the central questions of modernity were definitely not to be found in Frankfurt. In this essay, Luhmann further debunks the project of Frankfurt's critical theory. But Habermas has moved back to Starnberg. Luhmann, it seems, could never leave Frankfurt, or at least not forget his visit there during the *Positivusmusstreit*.

The connections between the various essays in this volume are at times loose and unclear. Some of the papers have been published before in other (English translations of) works of Luhmann and now appear in yet another context. I wonder if Luhmann would have approved of this collecting and recollecting of his writings. In any case, I find that of the various works by Niklas Luhmann that are now available in the English language this volume may well be the least useful for sociologists. That is not to say that the book has no merits. On the contrary, it clarifies to the specialist certain underlying epistemological concerns in Luhmann's work, especially with respect to the notions of observation and communication. But such efforts appeal to the philosopher of science more than to the student of society. Even seasoned theoretical sociologists may find this work not tremendously relevant. Luhmann has no U.S. interpreter within the discipline of sociology. Or perhaps Luhmanian theory is now

a closed system with its own binary code. Yet, fortunately, we can also rely on the insightful and more accessible works of Luhmann's oeuvre, such as his books on art, intimacy, mass media, and law. I feel that the legacy of Luhmann's theoretical work in sociology, bringing out the relevance of his excursions for contemporary sociological theory and research, should be carefully guarded.

The Sociological Ambition: Elementary Forms of Social and Moral Life. By Chris Shilling and Philip A. Mellor. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 2001. Pp. 238. \$94.95 (cloth); \$31.95 (paper).

Peter Kivisto
Augustana College

The thesis of this book is that contemporary sociology has lost the plot, and as a result, the discipline has not simply become increasingly fragmented, but has also witnessed an inclination to look outside of the tradition for intellectual nourishment. Shilling and Mellor have a solution to this problem, which involves a return to the central concerns and ambitions that they claim characterized sociology's formative era. They argue that however different the classical figures were, they were united in a desire to comprehend the complex and changing interconnections between social life and moral life.

Borrowing from Donald Levine, the authors explore the formative period in terms of national traditions, contending that the two most influential for the subsequent development of sociology were the French and German. Within those traditions they identify four main figures: Comte, Durkheim, Simmel, and Weber. Rounding out the section is the great synthesizer of the classics, Parsons. The authors are intent on indicating that despite the obvious differences between these figures, they shared much in common regarding the promise of sociology to make sense of the role of values in shaping social life. Moreover, influenced by Enlightenment ideals, all shared an abiding interest in identifying the universal trends of social development brought about by modernity and the impacts of those trends on humankind as a whole.

It is precisely these concerns that Shilling and Mellor fear have been lost in too many current theory schools. The second half of the book takes up five postclassical theoretical currents that are seen as exemplifying this unfortunate tendency: conflict theory, feminist theory, theories of racial otherness, rational choice, and postmodernism.

The problem with the first three theories is that they focus on the concerns and complaints of sectors of society and in so doing, fail to address issues related to the universal human condition. Conflict theorists, in this reading, are overly concerned with class divisions, while the foci of feminists and racial theorists are obvious. Shilling and Mellor claim

that these contemporary theories can have a salutary impact on the classics, where such topics tended to be ignored or downplayed (leaving Marx out of the classics helps make this case). However, this can only happen if contemporary theorists become willing to reengage the classics in potentially fruitful dialogues that connect concerns of the economically disadvantaged, women, and people of color to concerns about the overarching moral fabric of the social order.

The brief against the last two theory schools is somewhat different. Rational choice is accused of abandoning sociology by embracing the idea of "economic man" in the process of ignoring structure altogether. In a similar vein, postmodernism's major shortcoming is seen as its excessive concern with the individual at the expense of the social.

There are curious features about the book, not the least of which involve the process of selection and exclusion of theorists and the often truncated way in which each theory is presented and assessed. Is Comte really one of the classics, or ought we to view him as perhaps the last significant precursor to the discipline? Why include the Frankfurt school's concern with consciousness in the conflict chapter while ignoring Randall Collins? Given the profound divisions within feminist theory and racial theories, why not pay greater attention to those differences? The postmodern chapter is especially odd given that the two figures singled out for attention are Giddens and Bauman. Do the authors really believe that Giddens is a postmodern theorist? Given the synthesizing ambition of his structuration theory to find a new way of conceptualizing the relationship between agency and structure, how can they conclude that his sociology ultimately amounts to a preoccupation with the individual at the level of lifestyle issues and the realm of the therapeutic? Why Bauman rather than someone like Baudrillard? More generally, the book is peculiar insofar as it is an indictment of postclassical sociology for fragmenting and thereby undermining the sociological ambition, and yet it is written in a rather cheery tone.

However, there is a more profound problem with the thesis that is a consequence of the authors' reading of the history of the discipline. The argument hinges on the claim that once there was a tradition that has now become fragmented. But in fact, sociology has always been divided—as the profound differences between the French and German experiences nicely illustrate. Efforts to effect syntheses of these traditions, from Parsons to Habermas and Giddens, have met with only limited success and the detractors are legion. The book's cover illustration is Peter Bruegel's *The Tower of Babel*. The authors seem to think that the tower was built after Parsons. I would suggest it was constructed much earlier.

Toward a Sociological Imagination: Bridging Specialized Fields. Edited by Bernard Phillips, Harold Kincaid, and Thomas J. Scheff. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2002. Pp. xii+305. \$44 00 (paper).

Philip A. Mellor
University of Leeds

This book is intended to address concerns about the development and credibility of U.S. sociology. According to the editors, sociology has failed to achieve "cumulative development," breaking down into endless specialisms unable to communicate with each other. Opposing disciplinary fragmentation and the antisocialism and relativism of postmodernism, the project here is to provide definite signposts toward the fulfillment of sociology's lost promise and the restoration of its credibility. In a bold and critical manner, it aims to offer us an alternative way of doing sociology, illuminating the merits of what is called, variously, a "bureaucratic," "web based," or "part/whole" approach. In contrast to other contemporary reassessments of the sociological tradition, the authors are not content to limit themselves to a reengagement with the classics (there is little here that deals with them directly) or current trends (there are not much of those here either): what they propose, in contrast, is a new conception of the scientific method they believe to be indispensable for the future development of the discipline.

Many of these general aims are entirely laudable, and the editors, and many of the authors of individual chapters, have excellent track records. The devil, however, is in the detail, and there is much here to question. The sociological method developed here has, essentially, two key features. The first of these is an emphasis on the importance of abstraction, which involves judgments about how a research problem is defined, the general value of terms suggestive of a "high level of abstraction" (separate from conventional day-to-day language), and the relative usefulness of "low level abstractions" relating to operational definitions of research problems. The second key feature is the emphasis on reflexivity—in terms of an engagement with the "web of knowledge," circumstance, and influence surrounding research problems—and the social constraints and enablements that impinge upon the sociological endeavor. Taken together, both these features are intended to help grasp the inherent complexity of social life, but also to reorient sociology as a reflexive discipline able to contribute critically and constructively to the social and cultural developments of the present.


Nonetheless, the focus on abstraction looks underdeveloped and problematic. Replacing prejudice (a low level abstraction) with stratification (a high level abstraction), as the editors suggest (p. 25), or replacing secularization with deviance as Jacobsen's chapter proposes, raises questions about what counts as low and high, and about what is really gained by such replacements. Reinterpreting secularization as deviance from norms,

for example, not only marginalizes the religious factor, but also presupposes a prioritization of normative factors that many sociologists might object to (it is clearly this prioritization that *defines* what counts as high-level abstraction). The focus on abstraction also looks odd alongside the concern for a reflexive, socially engaged sociology, as do other elements of the book. Some might object, for example, to Phillips's desire to revive Alvin Gouldner's Comtean vision of a sociological elite as an insufficiently reflexive posture for current sociology. Furthermore, it is notable that the political engagements central to the work of Gouldner and C. Wright Mills are generally absent here. This is not simply due to the concern with abstraction (which, ironically, often suggests Parsons rather than Mills), but because of theoretical problems. In fact, though the editors claim to offer a new method rather than a new theory, the underdeveloped theoretical aspects of the book tend to throw the value of the method into doubt.

The relationship between structure and agency, for example, remains obscure in much of the book. Kincaid's chapter, which again prioritizes stratification, this time in preference to inequality (see also the chapter by Kimberly), is one of a number of chapters that suggest "moving up and down the ladder of abstraction" illuminates social structure, which, methodologically, is accessed through high-level abstraction. Lachmann's account of agency here is subtler than most, but a lot of the discussions in this book seem to assume a ladder running from voluntarism to determinism curiously aligned to the "ladder of abstraction." The concerns one might have about this are compounded by talk of "parts and wholes" and "micro-macro" relationships (see the contributions by Scheff and by David R. Maines and David W. Britt), which raises questions about what constitutes a part or a whole, micro or macro, the suspicion being that size and complexity are the key issues. Again, all sorts of questions are inevitably raised about whether this accounts satisfactorily for societal complexity, as the book strives to do, or reduces it to something insupportably simple.

In short, this is a suggestive book, with many laudable intentions, but key elements look significantly underdeveloped. The text, it should also be noted, is littered with typographical errors.

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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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Competition and Social Influence: The Diffusion of the Sixth-Generation Processor in the Global Computer Industry¹

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When is a social actor most strongly influenced by its peers? This article addresses this question by clarifying when computer firms were most strongly affected by the choices of their structurally equivalent rivals to adopt a well-known technology: Intel's sixth-generation processor. The core hypothesis is that the effect of adoptions by structurally equivalent firms increases with the competitive pressure that a focal firm faces in its market position. The results show that a chosen firm is most strongly influenced by comparable others when it faces scale-based competition and is diversified. The implications of this study are twofold: a social actor's sensitivity to the conduct of others may depend not only on its place in a hierarchy but also on the nature of its ties to an external audience; and a contingent theory of social influence may be necessary to characterize diffusion processes correctly, particularly when external and time-varying nonnetwork factors have significant effects.

In an early essay on reference groups, Merton and Rossi (1950) called for answers to a central sociological question: When is a social actor most strongly influenced by its peers? Various scholars have since addressed the theme of influence by proximate others (see Marsden and Friedkin 1993; Strang and Soule 1998). Some of the most compelling etiologies of social influence have focused on competition as the salient mechanism.

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Burt (1987), for example, portrayed physicians as rivals insofar as they filled comparable roles in a network of medical advice and discussion. In this view, a doctor closely observes and responds to the choices of socially proximate doctors so as to maintain his or her status in the medical community. It is by virtue of occupying substitutable roles that social actors compete and thus locally monitor and affect each other's choices (Burt 1982; Burt 1987, p. 1291). Similarly, White (2002, pp. 106–8) pictured firms as competitors, and thereby mutually influential, on the basis of their geographic proximity. In White's portrayal, producers occupy ego-centric and partially intersecting neighborhoods and so affect each other's strategic choices as a function of their spatially induced competitive overlap.

With the exception of these works, researchers have given relatively sparse attention to the link between competition and social influence. Although prior research has shown that firms are likely to copy other firms of the same industry (e.g., Fligstein 1985), very few projects have sought to illuminate precisely how competition activates influence between proximate social actors. In this article, I focus on competition as an answer to Merton and Rossi's question by specifying the conditions under which computer firms were most strongly affected by the choices of their structurally equivalent rivals (Lorrain and White 1971; Burt 1976) to adopt a well-known technology: Intel's sixth-generation processor. In what follows, I develop and test hypotheses proposing that the effect of adoptions by structurally equivalent firms—those with similar patterns of shipping computers across market segments—rises with the competitive pressure that a chosen firm faces in its position in the market.

These hypotheses follow earlier research that has equated structural equivalence with competition. I extend prior research by advancing a contingent view of influence by socially proximate competitors. In this study, the specific picture that emerges is one in which the influence of structurally equivalent firms operates most strongly on a firm that faces scale-based competition (Carroll and Hannan 2000) and is diversified (Carroll 1985). Therefore, structural equivalence constitutes the baseline in a multifaceted view of competition in which specific properties of a chosen firm—namely, relative size and scope—jointly elevate or depress the extent to which it falls beneath the sway of other firms clustered around its position in the market.

Viewing social influence as a process that is contingent on competitive pressure may yield a more precise representation of how a new trait diffuses. Offering a useful point of departure, Coleman (1964, pp. 43–45) noted three factors that are typically thought to account for the rising incidence of a trait in a population: (1) the attributes of prospective adopters, (2) localized processes of actor-to-actor transmission, and (3) the ac-

tivities of exogenous agents. For instance, in the case of doctors at risk of prescribing a new antibiotic (e.g., Coleman, Katz, and Menzel 1966), a physician may adopt because of his or her intrinsic proclivity to keep up with medical advances, the influence of prior adopters to whom he or she is socially proximate, or the marketing efforts of pharmaceutical firms.

Nonetheless, most analyses have overlooked the opportunity to integrate the first two mechanisms and thereby pinpoint when actor-to-actor transmission is strongest. In this spirit, Granovetter and Soong (1983, p. 165) critiqued diffusion models for not relaxing the claim that actors are homogeneous "with respect to those characteristics that bear on the likelihood of . . . contagion." Apart from work using Strang and Tuma's (1993) heterogeneous diffusion model (see, e.g., Zylan and Soule 2000; Myers 2000), most studies have strangely ignored the ways in which individual attributes and the properties of social networks jointly allow for the full expression of social influence.

When competition is at work, a contingent theory of influence offers an appealing lens through which to observe the pattern by which a new trait diffuses. Two doctors, for example, may occupy similar roles in a professional network. But if one begins gaining the other's patients, the rivalry between them will escalate above the level predicted by their substitutability in the network, and the losing doctor will in turn orient to his or her counterpart more intensely. Correspondingly, even if two firms pursue comparable strategies, other locally relevant factors may make their proximity especially consequential (or less consequential) for their decisions about technological innovations. Conceiving of interfirm influence as a process that depends on competitive pressure yields a clearer sense of which nodes in a network are most prone to mimicry and which can act autonomously. This study reveals that interfirm influence is greatest on firms facing the most intense competitive forces. Stated differently, when other, structurally equivalent firms have adopted the new processor technology, it is the firms in the weakest competitive positions that are most likely to adopt in response.

Underlying this result is the broader sociological claim that the comparatively weak or socially marginal are most prone to follow their counterparts. Various researchers in different eras have drawn connections between (the absence of) viability in a social arena and susceptibility to the actions of relevant others. For instance, in his essay on fashion, Simmel (1904) implied that men are less likely than women to follow new trends because men can enjoy social mobility without attending as closely to their outward appearance. Studying work groups in a public agency, Blau (1960) found that socially marginal employees were more likely to adopt group norms than their well-integrated counterparts. Unlike accepted employees, marginal workers were thought to feel obliged to better their

standing through conforming to the strictures of the group (Blau 1960, pp. 245–46). Similarly, Burt (1992) argued that managers, as well as firms, in networks marked by social constraint (and thus low survival chances) must in turn conform to established ways of executing their tasks. Unlike those with entrepreneurial networks, who can freely experiment with new ways of performing their jobs, managers whose networks lack structural holes must “get their role right,” for fear of being forced out of their jobs (Burt 1992, pp. 195–96). Where these otherwise disparate projects converge is on the contention that social influence is greatest on marginal individuals or organizations.

While the first goal of this article is to address Merton and Rossi's (1950) question by modeling the competitive forces faced by a focal firm in its position, the second, corollary goal is to show that taking such an approach adds to a current debate in the diffusion literature. Cast in Coleman's (1964, pp. 43–45) terms, this debate asks whether localized processes of actor-to-actor transmission or the activities of exogenous agents primarily drive diffusion. This debate has antecedents as early as Weber's ([1922] 1978, p. 23) discussion of social versus nonsocial action, which posited that social action should not be equated with many persons all behaving similarly at the same time. Using Weber's example, if, with the onset of rain, everyone raised their umbrellas at once, this event is most likely a common response to an exogenous change—not the result of individuals mutually orienting to and influencing each other to act in the same way.

While exogenous “change agents” (Rogers 1962), such as regulators, courts, and states, have been shown to play an important role in diffusion processes (Dobbin et al. 1993), external actors have recently been demonstrated to have enormous sway, even in a domain in which actor-to-actor transmission had been thought to matter. In the fourth reanalysis of Coleman, Katz, and Menzel's (1966) data, Van den Bulte and Lilien (2001) found that adjusting for the marketing efforts of drug companies washed out the impact of adoptions by socially proximate doctors. Given the medical community's familiarity with antibiotics similar to tetracycline, they argued, contagion among doctors was unlikely to have mattered. More abstractly, their results point to the important possibility that exogenous, time-varying “nonnetwork” factors may induce the empirical regularities that other scholars have ascribed to processes of social influence (Van den Bulte and Lilien 2001, pp. 1411–12).

Standing in contrast to this view, a large body of research by network analysts suggests that some form of social influence is nearly always at work. Among structural sociologists, the idea that structural equivalence yields similar behaviors and perceptions is almost self-evident. White, Boorman, and Breiger (1976), for instance, used blockmodeling to reveal

the fault lines along which the social structure of a monastery fell apart, showing that whether monks were expelled by their superiors or left by choice was a product of their position in social structure. In a similar way, Erickson (1988) argued that individuals share attitudes not because they have the same underlying tendencies but because they have dealings with the same significant others.

Contagion models also portray outcomes as the product of proximate events occurring in a social or geographical territory. Such models by definition reject the assumption of independence that underlies most analyses (Abbott 1988, pp. 181–83) and, if properly specified, yield a fuller picture of social processes. In an early study, Doreian and Hummon (1976) modeled the degree to which regions of the postwar Philippines were controlled by an insurgent political group as a function of that group's mastery of nearby regions. Land, Deane, and Blau (1991) later found evidence of spatial diffusion in a study of church attendance, as did Hedstrom (1994) for the spread of trade unions. Shared by such studies is the appealing theoretical claim that the conduct of a person or firm results, at least in part, from the influence of nearby others within a bounded population.

When this claim is viewed alongside Van den Bulte and Lilien's (2001) findings, a natural corollary is to ensure that peer effects are correctly specified, so that, if present, they appear even when all external influences are held constant. In the ideal, the modeling framework would adjust for all forms of temporal heterogeneity, so that the influence of proximate others appears conservatively as a cross-sectional effect.

Toward this end, the next section develops three hypotheses about the speed at which firms adopted the sixth-generation processor. Extending earlier research that has equated structural equivalence with competition and influence, the first prediction is that the likelihood of adoption increases insofar as a focal firm's strategically similar rivals have adopted. With this hypothesis established as a baseline, the second is that relative size (Hannan et al. 1998; Dobrev and Carroll 2003) drives the extent to which firms are influenced by the conduct of their proximate competitors. The third expectation then concerns how social influence varies in magnitude over the joint distribution of relative size and diversification, positing that relatively small firms are most likely to mimic, particularly if they lack the advantages of targeting a narrow segment of the market. In the next section, I move to the specific features of the case and briefly describe how the sixth-generation chip differed from its predecessor, the Pentium, Intel's fifth-generation architecture. I also note why interfirm influence should matter in this setting. The following section describes the data and the measures. The modeling strategy and control variables

are the substance of the next section. Separate sections present the results and the conclusion.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Competitor Adoption

When a social actor's proximate rivals have adopted an advantageous trait, that actor is then likely to adopt it in order to avert the probable social and economic costs of falling behind. This claim's precedents reside in the previously cited work of Burt (1987) and White (2002) and in related research equating structural equivalence with competition and social influence. In their early formulation, Lorrain and White (1971) portrayed two actors as structurally equivalent if they had identical ties to the same third parties. Extending this approach, Burt (1976) conceptualized actors as structurally equivalent in degrees insofar as they possessed similar relations with others in a network. The advantage of this conceptualization lies in its ability to capture spatially and temporally varying levels of substitutability—and by extension competition and influence—among actors in a population.

Scholarly applications of this framework to diffusion processes have relied on a set of related claims. Galaskiewicz and Burt (1991), for example, construed structurally equivalent actors (corporate philanthropic officers, in their case) as close substitutes, who consequently monitored each other in order to benchmark their performance. Accordingly, when a member of a focal actor's reference group embraces a new trait that strengthens its relative standing—making its products, services, or opinions more valuable, for instance—that focal actor follows suit or faces the ensuing social or economic penalties.

At the individual level, the costs of not adopting in the wake of adoptions by nearby competitors might be the rage of relative deprivation (Burt 1982) or the embarrassment of not holding an opinion considered appropriate for a social role, which might even lead to being forced from the role entirely (Galaskiewicz and Burt 1991, pp. 89–90). Similarly, at the organizational level, a corporation's failure to follow a proximate rival's pattern of campaign contributions might result in the loss of political clout (Mizruchi 1990).

This conception of competition as concentrated among structurally equivalent actors, who follow each other's adoption decisions to avert the costs of lagging behind, is well suited to the empirical realities of the computer industry. The industry is stratified by strategic choices about which customer segments to pursue, and firms with similar strategies watch each other closely. When firms interact with the same third parties

and one firm adopts an innovation, others are likely to follow as a necessary response.

Not migrating once competitors have done so entails various kinds of costs, particularly among buyers. So-called "warriors," who want the best technology first, are especially important, for they shape the purchasing behavior of their employers. Software engineers, for example, need the best machines to compile code, and, in financial services, traders demand the latest chip to access data faster. Maintaining a robust relationship (Hannan 1998) with an institutional account—with a corporation or university, for example—requires servicing such high-end users well. Corporate buyers seek volume discounts and want to reduce the technical frictions that come from unrelated platforms. Consequently, if a vendor cannot service a client's high-end users, it can also lose the "value line" sales, thus forfeiting its status as the "preferred vendor" or even losing the whole contract to a neighboring competitor.

Similar kinds of penalties potentially arise in the retail and reseller channels. Shelf space goes to the newest machines on the floors of major retailers, such as CompUSA and Circuit City. Channel politics are severe in the networks of distributors and value-added resellers, such as Ingram Micro and Merisel, which often form the link between the factory and the end consumer. Vendors often develop customized marketing programs to explain why resellers should give their products first priority. Obvious fodder for such programs is a rival's failure to keep up with the pack.

Whether or not a firm adopts also affects its relations with suppliers, for whom adoption signals the ability to move machines through the channel. Seagate and Western Digital, which sell disk drives, stand to benefit from supplying those on the technological frontier. They want their drives in machines that are as early in the life cycle as possible and thus face a low chance of failing and causing their components to be sent back. Contracts often allow for the return of a certain number of components—clearly an outcome suppliers wish to avoid. A vendor can be shut out of key upstream relationships if suppliers lose confidence in its capacity to push its products through the channel. Not adopting once competitors have done so can thus impair a firm's standing relative to those competitors, in turn eroding its own life chances. Consistent with this discussion, I expect that a vendor will be more likely to adopt if its strategically similar rivals have done so.

HYPOTHESIS 1.—*The likelihood of adoption increases with the degree to which a firm's structurally equivalent competitors have adopted the new technology.*

Competitor Adoption by Relative Size

Without detracting from hypothesis 1, a growing body of work also implies that the effect of peer adoptions will vary with a firm's size relative to those peers. While this claim follows from the broader idea discussed earlier—that the socially or economically marginal are most prone to conform—the notion that adoptions by competitors are most influential for comparatively small firms follows most directly from work in organizational ecology on relative size. Until recently, empirical work had used only absolute size to test claims about the dangers facing small-scale operations (e.g., Ranger-Moore 1997). Among such studies, Barron's (1999) stands out because of the care taken to conceptualize size as a rampart against competitive pressure. Using data on New York credit unions, Barron showed that the deleterious effects of population density were most consequential for the smallest firms, and thus advanced one of the first relational conceptions of firm size.

Several scholars have since taken this relational emphasis further. Underlying their approach is the idea that a firm's life chances are shaped by the growth of other firms, especially in industries marked by scale economies. In this line of work, researchers have distinguished between a firm's capacity to withstand random exogenous shocks (captured by absolute size) and its ability to compete directly with its larger, more efficient, and politically powerful counterparts (measured by relative size). Hannan et al. (1998) estimated the effects of relative size on survival in the British, French, German, and American automobile industries. Controlling for absolute size, they showed that size relative to the largest firm in the industry lowered the likelihood of death, a result that held across all four national markets. More abstractly, this result highlights the close coupling that often exists between shifts in the efficiency of preponderant firms and the life chances of their less fortunately positioned rivals.

Carroll and Swaminathan (2000) later documented that in the U.S. beer industry firms with many larger competitors were more likely to die. They argued that a relative measure of size is appropriate whenever firms compete on scale. In this view, the higher cost structures of smaller firms threaten their survival precisely because of their larger, more efficient rivals, in whose absence these smaller firms would be better off. It is by virtue of their low position in a hierarchy defined by size that smaller organizations face a greater risk of extinction (Carroll and Swaminathan 2000; Dobrev and Carroll 2003).

Carroll and Hannan (2000) also enumerated three closely related domains in which relative size should matter: in addition to superior efficiency in production, they suggested, relative size could also yield greater influence over suppliers and distributors. While these insights apply to

multiple industries, they especially concern the conduct and performance of computer firms, which compete in a domain marked by scale advantages in purchasing, production, and distribution. Upstream, the larger vendors enjoy significant discounts, especially when buying software, processors, disk drives, and keyboards. In manufacturing, the advantages of scale are important (Brock 1975; Scherer 1996, pp. 244–46) because of high up-front development costs. And downstream, larger firms get the best space on the shelves of retailers and are the first priority of major distributors. Consistent with these benefits of scale, the costs of failing to adopt once rivals have done so should appear especially pronounced for firms at the low end of the size hierarchy in their position. That is, I expect the impact of peer adoption to be greatest on firms that are small relative to their strategically proximate rivals.

HYPOTHESIS 2.— *The effect of adoptions by a firm's structurally equivalent competitors increases as relative size decreases.*

Competitor Adoption by Relative Size by Scope

Additional strands of theory offer an extension of hypothesis 2. While implying that relatively small firms are most vulnerable—and thus most responsive to the conduct of other firms—theoretical works dealing with scale as well as scope (e.g., Carroll 1985; Chandler 1990; Carroll and Hannan 2000) further imply that this effect is strongest if such firms are diversified. Central to ecological theory is the tenet that generalists (diversified firms) facing scale-based competition reside precariously between two otherwise viable extremes. Unlike their larger counterparts, such firms cannot compete on scale. Unlike their more specialized competitors, they cannot as effectively coordinate their routines (Nelson and Winter 1982) with distinctive consumer preferences.

Mirroring recent work on relative size, Chandler's (1990) account of modern capitalism and the ecological model of resource partitioning both stress the benefits enjoyed by large, diversified firms. Chandler (1990) depicted the modern economy as the by-product of firms that jointly exploited the advantages of scale and diversification. It was after achieving economies of scale that makers of chemicals, automobiles, and machinery widened their reach into new markets to grow and further bolster their competitive standings. More broadly, Carroll and Hannan (2000) argued that, in industries marked by scale economies, large firms tend to behave as rivals in an "arms race" for greater scale, and that the efficiency associated with greater scale enables them to diversify further into the niches of smaller generalists, absorb their customers, and induce their demise. Conversely, and unlike more specialized firms similarly sited in the size distribution, generalists facing scale-based competition lack the

protection afforded by targeting a narrow segment of the market. Here the theoretical logic differs from and extends the underpinnings of hypothesis 2.

Several studies jointly imply that specializing within a narrow subset of the market yields advantages that winnow the liabilities of scale-based competition and thus reduce a relatively small firm's proclivity to mimic the technology strategies of its rivals. According to this body of work (see Bruggeman 1997, pp. 203–4), when an organization targets a specific, narrowly defined area of the market, it develops routines that, at least within its domain, are superior to those of its more diversified counterparts. Specifically, ecological research suggests that a specialist's routines better incorporate the lessons of organizational search (Barnett, Greve, and Park 1994), yield more reliable (less variable) outputs (Hannan and Freeman 1984), and overall more effectively match indigenous customer preferences (Carroll 1985; Peli and Nootenboom 1999). Such views concur with other accounts of positional advantage, in which a firm effectively isolates itself from other rivals by sticking to and incrementally enhancing a focused course of strategic action (e.g., March 1991). Together, these lines of work imply that specialization strengthens a firm's connections with its customers and thus offsets the otherwise pernicious effects of proximity to larger competitors, in turn reducing the tendency to follow the adoption decisions of larger counterparts.

Earlier in the computer industry's history, Gateway and Dell were exemplars of the advantages of specialization. Before growing and diversifying, they were desktop makers selling only through the direct channel. Dell in particular sought to optimize its routines for a narrow subset of sophisticated consumers who were willing to purchase sight unseen (Narayandas and Rangan 1996). A main benefit of Dell's focus was continuing access to data on consumer preferences, which made it easier to customize and advertise its products (Dell 1999). More abstractly, the advantages of specialization suggest that relatively small, specialized firms are less likely than their diversified counterparts to follow the conduct of their rivals. Unable to compete on scale and lacking the benefits of focus, the relatively small generalist should be most sensitive to the technology strategies of its rivals.

HYPOTHESIS 3.— *The effect of adoptions by a firm's structurally equivalent competitors is strongest for firms that are relatively small and broad in scope.*

THE SIXTH-GENERATION PROCESSOR

The preceding hypotheses find further support from the main historical details of the case. Specifically, the nature of the differences between the sixth-generation processor and its predecessor, the Pentium, are compatible with the notion that interfirm influence—not just Intel's efforts, firm-specific human capital, or product market characteristics—mattered decisively in this context.

Initially code-named the "P6," Intel's sixth-generation processor was released as the "Pentium Pro" in November of 1995. Linking the Pentium Pro to its fifth-generation antecedent, the Pentium, one analyst called it the "son of Pentium" (Ortiz 1995).² The term *Pentium* remained, but, by adding the modifier *Pro*, Intel also signaled that the P6 was a faster, more "professional" chip than its predecessor (Jackson 1997, p. 370).

The Pentium Pro embodied many significant advances over the Pentium. One was a sharp jump in the number of transistors—nearly a two-fold increase from 3.1 to 5.5 million—which made the newer design better for multimedia and video applications. Linked to this was the upgrade of Intel's native signal-processing technology, which let the processor take on jobs often performed by multimedia software. Jerome (1995) thus noted that the Pentium Pro "handles MPEG compression, audio, and telephony, among other chores," whereas the "Pentium chugs under the same load." In addition, the Pentium Pro handled commands faster than the Pentium. It had three portals and could resequence instructions to perform more quickly.³

While the Pentium Pro was certainly a significant leap in technology, it was not such a mandatory change that all had to adopt it at once. Therefore, its diffusion is a case in which it is possible to detect interfirm influence insofar as that influence was at work. Had the Pentium Pro been a mandatory leap—as the Pentium might have been were it not for the early bugs found in its floating-point technology—then all but a few laggards would have adopted instantly. In that case, a plot of the number of adopters with time would follow an inverted J-shaped curve, where

² It is in this sense that the term *generation* connotes a pattern of familial descent. Chip technologies have been "born" of their parents since the early years of the hardware industry. The genealogy of the Pentium Pro began in the late 1970s: Intel released the 8086, its first generation, in 1979; three years later, in 1982, it released the 286, its second generation; the 386 came out in 1986, followed by the 486 in 1989, and then the Pentium, its fifth generation, in 1993.

³ Specifically, it could discern whether commands were data dependent and then schedule instructions that required neither information from memory nor the results of prior commands for times when the chip would otherwise delay or "stall" until data became available (Compaq 1997, p. 4).

adoption is rapid early on and then tapers with time (Coleman 1964; Burt 1987).

Specifically, the sixth-generation chip was significant but not mandatory for at least two reasons. First, the leap in technology from the fifth to sixth generations was not as sharp as it was from the fourth to the fifth. The Pentium was twice as fast as a 486 chip of comparable megahertz, but the Pentium Pro was only 50% faster than a comparable Pentium. Conversely, leaps that do crush prior advances create consumer insistence, so that demand, not interfirm influence, propels the adoption process. Second, when the Pentium Pro came out in late 1995, Intel had released high-speed Pentiums at 133 megahertz only months before, and demand for fifth-generation systems (first introduced in 1993) was strong and rising. In addition, while 486 chips were in decline at this time, they were in no way off the market, reflecting the fact that the new processor did not instantly displace older ones. The relative levels of shipments with 486, Pentium, and sixth-generation processors over time are shown in figure 1.

For each series, I placed counts of total shipments for each of the three processors over the worldwide market totals of each quarter. More than half of all units shipped were Pentium-based at the release of the Pentium Pro, and the share of fifth-generation systems peaked at over 80% well after Intel released the Pentium Pro.

Given the Pentium's appeal, as a general matter, computer makers were not forced to migrate to the sixth-generation processor. Keeping with the earlier discussion, however, there were specific conditions where, if a firm's peers adopted, it very likely had to follow suit. What Burt (1987, p. 1294) called the "luxury" of ignoring an innovation vanished for a positionally weak firm after its peers adopted. Through adopting the sixth-generation processor, a firm effectively moved beyond the Pentium world and could offer the newest technology, which in turn pressured its rivals. The plot of the number of adopters in each quarter in figure 2 shows that the inverted J-shaped curve characteristic of external influence was not evident; instead, it has the features of an S-shaped curve associated with actor-to-actor influence. Quarter 1 is the third quarter of 1995, the quarter before Intel released the Pentium Pro. Quarter 15 is the first quarter of 1999, the last period for which data were available.

DATA AND MEASURES

Data

The data for this project were collected and assembled by the International Data Corporation (IDC), the largest data consultancy worldwide




FIG. 1.—Trajectories for fourth, fifth, and sixth generations. (Data from the International Data Corporation.)

to information technology firms and industries. In 1995, after assembling yearly data on the computer industry since the 1970s, IDC began tracking the shipment and selling-price patterns of personal computer (PC) vendors each quarter. IDC's definition of the PC excludes mainframes, minicomputers, and workstations at the high end, as well as personal digital devices at the low end. Therefore, data on the shipments and sales of vendors in the sample are only those of personal computers.

With more than 575 analysts and research centers in 43 countries, IDC is well positioned to collect and organize information on the PC industry. While not entirely complete, its coverage of the industry is nearly exhaustive. The vendors IDC tracked accounted for 83% of the estimated worldwide PC sales from the first quarter of 1995 to the first quarter of 1999. My observation window excludes the first two quarters of 1995, as Intel released the Pentium Pro in the fourth quarter of that year, and it thus leaves out shipments with beta versions of the chip in prior quarters.




FIG. 2.—The proportion of adopters over time. (Data from the International Data Corporation.)

The data set for this analysis includes time-varying information on 302 computer vendors.

IDC reports the number of units shipped by each firm across several processor categories, such as 386 and below, fourth, fifth, and sixth generations. For the few vendors that rely heavily on Motorola's PowerPC chips, such as Apple, determining generation is impossible. Therefore, I excluded observations on firms for which more than a third of their systems were PowerPC-based. IDC codes shipments as sixth-generation-based if Cyrix or Advanced Micro Devices (AMD) made the chip, as long as it was architecturally comparable to Intel's category; AMD's K6-2 is an example. By the start of this study, Cyrix had 3% of the market and

Intel had between 80% and 85%, justifying the focus of the earlier discussion on Intel.⁴

IDC also reports quarterly sales as well as shipment breakdowns by national market, technological emphasis, and distribution channel. A total of 57 national markets are tracked, ranging from Canada and the United Kingdom to Japan and Chile. This number includes five aggregated regional markets, such as "rest of Asia Pacific" and "rest of Latin America," to cover areas where reporting is not individualized.

Coupled with a firm's national market focus, its choice of "form-factor" or PC technology and channel defines its strategy. These "form-factor" types—literally concerning the "form," or appearance, of the product—are desktops, notebooks, subnotebooks, and servers. Subnotebooks, such as Compaq's HiNote or Toshiba's Libretto, are colloquially known as "thin and lights." Servers are harnessed for many well-known, memory-intensive tasks.⁵

In addition to its form-factor emphasis, a vendor's position is also defined by choice of channels. IDC codes the units shipped by each firm as belonging to one of five channels: (1) direct inbound, (2) direct outbound, (3) reseller, (4), retail, and (5) other. Machines flow through the direct inbound channel if the buyer initiates the transaction by phone, Internet, or a vendor-specific catalog. Gateway and Dell were by no means the sole incumbents of this channel. Many other firms also sold direct over the course of this study. AST, Apple, Compaq, International Business Machines (IBM), Samsung, and Sanyo comprise only a subset of other well-known entrants. Conversely, the direct outbound channel is marked by the use of a sophisticated in-house sales force. A well-known example is the IBM representative selling to large corporations. But when buyers require highly specialized solutions, they often turn to the reseller channel. In IDC's coding scheme, this category includes dealers, such as Ingram Micro; system integrators, such as Vanstar and Dornier; and value-added

⁴ There are, of course, also manufacturing differences within the sixth-generation category. For example, the Pentium II came out after the Pentium Pro as the second version of the P6 in May 1997. But distinctions between generations or "architectures" overwhelm within-generation variations, making the choice to code shipment with either version as the same event very reasonable. The Pentium Pro and Pentium II had the same system bus, both employed dynamic execution techniques, and they had almost identical designs. Differences were minimal by comparison. For example, the Pentium II was packaged differently and was a lower-voltage chip (Compaq 1997).

⁵ They centrally store files and applications that multiple users, or "clients," access. They also host web pages, back up files, and collect and store e-mail. Such activities may make servers seem more akin to mainframes—used for "mission-critical" tasks, such as paycheck disbursement. However, the high-end desktop segment overlaps with that of PC servers. Vendors and analysts universally regard servers as members of the same market with other PCs.

resellers. Resellers offer more than just the "box." They sell services and bundle software and peripherals with the machine. Examples of major retailers, the fourth channel, are CompUSA in the United States and Dixons in the United Kingdom. Last, the fifth "other" channel combines several distinct outlets. By IDC's description, the other channel embraces third-party mail order and online distributors, military exchanges, and any means excluded from the other four categories.

With IDC's coverage of 57 national markets, 4 form-factor categories, and 5 channels, there are 1,140 possible segments in which vendors ship PCs. Separate from quarterly sales, which measure performance, a firm's strategy or conduct concerns its choice of technology, distribution, and regional focus. A virtue of the data set is that it includes time-varying information on every firm's strategy, on the basis of which each firm's strategically closest competitors are identifiable.

Measuring Competitor Adoption, Relative Size, and Scope

The measure of competitor adoption used in this project hinges on two elements: market contact and structural equivalence. Market contact occurs between firms i and j at time t if they overlap by selling jointly in at least one of 1,140 possible technology-by-channel-by-nation market segments. Even in the same country, if firm i sells only notebooks—entirely through the direct inbound channel—whereas j sells only servers—solely through resellers—then i and j have zero contact. I then assume they do not affect each other's conduct or performance. After making market contact a binary outcome, the next step in quantifying competitor adoption is to weight by the degree of structural equivalence between firms i and k . I denote i 's relevant competitors by k , rather than j , because i is likely to have contact with less than the total number of firms in the panel at t , so that $\max(k) \leq \max(j)$.

Consider a well-known vendor, such as Micron, for illustration. Micron shares segments with Gateway, which suggests that if Gateway adopts at t , Micron will be more likely to do so at $t + 1$. But Micron shares segments with many other firms k at t —all of which are more or less strategically similar to Micron than Gateway is. Infotel, Fountain, and Dell among others also bear on Micron's conduct and performance. Therefore in quantifying whether Micron's competitors have adopted, I follow an established approach in network analysis (e.g., Burt 1976, 1987) by allowing an indicator of adoption for firms k to receive weights proportional to their degree of equivalence to Micron.

The measure of competitor adoption for the i th firm at time t thus takes the form

$$C_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_{it}} w_{ikt} A_{kt}, \quad (1)$$

where A_{kt} is an indicator set to 1 if firm k shipped a nonzero number of sixth-generation-based machines at t , 0 otherwise. The integer K_{it} is a time-varying count of other firms with which i has market contact. The coefficient is the degree of structural equivalence between firms i and k . Calculating w_{ikt} first entails rescaling the shipment vectors of each firm by dividing through by the total number of PCs a firm sells in any segments (Burt 1988). The second step is to compute a firm-by-firm matrix of Euclidean distances, so that

$$d_{ikt} = \left[\sum_{j=1}^{1,140} \left(\frac{Y_{ijt}}{\sum_j Y_{ijt}} - \frac{Y_{kjt}}{\sum_j Y_{kjt}} \right)^2 \right]^{1/2}, \quad (2)$$

where Y_{ijt} denotes the shipments of the i th firm in segment j at time t . I then convert each firm's vector of distances into structural equivalence coefficients by subtracting each element from the maximum distance and making the weights on A_{kt} sum to unity (Burt and Carlton 1989):

$$w_{ikt} = \frac{\max(d_{it}) - d_{ikt}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K_{it}} [\max(d_{it}) - d_{ikt}]}. \quad (3)$$

This measure of competitor adoption has many desirable properties. It takes into account only those firms that a focal firm meets tangibly in at least one market segment and then weights those others by the extent of their structural equivalence with that chosen firm. Therefore the incumbents of this set exert influence in gradations based on their strategic similarities with the chosen firm. The use of structural equivalence weights also allows the effect of a particular competitor to vary with time. For example, if IBM migrated strategically so that it was "closer" to Micron at t than at $t - 1$, *ceteris paribus* IBM's relative contribution to Micron's level of competitor adoption at t would rise.

This measure mirrors models of spatial processes (Doreian 1981; Sorenson and Audia 2000), in which influence of geographically dispersed actors decays with distance, and it also resembles ecological work on niche overlap. Hannan and Freeman (1989), for example, measured competition between populations of firms as a function of how much they depend on the same customer bases. At the firm level, McPherson (1983) defined competition in terms of overlap in the kinds of members voluntary or-

ganizations recruit. Similarly, Peli and Nootenboom (1999) viewed competition as occurring between firms insofar as they cater to customers with the same tastes. Consistent with ecological models, equation (1) uses the continuous distance model of structural equivalence advanced by Burt (1976, 1987) to calibrate levels of strategic similarity among firms meeting in at least one segment.

This approach is also useful for illustrating the strategic variation around a chosen firm's position in the market. Consider, for instance, the differences that existed even among firms that were strategically proximate to Micron in the fourth quarter of 1995. To identify Micron's 25 closest rivals and the strategic differences between them, I began by normalizing each firm's vector of shipments to the 1,140 market segments, defined by technology, distribution channel, and region, by dividing through by the sum of shipments across all segments. Next, I collected the 25 firms who were strategically closest to Micron after generating a matrix of Euclidean distances among the rescaled shipment vectors. Then, I applied a multidimensional scaling (Johnson and Wichern 1982) routine to the remaining 26-by-26 matrix of distances to get the coordinates for figure 3.

As figure 3's bottom left corner shows, Gateway and Micron had especially similar strategies in the fourth quarter of 1995. More precisely, they both majored in desktops in the United States through direct methods. Micron sold direct exclusively, and only a small portion of Gateway's shipments reached the end consumer through indirect means. Conversely, Micron was further away strategically from Epson, which sold primarily through resellers and retailers and was almost as focused on Japan as it was on the United States. Consequently, Micron may be assumed to be competing more intensely with Gateway than with Epson, Digital, or IBM.

Using the same set of shipment profiles, a time-varying measure of relative size may be computed as follows:

$$R_{it} = \frac{S_{it}}{\sum_{k=1}^{K_{it}} w_{ikt} S_{kt}}. \quad (4)$$

The only difference between this measure and that of competitive adoption is that S_{it} and S_{kt} are the sales of the i th and k th firms. The same structural equivalence weights apply, only now to the sales of each firm's competitors.

Finally, I also used the data on market segments, again defined by form-factor, channel, and region, to measure scope or diversification. I




FIG. 3.—Vendors structurally equivalent to Micron, 1995, quarter 4

constructed an entropy index (Coleman 1964; Hannan and Freeman 1989; Davis, Diekmann, and Tinsley 1994) of the form:

$$E_{it} = 1 + \sum_{j=1}^{J_{it}} P_{ijt} \ln(1/P_{ijt}), \quad (5)$$

where P_{ijt} is the proportion of the i th firm's shipments to market category j at t and where J_{it} is a time-varying count of the number of market categories in which i ships at t . I added unity to the measure so that I could reduce its skewness by transforming it logarithmically.

MODELING AND CONTROL VARIABLES

To test the preceding hypotheses, I estimated discrete time event history models of the form:

$$L(\mu_{it+1}) = \ln\left(\frac{\mu_{it+1}}{1 - \mu_{it+1}}\right) = \alpha_0 + \tau_{t+1} + \mathbf{X}_{it}\boldsymbol{\beta} + \mathbf{Z}_{it}\boldsymbol{\phi}, \quad (6)$$

where μ_{it+1} is the i th firm's hazard of shipping for the first time with the sixth-generation processor at $t + 1$, given that it was at risk at t . The term α_0 is a constant; τ_{t+1} is a set of quarter-specific indicators for all but the fourth quarter of 1995, when Intel released the Pentium Pro; \mathbf{X}_{it} contains competitor adoption and its interactions with relative size, and scope, which are the predictors of substantive interest; $\boldsymbol{\beta}$ is a vector of parameters; and \mathbf{Z}_{it} contains control variables, whose coefficients are in $\boldsymbol{\phi}$. As the subscripts indicate, all predictors were lagged one quarter.

Using a full set of quarter indicators lets the baseline hazard shift freely with time (Allison 1984). Calendar time should affect the hazard, as distance from the launch date will pressure nonadopters. But a complete set of time dummies soaks up all temporal heterogeneity—not just time from Intel's release date. This step purges the impact of several important factors, such as the selling prices of processors and the total number of adopters and users. Controlling for these levels is important, for a wider installed base legitimizes a new technology (Hannan and Carroll 1992) and may create further demand because of network externalities (Katz and Shapiro 1985).

Quarter indicators also adjust for Intel's efforts as an external agent as well as for supply constraints. Intel hastens the adoption process by advertising and producing motherboards so that vendors need not wait on motherboard makers. The firm's advertising had far-reaching effects in its 1989 "Red-X" campaign, whose purpose was to create demand for the 386, over the 286, chip (Jackson 1997). Motherboard production by Intel first became important with the Pentium's launch. Both factors most likely affected the adoption of the Pentium Pro. In addition, sixth-generation chips were in short supply in three of the 15 quarters of the panel—the fourth quarter of 1996 and the third and fourth quarters of 1998. Quarterly indicators span the impacts of these shortages, as well as all other forms of temporal heterogeneity.

Shifting to firm-level control variables, it is likely that absolute size and scope will affect the hazard of adoption by virtue of the access large, diversified firms have to Intel. Using a new technology often requires support from Intel's engineers, who can realize economies of scale by working with the largest firms first. In addition, to remove any hint of collusion, an efficiency-based rationale for supplying Compaq first and

not eMachines is vital. Intel may also favor firms that are broad in scope because of their ability to advertise the new chip better than more specialized firms, which reach a narrower section of the market.

The extent of a firm's focus on servers, desktops, or notebooks is also likely to affect its speed of adoption. Servers are faster than desktops and portables, and the newest processors are often made specifically for them. Desktops are the closest to a commodity of the form-factor types. Low chances for differentiation in turn often forces desktop vendors to adopt. Conversely, those who mostly sell portables can differentiate in several ways—for instance, by weight, size, and battery life. But engineering concerns are also important. Upon their release, processors cannot go into notebooks or subnotebooks because of overheating. After an initial launch, Intel makes lower-voltage versions of the chip that stay cooler. To adjust for technological differences, I computed the proportions of a vendor's shipments that were servers as well as the proportion of its shipments that were notebooks or subnotebooks. I also dropped from the panel all observations on sole notebook producers (such as Sanyo, Canon, and Sharp) before the second quarter of 1996, when sixth-generation processors were first shipped in notebooks; beforehand they could not have been at risk of adoption.

Controls for technological focus cannot fully sweep out the effects of firm-specific traits and contexts, however. Two vendors may sell only servers, for example, but even after adjusting for differences in geographical focus, one may face more demand for the latest technology, or one may have greater costs of adopting. Engineering a system for a new processor involves extensive work. The processor must fit with the chip sets, and the right bus speed has to be chosen. Engineers must also know how much heat the chip dissipates, which affects the kinds of casing and fans to be used, the size of the box, and where circuits can be placed. Vendors that cannot perform the necessary tests are likely to wait longer.

To adjust for these possible effects, I followed the logic of Heckman and Borjas (1980) by creating a time-varying measure of the proportion of a firm's shipments that contained fifth-generation processors. A vendor who has barely moved from 486 chips to the Pentium will be less likely than a Pentium-focused firm to transition to the Pentium Pro. The proportion of Pentium-based shipments proxies a firm's place in a distribution of average processor speeds. Unobserved factors—consumer tastes, plant technology, and firm-specific human capital, particularly in engineering—certainly correlate with this measure, making it a useful adjustment. I also created an indicator variable measuring whether more than 50% of a firm's products still contain fourth-generation (or lower) processors. This measure, together with a measure of whether a firm's peers reside primarily in a fourth-generation state, are important for addressing an al-

ternative interpretation of the results, and so they receive further attention in the next section.

Even after controlling for technology and the level of Pentium-based shipments, emphasis on specific national markets may also delay or hasten adoption. Therefore, I added measures of the proportion of a firm's shipments to those markets that significantly predicted the rate of adoption in a model with all theoretically important predictors and proportions of shipments in 56 of the 57 regions. The national markets that were significant at the .05 level or better were Brazil and Mexico. The proportion of shipments in the United States had no effect on the hazard and so was left out in the interest of parsimony. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for all variables in the analysis.

RESULTS

Table 2 shows the results of seven discrete-time event history models predicting the adoption of the sixth-generation processor. Model 1 includes absolute size, scope, and temporal indicators.

The effects of absolute size and scope are consistent with the notion that they act as pull factors—making firms more attractive to Intel, the external agent of innovation. Mirroring the supply shortages in the fourth quarter of 1996 and in the third and fourth quarters of 1998, coefficients on the time dummies for these periods reveal drops in the baseline hazard from prior quarters.

Model 2 shows that, without time dummies, competitor adoption strongly affects the likelihood of adoption, net of absolute size and scope.⁶ When the quarter indicators reappear in model 3, however, the effect of competitor adoption vanishes. In light of the correlation between competitor adoption and other factors, such as advertising, processor prices, and the like, this result is unsurprising. If the conduct of other firms matters, it does so only in connection with other covariates.

Model 4 includes competitor adoption, relative size, and their product to test hypothesis 2—that the influence of a firm's peers is strongest when relative size is lowest. Model 4 shows that competitor adoption, relative size, and their interaction significantly enhance the fit. Models 3 and 4 may in turn be nested to yield a large difference in deviances. This difference of 26.56 is well beyond 5.99, the critical value on 2 degrees of freedom. Model 4 thus supports hypothesis 2: As a firm's size falls further

⁶ In this model, the number of observations drops from 1,158 to 1,157 because of a firm whose shipment profile overlaps with that of only one other firm, and whose measure of competitor adoption is therefore undefined by equation (3).

TABLE 1
CORRELATIONS AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES IN THE ANALYSIS

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. ln(sales)	1										
2. ln(scope)507	1									
3. Competitor adoption	-.134	-.132	1								
4. ln(relative size)9405	.4556	-.2783	1							
5 Pentium1105	-.0603	.5682	.064	1						
6 Fourth generation	-.0947	.0501	-.4697	-.0655	-.8652	1					
7. Competitor fourth generation0457	.1505	-.7887	.1189	-.7218	.6604	1				
8 Portables1198	.1026	2904	.0284	.2017	-.1199	-.2124	1			
9. Servers	-.1931	-.0782	-.008	-.1426	-.0098	.0176	.0367	-.0823	1		
10. Brazil0628	-.0256	.0331	.0516	.0527	-.0004	-.0387	-.0346	-.0317	1	
11. Mexico	-.0766	-.1618	.0736	-.0988	-.0765	.0857	.0101	-.0693	-.0231	-.0437	1
Mean	15.5907	49388	48275	-4.8277	.66824	28756	.19623	.16734	.01844	.08802	01844
SD	1.76636	.35333	.31721	1.86929	.33432	.45282	.27293	.32512	.10851	.27793	13349
Min	10.1832	0	0	-11.101	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Max	21.9531	162161	1	2.89139	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

TABLE 2
DISCRETE-TIME EVENT HISTORY MODELS PREDICTING THE ADOPTION OF THE SIXTH-GENERATION PROCESSOR

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Predictors:							
ln(sales)	.19 (.053)**	.218 (.051)**	2 (.054)**	-.234 (.141)	-.245 (.149)	.031 (.165)	.026 (.165)
ln(scope)	.755 (.260)**	.412 (.249)	71 (.263)**	.662 (.268)**	4.056 (1.011)**	4.167 (.968)**	4.121 (.962)**
Competitor adoption	2.214 (.278)**	478 (.527)	-1.213 (1.008)	4.755 (1.862)**	3.785 (1.814)**	3.877 (1.807)**
ln(relative size)712 (.146)**	-.052 (.229)	-.296 (.241)	-.274 (.238)
Competitor adoption by ln(relative size)	-.493 (.145)**	.758 (.318)**	.687 (.304)**	.684 (.301)**
Competitor adoption by ln(scope)	-6.654 (1.898)**	-4.578 (1.977)**	-4.686 (1.976)**
ln(scope) by ln(relative size)924 (.218)**	.931 (.216)**	.918 (.215)**
Competitor adoption by ln(relative size) by ln(scope)	-1.617 (.376)**	-1.214 (.373)**	-1.224 (.372)**
Quarter Indicators:							
96Q1	1.484 (.386)**	1.348 (.415)**	1.924 (.504)**	2.926 (.750)**	2.706 (.728)**	2.776 (.776)**
96Q2	1.604 (.389)**	1.334 (.489)**	1.86 (.609)**	2.775 (.826)**	2.599 (.824)**	2.749 (.898)**
96Q3	2.428 (.381)**	2.123 (.513)**	2.596 (.635)**	3.475 (.845)**	3.383 (.854)**	3.542 (.933)**
96Q4	2.321 (.400)**	1.973 (.555)**	2.428 (.669)**	3.302 (.872)**	3.262 (.889)**	3.459 (.960)**
97Q1	2.125 (.451)**	1.771 (.597)**	2.389 (.699)**	3.273 (.901)**	3.415 (.925)**	3.631 (.986)**
97Q2	2.562	2.227	2.752	3.648	3.988	4.262

97Q3	(440)**	3.053	(674)**	(880)**	(919)**	(986)**
							2.698	3.236	4.116	4.742	5.034
97Q4	(458)**	2.497	(706)**	(902)**	(959)**	(1.021)**
							2.075	2.58	3.447	4.525	4.797
98Q1	(548)**	2.213	(802)**	(985)**	(1.074)**	(1.125)**
							1.787	2.333	3.23	4.378	4.64
98Q2	(675)**	3.909	(886)**	(1.060)**	(1.156)**	(1.201)**
							3.514	4.008	4.815	7.029	7.288
98Q3	(599)**	3.528	(739)**	(990)**	(1.119)**	(1.165)**
							3.118	3.423	4.463	6.137	6.393
98Q4	(768)**	2.497	(887)**	(1.117)**	(1.240)**	(1.283)**
							2.073	2.328	3.651	4.866	5.139
99Q1	(1.182)*	3.643	(1.308)	(1.450)*	(1.706)**	(1.736)**
							3.271	3.88	4.757	5.455	5.734
Controls:						(1.458)*	(1.513)*	(1.569)*	(1.654)**	(2.004)**	(2.033)**
Pentium823	
										(.438)	
Fourth generation						-753
											(.358)*
Competitor fourth generation558
											(.94)
Portables					-2.661	-2.631
										(.412)**	(.413)**
Servers					1.514	1.595
										(.690)*	(.688)*
Brazil					-1.733	-1.73
										(.402)**	(.401)**
Mexico					-2.147	-2.157
										(1.017)*	(1.017)*
Constant	-6.695	-6.241	2.407	-1.733	-7.262	-6.606
						(.885)**	(.822)**	(2.719)	(3.026)	(3.441)*	(3.395)
N	1.158	1.157	1.157	1.157	1.157	1.157
Deviance	1,027.104	1,064.914	999.243	974.056	890.466	888.933

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$.

behind that of its closest rivals, it monitors and responds to those rivals' adoption decisions more closely.

Using the terms of model 4, the following expression illustrates how the effect of competitor adoption varies by relative size:

$$L(\mu_{u+1}) \propto [-1.213 - 493 \ln(R_u)]C_u, \quad (7)$$

where C_u is the measure of competitor adoption depicted in equation (1). When the log of relative size equals -2.5 , the coefficient on competitor adoption equals zero. And as relative size gets smaller, the contagion effect gets stronger. About 90% of the vendors fall beneath this threshold. Comparably small firms respond more to the conduct of their rivals than their larger counterparts do. In other words, the most responsive firms are those that face higher costs of not adopting once relevant others have done so. Controlling for absolute size and time, if two firms are relatively small, but one's rivals have adopted and the other's rivals have not, the former is at much greater risk of adopting.

Model 5 adds terms to test hypothesis 3, which was that relatively small firms that are also diversified are especially susceptible to peer influence. This expectation followed from work in organizational ecology stressing the vulnerability of small generalists when firms compete on scale, as well as the advantages that come from specializing within a narrow segment of the market.

Model 6 then shows that this effect stays strong when I include a full set of controls. Coefficients on many of these adjustments match earlier intuitions. Consider first the measures of form-factor emphasis. The estimate on the proportion of a firm's shipments that are portables (as opposed to desktops) is negative and strongly significant. Conversely, the more a firm sells servers, the faster it migrates. I expected this pattern because of the sequence in which Intel alters its processors for different types of PCs. The measure I devised of a firm's place in the range of processor speeds does not have an effect in model 6, although it does if other terms are omitted. Finally, the proportion of shipments in Brazil significantly lowers the likelihood of adoption, as does focus on Mexico.

The three-way term reveals where different levels of interfirm influence occur. By collecting terms from model 6, it is straightforward to show how the effect of interest varies with relative size and scope:

$$L(\mu_{u+1}) \propto kC_u, \quad (8a)$$

where

$$k = 3.785 + .687 \ln(R_u) - 4.578 \ln(E_u) - 1.214 \ln(R_u) \ln(E_u). \quad (8b)$$

In other words, the hazard of adoption varies with competitor adoption, C_u , multiplied by a function of relative size, R_u , and scope, E_u . A mean-

ingful way to portray this contingent effect is to show how the change in the odds given a unit increase in competitor adoption, e^k , behaves over the joint distribution of relative size and scope. This is done in figure 4.

The vertical axis, which is labeled competitor adoption effect, corresponds to the increase in the odds of adoption, given a unit increase in the covariate measuring adoption by a firm's structurally equivalent rivals (e^k). The range for each of the other axes is the mean plus or minus one standard deviation (taken from columns 2 and 4 of table 1). I selected these as the endpoints for the two horizontal axes to make sure that the response surface was always over the range of the data.

Moving to the results of figure 4, even at its center—above the midpoints of each axis—the effect of adoption by a firm's peers is substantively significant. There, adoption by a firm's proximate rivals raises its own odds of adopting the sixth-generation processor by a factor of three. The average firm's hazard of adoption is thus strongly associated with the conduct of its strategically similar counterparts. Once the impact of peer behavior is properly specified by interactions with other important covariates, it persists as a strong cross-sectional effect, holding up even in the presence of time dummies.

The main implication of figure 4, however, is that relatively small firms that are also diversified are most responsive to the adoptions of their rivals. This is apparent from the height of the grid where relative size is low but scope is high. In the upper left corner, where the surface meets the vertical axis, a unit increase in competitor adoption raises the odds by nearly a factor of nine. This region of the state space corresponds to firms that face scale-based competition but lack the benefits of narrow scope. Concurring with hypothesis 3, this pattern indicates that the conduct of a firm's rivals is most consequential for those whose market positions are weak.

Model 7 addresses a competing interpretation which is often overlooked in diffusion studies but which is especially important to rule out in this analysis.⁷ It concerns the distinction Doreian (1980) made between spatial

⁷ Additional models (not shown but available on request) were estimated to address three additional competing interpretations: (1) One alternative interpretation is that the interactions of relative size and scope with the competitor adoption term merely reflect the fact that the effects of these covariates vary with the age of the new processor. The main effect of competitor adoption was brought to zero by the entrance of the time dummies in model 3, meaning that time and levels of peer adoption are correlated. If the three-way effect of interest were just the product of temporal interactions, then substituting calendar time for competitor adoption should yield a better model. When this approach was taken, neither of the two-way interactions with the trend were significant, and the three-way scope-by-relative size-by-calendar time term was significant only at the .10 level. This result makes sense in light of the theory and measure used herein. Some interaction with time is expected because competitor adoption rises




FIG. 4.—The effect of adoption by competitors varies by relative size and scope.

disturbances and spatial effects. While spatial effects result from concrete processes of influence among nearby social or economic units, spatial disturbances refer to the fact that neighboring units may share an unobserved causal trait and thus only appear to affect each other. In the context of technology diffusion, it is possible that firm-specific propensities to adopt are clustered around particular market positions.⁸ More precisely, firms with analogous shipment profiles might also have similar adoption

with time. But since time only correlates with, but fails to measure, the conduct of other firms, results with time as a proxy are substantially weaker. (2) Although 84% of the cases have levels of relative size and scope for which the contagion effect is positive, a potential concern is that the few large generalists who adopt early, and the few small specialists who never adopt, drive the results. To assess this claim, I created two indicator variables, one for the smallest specialists and a second for the largest generalist (for both of which the contagion effect is negative). However, the coefficients were unaffected by dummied out these cases, which lends further support to hypothesis 3. (3) Another competing interpretation is the following: while the time dummies account for the main effects of supply constraints, shortages may not affect all firms equally. However, when size was interacted with the three quarters during which supply constraints were discussed and documented in the news wires (1996Q4, 1998Q3, and 1998Q4), none of these terms were significant, indicating that the period dummies alone are enough to capture the effects of shortages.

⁸ I am grateful to an *AJS* reviewer for bringing this to my attention.

thresholds or reservation prices (Van den Bulte and Lilian 2001, p. 1411). While the effect of processor prices is absorbed by the time dummies, the potentially important effect of clustered adoption thresholds is not. Nor is that effect spanned by the covariate measuring the proportion of a firm's shipments that are Pentium-based. That covariate proxies only the adoption threshold of the firm at risk—not the thresholds of structurally equivalent others. So, apart from further measures, a plausible interpretation is that the waiting times of strategically comparable firms are similar only because processor prices drop below their shared, unobserved thresholds at nearly the same time.

To address this competing interpretation, some measure of the propensity of a firm's peers to adopt is necessary. A plausible candidate is a time-varying measure of whether a firm's peers are still primarily shipping machines with fourth-generation (486) chips and below. Using this measure is particularly reasonable if a binary indicator of whether a focal firm ships mostly fourth-generation (and lower) machines suppresses its own hazard of adoption. The negative effect of the fourth-generation dummy variable in model 7 shows this to be the case. Therefore, I devised the following measure of whether a firm's rivals are still primarily in the fourth generation:

$$CF_{it} = \sum_{k=1}^{K_{it}} w_{ikt} R_{kt}. \quad (9)$$

As the notation shows, this covariate follows the same steps used to compute the measure of competitor adoption in equation (1). The only difference is that entries in R_{kt} , to which the weights w_{ikt} again apply, equal 1 if firm k in quarter t ships more than half its machines with 486 (or slower) chips, 0 otherwise.

Model 7 enters this covariate, as well as another indicator measuring whether more than half of firm i 's products are fourth-generation or below. If autocorrelated unobserved heterogeneity were responsible for the effect of competitor adoption in model 6, one would expect the impact of adoptions by a firm's peers to weaken appreciably in model 7. Upon entering a proxy for the adoption thresholds of the focal firm's peers, however, it is apparent that its effect is insignificant and that the substantively important pattern of effects remains entirely intact.

CONCLUSION

This article has addressed the question of when social actors are most strongly influenced by the conduct of their counterparts. This focus on contingent network effects informs many current projects in the discipline.

With the maturation of network analysis, economic sociologists especially have sought to clarify when social relations matter most, as in Podolny's (1994) study of market uncertainty and modes of exchange, Burt's (1997) treatment of the contingent value of social capital, and Ingram and Roberts' (2000) analysis showing when friendships among hotel managers most strongly affect firm performance. If, as White (1992) argued, a social actor should be seen not as a "tidy atom" but rather as embedded in larger "molecules" of other persons or organizations, then showing when social ties matter most is crucially important. The social atoms we often consider are implicated in larger structures (Uzzi 1996) and, to varying degrees, are fashioned by other proximate atoms.

This analysis showed that relatively small firms are most affected by the technology strategies of their peers, especially if they are diversified across market segments. Other scholars have also begun to consider the link between market position and the specific process by which new traits diffuse. Strang and Macy (2001), for example, considered market position and diffusion jointly in a simulation framework. They showed that structurally advantaged firms, rather than looking broadly for the best innovations, produce the models others copy, even if those models are worthless. Here, I linked interfirm influence to relative size and diversification, two studied predictors of organizational performance. Consonant with work on social networks and spatial processes, the adoptions of a firm's peers were shown to have strong effects, as long as the covariate measuring their conduct was interacted with other relevant factors. Consistent with work in organizational ecology, the analyses showed specifically that this effect was most salient for firms facing scale-based competition without the advantages of specialization.

These results carry implications for future diffusion research and for sociological theory more broadly. To bring forward these implications, it may be useful to start by describing the imagery that is typical of most diffusion studies: A new trait—an art form, organizational design, or opinion, among other possibilities—issues from an external source. With time, an increasing number of those inside a nearby population adopt this trait. Often, the force behind this transformation resides in the efforts of outside change agents, such as media firms or regulators. In other settings, differences in the attributes of a population's members mainly explain variance in when they adopt. But the settings that often interest sociologists most are those where differences in the likelihood of adoption are largely explained by whether those at risk are meaningfully close to prior adopters. There, the imagery and models of network analysis apply. After clarifying what stratifies the population—so that some nodes are "proximate" while others are "distant"—measuring the conduct of prior adopt-

ers is often achieved by weighting the conduct of a chosen actor's counterparts by the inverse of the social or spatial distance between them.

Most diffusion studies of actor-to-actor transmission stop there, however. Therefore, they implicitly make an assumption that is often hard to justify—that proximity, however defined and calibrated, is alone the basis on which influence occurs. In such frameworks, social actors are seen to affect each other equally, without regard to disparities between them, insofar as they are adjacent, proximate, connected, equivalent, in the same industry, or in some other way comparable.

One of the main implications of this study is that this assumption may mask the operation of consequential social processes. More precisely, positing that proximity by itself yields actor-to-actor influence could produce the false inference that the population consists of disconnected actors, at least with respect to diffusion. In this analysis, when competitor adoption was entered only as a main effect, the image of the computer industry was one of firms that are indifferent to the technology strategies of their rivals. The entrance of indicator variables for each quarter washed out the effect of adoptions by strategically similar competitors, much as Van den Bulte and Lilien (2001) found that advertising intensity rendered the conduct of socially proximate doctors irrelevant. Under such a scenario, the diffusion of a new trait appears to result only from the actions of an outside source. Additional models, however, showed that the process of diffusion is more intricate in the case of the sixth-generation processor: specifically, a frame of reference defined by strategic similarity affected the choice to adopt under conditions consistent with established theories of firm performance.

Another implication of this study concerns the fact that relative size and scope are specific instances of larger constructs. Size relative to other firms refers broadly to rank in a hierarchy, at the foot of which competitive pressure is high and life chances are therefore thin. In other industries, the analogues of relative size might be social status (Podolny, Stuart, and Hannan 1996) or reputation (Kreps 1996). There, the competitively weak or marginal firms would be those contending with rivals that are either more prestigious or known for higher-quality outputs. Consistent with the results of this study, firms near the bottom of such hierarchies should be most affected by the conduct of their peers. While that conduct might be the adoption of a new technology, in principle it would have to do with any new trait whose acceptance attenuates the survival chances of nonadopters.

Just as relative size is one of many ways to assess rank inside a population, specialization and diversification refer more broadly to kinds of relations a social actor has with its outside audience. In this article, the audience was made up of consumers of personal computers. In other

settings, the relevant audience might be composed of critics, patrons, bosses, or other kinds of evaluators. Earlier work in organizational ecology suggested that specialization furnishes advantages in dealing with consumers, and, in this context, it was shown to vitiate the effects of scale-based competition. Other, perhaps more direct, measures of ties to outsiders may also be relevant to the task of modeling the contingent effects of what others do.

Two related possibilities reside in the networks literature. One is the duration of an actor's relations to those outside the population (Granovetter 1973), which might find expression in a weighted measure of a firm's tenure in various market segments. Another possibility is multiplexity (Kapferer 1969), or the degree to which social ties embody several, substantively different kinds of relationships. Just as specialization lowered the effects of scale-based competition in this study, in future research measures of the duration or multiplexity of ties to clients or evaluators might dampen the deleterious effects of low status or an inchoate reputation. In other words, actors that are precariously positioned internally, and lack long-standing or multiplex ties to their external audience, should be those that are most influenced by their rivals' actions. In this sense, the scope and relative size state-space used here may offer a point of departure for future work in which social influence varies with measures of internal hierarchical position and tie strength to an external audience.

More broadly, the results of this study suggest that sociological theories of social influence and theories of competition and hierarchy may benefit from further integration. Sociologists have made significant progress in understanding why some social actors fall beneath the sway of others. Moving well beyond the classical work of Tarde and Le Bon, in which individuals almost unthinkingly bow to the authority of crowds, elaborate models of influence have been devised that combine social psychological ideas with the formal techniques of network analysis (e.g., Friedkin 1998). We also have intricate theories of competition and hierarchy, where pecking orders (Chase 1980) are thought to arise from multiple sources that are as diverse as distinctions in human capital, the ownership of physical property, and one's history of dominance and submission in long chains of prior encounters (e.g., Collins 1987). This study suggests that future research may benefit from combining these strands of work. When earlier research has implied that those further down in a hierarchy of rivals are most prone to conform to or copy others, the emphasis has typically been on a single hierarchy—without regard for the multiple dimensions along which actors may be ranked, and which may offset the effects of poor position on a single dimension. Nonetheless, the very notion of a social space, which has long occupied the imagination of social theorists (see Silber [1995] for a review), necessarily entails multiple dimensions, not

just a linear dominance ordering. While competition and sorting into pecking orders are persistent features of social life (Veblen 1973; Gould 2002), almost equally pervasive are the attempts of those occupying competitive hierarchies to circumvent or reduce positionally induced pressures to yield to the influence of their advantaged counterparts. Through the fusing of insights from work on networks and social influence with theories of competition and hierarchy, the result may be a broader understanding of when position in a hierarchical ordering is more or less consequential for survival and thus a more general understanding of the sources of social influence.

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Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transnational Political Action among Contemporary Migrants¹

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This article presents evidence of the scale, relative intensity, and social determinants of immigrants' transnational political engagement. It demonstrates that a stable and significant transnational field of political action connecting immigrants with their polities of origin does indeed exist. The results help temper celebratory images of the extent and effects of transnational engagement provided by some scholars. The article shows that migrants' habitual transnational political engagement is far from being as extensive, socially unbounded, "deterritorialized," and liberatory as previously argued. Transnational political action, then, is regularly undertaken by a small minority, is socially bounded across national borders, occurs in quite specific territorial jurisdictions, and appears to reproduce preexisting power asymmetries. The potential of transnationalism for transforming such asymmetries within and across countries has yet to be determined.

Grassroots symbolic and material relations connecting societies across national borders expanded to historic levels during the last third of the 20th century. These transnational connections simultaneously affect more

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than one nation-state and are often generated from below by human migration (Glick Schiller, Basch, and Szanton Blanc 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller, and Szanton Blanc 1994; Portes 1996; Smith and Guarnizo 1998), social movements (Smith, Chatfield, and Pagnucco 1997; Tarrow 1998), and nongovernmental organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Boli and Thomas 1999). The proliferation of grassroots transnational ties worldwide is a phenomenon of great significance but one that, so far, has received little attention in the sociological literature. Our goal in this article is to investigate one particular form of transnational engagement, namely the political activities conducted by contemporary immigrants across national borders, affecting communities, parties, and official institutions in the sending nations. From this analysis, we hope to draw general lessons modifying conventional expectations of what an immigrant is and what the process of adaptation to the host society is about.

Our main concern is to probe the extent, implications, and social determinants of cross-border political relationships initiated and maintained by contemporary migrants to the United States. Our analysis focuses specifically on the transnational political activities of three major Latin American immigrant groups residing in four major U.S. metropolitan areas. We seek to establish what types, scale, and intensity of political engagement prevail among these immigrants and to determine the individual and social factors that shape such participation.

In the past few years, the term "transnational" has become commonly and conspicuously displayed in the titles of conferences and discussion panels at scholarly meetings in the United States and Europe. This surge in interest has been accompanied, however, by mounting theoretical ambiguity and analytical confusion in the use of the term. Thus, while some scholars have started to embrace and deploy the concept in their work, others have responded with intense skepticism. Seeking to clarify the meaning of the term, several scholars have provided explicit definitions of "transnational migration" and "transnational fields." For Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999, p. 344), for example, "transnational migration is a pattern of migration in which persons, although they move across international borders, settle, and establish relations in a new state, maintain ongoing social connections with the polity from which they originated. In transnational migration people literally live their lives across international borders. Such persons are best identified as 'transmigrants.'"

The problem with this definition is that it does not establish explicit criteria for differentiating those who participate in these activities from those who do not. If the simple act of sending remittances to families or traveling home occasionally qualifies a person as a "transmigrant," the entire field is subject to the charge of banality since it is well known that

international migrants have always engaged in these activities (Foner 1997).

The main difficulty with the field of transnationalism, as developed so far, is that its empirical base relies almost exclusively on case studies.² While useful, these studies invariably sample on the dependent variables, focusing on those who take part in the activities of interest, to the exclusion of those who do not participate. The unintended result is to exaggerate the scope of the phenomenon by giving the impression that everyone in the studied communities is involved. While the occasional trip home or a sporadic financial contribution to a home country political party certainly helps to strengthen the transnational field, these intermittent activities do not justify by themselves the coining of a new term. It is the rise of a new class of immigrants, economic entrepreneurs or political activists who conduct cross-border activities on a *regular* basis, that lies at the core of the phenomenon that this field seeks to highlight and investigate.³ These are, to use Glick Schiller and Fouron's (1999) term, the true "transmigrants."

In this article, we focus on the phenomenon of political transnationalism as it manifests itself among immigrant groups in the United States. We have assembled data that allow us to answer or explore three fundamental questions: (1) Is there such a thing as a class of political transmigrants—immigrants who become involved in their home country politics on a regular basis? (2) If so, who are they and what are the main determinants of their participation in this form of activism? (3) If so, are there patterned differences across immigrant nationalities in the incidence and forms adopted by this phenomenon?

² Studies of various transnational activities have been conducted among a number of immigrant groups in the past. These include Brazilians (Margolis 1994); Central Americans (Hamilton and Chinchilla 1991; Mahler 1995, 1998, 1999), Dominicans (Georges 1990; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Levitt 2001b; Graham 1997; Guarnizo 1998; Sørensen 1998); Ecuadorans (Kyle 2000); Mexicans (Massey et al. 1987; Rouse 1992; Massey et al. 1994; Massey and Parrado 1994, R. Smith 1994, 1998; Goldring 1998); Haitians (Glick Schiller et al. 1995, Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999, 2001); Filipinos (Basch et al. 1994, Wolf 1997); Chinese (Zhou 1992, Mitchell 1997; Smart and Smart 1998; J. Lin 1998; Ong 1999), and Indians (Lessinger 1992). With the exception of the studies by Massey and his collaborators and Kyle's work on Ecuadorans, most of this literature is nonquantitative and based on ethnographic evidence.

³ Transnational engagement is not limited solely to public sphere activities, though. Transnational actors also include members of families or households residing in more than one country who maintain steady relations with each other (i.e., providing economic, social, and emotional support and keeping family relations, loyalties, and obligations alive) across borders (see Kyle 2000, pp. 102–12, Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001, chap. 4; Gardner and Ralph Grillo 2002)

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The recent research literature on immigrant transnationalism has made several important claims that deserve attention as a prelude to our own analysis. Several scholars have argued that migrants' loyalty and commitment to their homelands from afar constitute an alternative political force that not only alters local traditional structures but also opens up new opportunities for their communities of origin. Migrants are depicted as agents of change, who support and promote local development initiatives through hometown associations (Goldring 1996; R. Smith 1994, 1998; González Gutierrez 1995), as well as active political participants (Glick Schiller et al. 1992; M. Smith 1994; Graham 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999) and direct international investors (Portes and Guarnizo 1991; Massey and Parrado 1994; Baires 1997; Kyle 1999, 2000). For many sending countries, such as Colombia, El Salvador, and the Dominican Republic, migrants' monetary remittances have already become a major source of hard currency and the cornerstone of their countries' macroeconomic and social stability.

Several immigrant communities also remain an important part of their country's electorate. Political parties from these countries have opened chapters in immigrant settlements, while political candidates regularly campaign among expatriates to gain their political favor and monetary support (Graham 1997; McDonnell 1997; Itzigsohn et al. 1999). In countries such as the Dominican Republic, migrants' financial contributions are estimated to be as much as 15% of major Dominican parties' annual fundraising revenues (Graham 1997, p. 101). Even people who have lived overseas for several decades are reported to maintain their involvement with their homelands either in support of or in opposition to the incumbent government (see, e.g., Kearney 1991, 1995; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991; M. Smith 1994; Kyle 2000).

At the same time, an increasing number of states, including those of the countries included in our study, have introduced constitutional reforms to provide dual citizenship rights and formal political representation to their expatriates (Lessinger 1992; Mahler 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998). Such a panoply of initiatives has transformed the way in which migrants incorporate themselves into the societies where they reside. Incentives provided by sending countries are designed to maintain the loyalty of their expatriates and keep their remittances, investments, and political contributions flowing. At the same time, such incentives provide a new and stronger "voice" for organized immigrants in the politics of their country and home communities (Roberts, Frank, and Lozano-Asencio 1999).

The question is how and to what extent immigrants choose to avail

themselves of these new opportunities for political action. This literature leaves little doubt about the *existence* of the phenomenon of political transnationalism and its transformative potential, but it says little about the actual numbers involved or their characteristics and motivations. The relative presence and causes of transnationalism represent the logical questions in need of answer at this time. To accomplish this task properly, we seek guidance from existing sociological theories bearing on the processes of immigrant settlement and incorporation.

THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES

Potential determinants of immigrant transnationalism can be drawn from three different theoretical literatures: (a) classical theories of the role of individual factors in immigrant assimilation; (b) contemporary theories of contextual embeddedness as determinant of immigrants' incorporation to host societies; and (c) social network theory. Given the novelty of the phenomenon, the resulting hypotheses are tentative; we use them as an initial guide for exploring its onset and development.

Individual Characteristics Affecting Assimilation

Orthodox theoretical approaches to immigration, especially push-pull and assimilation theories, were based, for the most part, on the early-20th-century European immigration experience to the United States and elsewhere (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964). These theories continue to underlie the "canonical" view of how the process of assimilation plays itself out (Alba and Nee 1997). One of its guiding assumptions is of a world divided into well-defined sovereign national political units. Accordingly, migrants move from country A to country B and either settle for good (i.e., become "immigrants") or move back home after reaching their economic objectives (i.e., become "sojourners").

Immigrants who settle abroad are eventually expected to assimilate into the dominant society's sociocultural and economic systems while simultaneously shedding their "old" cultural practices and political loyalties (Warner and Srole 1945; Gordon 1964; Alba 1985). The main hypothesis derived from this perspective is that the longer immigrants live and are socialized into the ways of the host society, the greater the likelihood of their becoming thoroughly absorbed in it. As far as transnationalism is concerned, the logical corollary here is that longer periods of U.S. residence should lead to progressive disengagement from old country loyalties and attachments.

The same theoretical perspective generally expects immigrants to have

a single identity, national allegiance, and representation in one national polity (Pickus 1998; Schuck 1998). Accordingly, cultural identity and political membership are defined as well-bounded characteristics, such that acquiring new ones implies abandoning those held previously (Kessler 1998; Motomura 1998). The hypothesis derived from this reasoning is that immigrants who have naturalized as citizens would be much less likely to continue involving themselves in the politics of their home nation. Becoming a U.S. citizen should act as a "natural barrier" to the continuation of political transnationalism.

Another important individual characteristic is education. However, the predictive role of this variable is ambiguous. For assimilation theory, education should lead to a decline in home country ties, insofar as it facilitates swifter integration and mobility in the host society (Bernard 1936; Gordon 1964; Borjas 1987, 1990). Educated immigrants, therefore, would be significantly more inclined to shift allegiances and transfer their energies and interests toward their new country (Pickus 1998). This prediction is questioned by an extensive literature that shows that education increases political participation worldwide (Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Olsen 1980; Tarrow 1998). Thus individuals who were already interested or active in the politics of their home countries continue these interests even after emigrating. In that case, higher education would lead to an increase in transnationalism. The way that these contradictory expectations play out in reality has not been elucidated.

The Role of Gender

A recent literature on the relationship between gender and immigration finds that men and women have quite disparate views toward their receiving and sending countries (Grasmuck and Pessar 1991, 1996; Kibria 1993; Hondagneu-Sotelo 1994; Guarnizo 1997; Mahler 1999; Mahler and Pessar 2001). Commonly, males experience occupational downward mobility upon immigration. Women's experience tends to go the opposite way, as many of them become paid workers for the first time in the United States. Women's labor market incorporation brings about significant changes in how they perceive themselves and are perceived by men within and outside the household (Fernández-Kelly and Garcia 1990).

More specifically, Jones-Correa (1998) has introduced a gendered view of migrants' political orientation and engagement. Reinforcing earlier arguments, he asserts that Latin American immigrant men in the United States tend to have a stronger political perspective and are more likely than women to become involved in transnational political activities: "With the loss of status in the receiving country, men tend to form, participate in and lead ethnic organizations whose interests and focus is in the country

of origin. In contrast, women [are] more likely to shift their orientation toward the United States" (Jones-Correa 1998, pp. 34–35).

In many sending countries, including those of Latin America, men have traditionally dominated politics. In this context, Jones-Correa's prediction should be understood as asserting that this traditional male hegemony continues after immigration but that it remains fixed in the countries and communities of origin to compensate partially for the status loss experienced by men in receiving ones. The data for our analysis allow us to examine both the role of gender and that of downward mobility as possible determinants of political transnationalism.

Contexts of Migration

Immigrant adaptation is affected not only by individual characteristics but also by their contexts of exit and reception (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). An extensive literature dating back at least to the classic Midtown Manhattan Project (Srole, Lanner, and Mitchell 1962) supports the proposition that the greater the sociocultural differences between newcomers and the host society, the more difficult their process of incorporation. Hence, it can be expected that people emigrating from remote rural places to metropolitan areas in the United States will be less likely to adapt easily and, by the same token, will remain more closely attached to their past. Referring to the experiences of European peasants migrating to U.S. metropolitan areas, Srole et al. (1962, p. 234) concluded that "to compress the profound historical changes of a revolutionizing century into a few adult years can exact a high price."

Expectations held by kin and friends about the proper duration of the journey abroad can also affect immigrants' economic and political behavior. These "socially expected durations" (SEDs) were originally theorized by Merton (1984) as a decisive element in social life affecting a wide range of individual and collective activities. For the specific case of U.S.-bound migrants, Roberts (1995) applied Merton's concept to show that the propensity to engage in entrepreneurial ventures varies systematically with the SEDs of migration: those who are subject to strong normative expectations of return are less likely to launch businesses in the United States because they are strongly oriented toward saving for investments at home. Following Roberts' logic, we hypothesize that temporary SEDs—that is, normative expectations of return—will also increase transnationalism insofar as it helps preserve ties with the country and community of origin.

Contexts of reception in the United States also bear significantly on immigrants' economic and political adaptation. Governmental and societal reception of immigrant nationalities can range from a favorable or

at least neutral stance to active hostility and discrimination (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Differences in this respect among the three immigrant groups selected for study are described in the following section. For all immigrants, a more negative context of reception, marked by downward occupational mobility, should lead to the perpetuation of ties with the home countries. As several authors have noted, transnational activism can function, under these circumstances, as a compensatory mechanism for the immigrants' status loss (Jones-Correa 1998; Guarnizo and Smith 1998; Landolt 2001).

Social Networks

Sociologists have described migration as a network-building process that builds upon itself, facilitating the departure and settlement of newcomers and sustaining the movement when the original economic incentives have disappeared (Anderson 1974; Tilly 1990; Massey et al. 1987; Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994). The notion of cumulative causation has been invoked to describe the operation of networks of migration, whereby early departures pave the way for subsequent ones, lowering the costs and risks of the initial journey (Portes and Bach 1985; Massey and Espinoza 1997).

We expect that the onset and continuation of transnational activities will follow the same logic. In the absence of large economic resources, the implementation of long-distance ventures must depend on the maintenance of a strong web of social contacts. The larger or more difficult the attempted transnational project is, the stronger the social networks required to sustain it. Thus we predict that, regardless of the motivations individuals have for engaging in political transnationalism, the latter will be conditioned by the size and spatial scope of their networks. The larger and more spatially diversified these are, the greater the chances for engaging in political initiatives across national borders.

GROUPS STUDIED

Salvadoran, Dominican, and Colombian immigrants form part of the newest wave of mass immigration in the United States. These groups make up approximately 15% of the Latin American immigrant population (Farley 2001). Despite common cultural origins, these communities represent very different migratory experiences, shaped by the combined effects of global forces and national realities. We expect these national variations to affect, in predictable ways, the course of immigrant adap-

tation. For this reason, a brief introduction to the history of each group is in order.

Immigrants from Colombia (which has a population of 43 million) first started to arrive in significant numbers in New York and Los Angeles in the wake of the Second World War. The first wave of Colombians was formed mostly by upper-middle-class and professional people. After the 1965 immigration reform, the social composition of the inflow included mostly middle- and working-class immigrants in search of economic improvement (Chaney 1976; Cruz and Castaño 1976; Cardona et al. 1980). Since the mid-1980s, a deepening political and economic crisis in Colombia and growth of the drug trade have resulted in a significant expansion of migration, primarily from urban areas (Urrea-Giraldo 1982).

Recent research points to high levels of mutual distrust among Colombian immigrants stemming from insecurity at home and the shadow of the drug trade (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999): Colombians seldom cluster in tightly knit communities and become dispersed instead in large metropolitan areas. The major destination is New York City, where two-fifths of a U.S. Colombian population estimated at 750,000 resides. Even in New York, these immigrants remain relatively invisible, except in certain sections of Queens, such as Jackson Heights (Guarnizo, Sánchez, and Roach 1999; U.S. Census Bureau 1993c). Because of this spatial dispersion and their relatively high educational levels, Colombians have not been targets of extensive discrimination in the United States—notwithstanding the stigma of drug trafficking attached to Colombia. These circumstances, in addition to their alienation from traditional electoral politics and the convulsed sociopolitical situation of their country, lead us to predict limited involvement in political transnationalism. We suggest that this holds true despite the political rights, including voting rights from abroad and congressional representation, granted to them by the Colombian state. Relative to other groups, Colombians should tend to avoid continuous political engagement with their home nation.

Emigration from the Dominican Republic was severely constrained during the 30-year Trujillo dictatorship, but it suddenly increased after the dictator's assassination in 1961 (Hendricks 1974; Grasmuck and Pessar 1991). At the time, a substantial number of opposition leaders were forcefully expatriated by a provisional government seeking to alleviate domestic pressures. The U.S. government expeditiously issued visas to these deportees and, later, "cooperated at the provisional government's request, by refusing to permit the deportees to leave the United States" (Martin 1966, p. 347). This politically driven out-migration, concentrated in New York City, established the beachhead for subsequent waves of economic immigrants to the same area. By the end of the 1990s, approximately 10% of the Dominican population was residing in the United States (U.S.

Census Bureau 1999, p. 12). Areas with a high concentration of Dominicans in New York City, such as Washington Heights, and in some smaller northeast cities such as Providence, Rhode Island, have become sites for intense Dominican economic, cultural, and political activity (Itzigsohn et al. 1999).

Given the political roots of Dominican emigration and the active presence of national parties in this expatriate community, we expect political transnationalism to be relatively more common than among other migrants. The Dominican Republic is at peace and democracy has taken hold, so that active competition for office takes place regularly among the three largest national parties (Lozano 1997). Voting rights for Dominicans living abroad have been approved, and the consul general in New York has been selected in recent years from among leaders of that community (Itzigsohn et al. 1999; Levitt 2001a, 2001b). Such gestures contribute to reinforcing the web of transnational political ties between the sending nation and its emigrants.

Salvadorans come from a small (6.4 million) and densely populated Central American country that has been highly dependent on U.S. economic and geopolitical interests. During the early 1960s, Salvadoran immigration to the United States increased and was dominated by professionals, technocrats, and investors. These well-to-do immigrants opened channels for labor migration by importing Salvadoran domestic workers (Repak 1995; Mahler 1995). The civil war between 1980 and 1992 set off a massive exodus to the United States, mostly from rural areas (Aguayo and Fagen 1988; Montes Mozo and Garcia Vasquez 1988; Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo 1989; Córdoba 1995; Lungo 1997). By 1999, about half of the total Salvadoran immigrant population in the United States, estimated at over 800,000, resided in the Los Angeles metropolitan area (U.S. Census Bureau 1999; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996; Chinchilla, Hamilton, and Loucky 1993). The Washington, D.C., metropolitan area hosts the second largest concentration of Salvadorans, with an estimated population of close to 250,000 (Landolt, Autler, and Baires 1999, p. 293).

Although the majority of Salvadorans left their country because of political violence, their claims to asylum were routinely denied by U.S. authorities, who classified them as illegal immigrants (Lopez, Popkin, and Tellez 1996). Despite their precarious legal and economic status, Salvadoran migrants managed to maintain close ties with their communities and families of origin and to support them economically. Their remittances have consistently surpassed \$1 billion per year during the last decade and constitute the country's single most important source of foreign exchange today (Banco Central de El Salvador 1996; Landolt 2000).

Most Salvadoran immigrants come from small towns and rural areas severely affected by the country's civil war. The strong bonds forged

during that war were sustained and expanded after the country returned to peace. A still incipient democracy and frail political parties have failed to create many opportunities for migrant participation in Salvadoran electoral politics. Instead, expatriates and their organizations have concentrated their efforts at the local level, seeking to aid and improve their communities of origin (Landolt 2000; Menjivar 2000). Salvadoran transnationalism can thus be expected to follow a distinct course, defined by the historical context under which the original migration took place: unlike Colombians, Salvadorans are expected to sustain strong ties with their country of origin; unlike Dominicans they do not channel such ties through national political parties but link directly with the towns and regions of origin.

As previously noted, all three sending nations have implemented policies designed to sustain the loyalty of their expatriates and to encourage a continuing flow of remittances and investments (Guarnizo et al. 1999; Landolt 2000; Levitt 2001b). Despite these common policies, we expect the three groups to differ systematically even after controlling for individual variables. These differences reflect their distinct histories of departure and resettlement, as just seen. Table 1 presents a profile of the countries of origin and characteristics of each immigration according to the latest official figures.

DATA AND METHOD

Data for this study come from the Comparative Immigrant Enterprise Project (CIEP), a collaborative effort focused on entrepreneurship and institutional development among the three groups described.⁴ The project included both qualitative and quantitative data gathered between fall 1996 and winter 1998. The first phase of the study consisted of in-depth interviews with 353 key informants in six areas of immigrant concentration in the United States (two for each nationality) and two cities, including the capital, of each country of origin. The second phase was a probability survey of immigrant communities in four cities corresponding to the principal areas of concentration of the target nationalities. Dominicans were contacted and interviewed in the Washington Heights area of Manhattan and in Providence, Rhode Island; the Colombian survey took place in New York City, mainly in the borough of Queens; and the Salvadoran survey was conducted simultaneously in central and selected suburban

⁴ The project involved an initial collaborative agreement between Johns Hopkins University, the University of California at Davis, and Brown University. It is currently headquartered at the Center for Migration and Development, Princeton University.

TABLE 1
IMMIGRANTS' COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND U.S. PROFILE

	Colombians	Dominicans	Salvadorans
Country of origin.			
2001 population (in millions)	43.0	8.5	6.4
2001 GDP per capita (\$)	1,916	2,494	2,141
1997 income share of poorest quintile (%)*	3.0	5.1	3.7
1997 income share of richest quintile (%)*	60.9	53.3	55.3
1997 Gini index of income inequality*57	.47	.51
2000 average years of education*	8.9	9.3	8.3
1999 open unemployment (%)*	14.7	15.9	7.0
1999 informal employment (%)*	46.3	44.0	35.0
1990 households below poverty line (%)	41.0	32.0	40.0
Capital city	Bogotá	Santo Domingo	San Salvador
U.S. immigrant population			
Size (in thousands), 1999	435	692	765
Rank in recorded immigration	16	14	8
Arrived in 1990s (%)	41.3	42.3	39.6
Naturalized by 1999 (%)	38.6	33.8	19.7
Most common destination	New York	New York	Los Angeles
Median age, 1990	34.4	32.5	28.7
High school graduates (%) [†]	66.8	41.9	32.5
College graduates [†]	15.7	7.8	4.7
Professional occupations (%) [†]	17.0	10.8	5.8
Median household income [‡]	29.1	19.9	23.5

NOTE.—Data are drawn from International Labour Organization (2000, 2003), ECLAC (2003), U.S. Census Bureau (1993a), Camarota (2001), Farley (2001), and the World Bank (2003a, 2003b).

* Statistics reflect conditions in urban areas. For Colombians, "2000 average years of education" (8.9) is drawn from 1999 data and "1999 informal unemployment" (46.3) is drawn from 2001 data.

[†] Education completion is measured in persons 25 years old and older, professional occupations is measured among employed persons 16 years and older.

[‡] In thousands of 1989 dollars.

areas of Los Angeles and Washington, D.C. The CIEP survey was completed in 1998, gathering data on a total of 1,202 adult family heads.⁵

⁵ The CIEP sample was gathered through a two-pronged sampling design that aimed at providing representative data on the respective immigrant communities while including a sufficient number of economic and political entrepreneurs for subsequent analysis. The core survey was a two-stage random sample of households in areas of immigrant concentration. Within target census tracts, city blocks were designated as primary sampling units (PSUs) and selected through random sampling. In selected PSUs, a systematic canvassing of each fourth or fifth household was conducted to determine eligibility. If a target household proved ineligible because of different na-

The survey can be considered representative of each immigrant nationality in its principal areas of concentration, especially because non-response rates were uniformly low. However, sampling fractions—the ratio of the sample to the eligible population in each area—varied significantly among surveyed communities. To adjust for this problem we developed a set of weights based on the estimated sampling fraction in each area. Sampling fractions were computed by dividing the final sample by 1990 Census figures of the adult population of the target nationality in each area. Weights are the reverse of these sampling fractions (Kish 1967; Frankel 1983). The adjusted figures allow us to compare national samples and avoid unequal probability bias in the estimation of coefficients based on the full sample. Appendix table A1 presents the sampling sites for each nationality, unweighted samples, and corresponding sampling fractions.

Conventionally, political participation is measured by electorally related indicators. However, immigrants also seek to be represented and participate in decision making through political means other than elections. Thus, under the concept of transnational political participation, we include both electoral and nonelectoral activities aimed at influencing conditions in the home country. Each type of political participation is measured by a count of the number of activities in which respondents are involved on a regular basis. Transnational electoral participation includes membership in a political party in the country of origin, monetary contributions to these parties, and active involvement in political campaigns in the polity of origin. Transnational nonelectoral politics includes membership in a hometown civic association, monetary contributions to civic projects in the community of origin, and regular membership in charity organizations sponsoring projects in the home country.

Nonelectoral activities of this type are political because they influence local and regional governments by determining which public projects receive migrants' financial support. By so doing, they compel authorities to take immigrant wishes and priorities into account. As Levitt (1997a, 1997b) and Landolt (2000) have noted, helping finance local development projects or contributing to philanthropic works represent effective mech-

tionality or other characteristics, it was replaced. This sampling fraction preserved sample representativeness by keeping the number of interviews in each PSU (city block) proportional to the size of its eligible population (Kish 1967). This design was supplemented by a purposive sample of entrepreneurs identified through informant leads gathered during the first phase of the project. The number and diversity of informants insured multiple entry points to entrepreneurial activities, giving the sample broad coverage of such activities in each community and avoiding the familiar limitations of single snowball chains (Singleton and Straits 1999, pp. 156–63).

anisms to uphold high status and political influence in the localities of origin.⁶

Questionnaire items measuring involvement in each of these six types of political activities provided three response categories: "never," "occasionally/once in a while," and "regularly." In keeping with the previous theoretical discussion concerning reasons for operationally restricting the meaning of transnationalism, our primary focus in the following analysis is on activities in which respondents were involved on a regular basis. This definition identifies the class of migrants who have become most committed to transnational political action. As noted previously, however, the transnational field is also nurtured by the more occasional activities of other immigrants, and we also pay attention to these activities.

Among independent variables, age, sex, marital status, and years of U.S. residence are self-measured by individual questionnaire items. National origin corresponds to the original survey screening question used to determine sampling eligibility. Education is measured as years completed, coded into three ordered achievement categories. U.S. citizenship acquisition is coded "1" if the respondent had naturalized American and "0" otherwise. Corresponding to the remaining hypotheses, urban/rural places of origin are coded into three mutually exclusive size categories (large city, small city, and rural); SEDs of migration is a dummy variable coded "1" if the respondent's family expected the journey abroad to be temporary and "0" otherwise; downward mobility is the ratio of the occupational status of the last regular job in the country of origin to the first in the United States. Higher values of this variable, coded along a five-point status scale, indicate greater downward mobility.

Network size is measured by the absolute number of persons in the respondent's social networks, and network spatial scope by the ratio of out-of-town contacts, including those living abroad, to those in the city of residence. Both measures are drawn from a name-generator module in the CIEP questionnaire, designed to elicit first names and characteristics of individuals on whom respondents could rely for both occupational and personal needs (Burt and Minor 1983; Scott 1991; N. Lin 1998). The CIEP data set provides the first quantitative estimates of the phenomenon of transnationalism, allowing us to examine effects of both network size and spatial scope on each dependent variable. Appendix table B1 presents

⁶ A recent study in El Salvador based on the first phase of this project concluded that "life conditions in municipalities that receive grassroots transnational aid confirm the relevance of this collective remittance strategy. Towns with a hometown association have paved roads, electricity, and freshly painted public buildings. The quality of life in transnational towns is simply better" (Portes and Landolt 2000, p. 543).

measurement characteristics and frequency distributions of all the variables used in the analysis.

RESULTS

General Characteristics of the Sample

Table 2 presents a general profile of the sample. It shows that respondents are, on average, middle-aged and married; they arrived in the United States at a prime productive age, mainly from urban metropolitan areas, and have resided here for some 15 years. Close to one-third had become U.S. citizens by the time of the survey, but one-fourth still have children living in the country of origin and almost one-fifth travels there on a regular basis. Average group characteristics of the CIEP sample correspond in order of magnitude to figures from the 1990 census (see table 1). Both indicate that Colombians are on average older, have higher levels of educational attainment and personal incomes, and the highest rate of naturalization (44%) of the three groups. Dominicans are mostly at the opposite end regarding educational attainment and income, while Salvadorans exhibit the lowest naturalization rate.⁷

Table 3 presents frequency distributions of transnational political activism based on the strict definition adopted previously and on a more inclusive approach that includes both regular and occasional participation in these activities. The latter results show that the transnational field engages, in one form or another, up to a third of each immigrant group. Core transnational activists, on the other hand, are much less numerous, representing less than one-sixth of the sample. This figure contrasts markedly with past ethnographic descriptions of transnationalism as a form of political action adopted by entire immigrant communities. Around these averages, however, there are statistically significant variations by nationality: Dominican immigrants are most likely to engage in electoral party politics and Salvadorans most likely to focus on hometown civic committees and community projects; close to one-fifth of the Salvadoran sample takes part in these kinds of activities on a regular basis. Differences by nationality correspond to our predictions based on the known contexts of exit and reception of each group. To separate these group effects from those of individual-level factors, we incorporate all predictors in models of political transnationalism, defined strictly and loosely.

⁷ Figures in tables 1 and 2 do not coincide because of the differences in dates of data collection and target universes. Census figures are for the entire population of each nationality in 1990; the CIEP survey data are limited to adult heads of the three nationalities in these respective areas of concentration.

TABLE 2
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CIEP SAMPLE (%)

Variable	Colombians	Dominicans	Salvadorans	All
Personal characteristics.				
Sex (male)	52.1	41.8	63.3	53.2***
Average age (years)	43.3	42.1	39.6	41.1***
Married	54.7	55.4	51.8	53.6**
High school graduate	82.0	49.3	50.9	54.9***
Monthly income:				
\$2,000—\$4,000	31.0	9.3	14.4	15.2***
Over \$4,000	11.9	3.9	9.7	8.0***
Characteristics of migration				
Place of origin:				
Rural	17.0	9.9	31.5	20.9***
Small/medium city	22.5	10.9	34.5	23.4***
Large city	60.5	79.2	34.2	55.8***
Place of current residence: ^a				
Los Angeles			80.3	36.8
New York	100.0	96.7		52.9
Providence		3.3		1.3
Washington, D.C.			19.7	9.0
Age at immigration (in years)				
years)	26.2	26.8	25.3	26.0***
Years in U.S.	17.0	15.2	14.3	15.1***
U.S. citizen	43.6	35.4	24.8	31.8***
Home country ties:				
Children in country of origin				
	22.3	22.0	31.2	26.3***
Invests in country of origin				
	6.5	5.4	5.3	5.4
Travels annually to country of origin				
	17.0	20.5	18.6	19.1*
N (unweighted)	311	418	473	1,202

NOTE.—P values are from *F*-test of significance of between-group differences. Definitions and measurements of variables appear in app. table B1.

^a Weighted samples are used for residence in U.S. cities.

* $P < .003$.

** $P < .001$.

*** $P < .0001$.

Predictive Models

Our dependent variable, the number of transnational political activities in which immigrants become involved, is a count variable with a range of 0–6. Following the preceding definition, regular participation or involvement is coded “1” and occasional or no participation “0.” The use of linear regression for this dependent variable can result in inconsistent,

TABLE 3
TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL PRACTICES

	REGULAR ENGAGEMENT (%)			AT LEAST OCCASIONAL ENGAGEMENT (%)				
	Colombian	Dominican	Salvadoran	All	Colombian	Dominican	Salvadoran	All
Electoral politics								
Membership in home country political party	10.0	12.6	7.6	9.9	18.7	22.8	14.3	18.3
Gives money to home country political party	2.3	10.8	5.6	7.2	5.1	15.8	9.8	11.5
Takes part in home country electoral campaigns and rallies . . .	3.2	12.4	5.2	7.7	10.6	18.8	10.7	13.8
Nonelectoral politics								
Membership in a civic hometown association	7.1	9.6	19.3	13.7	18.0	19.9	37.5	27.7
Gives money for community projects in home country	6.1	8.5	12.8	10.1	18.7	18.4	33.6	25.4
Membership in charity organization active in home country	13.2	6.4	21.5	14.3	29.9	21.6	40.3	31.4

NOTE — Data are drawn from CIEP (1998). All between-group differences are significant at the .0001 level.

NOTE — Data are drawn from CIEP (1998). All between-group differences are significant at the .001 level.

inefficient, or biased estimates. The distribution of such variables is commonly modeled as a Poisson process. Deviations of the univariate distribution from Poisson are usually accounted for by heterogeneity in the average rate and are modeled accordingly (Long 1997, p. 221).

Poisson regression models rarely fit the data, however, because of the assumption of equidispersion in the conditional distribution, $\mu_i = \delta = \exp(x_i\beta)$. In practice, the variance frequently exceeds the mean. Preliminary analysis shows that this condition, known as overdispersion, is present in our data. Negative binomial regression models (NBRM) obviate this constraint by replacing the conditional mean μ_i by a random variable μ_i where $\mu_i = \exp(x_i\beta + \varepsilon_i)$ and ε_i is random error uncorrelated with x_i . The conditional mean of the negative binomial distribution is the same as the Poisson distribution, but the variance differs (Long 1997, p. 233). The extent of overdispersion is estimated by the NBREG routine of Stata, which also provides a likelihood ratio test of significance.

Predictor variables in our models follow the preceding theoretical discussion and include gender, education, size of community of origin, years in the United States, SEDs of migration, downward mobility, and national origin. As control variables, we add the linear and quadratic forms of age and marital status. The CIEP survey contains several different measures of respondents' social networks. Following the preceding discussion, we include network size (absolute number of respondent's social ties) and scope (the ratio of long-distance to local ties in the city of residence). The assumption is that larger and more geographically dispersed networks will be more conducive to transnational activism.

NBR coefficients can be transformed into percentages indicating the net increase/decrease in the relative probabilities of the dependent variable associated with a unit increase in each predictor. For clarity of presentation, we present these figures for all NBR coefficients that are statistically significant. The percentage change associated with significant coefficients has the advantage of not depending on the value of other predictors, unlike NBR coefficients that predict the actual count of transnational activities contingent on other variables. We use robust variance estimators to correct for the two-stage cluster sample design in different cities. The corrected variances do not affect the actual coefficients, but they adjust for underestimation of errors that can lead to inflated Z-scores. Robust standard errors provide a much more demanding criteria for statistical significance than ordinary ones so that regression coefficients that meet this criterion can be confidently tagged as reliable.

Table 4 presents our results in two sets of columns. The first regresses political transnationalism, defined according to the strict criterion given above. These results provide the main source for our conclusions. The second column redefines the dependent variable based on a broader def-

inition of transnationalism that codes as "1" both regular and occasional involvement in each of the activities counted as part of the index. These results allow us to examine to what extent determinants of political transnationalism vary according to the empirical definition of the concept.

The first column of the table highlights the nonlinear effect of age, as indicated by a significant negative quadratic coefficient. This means that engagement in transnational politics increases substantially during adulthood but declines in old age. The gender and marital status coefficients show that transnational activists are overwhelmingly married males. The column presenting the percentage change associated with each significant coefficient indicates that the gender effect is very strong, with males being over twice more likely to be involved in these activities. The tendency increases by an additional 13% for those married.

Both high school and college graduations lead to significant increases in the probability of political transnationalism. The high school effect is the strongest, exceeding 10 times its standard error and increasing regular engagement in these activities by 173% relative to nongraduates. These results support predictions based on conventional theories of political participation rather than on those derived from assimilation theory. Other hypotheses derived from the same perspective are also unsupported by the data: U.S. citizenship acquisition has no effect on the dependent variables, and length of U.S. residence actually increases the probability of political transnationalism.

These findings suggest that it is not the least educated, more marginal, or more recent arrivals who are most prone to retain ties with their home country politics. While running contrary to conventional expectations concerning immigrant assimilation, a moment's reflection suffices to make sense of these results. Educated immigrants are more capable of following events in their home countries and seeking a role in them; the passage of time and acquisition of U.S. citizenship do not necessarily reduce this interest since their assimilative potential is balanced by the greater security and stability that they produce. A U.S. passport enables former migrants to travel back and forth without restrictions; greater time in the United States is usually associated with economic stability and more resources to invest in favored political causes.

The hypothesis concerning significant effects of urban versus rural origins is not supported by the data, nor is that predicting greater transnational activism among the downwardly mobile. We interpret these results as supportive of the previous findings, indicating that transnationalism is not a compensatory mechanism for migrants most affected by the traumas of adaptation to urban life or those suffering from status loss. We further interacted downward mobility with gender to test Jones-Correa's (1998) notion that the proclivity of males to engage in

TABLE 4
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS OF IMMIGRANT POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM ON SELECTED PREDICTORS, 1998

	TRANSNATIONALISM, STRICT DEFINITION			TRANSNATIONALISM, BROAD DEFINITION		
	Coefficient	Z	% Change	Coefficient	Z	% Change
Demographic:						
Age101	3.10**	10.6	.032	2.08*	3.3
Age ² ...	-.001	-2.90**	-.1	-.000	-1.50	. .
Gender (male) ...	1.209	2.27*	235.3	.710	2.22*	103.4
Marital status (married)118	4.41***	12.6	-.056	-1.39	. . .
Place of origin:						
Large city185	.51	. . .	-.135	-1.03	. . .
Small city or town099	.27	. .	-.132	-.78	. . .
Human capital:						
High school graduate ...	1.003	10.00***	172.7	.646	5.74***	90.8
College graduate324	3.00**	38.3	.320	3.44**	37.8
Assimilation:						
Years in United States034	7.25***	3.5	.010	1.08	. .

home country politics is a consequence of status loss. The resulting coefficient (not shown) is statistically insignificant and does not alter the pattern of effects presented in table 4. Once again, it appears that transnationalism is not a refuge for the marginal and downtrodden, but a practice associated with greater stability and greater resources brought from the home country.

The hypothesis of socially expected duration is, however, strongly supported. Immigrants whose families expect them to return at some point (temporary SEDs) are significantly more likely to retain political ties with their countries than those never expected to return. The increase in the count of regular transnational activities brought about by the temporary SEDs is 55%. Along the same lines, respondents with larger social networks are much more likely to participate. We find that it is the size of the networks rather than their physical location that makes the difference. Each additional tie, regardless of whether it is local or not, increases the count of transnational activities by 10%.⁸ Taken together, these findings indicate that political transnationalism is associated with well-connected migrants who remain normatively attached to their home communities by kin and friendship ties.

With Dominicans as the reference category, results show that Colombian immigrants are the least likely to take part in home country politics, while Salvadorans and Dominicans are about equally likely to do so. The Colombian negative coefficient is very strong, exceeding 19 times its standard error. This finding is important for two reasons: first, it confirms the influence of national origin and the associated contexts of exit and reception for each immigrant group; second, it fits well the history of each nationality and its particular resettlement experiences. Colombians want little to do with their country's politics, having escaped a situation of profound instability, official corruption, and widespread violence. The return to social peace in El Salvador and the relative political stability in the Dominican Republic facilitate regular cross-border ties by their expatriates, though, as we will see, their form and determinants also vary.

A look at the second sets of columns of table 4 shows that "broad" political transnationalism follows a parallel course, but that effects are generally weaker. For example, the gender effect is more than halved,

⁸ We recognize that social networks can also be strengthened by transnational activities and, hence, that the relationship between both variables may involve a causal loop. However, commonsense scholarship and our own in-depth interviews during the first phase of CIEP indicate that socially isolated immigrants are unlikely to take the first steps toward transnational political participation. It is well-connected immigrants, both locally and abroad, who are most motivated and able to take part in these activities. Their networks can be increased as a result, but the primary causal linkage runs in the direction of social contacts leading to transnational involvement.

while that of high school graduation drops 82 percentage points. Importantly, neither marital status nor length of U.S. residence have significant effects in this alternative definition of the dependent variable. This suggests that the greater stability associated with marriage and permanent settlement in the United States increases the probability of regular, core transnational engagement but has no bearing on occasional participation. Broad political transnationalism emerges from this analysis as a diluted version of the strict version. It is affected by the same set of determinants, only less so. A probable reason is that occasional transnationalism is conjunctural and, hence, less dependent on the social and educational resources and political traditions that sustain regular involvement.

Table 5 summarizes our results to this point, indicating how each hypothesis has fared in the analysis as predictor of both versions of the dependent variable and the resulting evaluation of the underlying theories. Classic assimilation predictions are consistently rejected while those stemming from gender differences and contexts of exit and reception are supported. Political transnationalism is, in this analysis, strongly associated with national origin and a product of greater human capital, greater stability and experience in the receiving society; plus strong social connections and enduring moral ties with sending communities.

Interaction Effects

The resilient effects of national origin on both dependent variables suggests that different contexts of exit and reception may not only affect political transnationalism additively, but also interact with other predictors. We examine this possibility by running separate regressions for each immigrant nationality of political transnationalism on the same set of predictors considered previously. Because determinants of broad transnationalism continue to have parallel, albeit weaker effects than those bearing on a strict definition of the concept, we omit them from this analysis. Table 6 presents these results, which reveal several major differences among the three groups. The last column of the table presents formal tests of significance of these differences.⁹ The overall trend is for Colombian transnationalism to be not only exceptional but also more weakly determined. This is shown by the corresponding R^2 and the few predictors that achieve statistical significance in this case.

⁹ This is a Wald test of significance of the interaction effects between nationality and each individual predictor. It is computed by comparing the NBR coefficients associated with each X_iN_j predictor in a pooled regression where X_i equals the predictor variable and N_j equals each specific nationality (see Judge et al. 1985, pp. 20–28; McDowell 2001; StataCorp 1999).

TABLE 5
THEORETICAL RESULTS OF ANALYSIS OF DETERMINANTS OF POLITICAL
TRANSNATIONALISM

THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS	OBSERVED EFFECTS		CONCLUSION
	Strict	Broad	
Classic assimilation.			
Years of U.S. residence (+)	+	0	Reject
U.S. citizenship (-)	0	0	Reject
Education (-)	+	+	Reject
Conventional political participation:			
Education (+)	+	+	Support
Gender differences.			
Males (+)	+	+	Support
Contextual embeddedness of immi- gration			
Rural origin (+)	0	0	Reject
Temporary SEDs (+)	+	+	Support
Downward mobility (+)	0	0	Support
National origins:			
Colombians(-)	-	-	Support
Dominicans (+)	+	+	Support
Salvadorans (community politics +)	+	+	Support
Social networks:			
Size (+)	+	+	Support
Scope(+)	0	0	Reject

NOTE — A negative sign represents the prediction or finding of an inverse relationship between each individual predictor and the dependent variable, a positive sign indicates the opposite, a zero indicates no relationship. Signs in parentheses indicate the predictions associated with each theory.

For Colombians, only place of origin and a college education affect the dependent variable. The original hypothesis concerning the positive effect of rural origins on the perpetuation of home country ties is supported in this instance. In addition, college graduation also increases participation in these activities. Hence, it appears that whatever transnational political activism exists among Colombian immigrants, it follows a bimodal pattern involving highly educated individuals and those coming from traditional rural areas. As seen before, most Colombians show little inclination to engage in home country politics of any kind. Since migrants from that country come increasingly from urban areas and experience a dominant political culture of disengagement (Guarnizo and Diaz 1999), our results suggest that this pattern of disinterest in transnational activities may become even stronger in the future.

Dominicans and Salvadorans are much more vigorously involved in the politics of their home countries. The corresponding regressions intro-

duce controls for city of residence, since both national samples were drawn from more than one city. No statistically significant differences between areas of residence were found in either case. In both cases, however, network size increases transnationalism significantly: each additional tie raises the net count of Dominican transnational activities by 16% and the count for Salvadorans by 9%. The effect of education is also similar for both groups. Since so few Salvadoran or Dominican immigrants are college educated, the key human capital effect is that of high school graduation and it is quite strong in both cases. Differences between Salvadorans and Dominicans, on the one hand, and Colombians, on the other, in the effects of social networks are significant, as shown in table 6. Differences in the interaction effects between education and nationality approach, but fail to achieve, statistical significance.

The same pattern is evident with gender effects. Unlike Colombians, among whom gender is an insignificant predictor, Dominican and Salvadoran males are much more likely to participate in transnational politics. The effect is especially strong among Dominicans, where it exceeds six times its standard error. Temporary SEDs of migration have positive effects among Dominicans and Salvadorans, but only the latter effect is significant, increasing the count of transnational activities by 53%. By contrast, the effect of downward occupational mobility proves to be significant among Dominican immigrants only. In this instance, the direction of the effect runs contrary to the original hypothesis: instead of increasing the tendency to engage in transnational activity, downward mobility actually decreases it. The interaction between nationality and this variable is significant, as shown in the last column.

Where Dominican and Salvadoran immigrants differ most is in the *orientation* of their respective political activities. This was observed in table 3 and is further illustrated by the net effect of nationality on each sub-type of transnationalism, controlling for other variables. These are presented in the bottom rows of table 6. With Dominicans as the reference category, the Salvadoran effect on party politics is significant and negative and that on civic community activism is significant and positive. As expected, Colombian effects are uniformly negative. These results support the conclusion that Dominican immigrants are more likely to concentrate on party politics, while Salvadorans bypass it to focus on the affairs of their local hometowns and regions.

Thus, the meaning and scope of political transnationalism is not uniform. Although there are common forces bearing on all immigrants, the particular circumstances of each community also affect the extent and character of these activities. For some immigrants, transnational politics is a means to maintain an active presence in their country's centers of power; for others, it is a means to avoid such centers in order to provide

TABLE 6
NEGATIVE BINOMIAL REGRESSIONS OF POLITICAL TRANSNATIONALISM BY IMMIGRANT NATIONALITY, 1998

PREDICTORS	TRANSNATIONALISM (STRICT DEFINITION)									
	Colombians					Dominicans				
	Coefficient	Z	%change	Coefficient	Z	%change	Coefficient	Z	%change	P ^a
Demographic:										
Age052	.71	. .	.163	2.36*	17.7	103	1.60	. .	NS
Age ²000	-43	. .	-.002	-2.28*	-.2	-.001	-1.61	. .	NS
Gender	-.137	-.47	. .	2.316	6.21***	913.7	.701	3.15**	101.6	.001
Marital status396	1.35	. .	-.025	-.08104	0.52	. . .	NS
Place of origin:										
Large city	-1.082	-3.34***	-66.1	.574	1.04	. .	.382	1.57001
Small city or town	-1.184	-3.14**	-69.4	.603	.94	. .	.240	.9601
City of residence:										
Providence, R.I.073	14
Washington, D.C.	-.136	-.70
Human capital:										
High school graduate553	1.26	. . .	1.005	3.25***	173.6	1.156	4.81***	217.7	NS
College graduate	811	2.69**	125.1	-.022	-.05416	1.84	. . .	NS
Assimilation:										
Years in U.S.023	1.31026	1.34023	1.18	. . .	NS

U S citizen461	1.29	.034	-.10066	-.26	. .	NS
Downward mobility	-.057	-.42	. . .	-2.33*	-.41.6	.081	.98	. .	.05
Temporary SEDs171	.53	. .	.562	1.85	.423	2.17*	52.7	NS
Social networks									
Network size038	1.89150	3.42**	.084	4.02***	8.8	.05
Network scope159	.84	. .	-.2.53	-.95	. .	-.33	. .	NS
Constant	-4.102	-8.003	. . .	-5.427
α	2.458	3.78***	1.927	3.52***	. . .	1.232	4.38***	129.07***	.11
Wald χ^2	53.72***	.08	. . .	163.52***
Pseudo R^2
National origin effect on transnationalism:									
Electoral	-1.372	-9.02***	-.74.6	-1.112	-7.29***	-67.1	. . .
Community	-.981	-37.18***	-62.5491	5.96***	63.5	. . .

NOTE.—Description of variables can be found in app table B1. Significance levels and z-scores computed with robust estimates of SE for "place of origin," "rural" is the reference category, for "city of residence," New York is the omitted category for Dominicans and Los Angeles is the omitted category for Salvadorans; for "human capital," "less than high school" is the reference category, in "assimilation," "downward mobility" is the ratio of the last home country occupation to the first occupation in the United States; in "social networks," "network scope" is the ratio of nonlocal-to-local ties in the respondents city of residence. In "national origin effect on transnationalism," we control for all other predictors included in table 4 above, no results are reported for Dominicans, as they are the reference category in this predictor. NS = nonsignificant interaction effect.

* This column reports the significance of interaction effect between each predictor and national origins.

* $P < .05$

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

direct assistance to their native regions; and for still others, it is a practice to be avoided in order to leave a violent and unsettling past behind.

DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

An emerging transnational perspective has brought new vistas on international migration. It has questioned conventional analyses that focus exclusively on assimilation to the host society, neglecting migrants' ties and ongoing relations with their countries of origin. Yet serious shortcomings and criticisms have been leveled at this perspective. Most early studies of political transnationalism were based on ethnographic evidence and often lacked clear operational definitions. A dearth of knowledge about the size, scope, and determinants of such practices has been a consistent weakness of this field. Comparing Colombian, Dominican, and Salvadoran immigrants in several areas of settlement, this study seeks to address these shortcomings. It provides empirical evidence of the scale and determinants of transnational activism among these populations.

Our first significant conclusion is that the transnational political field is not as extensive or evenly distributed among contemporary immigrants as proposed by previous accounts. In fact, the number of immigrants who are regularly involved in cross-border activism is relatively small. However, this proportion reaches up to one-third of the sample if we shift to a more inclusive definition of transnationalism. The fluctuation between a small core and a larger soft rim of transnational activists suggests its sensitivity to changing contextual conditions. Thus, while core transnationals stay involved in their home country politics via electoral or non-electoral means, others become active only at special junctures such as highly contested elections or natural disasters.

A second set of findings is related to determinants of these practices in relation to predictions stemming from different theoretical schools. Our analysis shows that core transnational engagement is significantly different by gender and associated with migrants' age, human capital, and social capital. Results run counter to classical views of immigrant assimilation, still common in public understandings of the process. Contrary to these views, results indicate that transnational political activities are not the refuge of marginalized or poorly educated immigrants. That conclusion holds, regardless of whether transnationalism is defined strictly or broadly. Along the same lines, length of residence in the United States does not reduce interest or involvement in home country politics but actually increases it.

The uneven distribution of these practices by age and gender coincides with conventional power relations based on patriarchal structures that

have historically dominated Latin American politics. The view that greater male participation is a result of downward mobility experiences in the United States is not supported since the corresponding main and interaction effects are insignificant. Support for the hypothesis of a strong gender effect must also be qualified by significant differences among national groups. The male proclivity to participate is relatively strong among Dominicans (the group that gave rise to the hypothesis in the first place), but it is considerably weaker among other nationalities.

In conclusion, our evidence demonstrates that a stable and significant transnational field of political action connecting immigrants with their countries of origin does exist. Within this field, we find a repertoire of cross-border electoral and nonelectoral activities that warrant attention. The analysis shows that migrants' transnational political engagement is far from being socially unbounded and "deterritorialized," as some analysts have argued in the past. Transnational actions are socially bounded across national borders and occur in quite specific territorial jurisdictions. The transnational field is significant not only for home countries but also for the United States, since it affects the way immigrants incorporate themselves and alters conventional expectations about their assimilation.

The presence and dynamics of this phenomenon certainly contradicts a normative view of the assimilation process that places a premium on the rapid shedding of old loyalties and identities. This does not mean, however, that acculturation to the host society is not occurring or that transnational activism necessarily precludes successful integration (Brubaker 2001). The old-line exclusivist views of how assimilation is supposed to occur are contradicted by the fact that the immigrants most involved in transnational activities are better educated, longer residents of the host society, and more likely to become involved in local politics there (R. Smith 1998; Landolt 2001). Similarly, transnational activism often seeks to reproduce in home country national and local politics the discourses and institutional practices of probity and respect for civil rights learned in the United States (Levitt 2001*b*; Guarnizo et al. 1999). By and large, transnational activism is a constructive phenomenon through which people respond to long-distance social obligations and belonging and seek to transform political practices in their sending countries. By the same token, it endows immigrants with a renewed sense of efficacy and self-worth that facilitates their integration into the political institutions of their new country.

APPENDIX A

TABLE A1
CIEP SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION BY NATIONAL ORIGIN, AREA,
AND METHOD OF DATA COLLECTION

Nationality and Site	Informants (1st Phase)	Population N*	Survey (2d Phase) ^a	Sampling Fraction (%)
Colombian:				
Queens, N.Y.	55	26,750	311	1.16
Dominican:				
Providence, R.I.		2,296	159	6.92
Washington Heights, N.Y.		88,930	259	29
Subtotal	54	91,226	418	
Salvadoran:				
Los Angeles		57,076	240	.42
Washington, D.C.		12,176	233	1.91
Subtotal	50	69,252	473	
Total	159	187,228	1,202	

* Working adult heads of household of the selected nationality in each area, drawn from 1990 census (U S Census Bureau 1993a, 1993b)

APPENDIX B

TABLE B1
VARIABLES USED IN THE ANALYSIS

Variable	Definition or Measurement	\bar{X}	SE
Dependent	Count of regular or occasional involvement in transnational political activities (see table 3)		
Independent:			
Demographic:			
Gender	Male = 1; female = 0	.53	.50
Age	Years	41.11	11.24
Marital Status	Married = 1; else = 0	.54	.50
Place of origin			
Large city	Yes = 1; else = 0	.55	.50
Small city or town	Yes = 1; else = 0	.24	.42
Rural area	Reference category		
Human capital			
High school graduate	Yes = 1; else = 0	.55	.50
College graduate	Yes = 1; else = 0	.16	.37

Assimilation and Transnationalism

TABLE B1 (Continued)

Variable	Definition or Measurement	\bar{X}	SE
Did not graduate from high school	Reference category		
Assimilation			
Time in the U.S.	Years	15.10	8.35
Naturalized U.S. citizen	Yes = 1, else = 0	.32	.47
SED of migration	Family expects respondent to return = 1; else = 0	.30	.46
Downward mobility	Ratio of status of last occupation in country of origin to first U.S. occupation, both measured on a 5-point scale; higher values mean greater downward mobility	1.31	.85
Social networks:*			
Network size	Absolute number of personal ties on whom respondent could rely for various needs	8.67	5.08
Network scope	Ratio of nonlocal to local ties in respondent's current city of residence	.76	.61
Nationality			
Colombian	Yes = 1, else = 0	.16	.36
Salvadoran	Yes = 1, else = 0	.46	.50
Dominican	Reference category		

* Respondents were asked to name up to three alters in multiple domains ranging from closest friends to potential money lenders. Alters' sociodemographic information, including current place of residence, was also collected.

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The New Parochialism: The Implications of the Beltway Case for Arguments Concerning Informal Social Control¹

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This article presents a five-year ethnographic study of informal social control in the Chicago neighborhood "Beltway," where controls at the private and what has traditionally been known as the parochial level are weaker and less important than heretofore assumed. In addition, the parochial and the public arenas are inseparable from each other, not independent as others have argued. Instead, informal social control in Beltway is characterized by what the author calls the "new parochialism," where diminished private and traditionally parochial forms of social control are replaced by a combination of parochial and public controls. The new parochialism is occasioned by wider societal and local changes, and the concept is shown to have theoretical and empirical implications.

INTRODUCTION

What do people do to control crime and disorder? The question of what ordinary citizens do to keep where they live free from crime and disorder—that is, how people practice informal social control—is one that has attracted the interest of scholars for decades (see, e.g., Jacobs 1962; Sampson

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1997; Shaw and McKay 1942). Moreover, recent discussions of the notion of collective efficacy (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997) and the reworking of social capital (Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999) have touted the beneficent properties of informal social control. Despite the popularity of the concept, however, there have been few microlevel studies of how informal social control works over time.² In this article, I attempt to follow in the tradition of the Chicago school (see, e.g., Anderson 1923; Cressey 1932; Frazier 1932; Hiller 1928; Reckless 1933; Wirth 1928; Zorbaugh 1929) by using an extended ethnographic case study (Burawoy 1991; Van Velsen 1967) of the Beltway neighborhood in Chicago to discuss the process of informal social control (Abbott 1997).³ In so doing I hope to add to what we have learned from previous studies (Merry 1981; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sullivan 1989; Suttles 1968; Warner and Rountree 1997) and theoretical arguments (Black 1989; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Gibbs 1994; Granovetter 1973; Sampson 1997) that have examined informal social control, and I wish to suggest some future directions for theory and research.

In their statement of social disorganization theory, Shaw and McKay (1942) first postulated that regulatory activities carried on by neighborhood residents can impede criminal and delinquent behavior, and indeed recent reformulation of the notion of social disorganization (see Bursik 1988; Bursik and Grasmick 1993, 1995; Hunter 1985; Sampson 1988, 1997; Sampson and Groves 1989) has emphasized the "systemic" nature of these internal controls (Janowitz 1975; Kasarda and Janowitz 1974). The systemic model holds that the structure of relational networks, or density of social ties, determines the extent to which a neighborhood can engage in self-regulation (Janowitz 1975). I argue that the evidence from Beltway would seem to question the centrality of dense social ties in the implementation of informal social control. Informal social control in Beltway works without dense network ties because the strategies that are employed there do not owe their existence or their efficacy to social ties. The Beltway case studies illustrate how informal social control can work in a neighborhood that is not characterized by dense social ties but rather where community organizations and their links with public agencies outside the neighborhood facilitate action by citizens to control crime and disorder. The Beltway data should be viewed in the "context of discovery" (Fagan

² There are of course notable exceptions. Suttles's (1968) hugely influential study does discuss informal social control, as does Merry (1981), Anderson (1990), Pattillo-McCoy (1999), and Sullivan (1989). However, informal social control does not form the central focus of these studies and in this respect the present work differs.

³ Beltway is a white, working-class and lower-middle-class neighborhood located on the edge of Chicago. The name *Beltway* is a pseudonym. All of the names of people and places in this article have been changed to preserve anonymity.

1996) that has implications for how we think not only about informal social control but also with respect to broader issues of civic engagement (Putnam 2000) and citizen involvement in community policing and order maintenance strategies (Kelling and Coles 1996; Skogan and Hartnett 1997).

Much of the research that has utilized the systemic theory has focused on three basic types of networks derived from Hunter's (1985) typology of private, parochial, and public spheres of social control (see, e.g., Bursik and Grasmick 1993, 1995; Warner and Rountree 1997; Rountree and Warner 1999). Private networks center on family, kinship, and intimate friendship groups; parochial networks are less intimate, secondary relationships, such as community organizations; and public networks are the links to institutions and groups outside the neighborhood (Bursik 1999). Effective informal social control occurs where private, parochial, and public controls act together and such control is facilitated by the strength of the social networks that underpin each sphere.

In this article I will draw on five years of qualitative ethnographic research in the Beltway neighborhood to examine informal social control at the private, parochial, and public levels. I begin with a discussion of the literature that examines how neighborhood conditions lead to crime via the lack of social control, situating my own work within this tradition. Second, I outline the methodology of the project and provide a description of the neighborhood. Next, I discuss the social organizational structure of Beltway and describe the general features of informal social control in terms of Hunter's typology. Finally, I present a number of case studies that further depict informal social control in Beltway and I discuss the significance of these findings.

Specifically, I present two major findings that have implications for how we think about informal social control. First, I illustrate that controls at the private and what we traditionally have known as the parochial level can be weaker and less important than we have heretofore assumed. Many two-parent families in Beltway are dual-earner families where both the mother and the father work outside the home (Carr and Pashup 2002) and this weakens familial control because parents that work are home less. With respect to what we have come to know as parochial control (namely collective supervision of youth and intervention when trouble occurs), the supervision of young people in Beltway is age graded and, significantly, most Beltway residents do not collectively supervise teenagers. Similarly, Beltway residents are reticent to directly intervene in teen disputes and would prefer to call 911 (an indirect intervention) to report misbehaving teens rather than directly deal with the incidents.⁴ Second,

⁴ In the in-depth interviews that I conducted, I asked residents what they would do

I demonstrate that the parochial and the public arenas are inseparable from each other, not independent as other scholars have argued (see Bursik and Grasmick 1993). I explain these two findings by arguing that informal social control in Beltway is characterized by what I call the "new parochialism," where diminished private and traditionally parochial forms of social control are replaced by a set of behaviors that are a combination of parochial and public controls. Instead of supervision and direct physical intervention in disputes, Beltway residents engage in behaviors that are more secure and facilitated by actors from the public sphere of control. I describe the case studies of the Beltway Night Patrol, the neighborhood problem-solving group, and the Court Advocacy Program as illustrations of the new parochialism and how it works.

The new parochialism encompasses the informal social control behaviors engaged in by citizens at the parochial or neighborhood level of control but facilitated by agents from the public sphere. For example, the actions of the neighborhood problem-solving group who utilize the local politicians and city bureaucracy to close down a tavern that is notorious for creating crime and disorder illustrates the new parochialism. Residents who engage in these actions want to control crime and disorder, but they also fear repercussions from their personal involvement. Beltway residents want to engage in secure activism and, while Beltway does not have a high crime rate relative to other neighborhoods in Chicago,⁵ many residents there are afraid to involve themselves directly in informal social control (see Skogan [1990] for a discussion of how residents adapt to a fearful environment). In the Beltway case some residents get involved in organizations that work to keep the neighborhood free from crime. The new parochialism and the behaviors associated with it are neither wholly parochial nor public controls; instead there is a partnership between parochial and public spheres. The new parochialism is that set of practices that creates solutions at the parochial level but owes its existence and its efficacy to the intervention of institutions and groups from outside the neighborhood. Further, the activities of residents in Beltway seem to suggest that dense social network ties are not wholly necessary for effective control. Beltway residents are not closely tied with each other, and this may be one of the reasons that private forms of control, such as collective supervision of neighborhood children and intervention in disputes, are rare. However, I would suggest that while people who are not closely tied

if they witnessed a group of teens misbehaving. Thirty-six out of 40 (90%) said that they would call 911 rather than deal with the incident themselves. Of the remainder, two said they would deal with the incident themselves, and two said that it would depend on the situation.

⁵ The period 1994 to 1995, e.g., Beltway ranked in the lowest quintile of community areas in Chicago in terms of overall violent crime rate.

may not supervise or intervene, they may engage in other behaviors designed to help them live in an area free from crime (a finding echoed by Bursik [1999]). The lack of close ties may indeed be partly responsible for some residents' fear of reprisals if they get personally involved in informal social control. Involvement in a neighborhood organization offers a solution for those residents that want to be civically engaged but would prefer to do so as part of a group, not as individuals.

The new parochialism then would seem to undermine some of the central assumptions of the systemic model. In the first place, strong social ties do not appear to be crucial to informal social control.⁶ Beltway is not characterized by dense interpersonal networks; yet, as the case studies detailed later will illustrate, residents engage in successful campaigns aimed at controlling crime and disorder in the neighborhood. Second, the spheres of control, specifically the parochial and the public, are not independent of each other, but rather there is a mutual interplay between them. Ultimately, the partnership between the parochial and public spheres appears to be crucial for effective informal social control. Before discussing the methods used in the study and describing Beltway, I will explain how this work contributes to the literature on crime in general and to social disorganization research in particular.

NEIGHBORHOODS AND CRIME: THE SALIENCE OF INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL

The salience of informal social control for self-regulation generally, and for the control of crime specifically, is evident on the theoretical level. It is almost common sense to say that if the members of the community regulate behaviors and sanction deviants then there will be less deviation from established norms. Since Shaw and McKay's (1942) first statement of the theory of social disorganization and Jane Jacobs' (1962) propositions regarding surveillance and intervention, the concept of informal social control has been central to the study of neighborhoods and crime (Bursik 1999; Girling, Loader, and Sparks 2000; Greenberg, Rohe, and Williams 1985; Reiss 1986; Sampson and Groves 1989; Skogan 1988; Stark 1987; Taub, Taylor, and Dunham 1984), communities and crime prevention (Bennett and Lavrakas 1989; Bennett 1987, 1989, 1990; Cirel et al. 1977; Crawford 1995; DuBow and Podolefsky 1982; Garofalo and McLeod 1989;

⁶ This finding echoes similar recent work by Bellair (1997) and Warner and Rountree (1997) and the observation by Granovetter (1973) about the strength of weak ties. In addition, Fischer's (1982) diversity of communities perspective indicates that even in dense urban settlements community may not be lost (Wellman 1979), and even weak ties can facilitate supportive networks.

Hope and Shaw 1988; Lavrakas 1985; Lavrakas and Herz 1982; Rosenbaum 1988), and community-policing initiatives (Fielding 1995; Kelling 1987; Skogan 1990; Skogan and Hartnett 1997; Wilson and Kelling 1982). Moreover, recent work by Sampson (1997) has argued for a recasting of social (dis)organization theory that will focus on informal social control as the key neighborhood process. However, there have been few in-depth examinations of how informal social control as a process works over time (notable exceptions are Merry 1981; Pattillo 1998; Pattillo-McCoy 1999; Suttles 1968; Sullivan 1989). Much of what we do know about informal social control has been inferred from large-scale surveys, such as the British Crime Survey or, more recently, the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods. These "big science" projects (Short 1998) have certainly illustrated what has been evident in previous ethnographic accounts of neighborhoods (Anderson 1990; Gans 1962, 1967; Kefalas 2003; Merry 1981; Stack 1974; Whyte 1981)—namely, that community processes are important for understanding a range of action within the community, among them the informal control of crime and deviance. In addition to the big science projects,⁷ other studies have examined the impact of informal social control on crime, territoriality, and social ties (e.g., Greenberg et al. 1985; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sullivan 1989; Warner and Rountree 1997), and there have been recent theoretical statements about the phenomenon (Stark 1987; Black 1989; Gibbs 1994).⁸ Furthermore, a multiplicity of theories of the relationship between neighborhoods and crime have posited the beneficent properties of informal

⁷ A good recent example of such work is that by Morenoff, Raudenbush, and Sampson (2001), which examines the spatial dynamics of urban violence, utilizing data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods.

⁸ Each of these theoretical statements has a different take on the role of informal social control. Stark (1987), for example, argues for a return to the ecological framework that explains deviance not in terms of kinds of people, but rather as a kinds of places argument. Stark outlines 30 propositions of his theory of deviant places, and he argues that essential aggregate characteristics such as poverty, density, and transience have impacts on the moral order of neighborhoods. One of the possible responses to poverty, transience, density or dilapidation is diminished social control, which can then further amplify the "volume of deviance" (Stark 1987, p. 895). Informal social control for Stark, then, is the result of supranighborhood characteristics, and in turn diminished social control can contribute to further deviance and crime. Black (1989) outlines a theory of social control that argues for the central role of the socialization process. He also discusses specific processes such as gossip and avoidance that function as effective informal controls on behavior. Gibbs (1994) advances a general theory of control, which, he argues, is *the* central sociological notion. His expansive work includes discussion of a wide variety of social controls. For example, he distinguishes seven basic types of control over human behavior, which enhances the scope of the concept of control. The seven types are proximate control, sequential control, referential social control, allegative social control, vicarious social control, modulative social control, and preclusive social control (Gibbs 1994, pp. 46–57).

social control (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Granovetter 1973; Hunter 1985; Jacobs 1962; Kornhauser 1978; Sampson 1997; Sampson and Wilson 1995; Skogan 1990; Shaw and McKay 1942; Wilson and Kelling 1982). However, social disorganization theorists first posited that neighborhood conditions lead to crime in the absence of social control, and this project is embedded in this perspective.

Shaw and McKay's (1942) statement of social disorganization theory held that certain neighborhoods have a diminished capacity to regulate the behavior of juveniles. In particular, they argued that the residents of high poverty neighborhoods have difficulty regulating the behavior of juveniles because such neighborhoods are also characterized by high levels of residential mobility and a high degree of ethnic and racial heterogeneity (Bursik 1999; Kornhauser 1978; Shaw and McKay 1942). In this view, neighborhoods that have limited capacity to regulate the behavior of juveniles are socially disorganized. The regulation of behavior, or informal social control, then is key to preventing crime and delinquency. The social disorganization perspective has persisted in spite of a number of critical challenges (see, e.g., Jonassen 1949; Kobrin 1971). While Bursik (1988) acknowledges some of the problems with the original formulation of social disorganization theory (see also Kornhauser 1978), he argues that the essential thrust of Shaw and McKay's thesis concerning the importance of internal neighborhood controls remains pertinent. Similarly, Sampson's (1997) proposal for a reconceptualization of social (dis)organization argues for the centrality of informal social control. Thus, while social disorganization theory has received its fair share of criticism (e.g., Reiss 1986), many studies have sought to specify the nature of neighborhood processes and their relationship to crime and delinquency. In particular, the social disorganization framework has been recast in terms of the systemic theory of control.

The systemic theory is based on the work of Kasarda and Janowitz (1974) where they state that "local community is . . . a complex system of friendship and kinship networks and formal and informal associational ties rooted in family life and ongoing socialization processes" (p. 329). The complex of network social ties mediates between neighborhood structural variables, length of residence for example, and outcomes for the community, among them the informal control of crime. Janowitz (1975) specifically ties the concept of informal social control to systemic theory when he argues for a return to what he considers the classical usage of social control; namely, the capacity for a group to engage in self-regulation. Self-regulation is achieved through the density of neighborhood social ties that mediate between the structural variables of poverty, residential mobility and ethnic and racial heterogeneity, and crime rates (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Neighborhoods that have a high rate of residential instability, or

population turnover, have difficulty establishing stable relational networks that serve as the foundation for informal social control. Conversely, residentially stable neighborhoods with dense and widespread friendship and associational ties have the greater potential for informal social control. The systemic theory redefines social disorganization "as the regulatory capacity of a neighborhood that is imbedded in the structure of that community's affiliational, interactional and communication ties among its residents" (Bursik 1999, p. 86).

The systemic theory of neighborhood organization has enabled scholars to test the theory of social disorganization. The evidence in support of the disorganization framework has been mixed. For example, Sampson and Groves (1989) find in their analysis of the British Crime Survey that communities with extensive friendship networks, high organizational participation, and effective control of teen peer groups have lower than average rates of burglary. They also find that the presence of unsupervised teen groups in a neighborhood has direct positive effects on rates of both violence and damage to property.⁹ However, Warner and Rountree (1997), in their analysis of Seattle neighborhoods, find that social ties do not have strong effects on crime rates. In the case of burglary, strong social ties seem to have positive effects on burglary rates. Bellair (1997) examines the effects of social interaction on crime and finds that frequent and even infrequent interaction among neighbors is important for establishing community controls. The finding that weak ties can be effective in crime control (also provided by Granovetter 1973) is interesting because it may speak to processes beyond interaction and the oft-cited systemic control practices of supervision, surveillance, and intervention. While Bellair (1997, p. 697) notes that people who interact infrequently may supervise and intervene, I would suggest that people who are not closely tied may not supervise and intervene but may engage in other behaviors that contribute to community controls. In other words, it may be possible to have effective informal social control without dense interpersonal networks. The latter point has been recently underscored by Morenoff et al. (2001), who posit that there are "reasons to problematize the process by which

⁹ Recently, Veysey and Messner (2000) have argued that Sampson and Groves may have overstated the support for social disorganization theory in their analysis of the British Crime Survey data. After a reanalysis of the data, Veysey and Messner (2000) argue that the mediating effect of social disorganization variables is not as strong as Sampson and Groves originally argued, and, rather than a single construct, social disorganization may represent several mechanisms. In particular, Veysey and Messner state that the strong effect of unsupervised teens on crime may not in fact be supportive of social disorganization, and they posit the salience of learning theory for explaining the effect of unsupervised peer groups. While Veysey and Messner (2000) do not advocate abandoning social disorganization theory, they underscore the need for further theoretical and empirical specification.

strong social ties translate into low crime rates" (p. 519). Specifically, Morenoff and his colleagues draw on Wilson's (1996) insight that in many impoverished neighborhoods high degrees of social integration and low levels of informal control coincide, mainly owing to the social isolation of residents and the consequent inability to tap into extra-community resources. Sampson and his colleagues (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997; Sampson, Morenoff, and Earls 1999) argue that we should direct our attention to mechanisms that can facilitate social control in the absence of strong ties; to wit, they posit the notion of collective efficacy, which is the linkage of trust and cohesion with shared expectations for control (Morenoff et al. 2001). These authors' emphasis on the action residents are capable of rather than on the potential for action that inheres in social ties prefigures the present extended case-study analysis, which seeks to provide additional clarification as to the workings of neighborhood informal social control.

Bursik and Grasmick (1993) use the systemic model as their baseline for discussing effective neighborhood control (Hunter 1985), adding that the systemic model relies on the assumption that people who live in a neighborhood share a common goal of living in an area relatively free of crime (Bursik and Grasmick 1993, p. 15; Sampson 1997). Hunter's (1985) typology of private, parochial, and public spheres, each with an attendant form of social control, focuses our attention on the maintenance of effective social control at the neighborhood level. It is the articulation of private, parochial, and public controls that results in effective neighborhood social control. Bursik and Grasmick (1993) utilize the Hunter framework in their discussion of the dimensions of effective control and summarize it thus:

[Hunter's] most basic order of control is at the "private" level, which is grounded in the intimate informal primary groups that exist in the area. . . . The second level of control . . . is called the "parochial" order and represents the effects of the broader local interpersonal networks and the interlocking of local institutions, such as stores, schools, churches and voluntary organizations. That is, whereas the private order refers to relationships among friends, the parochial order refers to relationships among neighbors who do not have the same sentimental attachment. . . . [Finally, there is] the "public" level of social control, which focuses on the ability of the community to secure public goods and services that are allocated by agencies located outside the neighborhood. The external resources can take two basic forms . . . municipal service bureaucracies . . . [and] the police department. (Bursik and Grasmick 1993, pp. 16–17)

The Hunter typology offers a useful heuristic to examine effective informal social control. If social control is to be effective, then all three levels—private, parochial, and public—must function together. Do private, parochial, and public forms of control act together in the Chicago

neighborhood of Beltway? In what follows I will present a number of case studies that demonstrate effective informal social control in the neighborhood, and I will document the contribution of the various levels of control to these efforts.

THE STUDY

I collected the data for this study over a five-year period from 1993 to 1998. For the first two and a half years the research was part of the Comparative Neighborhood Study (CNS) at the University of Chicago. The CNS focused on four working-class lower-middle-class neighborhoods in Chicago: Archer Park, a predominantly Mexican community; Beltway, a white neighborhood; Dover, a neighborhood in transition from white to Mexican; and Groveland, an African-American neighborhood. The CNS set out to study the social organization of each neighborhood, with an emphasis on the roles of race, racial discourse, and culture. In addition to the two and a half years of the CNS, I spent an additional two and a half years in Beltway, studying informal social control specifically.

The data were collected using a variety of methods. The principal source of the CNS data was intensive participant observation in the local schools, parks, restaurants, bars, and homes of each neighborhood (Burgess 1995; Spradley 1979; Stewart 1998). Field-workers attended meetings of local organizations, community-policing groups, and business associations, and they engaged in activities that ranged from volunteering in the park district to helping out on election campaigns. Much of the participant observation involved weekly and biweekly interactions with the same informants. Researchers were able to gain the confidence of local residents, and this familiarity and trust facilitated frank conversations about family, crime, politics, aspirations, and ethnic/race relations. In addition to the participant observation in Beltway, the CNS research team conducted 31 interviews with local residents and a further 8 with important institutional actors in the neighborhood who did not reside there.¹⁰ There were a number of specific interview guides utilized that were designed to elicit information on a broad range of topics. The CNS fieldwork was continually reflexive; each situation would bring new questions to investigate, and the analysis of field notes was carried on simultaneously with the fieldwork. We coded our field notes by subject category, which aided in

¹⁰ The research team in Beltway consisted of two field-workers, one male and one female. The CNS principal investigators felt that having male and female field-workers could aid in gaining access to gendered spaces in the field. When the CNS research was completed, both field-workers continued their research in Beltway.

the identification of patterns in the data. We also conducted an exhaustive search of three daily Chicago papers—the *Chicago Tribune*, the *Chicago Sun-Times*, and the *Daily Southtown*—as well as of the local weekly papers for articles that pertained to Beltway itself or to issues relevant to the neighborhood. We minimized the problem of selectivity by the range of interactions and data sources utilized in each field site.

The informal social control study that I carried out in Beltway entailed a more directed reflexive approach. At the conclusion of the CNS fieldwork, I stayed in Beltway specifically to study informal social control. I paid special attention to the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) initiative in Beltway,¹¹ and I attended beat meetings, spoke with police officers, and became involved with the Beltway problem-solving group and the Beltway Night Patrol (BNP) neighborhood watch group, both of which were started under the auspices of CAPS. I volunteered with the problem-solving group, and I went out on patrol every month for 18 months with the BNP. Being a participant not only afforded me the opportunity to observe these processes over time; it also permitted me to gain the confidence of the people in the problem-solving and neighborhood

¹¹ The CAPS program began in five prototype police districts in April 1993 and was expanded to the remaining 20 districts in the city 18 months later. There are four basic elements to CAPS that set it apart from traditional policing methods: proactive problem-solving as opposed to reactive policing; partnership with the community rather than police officers' working alone; support of other city agencies, a multiagency rather than monoagency approach to problems, and, finally, departmentwide change in the police department to allow it to become more decentralized, flexible, and supportive of the CAPS program (Research and Development Division 1995). CAPS, then, has a number of facets that distinguish it from other community-policing programs (Skogan and Hartnett 1997). For a start, the whole police department was involved in the program; it was not just a specialized unit. Second, each of the 25 districts was divided into beat areas, 279 in all, with each area having approximately 10,000 inhabitants and 4,100 households. Beat officers were assigned to work certain beats and were given a mandate to get to know their beat area and its problems. They are expected to stay in their beat area for the majority of their shift, responding to calls and working on local problems. The beat officers are augmented in their task by rapid response teams, which serve a whole district and respond to the bulk of the 911 calls, and by tactical officers. These operational procedures help maintain beat integrity by allowing beat officers to spend most of their time working on their beat area. The third area that differentiates CAPS from other community-policing programs is the serious commitment to training that was done in order to underscore the professionalism of community policing. The fourth, and for my purposes most important, characteristic of CAPS was the central role envisioned for the community in the CAPS program. The assumption is that the police cannot solve problems on their own and thus they require the assistance of the public in their problem-solving efforts. The community component of CAPS was realized initially in two fora: The regular monthly or bimonthly beat meetings, where the beat officers meet with community members to discuss crime and disorder problems in the area, and the meetings of a district advisory committee, where community leaders meet with district commanders and staff to develop joint police-citizen plans to tackle problems.

watch groups. I conducted in-depth interviews with 28 of the approximately 33 active members of the BNP. The interviews were designed to focus on informal social control processes and on crime in Beltway, and my interview guide used open-ended questions primarily in which I asked people to elaborate on issues rather than restrict them to a set of pre-determined answers (Spradley 1979). In addition, I used the same guide to interview a further 12 neighborhood activists, identified as people who are actively involved in a neighborhood organization but who are not members of the BNP.

The methods employed in the study allowed me to get at the process of informal social control. Indeed, it was fortuitous that the fieldwork in Beltway did not initially concentrate on informal social control. Instead, in the manner of all good emergent themes (Glaser and Strauss 1967), the topic of informal social control sprang forth from the fieldwork. By the time I narrowed my focus in the field, I had already fostered relationships with several residents who were active in the neighborhood, and, consequently, I was well known in Beltway. My key informants helped me enormously in setting up the fieldwork, and the five-year time frame also allowed me the luxury of observing events, institutions, and people over an extended period of time, which is crucial to capturing process. Informal social control can be better understood if we see how it actually plays out over the course of several years. Quantitative methods alone would not have permitted me to glean such detailed, rich data about the process, and, ultimately, I think that we can better quantify a phenomenon such as informal social control when we know more about how it works over time.

There are well-documented difficulties with qualitative research (see, e.g., Reiss 1986). It is true that one case cannot tell the whole story about any phenomenon, but I think that the Beltway case can tell us a great deal about informal social control. By offering a detailed picture of how the residents in one neighborhood engage in informal social control, the present work can shed light on what makes for effective social control generally at the neighborhood level. Specifically, I think that this ethnography can add to our theoretical knowledge of informal social control and suggest avenues for further empirical investigation. In this regard, the extended case method employed here addresses the issue of generalization by using what Burawoy (1991, p. 280) calls a "genetic" explanation of particular outcomes. Burawoy argues that the extended case method can derive generalizations by reconstructing existing theory, which it does by investigating what implications the case study has for society, thereby uncovering how the micro situation is affected by wider societal processes. Crucially, the extended case method (see also Sullivan 1998; Van Velsen

1967) tests and refines theory by working "outward and upward to identify the contexts relevant to understanding that case" (Sullivan 1998, p. 389).

The events in Beltway that I describe are embedded in the contexts of the local history and city and nationwide trends, and any understanding of the Beltway case must uncover how these macro processes impact and give shape to the micro events. Working in the opposite direction, the case study here can help refine and reconstruct current theory on informal social control.

THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Beltway is located on the edge of Chicago. The neighborhood is made up mostly of single-family Chicago bungalows that stand on postage-stamp lots: precise, neat, and clean. In Chicago terms, it is a relatively young neighborhood,¹² since most of the houses were built in the postwar building boom of the 1950s and 1960s. One of the first things to strike the outsider about the neighborhood is the manner in which it is bounded by dramatic ecological barriers. Beltway is bordered to the north by an airport and by railroad tracks, to the south by a line of factories, and to the west by railroad tracks and the city limits. The eastern border is a six-lane thoroughfare that links the north and south sides of Chicago. Interspersed with the predominant bungalows are older ranch-style houses (which date from the early 20th century when most of the area was prairie) and newer blocks of condominiums. The Beltway business district runs through the center of the neighborhood, and, while there are still a number of stores open for business, much of the area is deteriorating, since people do most of their shopping in the nearby malls. Beltway has three parks, four elementary schools, two Roman Catholic churches, a United Methodist church, a Lutheran church, and a new multipurpose field house at one of the parks.

The 2000 national census offers the most recent demographic data on Beltway. Up to 1980, Beltway had been 99% white. However, in the 1980s a Latino population began to settle there, especially in the eastern part of the neighborhood. The 1990 census indicated that almost one-tenth of the Beltway population of about 25,000 was Latino, the vast majority of this group being Mexican in origin. The trend of an increasing number of Latinos moving into the neighborhood continued in the 1990s. Census

¹² While much of present-day Beltway was built after World War II, the neighborhood has been part of Chicago since 1915, when the village of Beltway was annexed to the city of Chicago. More land was added in 1917 and 1923 when the current boundaries of the neighborhood were established.

2000 statistics for race and ethnic origin indicate that the population of Beltway is now approximately one-fifth Latino.

Of the more than 9,000 housing units in Beltway in 2000, over three-quarters were owner occupied and less than one-quarter renter occupied. With respect to residential stability, almost two-thirds of Beltway residents in 2000 reported that they had lived in the same house five or more years, which is higher than the average for the city as a whole. The local workforce historically depended on the nearby factories for work. Now the vast majority of Beltway's working population is employed in low- and mid-level white or pink collar work. In 2000, 33% of the workforce had "sales and office" occupations, 19% had "service occupations," 21% were managers and professionals, 17% were employed in "production, transportation and material moving," and 9% had jobs in "construction, extraction and maintenance" operations. The decline in the number of blue-collar workers is demonstrated by the fact that only around one-quarter of the workforce is in traditional blue-collar employment. The employment data includes a fifth who were employed by the City of Chicago. The large number of city workers in Beltway is because Chicago has an ordinance that prohibits them (i.e., city hall, streets and sanitation, police, firefighters, and park district employees) from living outside the city limits. Thus, Beltway is home to many city employees, mostly to police officers and firefighters. Median family income in 1999 was about \$53,000 (higher than the city average of \$42,724), and the poverty level is low in Beltway, with only about 1 in 20 residents at or below the poverty level.

Beltway is a low crime neighborhood. Compared to other Chicago neighborhoods, the area does not have a great deal of crime. For example, the index crime rate in Beltway in 1997 and 1998 was approximately 2,300 and 2,500 per 100,000 of the population, which compares to citywide figures of 9,360 and 6,921 per 100,000 over the same period. The three largest crimes in the neighborhood are theft, burglary, and auto theft. During the period of the fieldwork there was a total of only five homicides in Beltway, an average of one per year.

Overall then, Beltway is a homogeneous, residentially stable neighborhood with an above-average level of income and a below-average level of crime. Beltwayites work in mostly low- and mid-level, white or pink collar occupations, and they tend to be homeowners. All in all, Beltway seems to be a typical white working-to-lower-middle-class neighborhood in a large city. In what follows, I will briefly describe the social organization of Beltway and then detail the case studies of the problem-solving group, the Beltway Night Patrol, and, the Court Advocacy Program.

THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF BELTWAY

Sampson (1997) has argued that, instead of asking how socially organized a neighborhood is, we should ask the question: organized for what? To that end, my discussion of the social organization structure of Beltway centers around what this organizational structure supplies in terms of informal social control. I will focus on the community-level structural variables, the institutional structure of the neighborhood, and the density and availability of public resources in Beltway. This discussion is cast in terms of the history of activism in Beltway to help distinguish the new parochialism from previous organizational forms.

In terms of the Shaw and McKay (1942) indicators of disorganization, Beltway appears to be a textbook example of a socially organized neighborhood. Poverty levels are low, the neighborhood is racially and ethnically homogeneous, and there is a high degree of residential stability. However, social organization is more dynamic than a set of static indicators (Sampson 1997; Venkatesh 1997). Beltway also has a large number of local institutions. For example, the Beltway Civic League is a local organization that has existed since 1960, and the area is also served by the Beltway Business Association, the PTA, two park advisory councils, church boards, the Beltway branch of the Chicago Public Library, and four local school councils, all of which are active within the neighborhood. However, the large number of groups tells only part of the story of social organization in Beltway. These community groups benefit from the activities of two local aldermen who are connected to powerful ward machines and to Mayor Richard M. Daley, and local groups can also call upon area residents who are city workers in the Chicago Police Department, Chicago Streets and Sanitation, the Chicago Fire Department, and the Chicago Park District. In addition, a U.S. congressman lives in a nearby neighborhood and serves as one of the ward's Democratic committeemen.¹³ The Democratic committeeman for the neighborhood's Second Ward is a long-time state representative. Community activists often call on the assistance of the aldermen, a friend in the police department, or the congressman for assistance on a project. For example, the former commander of the local police district, Henry Rusnak, talked about how well the local political machine worked, and how he utilized the aldermen in his area in order to get things done.

¹³ The committeeman is one of the most important positions in the ward organization. The committeeman is responsible for picking and choosing who will serve as the Democratic Committee's nominee for alderman and who will serve as precinct captain. Unlike the alderman, the committeeman is not elected by the people. The ward committee selects the committeeman. Thus, Democratic committeemen in Chicago are very powerful, since they directly influence the makeup of the ward organization.

Now over in Beltway you have two aldermen, young men, both smart. Now if I have a problem that I need their help getting done, like it would take me forever to do it through the channels downtown, I just call 'em. Once I have to get some new lights put in at Fairfield Park, there's a lot of gang activity there and they figured that if there were more lights there. If it was lit up more at night, then the problem would go away. Now if I call up the electric company department and say that one of my officers has a bright idea [*sic*], they'll just sit on it and do it whenever. Now I call up [the alderman] and say can you get this done for me, he says "sure in about three or four days." And it's done, [with] no fuss. That's the way it should be.

Rusnak's comments demonstrate how formal networks in Beltway can tap into the political structure of Chicago. Beltway residents who are skilled in utilizing these formal networks of social organization are more likely to secure goods and services for the neighborhood. It is important to note that there is a good deal of access to public resources available to Beltway residents and that it is activated in order to get things done for the neighborhood. For example, the Beltway Civic League has a rich tradition of promoting local issues. Specifically, the league has used its connections to the ward system to fight a number of zoning issues, and it helped secure a new library for the neighborhood and agitated for the demolition of a vacant "white elephant" adjacent to Beltway. Similarly, individual community members can call on their precinct captain to get an alderman's assistance with permits for a home conversion or with sponsorship for an annual block party.

The activities that I later describe as the new parochialism have their roots, then, in the type of activism that has been practiced in Beltway for several generations. The new parochialism is different from previous forms of social organization in Beltway because in large part it exists independently of the ward system,¹⁴ and its primary point of contact with the public sphere is the police department. The fact that the new parochialism is not subsumed under the ward system marks it as a new hybrid form of organization that is focused on internal neighborhood problems but that exists independently of the local political structures.

In summary, Beltway is socially organized in terms of community-level structural characteristics, institutional density, and the ease with which residents can secure goods from the public sphere. It is the availability of and the willingness to access these resources that provides the key to

¹⁴ The Beltway examples of the new parochialism differ from the case study detailed by Guterbock (1980) in that the alderman is not an active participant in the voluntary organizations of the Beltway problem-solving group and Beltway Night Patrol. The alderman and the ward to serve as conduits for city services, but remain largely outside the organization.

answering the question: organized for what? In the case of Beltway, social organization must preclude effective informal social control. The successful articulation of private, parochial, and public spheres of control necessitates, at the very least, a number of local institutions and a mechanism to procure goods and services from outside the neighborhood. The case studies of the problem-solving group, the BNP, and the Court Advocacy Program illustrate the informal social control process in the neighborhood. Before going on to detail the case studies, I will describe the general picture of informal social control in Beltway.

INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL IN BELTWAY: THE DIMINISHING ROLE OF PRIVATE AND TRADITIONALLY PAROCHIAL FORMS OF CONTROL

Generally, informal social control in Beltway is a complex process. Residents engage in a variety of behaviors designed to control disorder, deviance, and crime. In terms of the systemic model, supervision and intervention do take place in Beltway but only in specific situations. The main point to note is that supervision is age graded: children up to the teenage years receive the vast majority of supervision, while teenagers are left to their own devices in many cases.¹⁵ For example, at the numerous block parties that punctuate the summer in Beltway, young children are collectively supervised as they bounce on jumping jacks, play Frisbee in the street, or swim in a neighbor's pool. The supervision is expected and unconscious. The nearest parent or adult usually takes care of a group of children. The same collective supervision is also evident at the many school-sponsored activities: concerts, sports events, or picnics are staffed by parents and teachers who keep a watchful eye on the children. The school activities tend to be more structured than block parties, with each adult given specific responsibilities. However, in less-structured activities the amount of collective supervision is more sporadic and irregular. Importantly, the day-to-day supervision of teens is rarely a collective enterprise. People tend not to stand on street corners, and many front stoops

¹⁵ James Coleman's work (see, e.g., 1971) has illustrated that teenagers in the United States have always enjoyed at least a modicum of freedom, and so the fact that Beltway teens are relatively unsupervised is unremarkable. What is important to note is that this dearth of supervision takes place at a time when changes in U.S. society that impact the lives of many teens make this a more portentous development. The most notable changes include rising juvenile crime rates, especially violent crime (see, e.g., Cook and Laub 1998), a proliferation of handguns (Fagan and Wilkinson 1998), and violence in urban schools (Heaviside et al. 1998), all of which takes place against a backdrop of fundamental changes in the transition from adolescence to adulthood (Furstenberg 2000)

and porches remain uninhabited during the summer months. In the 40 in-depth interviews that I conducted with members of the local watch group and other neighborhood activists, I asked the respondents, "If you witnessed a group of teens misbehaving, what would you do?" Thirty-six of the 40 respondents (90%) said that they would call the police rather than take care of it themselves. The sample is not representative of the neighborhood as a whole, but it would seem that Beltwayites are more likely to call 911 than to intervene personally. When asked if people in Beltway engage in collective supervision, Lydia Donovan, a longtime resident and local activist, replies:

Yes and no. They usually have a group of kids that they know through friendship ties of their own children, and then if they are the kind of house where the kids come over, then they would supervise in that situation. Sometimes if people are out on the street they may choose to comment depending on the situation. Nobody wants to deal with teens, that's where everybody drops out. They don't want to deal with teens at all. I think part of it is an age perception, a single old adult does not want to go up against a crowd of youth.

For most Beltway residents, then, informal social control consists of age-graded collective supervision in familial and personal networks. Teens are largely unsupervised either by family or by the community at large, except where they are involved with organized activities sponsored by the school or the park. Generally, there is a diminished role for private and traditionally parochial forms of control in Beltway,¹⁶ and, specifically with respect to the collective supervision of teenagers, many residents "don't want to deal with teens" because they fear them.

The diminution of private and traditionally parochial forms of informal control in Beltway has important consequences for the neighborhood. In particular, the lack of supervision of teens has coincided with a rise in the amount of gang activity in Beltway. Over the course of the fieldwork the number of gangs with active members in the neighborhood grew from one in 1993 to five in 1998.¹⁷ While a good deal of gang activity in Beltway

¹⁶ As Taylor (2002, p. 784) notes, "At the core of the parochial level of systemic control is residents' perceived and actual willingness to intervene." Beltway residents are mostly unwilling to supervise area youth or directly intervene when there is trouble, which are the bulwarks of traditional parochial control.

¹⁷ The information on local gangs was obtained from the local police department's gang officers, from the local beat officers, and from young people in the neighborhood. There are, of course, different types of gang and indeed different levels of involvement. For the present purposes, all gangs referred to have at least five active members in the neighborhood who engage in illegal gang activities, such as violence or drug dealing. Gangs also have identifiable names and colors associated with them, and have engaged in some form of gang tagging: in Beltway. Tagging is the spray painting of graffiti.

is of a "wannabe" (Monti 1994) variety, there have been some incidents of serious violence. Specifically, the double homicide of two local teenage girls by area gang members alerted residents to the problems of unsupervised youths.

THE POWELL-HARVEY MURDERS: A WAKE-UP CALL

In 1995, two 13-year-old girls from Beltway were shot and killed by five members of a local gang called the Knights. The girls, Melissa Harvey and Teresa Powell, were shot because they had been sitting in a van with three members of another gang, the Vikings, who had been vying for Beltway turf with the Knights. The double homicide had a profound effect on Beltway. First and foremost, it brought home the fact that Beltway was not immune to the dangers of youth gangs. Residents were faced with the evidence that these gangs were not nonwhite, poor youths from outside the neighborhood but youths homegrown on the perfectly manicured lawns and ordered blocks of bungalows.

While the danger signs of an increasing youth gang problem had been evident in the form of gang graffiti and a number of drive-by incidents,¹⁸ many residents ignored the problem until the Powell-Harvey killings. In the weeks following the murders, there were a number of well-attended meetings. Local activists and police officers urged residents to get involved with local community policing efforts and help eradicate the youth gang problem. For example, at a community policing beat meeting soon after the murders, Sergeant Henderson, a neighborhood relations officer, addressed residents on the issue.

I can see that this incident has polarized people. There's two ways people can react in a situation like this, one of them is fear, and that's no good. I think that something like this can make us all afraid, and what we have to do is get involved and do something. I'm involved with the neighborhood watches in the area. I live in this beat so I'm concerned about all of this. But there's ways that we can fight back. Neighborhood watch is one of those ways, and it's part of the problem-solving training. A number of local neighborhood watches have been very successful. You all know Victory

There are two main types of tagging. general tagging, where the tagger or graffiti artist "throws up" his or her specific tag or moniker, and gang tagging, where members of a gang paint slogans to mark their territory or to communicate messages to other gang members (see Phillips [1999] for a more detailed explanation of the meaning and significance of tagging). Typically, gang tagging will have specific letters and symbols that represent the particular gang throwing up the graffiti.

¹⁸ There were three drive-by shootings in the eastern part of Beltway from March 1994 through June 1995. Although only one person was actually hit in these drive-bys, all three were attributed to gang activity in the area.

Park? It's near here. Well they had problems that are much worse than here with the gangs. The folks over there got together and formed a neighborhood watch, and the crime has gone down over there.

The calls for action encountered resistance from some Beltway residents, who felt that ultimately the parents of gang members, the police, or the school should be made accountable for the gang problem. To many Beltwayites, gangs were not a community problem. Interestingly, it was formal agents of social control that were instrumental in stimulating the informal social control apparatus in Beltway. The Joint Community Police Training (JCPT) program, jointly run by the Chicago Police Department and the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, trained local residents in problem-solving techniques in Beltway in the early months of 1996, and a neighborhood watch group was formed in September of that year from the core members of the problem-solving group. The link between the watershed event of the Powell-Harvey murders and the formation of the problem-solving group and neighborhood watch is not lost on Jane Pratt, a longtime resident and founding member of both groups: "The problem solving [trainers]. I liked what they brought in and it seemed like exactly what we need in our area, to me like they were like a wake-up call. And that's what most people seem to need before they get involved, a wake-up call and the timing about everything was right, it was after the shooting of those girls."

PROBLEM SOLVING AND THE BELTWAY NIGHT PATROL: THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF THE PAROCHIAL AND PUBLIC LEVELS OF CONTROL

After the Powell-Harvey shootings, the Chicago Police Department decided to introduce problem-solving training into the neighborhood a full four months ahead of schedule. As Officer Sabatini, a local resident and problem-solving trainer, explained, "After those girls were killed, I pushed to bring in the JCPT early to the neighborhood. We felt that we had to get started solving the problems right away. It was a matter of urgency for us." The JCPT trainers held a number of training sessions at the Beltway Public Library and trained a local group of activists in the use of problem-solving techniques. The problem-solving group then assessed a number of local problems and settled on one that they would try to solve; namely, the disorder created by a local tavern. The tavern had become notorious for attracting drug users, alcoholics, and panhandlers, and locals frequently complained about the crime and disorder associated with the bar. The owner of the tavern was invited to a problem-solving meeting and, after a particularly heated exchange, he stormed out of the

meeting, yelling, "Prohibition didn't work." The owner was also at a number of subsequent meetings, but each time the Beltway problem-solving group tried to resolve the situation informally, he rejected the proposals and responded that he was being railroaded and singled out. It was at this stage that the group decided, after consulting with the JCPT trainers, to refer the matter to the liquor commissioner for the City of Chicago. The liquor commissioner had a series of meetings with representatives of the problem-solving group and the owner of the tavern, and the commissioner tried to broker a solution that would address the concerns of the Beltway residents. The owner failed to cooperate with the directives, and the commissioner told him that he should take the problems of the community seriously and admonished him: "Holding a liquor license is a big responsibility and you need to start taking this more seriously than you are. We appreciate that you are starting to recognize [the problems] and trying to work with the community, but you . . . need to do more, be more compliant."

When the owner of the tavern did not comply with the directives from the liquor commissioner, the Beltway group, in concert with one of the local aldermen and with the blessing of the commissioner, generated a petition for a referendum on the tavern's liquor license. The result of the ballot in November 1996 was overwhelmingly in favor of rescinding the license of the tavern, and, in late 1996, the bar was closed down, just seven months after the issue had first surfaced. The example of the problem-solving group at once illustrates the tenor of community action and the operation of the new parochialism in Beltway. The work of the problem-solving group is informal social control in that it is action undertaken by residents for self-regulation, but this action follows a more formal route than what we would normally think of as informal social control. The work of the members of the Beltway problem-solving group was facilitated in part by the JCPT trainers and local police officers who worked closely with them in the initial stages of their campaign. In addition, when informal mediation between the problem-solving group and the tavern owner breaks down, the group utilizes ties with the public sphere of control in the form of the city bureaucracy (the liquor commissioner and the local alderman) to expedite getting a referendum vote to take away the tavern's license. Kitty Kelly, a longtime resident and founding member of the problem-solving and neighborhood watch groups, details how the Beltway group solved the problem of the tavern:

We took the [tavern] problem that seemed to [create] the most concern among the people. So one girl was assigned to go the Liquor License Commission to find out if he had a license, [or] who had it. Someone else was supposed to write a letter to request that the owner of the bar come [to a

meeting] so we could talk to him. Then we researched how exactly we could shut him down and we researched any offenses he had against his liquor license in the past. So there was a lot of research done in the beginning. We were told [by the JCPT trainers] to kind of watch the situation [and] if we went by the location and there were a lot of drunks there we were to write that down. So [group members] went around and got a petition together and were able to close him down. We finally closed him down. The people of the precinct voted against him.

The problem-solving group thus utilizes formal channels to solve the problem of the tavern. Even the informal mediation takes place in bounded settings such as community meetings.

While the Beltway problem-solving group had been attempting to solve the problem of the tavern, the subject of having a neighborhood watch had been raised at a number of meetings, and, during August 1996, the Beltway group took their first steps toward forming a watch group. The Beltway Night Patrol had its inaugural meeting on October 2, having their stated purpose as

1. To promote neighborhood safety by patrolling the community and contacting police and proper authorities when action is required.
2. To assess community problems through the use of problem-solving techniques (Beltway Night Patrol Bylaws).

The night patrol began patrolling in mid-October 1996. The BNP has an elaborate set of bylaws, which govern the conduct of group members. For example, there is a probationary period for new members and while on patrol members of the BNP are forbidden to leave their car to get involved in challenging miscreants. The routine of the BNP is to have one or two cars patrolling the area and to call in problems by radio to a designated home base. These problems range from suspicious persons or, most often, curfew violators to city service requests for items such as malfunctioning streetlights or crooked stop signs. The home base person then relays calls either to the police or to the city services' 24-hour hotline. The rest of the time the two-person patrol (no one is allowed to patrol alone) trawls through the streets and alleys logging incidences of graffiti and watching for crimes in progress. Patrol volunteers use a logbook to note the graffiti that they encounter. After each weekend the BNP president reports all graffiti to the relevant source in order to have it removed. The local ward office will send out the graffiti-blasters truck to remove graffiti on residences and businesses, and, for graffiti on dumpsters in alleyways, the BNP president calls the sanitation companies that own the dumpsters.

In its first year, the BNP targeted graffiti in the neighborhood as one of their main priorities. As a neighborhood watch volunteer, I found that a large part of each patrol was taken up with logging graffiti, after which

there was a careful follow-up by the BNP president to make sure that the graffiti was removed. At each BNP monthly meeting there was a report on new graffiti in the area, and a number of BNP members became skilled at "reading" graffiti and could tell what gang messages, if any, were being communicated. Graffiti removal in Beltway during this period was swift and efficient. Most graffiti was removed in less than a week. A BNP member had also taken it upon herself to remove smaller graffiti from garage doors, stop signs, and dumpsters.¹⁹ She estimates that in her personal crusade she has removed over 200 pieces of graffiti. In addition, within the organization's first year, from October 1996 through October 1997, the BNP called in 698 separate incidences of graffiti. Along with logging graffiti and requesting city services, the BNP also coordinates local representatives for the Court Advocacy Program, which is a part of CAPS. In this program, volunteers attend court cases of offenders who have committed crimes of particular interest to neighborhood residents.

LETTING THE JUDGE KNOW THAT THE COMMUNITY CARES: COURT ACTIVISM AND THE COURT ADVOCACY PROGRAM

The tactic of getting a group of people to go to court to "let the judge know that the community cares" is one that historically has been used to great effect in Beltway and actually predates the Court Advocacy Program. In 1994, a case involving a local boy, Orlando Santos, who was apprehended while scrawling graffiti on a local school, was concluded successfully after three hearings that were attended by an average of a dozen local residents. Concerned that the juvenile courts might be too lenient on Santos because he was a first-time offender, school principal Jean Sidwell called on parents and the school's neighbors to attend all the court dates in order "to put pressure on the judge" and demonstrate that the community viewed Santos's actions as a serious assault against the neighborhood and the school.

Another case in which residents lobbied the courts concerned a drive-by shooting that injured a local gang member near Leahy Park in the eastern part of Beltway. The perpetrator was caught and charged with simple battery. Maria Causio, a local resident, organized a petition that she presented to the judge in the case. She explained, "The slap on the wrist is an invitation for more firearm use in our area. We need stiffer penalties to protect our community and the innocent bystanders. The shooting was just a few blocks from the school where our kids go!" Or-

¹⁹ This member of the BNP was so zealous in her removal of graffiti that the local beat officers had to issue her a warning because she was removing graffiti from mailboxes. It is a federal crime to tamper with mailboxes.

ganizing the petition about the simple battery charge, which is a misdemeanor, resulted in the charge being upgraded to aggravated battery, a felony. Causio remarked that the change in the charge had been made "after a lot of us went down there to the court and showed the judge that we were paying attention." The charge was actually upgraded by the prosecutor in the case, who was persuaded by the petition and show of support by Beltway residents.

CAPS initiated the Court Advocacy Program in 1996 to coordinate community action in the courts. This description of the program comes from a police department brochure:

Each of the 25 police districts has a Court Advocacy Subcommittee. With input gathered at beat meetings or from other members of the community, the Court Advocacy Subcommittees, working with the Police Department, identify and track cases of interest to the community. Cases can range from violent crimes, such as murder or rape, to "quality of life" cases, such as drug dealing and public drinking, abandoned buildings and negligent landlords, and problem liquor establishments. Volunteers then attend court dates associated with those cases. Court Advocacy Subcommittees play an important role in advancing the goals of making our neighborhoods safer. First, volunteers provide support for victims and witnesses who may be hesitant to testify in court. The presence of Court Advocacy volunteers from their community can make the difference in whether a victim or witness decides to appear in court. Second, the presence of Court Advocacy *volunteers sends a strong message to the defendant, the judge and all other interested parties in the criminal justice system: the community cares about the outcome of these cases and is willing to devote its time and energies to monitoring the workings of the judicial system.* (Emphasis added.)

The Court Advocacy Program organized a delegation from Beltway when the cases of the gang members accused of killing Teresa Powell and Melissa Harvey came to trial in July and August 1997. The BNP team leader, Kitty Kelly, coordinated with the district-court advocacy subcommittee and distributed buttons with "Court Advocate" printed on them. The buttons are worn in court to identify "concerned members of the community."

For the most part the Court Advocacy Program volunteers tend to be retirees, who, in the words of BNP member Marcia Moran, "just have more time to go to court, day in and day out. I would love to go to all of the cases about local issues but I cannot take all that many days off work." In certain cases, Beltway residents will take off work to go to court. In the aforementioned Orlando Santos case, four of the Beltway delegation took days off or swapped shifts with coworkers to attend the hearings. Court advocates, in a similar fashion to the Beltway problem-

solving group, engage in informal social control in a bounded and secure setting.

There are other strategies that Beltway residents utilize to informally control their neighborhood. These strategies include using phone trees for calling 911, painting house numbers on garages in alleys to help identify residences, and utilizing the local zoning board to fight unwanted buildings or licensed premises. These strategies, along with those employed in the case studies of the problem-solving group, the BNP, and the Court Advocacy Program, are deployed at the parochial level of control and are coproduced by Beltway residents and actors from the public sphere of control.

The data from the case studies illustrates the interdependence of the parochial and public levels of control in Beltway. The examples are neither wholly parochial nor public forms of control. The neighborhood groups such as the BNP and the problem-solving group are parochial groups but, in order for informal social control strategies to be effective, they engage public agents of control, the liquor commissioner, judges, or aldermen, and they procure goods and services from the public arena. Indeed, public agents of control help establish and enable some of the neighborhood groups in the first place—for example, the JCPT trainers who equip residents with strategies for problem solving. Taken together, these strategies form what I call the new parochialism, a new parochial order of control that demonstrates the diminishing significance of private and traditionally parochial forms of control and the increasing interdependence of parochial and public forms of control. In the remaining sections I will situate the new parochialism, explain why it is “new,” and assess the theoretical and empirical implications of the Beltway case.

DISCUSSION: THE NEW PAROCHIALISM

The data from Beltway tell us a great deal about the process of informal social control, and there are two main findings. First, the roles of private and what we have traditionally known as parochial forms of informal social control are much smaller than has been assumed (Bursik and Grasmick 1993). Supervision and intervention in disputes is age graded and confined for the most part to familial and personal networks, and there is a dearth of collective supervision and intervention in disputes. Collective supervision of neighborhood youth, and of teens in particular, is sporadic. The second major finding is that there is a strong interplay between the parochial and public levels of control. Far from being independent, the two levels seem dependent on each other in Beltway and the interplay between them gives shape to the strategies of informal social

control practiced in Beltway. It is the partnership between parochial and public levels of social control that gives rise to the new parochialism. This new parochialism owes its existence in part to the diminished role of private and traditionally parochial forms of social control. For example, in Beltway after the double homicide the strategies of informal social control that took shape were prompted by JCPT trainers and local police officers, and the action undertaken for self-regulation is a hybrid of parochial and public forms of control.

The practices of informal social control in Beltway are now based mainly around problem solving, neighborhood watch, court advocacy, and phone trees. Certainly, these strategies are informal social control in that the residents of Beltway enact them to engage in self-regulation, but they are coproductions of Beltway residents and actors from formal agencies, such as police officers, problem-solving trainers, aldermen, and city bureaucrats. The new type of parochial control is certainly more formal than the hand-to-hand immediacy of collective supervision and intervention. Beltway residents now have a buffer between themselves and teens. They can call 911 to report miscreant teens, they can monitor local wrongdoers through court advocacy, and they can avail themselves of the liquor commissioner when they have a problem with a local tavern. The new parochialism thus allows for a more formalized and, for some residents, a more secure type of activism.

Why in essence is this a *new* parochialism? It is certainly accurate to say that residents in neighborhoods that resemble Beltway, especially white ethnic groups in Chicago, have always used ties to the public sphere to solve their problems. However, the partnerships in Beltway between parochial and public agents of control that were described in the case studies are formed specifically to enable Beltwayites to engage in self-regulation, a process that by its very nature has always been internal to the neighborhood. It is not as if Beltway residents have outsourced the control of crime and disorder; rather, a new hybrid organization for self-regulation has arisen in response to local, citywide, and national changes.

The argument that the Beltway case study presents a new hybrid form of informal social control necessitates examining the assumption that there was a great deal of traditional informal social control in the past both in Beltway and, more generally, in places similar to Beltway. Suttles's (1968) depiction of the segmented social order illustrated the strength of localized control while identifying the limitations faced by neighborhoods lacking strong political ties. More important for the current argument is the testimony of Beltway residents, both those that have lived in the neighborhood for several decades and those who, while they are more recent arrivals, *previously* lived in neighborhoods similar to Beltway. In the in-depth interviews, more than 90% of the residents and activists stated that

there had been a significant change in terms of what people do to control crime and disorder in the neighborhood. Residents expressed this change in terms of a discourse that emphasized that in the past people were available and willing to intervene if someone, especially a local youth, was misbehaving. The type of intervention that many residents say was commonplace no longer takes place. For longtime residents such as Brendan Sheridan, part of the reason is that parents are defensive about the misdeeds of their children and this leads to a reticence to intervene, because there is no agreement on how social control should be exercised:

In days gone by, if you got in trouble in school and then when you got home you get in trouble for getting in trouble in school. It would be double trouble. The same way with the neighborhood. If Mrs. Jones down the block or Mr. Jones down the block caught you doing something he'd kick your butt and send you home. Then he'd tell your dad and your dad would kick your butt. Now, both in the neighborhood and in the schools, if the teacher complains about you or the neighbor complains about you and tells your dad, your dad goes and complains to the teacher and tells the neighbor to mind his own business, that "my little Johnny isn't like that."

Other residents such as Jane Schubert, a lifelong Beltway resident, contextualize the change in terms of general lack of supervision of children: "A lot of these kids today are left home alone or they're left with sitters that don't care or that are actually doing things that they shouldn't be doing with them. So, how can you control that when people are trying to work two jobs, both parents are trying to work and the kids are not getting the guidance that they need? How do you change that, how does society change it and go back to having people at home with their kids that really care about them?" Whatever the predominant reason given by the residents, defensive or absent parents, there is a sense that there is much less supervision and intervention in Beltway now than there was when adult residents themselves were growing up. The frequency with which the discourse of diminished supervision and intervention was expressed would seem to go beyond simply viewing the past through rose-tinted spectacles. In fact, it is worth examining the changes that seem to give rise to new parochial forms of control.

Historical Context of the New Parochialism

The historical context in which the new parochialism has been forged is crucial to understanding its existence. In particular, a number of trends set the stage for the new parochialism. First, the trend of increasing numbers of women joining the labor force, either because they wish to supplement or maintain family income, in the case of many working- and

middle-class women, or because they are coming off welfare rolls, in the case of many poor women, is one that impacts every neighborhood. The recent *Report on the American Workforce* (U.S. Department of Labor 1999) illustrates how the labor-force participation of "women has risen sharply from 41.6% in 1968 to 59.8% in 1998" (p. 41). Married women are working or looking for work in greater numbers, and the proportion of women with children under three in the labor force rose from 23% in 1969 to 63% in 1998 (p. 96). In tandem with the trend of an increasing proportion of women entering the workforce is the fact that the percentage of married women working full-time doubled between 1969 and 1998. While the average weekly hours worked by women has since 1969 remained steady over time, the average for married couples as a unit increased by about 14 hours per week from 1969 to 1998 (p. 100). This latter increase occurred for married couples with and without children, and couples with children under six years old experienced the largest increase. Put simply, in terms of what Cohen and Felson (1979) call routine activities, for many parents there has been a change in routine activities that has taken them away from the household to the workplace,²⁰ which, in turn, leaves less time for home-based activities. The implication of these trends is that parents have less time to devote to basic parental responsibilities, let alone volunteer activities. This dramatic change in routine activities impacts many important neighborhood processes, including informal social control. More two-parent families now have both parents working and putting in longer hours on the job, and for many there is simply not enough time to collectively supervise and socialize neighborhood youth.²¹

In Beltway it is not simply that women are working; labor force participation for Beltway women has steadily increased from a little over 40% in 1960 to close to 60% in 1990, but additionally mothers of children under 18 years of age in the neighborhood have increasingly joined the labor force. For example, labor force participation for married women with children under six doubled from one-fifth to two-fifths between 1970 and 1980, and by 1990 over half of children under six living with both

²⁰ It should be noted that during this time an increasing number of people work from home or telecommute. However, the proportion is sufficiently small that it does not detract from the overall argument that more time spent working means less time available for parenting, volunteering, and informal social control.

²¹ Perhaps the major reason that there are more dual-earner couples in Beltway and that people are working longer hours is that in real terms income has declined for most Beltway residents. When we adjust median household income to 1996 dollars, we can see that median household income declined from almost \$50,000 in 1970 to just over \$40,000 in 1990. Put simply, Beltway residents have had to work more and for longer to maintain their income levels. See Parcel and Menaghan (1994) for a more complete discussion of the effects that parents' jobs have on children

parents had both parents in the labor force. The labor force participation for married women with husband present also increased between 1970 and 1980, and in 1990 over two-thirds of children in Beltway between 6 and 17 years old who lived with both parents had both parents in the labor force. The large proportion of dual-earner families with children under 18 where both parents work has considerable implications for informal social control. For example, Ruth Breslau, a lifelong resident, explains how she views the impact of dual-earner families on youth gang formation. "The reason why the gang activity has kind of exploded [is] that both parents are not home. Mom is working now, which has taken [an] adult [away]. It used to be when I was a young girl there was moms home on the block. God forbid you did something wrong, you were gonna hear it not only from that mom who caught you doing it, but she would tell your mother." The economic imperatives that compel increased labor force participation are not the province alone of two-parent households; one can speculate that the need to go out to work is even greater for single parents. However, the net effect in terms of supervision of youth is, to use Cohen and Felson's (1979) phrase, "the absence of capable guardians."

A second national trend that impacted Beltway and made the new parochialism possible was the rising rate of juvenile crime, especially violent crime, that occurred in the latter half of the 1980s and continued into the early 1990s, peaking in 1993 (see Cook and Laub 1998, 2002; Fox 1996). Much of the violence was associated with youth gangs and the illicit drug trade. By the mid-1990s Chicago was reputed to have about 130 youth gangs with an estimated 36,000 members (Block et al. 1996; Block and Block 1993; Skogan et al. 1999). More important, Skogan and his colleagues (1999) report that the Chicagoans they surveyed in 1996 said that crime was by far the city's most important problem. While in Beltway the gang problem was not as severe as in other parts of the city, the perception among Beltwayites in the mid-1990s was that if the problem was left unchecked, gang crime could get significantly worse. One of the specific elements of this discourse in Beltway was an avowed fear of youth with guns. The concerns and fears of residents in response to the rising rates of youth crime and the possibility that teens were carrying guns also affect the tenor of internal community controls.

The increasing participation of women (especially mothers of children under 18) in the workforce and trends in youth crime can also be discerned at the national and metropolitan level. In Chicago, a larger proportion of women, especially those with children, were in the labor force in the

1990s than at any time since World War II,²² and youth violence and gang violence in particular peaked nationally and locally in the early to mid 1990s (Cook and Laub 1998, 2002). Changes internal to the city were also reshaping Chicago.

The 1990s saw the Latino population in Chicago increase from 19% to 26% of the total population; in real terms over three-quarters of a million Chicago residents are Latinos. As the Latino population, which is predominantly Mexican in origin, increased in many neighborhoods, especially on Chicago's south and southwest sides, Latinos began to displace not only whites but also African-Americans. Latinos, too, were increasingly populating Beltway; they went from being one-tenth of the population in 1990 to one-fifth in 2000. The arrival of Latinos in large numbers was a cause of concern for some Beltway residents.²³ However, the Latinos that settled in Beltway were primarily middle-class second- and third-generation Mexican Americans and Puerto Ricans for whom Beltway has been a step-up neighborhood; they own their own homes and share many of the values and practices of their white neighbors.²⁴ Latinos in Beltway in the 1990s participated in civic groups, and many volunteered their time for the neighborhood watch and problem-solving groups. However, the ethnic turnover and increasing heterogeneity of Beltway does have implications for the strength of local social ties. Residential mobility alone can weaken social ties, because if people are moving in and out it is hard to get to know your neighbors, but when this process is combined with heterogeneity the potential for what we have traditionally thought of as informal social control is diminished.

The advent of the CAPS program in Chicago is perhaps the development that most directly impacts the new parochialism. CAPS and its problem-solving component were instituted in the 1990s as a response to the rising crime rates, and as an attempt to allay citizens' fears and enable them to become involved in controlling crime and disorder in their neighborhoods. The fact that the CAPS program focused on changing the whole policing model in Chicago over time, and was not an experiment carried out in one or two districts, underscores its potential as a transforming agent. The CAPS focus on stimulating local problem-solving efforts and

²² In 1996, 55.6% of adult women in Chicago were in the civilian labor force (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).

²³ For example, a common discourse centering on Latinos in Beltway was that "they were bringing the gangs with them from the old neighborhood." This was used to explain the increase in gang activity that occurred in the neighborhood in the early 1990s. While there were some Latino gang members, the vast majority of local gang members were white.

²⁴ The vast majority of the Latinos in Beltway are Catholic, and many take an active role in both neighborhood parishes.

on encouraging citizen participation provides a needed focus and a formal procedure for communities concerned with regulating crime and disorder.

The confluence of increasing labor force participation of women, rising rates of youth crime and fear of youth gangs, changing neighborhoods, and a new brand of policing provide the backdrop against which the new parochialism emerges. Certainly in Beltway the Powell-Harvey murders are the local stimulus for action, but the particular brand of action is inflected by the wider social and historical context. The new parochialism is occasioned by developments that render what we have traditionally known as parochial control difficult to enact. If people are not around to supervise or are afraid to intervene because they fear teens or don't really know their neighbors, then the new parochialism is a viable and attractive option in terms of informal social control.

Implications of the New Parochialism

In terms of informal social control theory, I would argue that the systemic model, which has been very influential, comes into question given the ethnographic data from Beltway. It would seem that Warner and Rountree (1997) are correct to say that strong social ties, the staple of the systemic model, are not the keys to the process of informal social control. Rather, being closely tied is not a prerequisite for successful informal social control. In concrete terms, the practices of informal social control in Beltway exist in spite of the diminished role of private and traditionally parochial forms of control, both of which are dependent on close ties. Beltway residents who are involved with problem solving or neighborhood watch bemoan the fact that not everybody gets involved or knows each other in the neighborhood.²⁵ Moreover, they attest to the fact that many parents simply do not have the time to supervise children. For example, Carla Wisneski, a longtime resident and member of the BNP notes,

I think everybody used to watch out for everybody else's kid and nowadays you can't do that. People get very defensive if you yell at a kid who's running in the store. And they get so defensive cause they know they're not doing their job and if I happen to say something to some kid in the store it has nothing to do with how I feel about their parents or their parents aren't watching over them. I know you can't do it every second. But you shouldn't get upset when someone else tries to watch out for the child. You need to have an authority figure around the corner. [When I was young] you couldn't do anything, somebody would be there to break up a fight. Now the kids are on their own and I think they have too much freedom, too much time on their hands and they make too many decisions on their

²⁵ In extended interviews the themes of lack of involvement in neighborhood groups and lack of parental supervision were addressed by 77% and 87% of those interviewed.

own. That's another problem. How do you have one parent stay home when you have two car payments and a mortgage?

Similarly, Bernadette Boniek remarks,

I think parents today, [families with] two parents, both parents have to work today just to exist in a halfway decent life. I think children have too much time on their own, too much time to fantasize and dream up things to do. They don't have that guidance of a mother at home with the cookies, the warm bread, and that was me, I was guilty. I was a stay-at-home mom. [I] was always there. Nothing took place in my house because mom didn't go anywhere. But I think the fact that both parents have to work, and when they come home, they're tired, and it's just like "go on out will you, I need to rest, I'm exhausted." Parents don't do enough activities with their children.

Dual-earner families and the unwillingness of residents, in particular seniors, to "deal with teens" has created a situation where the usual patterns of informal social control, supervision and intervention, have been supplanted and replaced by a set of more structured and formalized practices. For example, older residents in Beltway may be unwilling to supervise young people or confront them when they witness wrongdoing, but they will get involved with the Court Advocacy Program. Lydia Donovan explains why she thinks seniors do not pick up the slack with regard to informal social control, "They don't want to be bothered in the sense that either (a) they think they've done their community efforts and they're tired of that, or (b) they could be physically afraid of the situation that they see overwhelming them. And, I mean, whether it's a gang situation or theft or drugs or any of that, if they feel physically intimidated about it, they are not going to get involved. Actually, it's the mental intimidation even more than a physical intimidation."

Thus, on a theoretical level we may need to rethink the systemic model and examine how neighborhoods where people are not closely tied engage in informal social control. Loose ties can be efficacious, but effective control may depend on the strength of local institutions or the ease with which partnerships can be formed between parochial and public levels of control. Some of the recent studies of collective efficacy (Morenoff, Raudenbush, and Sampson 2001; Sampson et al. 1997) and social capital (Sampson et al. 1999) offer insights as to how we may go beyond the systemic model. Neighborhoods that are not characterized by dense social ties may be capable of exercising effective control over crime and disorder because of the ease with which they can avail themselves of political and institutional resources outside the neighborhood. For example, neighborhoods that can use ties with politicians, police, judiciary, and city bureaucracy to help keep their area free from crime and disorder should

have an easier time exercising effective social control. The new parochialism in Beltway suggests the central importance of partnerships between parochial and public actors for effective social control. Areas that can use resources such as the JCPT,²⁶ and engage in problem-solving efforts to control crime and disorder, should be able to exercise effective informal social control regardless of the density of social ties within the neighborhood. In terms of the Hunter (1985) typology, then, effective control can occur where there is not a perfect articulation between the private, parochial, and public level of control. An effective partnership between parochial and public spheres, for example, can offset deficiencies at the private level.

The Beltway case also speaks to more general issues of civic engagement. It has not been my intent to weigh in on the debate about civic engagement and whether it is declining (see, e.g., Lappe and Du Bois 1997; Norris 1996; Putnam 1993, 1995).²⁷ However, the Beltway data does showcase civic engagement in action and as such it does tell us a little about the phenomenon in the latter part of the 1990s. The restrictions on time for volunteering that Putnam (2000) talks about in his most recent work, and the diminishing capacity of middle-class women (long the stalwart volunteers) to allocate time to civic engagement because of their increased involvement in the labor force, may go some way toward explaining the new parochialism in Beltway. For example, about three-quarters of the local residents involved in the problem-solving group and the BNP are women, and almost all of these women either work in full-time or part-time employment. Their time is precious, and, consequently, their activism must be focused and have identifiable outcomes. The strategies of the new parochialism then may take root because they are co-produced by local residents and actors from the public sphere and, as such, local activists are not wholly responsible for their initiation and implementation. Moreover, time is used efficiently when tasks are laid out in advance and there is a definite division of labor. Thus, even those residents who are pressed for time can volunteer when there is a framework that facilitates efficient involvement.

²⁶ For a more detailed discussion of how different types of neighborhood engage problem solving under CAPS, see Skogan et al (1999).

²⁷ Much of the debate focused specifically on social capital, defined by Putnam (1995, p. 67) as features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit. For example, Norris (1996) takes issue with Putnam's assertion that television is one of the causes of declining civic engagement and political participation. Lappe and Du Bois (1997) argue that Putnam's focus on voluntary activity alone ignores arenas of participation in the workplace and in schools, and that increasingly there are many possible sources for activism.

Of course, the people that volunteer are still in the minority and among those that do give up their time, a core group undertakes a disproportionate amount of the work. However, the new parochialism is attractive in part because it can fit into the hectic schedule of women such as Lydia Donovan, Carla Wisneski, and Kitty Kelly, who all remarked that even though they work full-time, allocating five or six hours a month to volunteer with the BNP is not a hardship. The bounded nature of the new parochialism, compared to the traditional parochial activity of ongoing supervision for example, makes it an attractive option for many residents. One of the central theses of Putnam's (2000) work is that while traditional forms of civic engagement may indeed be declining, alternative avenues of volunteerism and civic participation may be opening up. Certainly the new parochialism in Beltway would seem to mirror that particular finding.

The new parochialism also has implications for community-policing initiatives. The main strategies of the new parochialism in Beltway were created at the behest of the CAPS program in Chicago. On a purely practical basis, the strategies and campaigns of the problem-solving group and the BNP have yielded some positive results—the closing of the disorderly tavern and the reduction of graffiti in the neighborhood. Some of the other initiatives have less tangible outcomes. For example, it is not altogether clear what effect, if any, the Court Advocacy Program or the painting of house numbers on garage doors has on crime and disorder.²⁸ However, the finding that actors from the public sphere of control facilitate the initiatives that Beltway residents undertake provides evidence for the possible success of new parochialism partnerships within a community-policing model.²⁹ The new parochialism is not about applying the same strategy to solve the same problems in every neighborhood. If anything, the approach of equipping interested citizens with the wherewithal to solve problems for themselves is adaptable across neighborhood context precisely because the problem-solving skills can be molded to suit the exigencies of each particular situation. Given the dexterity of the approach, it is important to note that neighborhoods that have less access

²⁸ Of course, not every action has the result of reducing crime. It may well be important for people to feel involved, as in the Court Advocacy Program, or to feel more secure, as when they paint house numbers on their garage doors. Such intangible benefits are vitally important for individual and civic well-being.

²⁹ The concept of community policing used here is meant to mean all policing approaches that seek to involve the citizenry in some way in the overall goal of maintaining order (see Fielding 1995 for a more thorough discussion). The variants of community policing are as plentiful as the departments that employ it, either wholly or in part, but in general, it stands opposed to the professional model of policing. The professional model holds that police are the only people who should deal with crime and disorder. Even as variants of community policing differ, so, too, does the willingness on the part of officers to put the ideals into practice (see Skogan and Hartnett 1997).

to public-sphere goods and services, or whose citizens lack experience in procuring such amenities, may have a harder time achieving success. However, even for residents in impoverished and high-crime neighborhoods the new parochialism with its brand of specific, secure, and bounded activism may be a model with which to deploy meaningful community-police partnerships.³⁰ While it would be naive not to recognize the historically privileged position of whites, especially the middle class, with respect to being able to secure public goods for themselves and their communities, I would contend that the current sociopolitical landscape in Chicago dilutes this position of privilege somewhat, especially with respect to the new parochialism. There is no longer a white hegemony in the City Council, and Mayor Richard M. Daley's power base is maintained by coalitions he has formed with African-American and Latino politicians and ward organizations. And, perhaps more important, the CAPS program and the problem-solving initiatives therein are extant in all city neighborhoods.

Building on the latter point, a final implication of the new parochialism is with respect to policy on community control of crime. The new parochialism demonstrates how successful partnerships to combat crime and disorder are forged between parochial and public agents of control. The semiformal organization of initiatives such as the problem-solving group and the BNP suggest a possible blueprint for future community-policing and crime-prevention initiatives. At the very least, the Beltway case study illustrates what works in terms of the CAPS program for their neighborhood (see Skogan et al. [1999] for a more detailed discussion of police and community problem solving in other Chicago neighborhoods). Perhaps similar strategies can be employed in other cities to good effect. Further, the existence of the new parochialism provides firsthand evidence of civic engagement in action and, at the micro level, bears out Robert Putnam's (2000) argument that civic engagement may not simply be on the wane. For many Americans the nature of engagement itself may be changing, and future policies aimed at stimulating civic engagement should take into account the fact that many people have limited time to

³⁰ Skogan and Hartnett (1997) report that beat meetings were well-attended in African-American beats, even ones that were high crime, although attendance in Latino beats was not as high. While Venkatesh (2000) does not talk about beat meetings or the CAPS program, it is apparent that many residents of the Robert Taylor homes wanted to have more control over the youth gangs in the area, but feared for their personal safety. I would suggest that the new parochialism might be especially attractive in such circumstances. However, the crucial caveat is that any stimulation of local action and any partnerships between parochial and formal control agents must be able to take account of and overcome what Sampson and Bartusch (1998) call legal cynicism and the subcultural tolerance of deviance on the part of many residents in disadvantaged and minority neighborhoods.

devote to volunteerism and may opt for engagement that is structured and organized, and, in the case of informal social control, for activity that is secure.

CONCLUSION

The Beltway case study illustrates a diminution of the role of private and traditionally parochial forms of control and a strong interplay between the parochial and public levels of control. The interplay between the parochial and public levels of control gives rise to strategies that I call the new parochialism, a set of semiformal practices coproduced by neighborhood residents and formal control agents. The new parochialism is grounded in the context of Beltway but speaks to wider trends and developments. Residents say that they and their neighbors have changed what they do with respect to controlling local youths and many articulate that what has changed specifically is that parents are too busy to properly supervise their children and neighbors are afraid or unwilling to fill the void. The new parochialism is new in the sense of its being a new form of organization that is there specifically to deal with informal social control because the traditional forms of parochial control are no longer widely practiced in Beltway. It would be a mistake to assume that the new parochialism does not have a degree of continuity with other forms of community organization. Certainly the tradition of the ward system in Chicago (Guterbock 1980) and the practices associated with it give residents a repertoire for getting things done.³¹ However, the ward organization and its ties to agencies outside the neighborhood has rarely been used for self-regulation, except in extreme circumstances and then only as a conduit to ask for stronger formal control. More important is the fact that the new parochialism is a set of strategies of ongoing informal social control, enabled by community policing initiatives, that arise in response to the confluence of trends in labor force participation, youth crime, and neighborhood change that render traditional forms of parochial control more difficult to undertake.

The Beltway case study then compels us to reconstruct existing theory about informal social control because the developments underpinning the new parochialism are not limited to neighborhoods that share Beltway's profile. Specifically, the central tenet of the systemic model of control, that strong social ties are crucial to engaging in effective neighborhood control, is called into question. Beltway residents engage in effective informal

³¹ For example, using the precinct captain to get the alderman to fix street signs or help out with the annual block party

social control, as evidenced by the successful campaigns to close down the tavern and reduce graffiti in the neighborhood, but the neighborhood is not characterized by dense social ties. Indeed it is the dearth of dense social ties that contributes in part to the diminished role of private and traditionally parochial forms of control. The central insight of the social disorganization approach, namely that neighborhoods have different capacities for controlling crime and disorder, remains pertinent, but it seems that the mechanisms that contribute to effective control are changing. Instead of private, parochial, and public forms of control acting in concert to maintain effective neighborhood controls, in the Beltway case we see how effective control can be exercised when private and traditionally parochial forms of control are weak and when there is a strong interplay between the parochial and public levels of control.

Whether the new parochialism operates in neighborhoods with different levels of crime and different class and racial profiles is an empirical question.³² However, I think that neighborhoods that have crime and disorder problems may find that the new parochialism is an appealing and often-times effective way to control crime. Indeed, with fear of teens and crime at high levels, the new parochialism may be increasingly the most prevalent form of informal social control in many urban neighborhoods. In particular, the new parochialism may be particularly relevant for suburban neighborhoods. Some suburban neighborhoods have seen crime rates increase recently,³³ even as crime rates drop in many urban areas, and perhaps in many suburban areas that are newly established, where dual-earner families are common, or where there are residentially transient populations, there is also a penury of private and traditionally parochial forms of control.³⁴ In such a situation the interplay between parochial and public forms of control may increasingly be adopted. With respect to urban

³² For example, Pattillo (1998; Pattillo-McCoy 1999) notes that the overlapping of licit and illicit networks in the African-American neighborhood of Groveland can work against partnerships between residents and formal agents of control. Such a situation is certainly one that could compromise a new parochial order, and it would make for an interesting empirical test.

³³ In the first half of 2002 the FBI reported a 3.6% increase in serious crime in suburban counties generally across the United States. This increase was addressed by the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee on December 16, 2002. Senator Patrick Leahy (Vermont) spoke about "the new trend showing an unprecedented rise in suburban crime. Nearly every type of crime is up in suburban counties, with murders rising a staggering 11.5 percent and forcible rapes up 3 percent."

³⁴ For example, the *Frontline* documentary "The Lost Children of Rockdale County" details the troubled lives of affluent teens in the middle-class suburb of Conyers, Georgia. One of the recurring themes in the documentary is the absence of working parents and, consequently, the lack of supervision and how this can lead to self-destructive, deviant, and, in some cases, criminal behavior.

initiatives to fight crime and disorder, some community-policing and neighborhood-organizing programs have emphasized the notion of partnerships between parochial and public groups to achieve desirable outcomes (Berrien and Winship 1999; Braga et al. 2001). There is institutional support for the new parochialism, and in Beltway it seems to resonate with neighborhood activists.

Finally, there are significant policy implications of the new parochialism. In the first place, the data from Beltway suggest that the CAPS initiative has produced some beneficial results for the neighborhood. The problem-solving and neighborhood watch groups are cosponsored by CAPS, and the Court Advocacy Program is also part of the CAPS initiative. The Beltway problem-solving group and the BNP owe part of their success to CAPS, and it will be interesting to see whether similar initiatives in other neighborhoods and cities have similar outcomes. Second, if Beltway is efficacious because of its strong political ties, then efforts should be made to provide neighborhoods that are not well-connected with the means for achieving effective social control. If everybody wants to live in an area free of crime, then it is imperative that they be provided with the means to achieve this goal, and in such a way that empowers those hitherto cynical or alienated from the legal system, or those who have been denied access to the requisite political and social resources increasingly needed for successful self-regulation.

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Status, Networks, and Social Movement Participation: The Case of Striking Workers¹

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Individual participation has been at the core of much theorizing and research on social movements. Little of this attention, however, has focused on the labor movement and individual strike involvement. In this article, the authors extend the literature by employing rational choice and network perspectives on social movement participation and by analyzing strike mobilization in a recent action by the Communication Workers of America. The data are unique to social movement analyses as they include participants as well as nonparticipants, have significant heterogeneity across lines of status, and provide potentially influential individual background and network indicators. Findings show how race, income, and occupational distinctions are influential for strike behavior. Importantly, workers' networks at the point of production also impact strike involvement. The authors discuss the implications of these and related results for understanding worker insurgency and social movement participation more generally.

Individual participation and its determinants are at the core of social movement analyses. While movement formation and persistence are certainly shaped by more aggregate processes, such as historical junctures of subordinate group opportunity (Jenkins 1983; Tilly 1978) and tactical innovations of insurgent groups and elites (McAdam 1983), mobilization itself is ultimately dependent on individual participation and related

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status, cultural, and microstructural dynamics (Fantasia 1988; Klandermans 1984; Snow, Zurcher, and Eckland-Olson 1980; Taylor and Whittier 1992).

In recent years, a growing body of work has applied insights from social movement theory to the American labor movement (e.g., Ganz 2000; Isaac and Christiansen 2002; Johnston 1994, 2001; Voss and Sherman 2000). Yet little of this work has addressed individual participation in industrial actions, strike activity in particular. This is unfortunate. Successful union organizing drives in the United States involve nearly 250,000 workers annually, and more than 200,000 workers take part in strike events each year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2002; Clawson and Clawson 1999). But what influences who participates in work-based collective action? Is involvement shaped by rational decision making by actors, each of whom weighs the costs of participation relative to their own status position? Might social networks—a key focus in social movement theory—also persuade or dissuade worker involvement in strikes?

Building on rational choice conceptions of social action and movement participation (e.g., Huber 1997; Marini 1992; Oberschall 1980, 1994) and research on potentially influential status distinctions between workers (e.g., Cornfield and Kim 1994; Form 1985; Wright 1985), this article extends the literature on social movement participation and strike activity.² We also consider more aggregate network processes that may condition the costs and benefits of participating in the first place. Indeed, rather than existing in a social or cultural vacuum, individual decision making is ultimately bounded and conditioned by social attachments and associations (Blau 1964; Oberschall 1994). Our data and analyses, which focus on an actual strike in 2000 by the Communications Workers of America (CWA), are appropriate for addressing these questions. They are also unique relative to much prior work in that they include participants and nonparticipants and allow for the inclusion of both individual status distinctions and potentially influential network dynamics. We conclude by discussing our findings relative to existing research on worker insurgency and more general perspectives pertaining to social movement participation and formation.

² Rather than the typical formulation of utility maximization employed in economics, we adopt a less restrictive model of purposive and conscious choice that may include utility maximization in the economic sense, but that also recognizes the role that values, beliefs, trust, friendship, and group and network affiliations may play in goal-directed decision making (see also Blau 1964). This is made more explicit in our theoretical development section, where we discuss historically forged status identities as well as the ways in which network and group affiliations may impact individuals' choices, calculations, and actions.

STATUS, SOCIAL MOVEMENT PARTICIPATION, AND LABOR
INSURGENCE

The importance of individual status to social movement participation has been at the center of historical arguments and analyses pertaining to the civil rights, women's rights, and antiwar movements. Grounded in assumptions regarding rational decision making, this literature holds, most generally, that individuals of markedly low status or those with greater autonomy from institutional or political constraint will be more likely to participate, since the costs of involvement (be they social, political, or economic) will be lower and the rewards arguably higher. Such a premise, usually implicit, is not too far removed from the relatively straightforward costs-benefits analyses put forth by classical rational choice and exchange theorists (e.g., Homans 1961).

Notably, however, a tension exists regarding individual status, costs/benefits, and the choice to participate—a tension that becomes apparent upon closer inspection of the social movement literature. On the one hand, some analyses suggest that aggrieved groups and subordinated individuals will be more likely to participate in a mobilization campaign given that it is in their rational interest to do so. Classic social movement literature, such as Piven and Cloward's *Poor People's Movements* (1977), as well as some resource mobilization accounts (e.g., Klandermans 1984; McCarthy and Zald 1977) certainly rest on this assumption. Yet, we also find examples of advantaged individuals taking part, leading, or even becoming a protest core in movements given greater autonomy from structural constraint and, arguably, the lower political and social costs that participation might entail. McAdam's (1988) Freedom Summer activists, more highly educated, middle-class whites involved in women's movements (Higginbotham 1992; Mathews 1982), and the high-status participants in environmental and peace movements (Oliver 1984; Oskamp, Bordin, and Edwards 1992; Walsh and Warland 1983) serve as cases in point.

Participant status differences across movements certainly exist and may be a function of historical era (see Melucci 1985). In this regard, some have highlighted the tendency of "old" social movements to recruit on the basis of, and appeal to, material grievances. Lower-status groups are thus more likely to participate. "New" social movements, in contrast, are more likely to organize and mobilize on the basis of identity (Taylor and Whittier 1992). This strategy generates a following among those for whom the identity is salient, including especially those of advantaged status positions. Despite such historical tendencies *across* movements, it is equally important to recognize that status divides exist *within* both historical and contemporary movements, with serious implications for movement cohesion and success.

The question of status and status divides likewise exists, both theoretically and empirically, in research dealing specifically with the labor movement. Research on historical labor mobilizations, and that pertaining to union membership more generally, has highlighted the tendency of not just workers but especially poor, low-status, and racial and ethnic minority workers to be the most fervent in terms of class-conscious attitudes, activism in organizing campaigns, and the unfolding of actual strike events (e.g., Letwin 1998; Roscigno and Kimble 1995; Zingraff and Schulman 1984). Status divisions among workers (be they race, gender, skill, occupation, etc.) and their relation to labor organization, development, and cohesion are, nevertheless, complex and often historically contingent (Baron 1991; Cornfield 1989; Goldfield 1997; Gordon, Edwards and Reich 1982). Indeed, any resulting labor organization and mobilization can vary considerably in type and character depending on the degree of elite cohesion, specific workplace grievances, and strategies formulated at the point of production (Brown and Boswell 1995; Kimeldorf 1999; Kimeldorf and Stepan-Norris 1992).

In contrast to work highlighting the central role of low-status workers, other labor research denotes significant participation in, and initiation of, collective action by more advantaged, skilled workers. Rather than being driven strictly by material grievances, skilled workers' participation is related to a historically forged class identity, solidarity-generating labor processes, and greater workplace power and autonomy (Form 1985; Lichtenstein 1980; Zetka 1992, 1995). Just who becomes the protest core may thus reflect a divide between worker mobilizations based on heightened material grievances and those tied to an advantaged labor market position (Cornfield 1985; Fantasia 1988). The contemporary labor movement and related recruitment strategies arguably embody both tendencies. This is evidenced by the recent upsurge in organizing activity among predominantly low-paid immigrant and racial and ethnic minority service workers, as well as in that of somewhat more privileged professionals (Milkman 2000; Waldinger et al. 1998; Cornfield and Fletcher 2001).

Individual status is undoubtedly influential for movement participation, via rational calculation processes, and this association continues to be important for labor organization and strike activity. The possibility of somewhat contradictory status pulls and tensions, however, remains. Those of the lowest status probably have the least to lose in absolute terms and, therefore, should be more likely to collectively mobilize. In contrast, higher-status individuals may exhibit greater participation since they will hold some power and autonomy relative to existing power structures and oftentimes hold an already established, historically driven, class-based identity. In our view, both scenarios are plausible—that is, there may exist a bipolar effect of status on involvement. Such a possibility has

been difficult to address because of a lack of data on status attributes and *variations between social movement participants and nonparticipants*.

McAdam and Paulsen's (1993) analysis of Freedom Summer begins to get at the question by analyzing activists' relatively advantaged status, although the comparison group is not young adults or even college students generally, but rather those who applied to the Freedom Summer project (i.e., those who wanted to participate). Hodson, Ziegler, and Bump (1987) similarly analyze worker status effects relative to a particular strike campaign, yet the workers they examine are quite homogeneous in terms of status attributes. As a consequence of these data limitations, social movement and labor analyses have tended to focus on participants and processes pertaining to mobilization, rather than comparing participants and nonparticipants on various status dimensions.

NETWORKS, SOCIAL MOVEMENT CULTURE, AND PARTICIPATION

Along with being patterned by individual status attributes, social movement participation is also a function of the networks one is embedded in and of related normative, cultural, and cognitive processes that translate movement issues into the day-to-day experiences of individuals. Indeed, networks are necessary for the recruitment and coordination of individual participants (Kim and Bearman 1997; Klandermans 1984; Myers 2000; Oberschall 1994; Oliver 1984; Opp 1988; Zhao 1998), and they serve as the conduit for identity building, framing, and dissemination of social movement culture (Fantasia 1988; Gamson 1995; Melucci 1985; Snow et al. 1986; Taylor and Whittier 1992). Networks and what they disseminate may, in fact, alter calculations and either facilitate or hinder individual involvement.

Network accounts can inform the question of why individuals participate and are intuitively linked to discussions of social movement culture, identity, and framing. Oppositional cultural formation and identity, in fact, are salient only to the extent that they are somehow transmitted to group members and potential participants. Conversely, networks will be influential to the extent that they are disseminating something of consequence (Roscigno and Danaher 2001) or are altering actors' calculations at some temporally proximate moment (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1980). Network accounts thus tend to focus on the conduit itself and the resulting spread of social movements across time, place, and population, while research on framing, social movement culture, and identity delineate what precisely is being transmitted. Both aspects, certainly interdependent, are important for mobilizing individuals (Strang and Soule 1998).

Although little labor research has dealt specifically with network effects and potentially related social movement cultural and identity processes, there is good reason to suspect that these foci are important. Fantasia's (1988) analyses of contemporary strike campaigns, for instance, suggests that transportation and communication networks provide a necessary conduit for strikers and that "cultures of solidarity" emerge and are disseminated with clear implications for individual involvement and commitment (see also Letwin 1998). In a more recent analysis of textile worker mobilization in the U.S. South during the 1920s and 1930s, Roscigno and Danaher (2001) explicate the role of radio networks in the activism that occurred, along with the cultural content that was transmitted and that arguably fostered necessary dimensions of identity, interpretation, and collective political efficacy. Certain key questions nevertheless remain. To what degree might network processes pattern worker identity and action, regardless of individual status attributes? And, what forms of network processes might occur, particularly at the point of economic production, with implications for worker resistance? In the next section, we address these questions within the context of contemporary workplace divisions and structures. For many workers, we suggest, status position and related calculations may be directly influential, although they are also often tied to, if not embedded within, relevant network processes.

THE CASE OF STRIKING WORKERS

Understanding worker mobilization requires attention to influential status distinctions, potentially relevant network processes, and their respective associations. The most obvious starting point in these regards is literature pertaining to class status in the United States—a literature that highlights the complexities of the working class and their implications for collective and political efficacy (Grusky and Sorensen 1998; Rubin 1986). Such foci are central to Wright's (1978, 1985) work on contradictory class locations, whereby individuals are conceived of as holding power in occupational hierarchies without necessarily owning or controlling assets within the structure of production. Although this is especially pertinent to the case of the contemporary middle class, Form (1985, 1995) has delineated increasing segmentation among the working class as well, resulting in cleavages most notably between skilled and nonskilled workers. Such divides, he suggests, have implications for, and if anything undermine, class mobilization and political efficacy.

While occupational and skill divisions contribute to the complex and possibly fragmented nature of the working class, status divisions of race/ethnicity and gender may also be important for understanding worker

mobilization and strike campaigns. Race and gender represent meaningful background statuses in and of themselves, patterned within and outside the economic arena, with implications for mobilization generally and class-based action (Cornfield and Kim 1994; Zingraff and Schulman 1984). These status attributes and associated inequalities may be commensurate with worker grievances and, thus, can enhance the capacity to organize on a class basis. At the same time, however, and as made clear in historical and social movement literatures, such divisions may also undermine cohesion and the ability to organize working class individuals and groups. This is particularly true when the specific grievances of subordinate group participants within a movement are overlooked or neglected (Gabin 1990; Gilroy 1991; Geschwender 1971; Roscigno and Anderson 1995). Cornfield and Kim's (1994) analysis of union support provides some conceptual clarity on these issues, denoting how worker status should be conceptualized of as multifaceted and measured both at the workplace level (i.e., occupation, skill, income, etc.) and in terms of more ascriptive background attributes (i.e., race/ethnicity, gender, etc.). But how and why might particular statuses prove to be influential in the case of labor organization? And, might not status variations undermine efforts toward collective action?

In relation to the first question, one might expect workers with high occupational status to have greater allegiance to, and identify more with, their employer than the union (Cornfield and Kim 1994). This tendency will be driven by prestige associated with skill level, possibly greater seniority, and higher relative wages. Such a straightforward prediction, however, lacks clear delineation of historical context and the complexities of class. Skilled workers should indeed exhibit greater commitment to employers and a diminished likelihood of striking, given their relatively high pay and prestige. At the same time, however, these very same workers have a historical legacy of successfully organizing and striking (Form 1985). Such *intrastatus* tension, between higher rewards on the one hand and a historical union legacy on the other, leads to the expectation that wages and job status may have countervailing effects, particularly for skilled workers.

In contrast to highly skilled workers, who may experience contradictory pulls in the process of labor organizing and mobilization, those of low workplace and subordinate race/ethnic and gender statuses may have an overall greater propensity to participate (see Cornfield and Kim 1994). We see this as partially driven by lower relative status inside and outside the economic arena and, consequently, heightened material grievances. It is also likely that historical exclusion, persistent segregation, and a legacy of action through collective, informal political channels, especially for African-Americans and Hispanics in the United States, will play a role

in fostering participation among what Oberschall (1993) calls "negatively privileged groups" (see also Tilly 1975; Zingraff and Schulman 1984). It is for these reasons that unions, at least in the contemporary era, have been more inclined to recruit and mobilize based on background statuses.

Rational calculations pertaining to movement involvement or, in our case, strike action are thus structurally patterned by status distinctions. Equally important is the recognition that potential actors and their decision making are fundamentally bounded by, and linked to, social attachments and network processes. Making explicit the social milieu within which decision making unfolds or is even constrained is not only useful but necessary (Blau 1964; Huber 1997; Oberschall 1994). It is usually the case, for instance, that movements themselves introduce grievance frames, collective identity processes, and even repertoires in a manner that alters potential participants' calculations and that can bridge status divides (Fink 1985; Letwin 1998; Snow et al. 1986). Actors' embeddedness within social networks may or may not be, strictly speaking, related to a movement or mobilization campaign. Such networks nevertheless may condition the terms, rewards, and/or costs of individual involvement (Calhoun 1982).

Network and cultural processes are issues not entirely distinct from the topic of individual statuses, rational calculations, or identities. The structuralist perspective in social movements (e.g., Gould 1995; Wellman and Berkowitz 1988), in fact, typically assumes an isomorphism between individual processes and structural location. Constructionists, in contrast, suggest there is "considerable indeterminacy between identities and their roots in either personality or social structure" (Snow and McAdam 2000, p. 46). Rather than adopting either extreme, Snow and McAdam (2000) suggest that the task is to identify situations in which identity convergence—a situation wherein individual identities and calculations correspond to the goals and framing of a movement—occurs. This process, they continue, unfolds in part through solidarity networks or through networks of individuals "who are not only linked together structurally in some fashion or another but also share common social relations, a common lifestyle, and a common fate and who therefore are likely to share a common identity" (p. 48). To successfully recruit, a movement must tap into such networks and make effective use of grievance frames—grievance frames that are relatively consistent with already established identities and that bridge potential status divides (e.g., see Fink 1985; McAdam 1982; Morris 1984). If successful on these counts, rapid mobilization is more likely since "bloc recruitment" (as opposed to individual recruitment) will be possible (Oberschall 1973; Snow and McAdam 2000).

Although little research directly addresses the relevance of networks and their interplay with calculations among workers, there are several

pieces of work from which we can draw. Notable in this regard is the early work by Kerr and Siegel (1954) on interindustry strike propensity, wherein the authors suggest that preexisting social relations among workers are crucial. Especially important, they continue, are situations in which members of an aggrieved group are linked to one another by conditions and concentration in their lives and at work. Lincoln (1978, p. 217) similarly suggests that employment concentration increases strike activity because it "defines the actual organizational boundaries in which interaction networks among workers are formed" (see also Shorter and Tilly 1974).

It is conceivable that there exists considerable capacity for the formation of influential networks at the workplace itself, as opposed to those occurring across broader communities or through autonomous institutions or organizations highlighted elsewhere in the social movement literature (Minkoff 1993; Morris 1984; Taylor 1989). Prior research on worker grievances, communication, and insurgency suggest that the workplace itself is the arena within which individuals formulate impressions about their jobs, the adequacy of rewards, and their capacity to demand change (Burawoy 1979; Hodson 1996, 2001; Vallas 1987). What this suggests to us is that networks occurring naturally at the point of production, while certainly not the only network a worker may be embedded in, may be most influential for shaping individual involvement in strike action. Indeed, sociohistorical accounts of union involvement and striking suggest that rather than being shaped by the goals, strategies, or networks of a larger union or broader-based class mobilization, worker grievances and insurgency are often formulated and fostered more proximately to the point of production (e.g., Fantasia 1988; Kimeldorf 1999).

But how might networks be forged at work, and why might they be influential in shaping mobilization and individual strike support specifically? Workers tend to be segregated by skill level and by race and sex (Kilbourne, England, and Beron 1994; Okamoto and England 1999; Tomaskovic-Devey 1993), and concentration of workers of similar statuses may have implications for identity and consciousness. Such segregation in large organizations typically occurs across the lines of work unit, with certain units being comprised of lower-skilled or race- or gender-specific employees. And, it is within such units and via job segregation that several processes with implications for insurgency may unfold.

First, if concentration within a workplace, or within units of a given workplace, is particularly intense, those of similar statuses (advantaged or disadvantaged) will be working alongside one another, communicating, and possibly sharing grievances (see Oberschall 1973). Here, the work unit becomes the natural network conduit, and within such a unit lies the potential that consciousness, working class identity, and grievances

will homogenize among unit members despite possible status variations that exist. If greater union or class loyalty manifests within a unit, for instance, this may encourage individual support of a union or actual strike participation above and beyond the impact of one's own pay, seniority, or feelings toward unions or strikes. If racial segregation within work units is evident, one might expect racial identity to become salient. This may help or hinder the unfolding of class action depending on whether the movement can successfully frame and negotiate identity differences across work units. That is, grievance framing within a movement, if effective, will bridge potential status divides among workers of various structural locations.

A second possibility is that networks may be influential not simply because of potential information, identity, or oppositional culture that is shared but, rather, through their effects on rational calculation at a given, arguably pivotal, point in time (Marwell and Oliver 1993; Oberschall 1980). Such might be the case during a walkout, when an individual must choose to stay behind on her job or walk out with fellow workers. While such on-the-spot decision making will undoubtedly be patterned by an individual's particular statuses, it will also be weighted by the immediate and/or future costs associated with not walking out with one's coworkers. Although actors may garner such information informally through their networks days or even weeks prior to the mobilization, there is often on-the-spot "milling" that occurs, where actors assess the immediate likelihood that others will participate (Brown 1965; Oberschall 1993). What this means is not only that rational calculation will make its way into individual status effects, but that such calculation also typically occurs within a context of network position and group affiliation. In either scenario—the first, where identity building and grievance sharing occur informally and prior to a mobilization campaign, or the second, where momentary calculations are made—one's workplace networks will be crucial. The analyses that follow attempt to delineate which, if either, is occurring, although we do not view the two possibilities outlined as mutually exclusive but perhaps instead reinforcing.

THE DATA, THE CASE, AND MEASUREMENT

Our analyses draw from data on a strike by the Communications Workers of America (CWA) that occurred in the spring of 2000 at Ohio State University. This data, which includes a variety of relevant indicators pertaining to the background and workplace status of the 1,681 full-time dues-paying university workers covered by the CWA collective bargaining agreement, was provided to us by CWA Local 4501 immediately following

the strike.³ Also included are work unit identifiers and university time records for each employee over the three-week strike period. These allow for the computation of several aggregated network measures and an indicator of individual strike participation. We supplement this quantitative data with ethnographic material, including our own interviews with strikers and union officials, observational notes of protest events and pickets, and archived media accounts.⁴

The significance of this particular strike and the more general usefulness of case analyses are worth highlighting. Although detailed, historical analyses of unique cases may undermine efforts toward generalizable conclusions, cases that lend themselves to assessment of theoretically meaningful questions have been essential to the development and understanding of common social processes (Ragin 1991; Ragin and Becker 1992). Indeed, rigorous sociological analyses of a single case provide the benefits of both theoretical generality and "situational groundedness" (Harper 1992, p. 139; see also Kimeldorf 1985). We thus bring to this analysis general theoretical questions pertaining to mobilization, in-depth knowledge of the specific context within which the strike at Ohio State University (OSU) unfolded, and the explicit goal of informing theoretical understanding of mobilization outside the context of this one case.⁵

The strike by CWA workers at OSU was the first walkout in 33 years, and it marked a breaking point from generally conciliatory labor relations with the university. In the context of the city of Columbus, where the labor movement has been historically inactive and poorly integrated relative to other industrial strongholds in the region (Form 1995; Hirsch and Macpherson 2000), the three-week strike at one of the largest and most well-known employers in the area was indeed a significant action. Despite voting to strike at the expiration of numerous contracts over the past 25 years, all previous efforts to strike were eventually averted, with the union consistently conceding on wages, health care, and the contracting out of jobs to nonunion employees (Devault 1975; Doulin 1990; Flood 1994;

³ The bargaining unit covers all skilled trades, service, and maintenance workers on the main campus in Columbus. Skilled trades include electricians, carpenters, plumbers, pipe fitters, etc.

⁴ All quotations are from interviews the authors conducted during and after the strike unless otherwise noted.

⁵ We nevertheless recognize that, in the face of attempting to draw generalizable conclusions, it is important to define or even constrain the theoretical scope of the questions and the theoretical generalities we can make given the specifics of the case we analyze. For this reason, we have made explicit in our literature review and theoretical development section that the impact of various status attributes, such as race, tensions between status groups (i.e., skilled vs. unskilled workers), and union recruitment strategies will vary by historical era and that our case is reflective of labor and recruitment in the modern day. We return to issues of generalizability in our concluding discussion.

Social Movement Participation and Striking Workers

Helsel 1988). In the case of the 2000 strike, however, workers did not concede.

The service, skilled trades, and maintenance workers at OSU made clear to a reluctant union leadership and a disbelieving administration that they were fed up, underpaid, and ready to walk out. As a veteran female custodian put it: "This has been 30 years in the coming. Let 30 years of frustration build up and when they walk, they're not going to come back until they get what they want" (Marx and Thomas 2000, p. 1).

Under the banner of "2 for 2000" (or the demand for an immediate two dollar raise across the board in the year 2000), nearly 80% of all CWA members walked out and stayed out for the duration of the three-week strike. What resulted was a general upheaval at the relatively quiet Mid-western campus, known more for its football than for its activism. Picket stations and noisemakers dotted the campus, workers and students staged nearly a monthlong sit-in of the administrative offices, and many faculty and graduate instructors orchestrated teach-ins and held classes outside as a showing of solidarity. The administration responded by cancelling strikers' health insurance that was already paid for, taking away employee building keys before the strike even unfolded, bringing in temporary workers (often students), and threatening wayward instructors through mass e-mails and a full-page ad in the student newspaper (Marx and Thomas 2000; Thomas 2000).

Rallies and meetings, complete with chants and slogans highlighting wage grievances and economic inequalities, kept workers tied to one another, garnered sympathizers, and also rekindled excitement every few days. According to one striker,

The last rally we had was a shot in the arm for all of us. After talking to everyone, and listening to everyone who we don't see but are our friends, there's a lot of students, and there were faculty, which really surprised me too. They put their necks on the line, and hopefully there won't be any repercussions after this is all settled on them . . . for speaking their minds. . . . Everybody walked away from it feeling like we can get back out there, and we can keep the fight going, so that was really positive.

The introduction of new tactics generated excitement and greater public awareness as well. In one of the most visible of protest events, strikers (with student support) shut down the \$187 million dollar construction project at the university football stadium, thus highlighting their material grievances in the midst of seemingly abundant wealth. In the process, national attention was focused on the OSU case (Meatto 2000). The Teamsters responded by offering support and by helping to shut down campus mail services, vending machines, and deliveries. The Construction and

Building Trades Union followed suit by refusing to cross picket lines, and poet Maya Angelou and NAACP President Kwesi Mfume canceled previously scheduled appearances on the campus. Local, regional, and national visibility escalated as strike events were reported daily by the student newspaper and the Columbus city papers. The strike action would eventually receive coverage in the *New York Times* and *Washington Post* and would be counted in *Mother Jones* magazine as one of the top 10 campus protests of 2000.

The strike by CWA workers at OSU was particularly impressive given the diversity across race and ethnicity, as well as across status distinctions of skill, occupation, and rewards. In the previous section we noted the theoretical implications of such segmentation for worker mobilization. We suggested that the impact of status distinctions, and potential divides across them, may vary depending on network dynamics and the ability of the movement to frame issues broadly. In terms of the latter, the dominant frame was clearly a material one. The 2 for 2000 slogan, which became ubiquitous across campus, demanded an immediate and universal rectification of years of inadequate wage practices. This struck a chord for workers across the board, high and low status, black and white, male and female. As an African-American custodial worker noted,

We need the money. Wages plus cost of living, everything is going up. They don't want to give us that, the two dollars, they don't want to give us that. They want to give us lower wages, and people ain't gonna' go for that, man. We want more, this is a new millennium. Year 2000 now, things are changing now, that's why we are out here. To make them understand that we ain't gonna' go for that no more. No more low wages and stuff, that's pennies, nickels, and dimes, man.

The issue of wages resonated with skilled workers as well, as suggested to us by a white male electrician, employed by OSU for nearly 24 years:

The university keeps taking more and more away from us, as a whole, and it's got to a point where they have got our backs against the wall. Uh, first they took away longevity, which they used to have step raises and longevity, they took away the step raises, and they took away the longevity, so now the only raises I would get would be, uh, the annual raises.

There was certainly some potential for racial division and the emergence of an overriding racial injustice frame, given the disparate concentration of African-Americans in the least skilled and lowest paying jobs on campus (discussed momentarily). Such framing might have alienated the disproportionately white, skilled workers on the campus. Although periodic slogans and chants emphasized racism by the university, this never became

the overriding theme during the strike or for workers themselves. Instead, the focus on low wages, the use of the 2 for 2000 slogan, the tactical and verbal emphasis on university multimillion dollar spending on a football stadium, and the contrast between OSU's wages and those of other public sector employees off campus, all of which were played out in the local media and during rallies, kept levels of solidarity high.

With high levels of participation throughout the three-week period and strong student and community support, workers at OSU made some meaningful financial gains (averaging raises of more than 18%), although the final contract included contentious pay differentials between north campus and medical center employees.⁶ Equally important to financial gain was the statement workers made to the administration by walking out for the first time in three decades. As one union official described, "People who had been ignored for a long time got heard" (Marx 2000, p. 11E).

In the context of this strike, framed largely in material terms, the following analyses attempt to disentangle and more fully understand the impact of pertinent status distinctions among workers and their structural location in the workplace hierarchy. We also examine more aggregate processes occurring in worker networks and their impact on individual strike involvement. Our analyses and the data from which they draw are quite unique relative to prior studies, which have been limited to a single occupation or a relatively homogeneous population. Furthermore, and unlike many social movement analyses, these data include not only participants in the mobilization *but also nonparticipants*. Ideally, such data would be longitudinal and allow for measurement of predictors at an earlier time point relative to the outcome of interest. Although the analyses that follow are cross-sectional,⁷ confidence in causal ordering is bolstered to some degree by firsthand accounts by strikers and by the media and archival sources from which we draw.

Strike Participation

Our indicator of strike participation measures in dichotomous fashion whether an individual took part in striking over the entire three-week period. Approximately 80% of the 1,681 workers did so, while the remainder continued to work during this period. Of the nonstrikers, about

⁶ While many regarded the new contract as the best in recent years, the union conceded on a 10¢ pay differential separating north campus and medical center workers

⁷ To model the processes described longitudinally would require detailed, daily, individual records of worker action starting on the first day of the strike, which we do not have

half crossed the picket line at some point during the strike (most at the conclusion of the first week), while the other half worked the entire period. Rather than treating nonstrikers as a homogeneous category, we ran models of strike participation using a continuous measure of total hours worked during the strike. We also analyzed strikers, strikebreakers, and nonstrikers in multinomial logistic regression. The patterns, however, were consistent with findings derived from the dichotomous indicator reported in the forthcoming tables, suggesting that nonstrikers and strikebreakers are more similar than distinct, relative to those striking over the three-week period. Table 1 presents descriptions, means, and standard deviations for our dichotomous indicator of strike participation, along with key individual and network explanatory variables.

Background and Workplace Status

Consistent with Cornfield and Kim (1994), we include measures of an individual's background and workplace statuses. Among background status indicators are age of the employee, measured in years, and sex (1 = male). Race is coded as African-American and other, with white as the referent.

The data provide relatively specific measures of workplace status, the most important of these being occupation. Occupational categories include custodial worker, hospital service worker, maintenance/manual worker, and skilled worker, with service worker as the referent in the analyses. Note the substantial occupational heterogeneity within the sample, with custodial workers making up the largest portion of workers, followed by the service workers (the referent and 28% of the sample), skilled workers, maintenance/manual workers, and hospital service workers, respectively.⁸

While background and workplace status may have direct effects on participation, it is also likely that they may be influential through associated reward structures and/or individual class identity. For these reasons, we include measures of income (hourly wage), seniority, and card-carrying union member status. Rational choice perspectives would suggest a depressant effect of income on participation, while the impact of seniority is less clear-cut. On the one hand, seniority may reflect an organizational commitment to the employer. At the same time, seniority may be related to higher commitment to the work group itself and, thus, may facilitate action (Burawoy 1979; Hodson et al. 1987).

Card-carrying status, an indicator of individual, class-based identity,

⁸ Hospital service workers, while not at the top of the wage scale, faced a number of normative challenges to striking. This included emphasis by the university on "patient care and well-being."

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TABLE 1
VARIABLE NAMES, VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS, AND MEANS AND STANDARD DEVIATIONS

Variable	Description	Mean	SD
Dependent variable:			
Strike participation	Dichotomous measure of whether an individual worker took part in the strike (0 = no; 1 = yes)	.80	.29
Background status:			
Age	Age in years	43.25	11.24
Race/ethnicity	Reference = white		
African-American	1 = African-American; 0 = other	.57	.50
Other	1 = Asian, Hispanic, and Native American; 0 = other	.10	.30
Sex	1 = male, 0 = female	.66	.47
Workplace status:			
Occupation	Reference = service worker		
Custodial	1 = custodian	.38	.48
Hospital service	1 = hospital service workers	.07	.26
Maintenance/manual	1 = maintenance/manual workers	.10	.29
Skilled	1 = skilled workers	.17	.38
Income	Hourly wage in dollars	10.48	2.64
Seniority	Seniority in years	9.63	9.37
Card-carrying	Individual, class-based identity as denoted by the worker's union card-carrying status (1 = yes; 0 = no)	.65	.48
Network measures:			
% card-carrying in unit	% employee's work unit that is card-carrying, not including specific employee	65.43	16.41
% African-American in unit	% employee's work unit that is African-American, not including specific employee	56.63	21.92
% striking in unit	% employee's work unit that went on strike, not including specific employee	80.13	17.12

should have a positive impact on individual strike involvement. Upon hire, workers have the option to become a card-carrying union member or a "fair-share" member, the latter meaning that they pay dues but do not identify with the union. Although perhaps a symbolic gesture upon being hired, the decision to be card-carrying likely reflects commitment to the union, class-based attitudes, and an overall greater propensity to act during a strike. Our quantitative findings along with qualitative insights, discussed momentarily, support these possibilities.

Networks

To gauge network and associated collective identity processes, we use aggregate workplace unit data. The work unit sets the organizational boundaries in which workers interact on the job and thus can be a conduit for information flow and communication. The union's shop steward system is also built around work unit organization. Shop stewards are, among other things, responsible for disseminating information between union leadership and rank-and-file members for each work unit. Importantly for prestrike mobilization, shop stewards were responsible for bringing to workers the pragmatic details of a potential strike (information on legal rights, potential picket locations, how strike pay works, etc.) as well as reports from prestrike informational meetings, which grew considerably in attendance and contentiousness toward the end of the negotiations period.⁹ The 1,681 employees in the data are spread out across 82 workplace units on the campus, ranging in size from 1 to 368. More than three-quarters of these individuals are concentrated in 13 units of 30 or more people.¹⁰

Earlier we suggested that the concentration of individuals of a similar status may have implications for identity, consciousness, and strike action. Moreover, networks at the point of production may be influential through their effects on decision making at a temporal point in time. To address the first of these possibilities, we use the percentage of an individual's work unit that is card-carrying and the percentage of the individual's work unit that is African-American as indicators of aggregate class- and race-based identity within the work unit. The percentage of a workplace unit that went on strike is used as a proxy for social pressure to strike

⁹ According to union officials and rank-and-file activists, the informational meetings held during the negotiations period drew unanticipatedly high attendance (200–300 in attendance vs the 20–50 at typical union meetings). While attendance at meetings typically increases during contract talks, this was substantially more than in recent years and thus meant that, in addition to the shop stewards, there were more rank-and-file members bringing back information to their work units. In fact, it was during these meetings that rank-and-file members demanded that union leadership ask for more at the bargaining table and coined the 2 for 2000 slogan that was used throughout the mobilization. It was also during this period that some rank-and-file activists (given a degree of autonomy on their jobs that allowed them to move across campus) began to spread information on negotiations, grievances, strike possibilities, and the like across work units on the campus.

¹⁰ One of our initial concerns was whether work unit size itself was conditioning the individual likelihood of striking. For this reason, we include work unit size in our analyses of network effects. The influence appears to be mild and slightly negative. We also introduced dummy indicators for small, medium, and large work unit size, which confirmed the general, linear relationship reported in our findings section.

within the network and offers insight into the temporal component. Figure 1 reports the distribution of work activism across work units in our study.

Given the possibility of nonlinear pressure associated with workers in one's unit walking off the job, we use the natural log function of this indicator—something we discuss in our analytic strategy section and graphically display in our results.¹¹ The variable itself, as the reader will note in figure 1, is negatively skewed to begin with: a fact that is not remedied by the log transformation being used. This should not raise concern, however, given that logistic regression makes no assumption and has no restrictions pertaining to the distribution of independent variables (von Hippel 2003). We nevertheless undertook several steps to bolster confidence that the negative skew was not altering the patterns or associations we report.¹² Potentially influential outliers were eliminated, as were small and low activism units, resulting in a more normal distribution. Results pertaining to the impact of work unit activism and its slope, however, did not change.

Importantly, the actual individual under examination was excluded from the three network computations pertaining to his unit. This was done to insure that findings are not influenced by collinearity artificially created during aggregation. Workers in one-person units ($N = 11$), by virtue of our measurement strategy, automatically receive a score of 0 for network activism (given that they do not have any immediate union coworkers). To insure that this coding scheme and especially its application to very small work units were not altering our findings, we controlled for individuals in units of 1–3 people, introduced a dummy control for units of fewer than 10 workers, and also excluded small units from the analyses altogether. None of these procedures altered the results, thus bolstering confidence in our measures and findings.¹³

¹¹ We use the natural log of this indicator given the theoretically derived expectation not only that the effect may be nonlinear but that its initial impact may be significantly more pronounced, followed by a tailing off.

¹² There are 16 work units between 0% and 10% when it comes to work unit activism. Predictably, these units are small, ranging from one employee to 12. Combined, these work units have 36 workers.

¹³ We recognize that our work unit network measures may not capture potentially influential network processes manifested outside the workplace. Little work, however, has incorporated network and identity dynamics into strike analyses to begin with. Thus, despite the limitations of these measures, they are the best proxy for network processes occurring at the point of production.




FIG. 1.—Distribution of work unit activism across work units ($N = 82$)

ANALYTIC STRATEGY AND RESULTS

The analyses proceed in two steps. We first illustrate linkages between background and workplace statuses and their respective associations with individual strike participation. This provides insight into the relations and varying effects of status described by Cornfield and Kim (1994), although it is an extension in two regards. First, by delineating associations between background and workplace statuses, we acknowledge that such statuses are often interdependent and consequential for understanding race/sex disparities in pay and occupational segregation—something clearly noted in recent stratification research (e.g., Tomaskovic-Devey 1993). Second, we extend the analytic focus not to union support, which is typically done, but rather to mobilization in the form of strike participation. For strike participation models, we introduce background status, workplace status, and then individual income, seniority, and card-carrying status. Declines in coefficient magnitudes and significance across equations highlight the degree to which background status matters through occupational disparities and whether occupational rewards (i.e., income), class-based identities (i.e., card-carrying), or seniority mediate some of the status effects we find. Quantitative findings are supplemented throughout with qualitative, open-ended interview material, gathered by the authors during the strike.

The second portion of our analyses highlights the importance of network processes for individual strike involvement. We introduce the percentage of card-carrying members in the employee's work unit, the percentage of African-Americans in the work unit, and the percentage in the work unit that struck. These are examined in separate equations and then simultaneously, while controlling for status, income, identity, and seniority measures specified earlier. Declines in significance for the percentage of

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card-carrying members and the percentage of African-Americans in the final equation, when network strike participation is included, is suggestive of a network identity process, played out through action (i.e., strike participation in the network).

Persistent and nonlinear effects of work unit strike support on individual strike participation may be driven by prestrike network identity processes or by more temporally proximate calculations of individuals based on whether those in their work unit walked out when the strike unfolded. Indeed, decision making with regard to collective action does not occur in a vacuum but rather is interdependent with the attitudes and actions of those in close proximity (Granovetter 1978; Klandermans 1984; Oberschall 1980). Especially important may be the existence and impact of an initial, critical mass of strike supporters within the network (see Marwell and Oliver 1993).¹⁴ It is for this reason that we utilize a nonlinear function of work unit activism in our modeling and plot the relationship in figure 2 (displayed later on) for the distinct subgroups highlighted in our initial findings.

Admittedly, most employees fall in work units with high levels of activism, providing less than ideal variation at the lower end of the work unit activism continuum. Dropping low activism units from the analyses, however, does not alter our results. Moreover, while confidence intervals around the average effect (also illustrated below in fig. 2) are understandably wider for low activism units, given their limited representation in the data, the general pattern and interpretation do not differ significantly. Such data limitations notwithstanding, our finding of a nonlinear effect of work unit activism, its actual graphical pattern, and our own interviews with strikers and union leaders suggest that on-the-spot calculations were made by many workers.

Individual Status, Income, and Identity

Table 2 reports associations between workplace occupational status, the background statuses of race and sex, and income, seniority, and union support measured by card-carrying status. Consistent with much research on work organization and stratification, the workforce at OSU is relatively segregated across occupational lines. Minority groups tend to be concentrated in lower-status service and custodial jobs. White males, in contrast, are concentrated in the skilled trades and in maintenance and manual work. This pattern of segregation is most pronounced among skilled workers, nearly three-quarters of whom are white and virtually all male. As

¹⁴ This implies a nonlinear effect, or what Marwell and Oliver (1993) refer to as a "decelerating production function," where returns decrease at increasing levels of X_1 .

TABLE 2
WORKER ATTRIBUTES BY OCCUPATION

Occupation (<i>N</i>)	% Minority	% Female	% Card- Carrying	Average Hourly Wage	Average Seniority
Custodial (646)	84.20	40.10	65.00	8.95	7 17
Hospital service (126)	80.90	65.10	57.00	10.34	9.52
Maintenance/manual (161) ...	38.60	1 90	71.00	11.89	10.93
Skilled (296)	25.10	1 40	70.00	13.71	13 60
Service (452)	73 60	49 20	64.00	10.10	10.18

denoted in the table, it is within these higher-skilled and maintenance jobs that wages are higher, as is the general level of union support. These workers, as we suggested earlier, may consequently experience intrastatus contradictory pulls when it comes to strike action.

Disparate occupational concentration may also hold consequences for reward structures across race and gender lines. The resulting wage gaps between minority and white workers and between male and female workers, reported in table 3, are both considerable and statistically significant. On average, whites receive over two dollars more in hourly wages than blacks and others, and men receive about a dollar and a half more an hour than women in the sample. Arguably, this deficit in wages should increase minority and female involvement in protest action since the absolute wage costs of participation will be lower and material grievances probably more pronounced.¹⁵

Table 4 reports the consequences of background status, workplace status, income, seniority, and card-carrying status for strike participation among 1,681 workers over the three-week strike period. Consistently, African-Americans and other racial/ethnic minorities are significantly more likely to strike relative to whites. For African-Americans specifically, the likelihood is nearly double that of white workers ($P < .001$). Although there is no apparent gender influence, workplace status clearly matters. Occupational differences in the likelihood of striking are reported in equation (2) of table 4. Custodians, skilled workers, and maintenance and manual workers are all more likely to strike than service workers generally, as well as hospital service workers.

Equation (3) of table 4 introduces potential mediators—individual income, seniority, and card-carrying status. Income, in the form of hourly

¹⁵ Although this is not reported in the table, African-Americans are somewhat more likely than whites to be card-carrying union members. This difference is statistically significant below the .05 level. Other racial/ethnic minorities did not differ significantly from whites, and men and women displayed no apparent difference on this indicator.

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TABLE 3
AVERAGE HOURLY WAGE BY
RACE AND SEX

Category	Hourly Wage
Race:	
Black	9.84
White	12.01
Other	8.83
Sex:	
Male	11.02
Female	9.42

wage, has an expected, negative effect on striking. For each dollar per hour in wages, the average likelihood of an individual's striking declines by approximately 25% ($P < .001$).

In contrast to income, seniority and union identity (measured by card-carrying status) positively shape the likelihood of striking. A card-carrying union member is about four times more likely to strike than a counterpart without similar union identification ($P < .001$). We proposed initially that card-carrying status implied a more general commitment to the union and that this might foster strike participation. Although many striking workers noted that their reasons for striking were strictly economic, several high-skilled workers with considerable seniority highlighted their commitment to the union. Such was the case with the following white male technician, with 23 years of service to the university: "I support the union as a union card-carrying member. They all voted to strike. I have to follow suit with their decisions. . . . When you're a card-carrying union member you got to honor what they decide and it was a 98% strike vote."

Intrastatus contradictory tensions are apparent, however, with the addition of wages, seniority, and card-carrying status in equation (3) and in conjunction with the descriptive associations reported earlier. Skilled and maintenance/manual workers experience the highest wages and strongest union identity, yet wages and union identity have countervailing effects. The depressant effects of wages on striking explains why occupational status effects among skilled and maintenance workers actually increase in equation (3). These occupational groups are likely to support collective action because of individual union identity and probably recognition of broader union and strike history and potential—something captured by the persistent, strong, and significant effects of these occupational designations. Yet, their higher incomes mitigate, to some degree, their likelihood of actual participation. This important finding highlights some level

TABLE 4
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF STRIKE PARTICIPATION ON INDIVIDUAL
BACKGROUND AND WORKPLACE STATUS MEASURES

VARIABLE	EQUATION		
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Background status:			
Age	-.003 (.006)	-.006 (.006)	-.014 (.007)*
Race/ethnicity:			
African-American675 (.137)***	.718 (.151)***	.527 (.161)**
Other482 (.228)*	.473 (.238)*	.450 (.254)
Sex071 (.139)	-.184 (.152)	-.057 (.159)
Workplace status:			
Custodial820 (.163)***	.572 (.176)**
Hospital service		-.475 (.223)*	-.324 (.236)
Maintenance/manual ..		.761 (.245)**	1.108 (.274)***
Skilled655 (.200)**	1.454 (.265)***
Income			-.299 (.058)***
Seniority031 (.013)*
Card-carrying			1.448 (.153)***
Constant	1.095	.924	3.237

NOTE.— $N = 1,681$; nos. in parentheses are SEs. Two-tailed tests of significance.

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$.

*** $P < .001$.

of discontinuity between subjective and objective criteria informing individual decisions pertaining to work-based actions.¹⁶

Custodial workers, whose ranks tend to be disproportionately African-American, display persistent and positive strike support. The coefficient decline suggests that this is partially a function of lower pay and, in all likelihood, clearer-cut wage grievances. When asked why he was participating, a custodial worker with eight years experience suggested that it was

for better wages. Because like right now, just paying off my insurance and all that, and child support, I bring home \$230 every two weeks. And that's nothing. You see, so I'm struggling, and I like to spend a lot of time with my children. If I have to go out and get another job, then we won't have time at all. You see, and I need this raise, bad.

¹⁶ More broadly, this finding reflects a division between conceptions of worker resistance focused on heightened subjective grievances (or consciousness-based approaches) versus accounts more informed by resource mobilization theory, which tend to highlight the structural capacity of workers in more advantaged labor market positions and their ability to withdraw labor without fear of replacement.

Notable as well in table 4 is the persistent effect of being African-American even with workplace status and other potential mediators included. As suggested earlier, this lingering effect may be tied to the history of collective action in the African-American community and its viability, even in the contemporary era, for addressing workplace grievances. This is consistent with the reflections of a black male worker, given while out on the picket line: "Well, I'm kind of like a '60s child, kind of, I was back in the '60s where you protested for what you wanted. A lot of that's there. A lot of it is actually, uh, feeling for other people."

Findings presented thus far denote a strong effect of both background and workplace status attributes on individual strike participation. For background status, race is clearly the most meaningful. While part of its impact is tied to occupational concentration, the impact of African-American status remains strong and stands alone. Among workplace status attributes, occupational designations clearly make a difference. Although some of the impact is tied to differences in income and union identity, these effects remain. Simply, occupational designations and identities are meaningful for workers and for their strike involvement (see also Klandermans and de Weerd 2000). Although skilled workers may have a stronger union identification and, consequently, a relatively high propensity for involvement, their higher incomes appear to seriously mitigate this potential. Nevertheless, results suggest that along with lower-status African-American custodial workers, high-skilled, mostly white, workers remain more likely on average to mobilize. The implication is that there is a heightened capacity for action, even within a single labor campaign, among low- and high-status mobilizers.

The Impact of Networks

The preceding analyses illustrated the impact of background and workplace status on strike participation and the partial mediation of these effects through income, seniority, and individual union identity. In table 5, we analyze the impact of workplace network dynamics, with controls for the status, income, and individual union identity indicators specified earlier. We also account for unit size throughout.

Equation (1) suggests important effects of work unit class identity on individual strike participation. Recall that the computation of this work unit network measure does not include the individual under consideration. The influence of individual card-carrying status, reported in the lower portion of the table, remains significant and virtually unchanged relative to the earlier, individual model. This suggests to us an identity dynamic occurring in the network, not reducible to individual preferences or individual union affinity.

TABLE 5
LOGISTIC REGRESSION ESTIMATES OF STRIKE PARTICIPATION ON WORK UNIT
ATTRIBUTES, WITH INDIVIDUAL CONTROLS

VARIABLE	EQUATION			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
% Card-carrying in unit . .	.009 (.004)*			.003 (.004)
% African-American in unit005 (.004)		-.001 (.004)
(ln) % striking in unit682 (.124)***	.663 (.131)***
Background status:				
Age	-.014 (.007)*	-.014 (.007)*	-.015 (.007)*	-.015 (.007)*
Race/ethnicity:				
African-American562 (.162)**	.524 (.162)**	.505 (.165)**	.514 (.166)**
Other476 (.254)	.436 (.255)	.408 (.258)	.416 (.259)
Sex	-.074 (.160)	-.052 (.161)	-.007 (.163)	-.012 (.164)
Workplace status:				
Custodial629 (.180)**	.646 (.180)**	.498 (.184)**	.495 (.184)**
Hospital service	-.426 (.249)	-.520 (.250)*	-.365 (.259)	-.346 (.263)
Maintenance/manual ...	1.217 (.285)***	1.306 (.285)***	1.115 (.291)***	1.101 (.294)***
Skilled	1.461 (.270)***	1.653 (.284)***	1.293 (.275)***	1.262 (.297)***
Income	-.314 (.059)***	-.314 (.059)***	-.305 (.060)***	-.304 (.060)***
Seniority029 (.014)*	.032 (.014)*	.033 (.014)*	.032 (.014)*
Card-carrying	1.460 (.155)***	1.489 (.155)***	1.461 (.157)***	1.453 (.158)***
Control for work unit size	-.001 (.0005)*	-.001 (.0005)*	-.001 (.0005)*	-.001 (.0005)*
Constant	3.016	3.209	.687	.630

NOTE.—N=1,681; nos in parentheses are SEs. Two-tailed tests of significance

* $P < .05$.

** $P < .01$

*** $P < .001$

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Work unit racial composition exhibits no apparent influence on the likelihood of individual striking (eq. [2]). The effect of having strikers in one's work unit, however, is quite sizable and significant ($P < .001$). Social movement scholars have debated for some time over the issue of potential protestors' calculations within the context of social connections and network embeddedness, suggesting possible exponential costs of not participating when others do or an initial and strong pull to participate once a core takes action (Marwell and Oliver 1993). Our use and finding of a nonlinear effect lends some weight to these claims. Figure 2 displays the pattern graphically for the two high-activism groups of workers, highlighted in the first portion of our analyses, relative to all other employees. The figure reports the predicted probabilities of striking derived from equation (3) of table 5.¹⁷ In the lower right corner, the reader will note the average impact of work unit activism on striking, with confidence intervals surrounding the mean effect.

What we find in figure 2 is an initial and quite strong slope for all three groups of workers. The impact of unit activism on the probability of individual strike participation continues to increase at higher percentages but at a decelerating rate. Notably, and consistent with our expectations and findings reported earlier in table 4, both low- and high-status mobilizers start out with a greater likelihood of striking relative to other employees. It is interesting to note, however, variations in the slopes for the three groups and, specifically, a steeper initial slope especially for African-American custodial workers—a pattern that seems to suggest that these workers may be more amenable to activism when there is already support in the network. The same seems to be the case for high-status white workers, although their higher incomes have a mitigating effect (see also tables 2 and 4).

The finding of a stronger initial slope is most consistent with an "initial activist core" interpretation, while the persistent but decreasing coefficient at higher levels of network strike support seems congruous with the "de-

¹⁷ Figure 2 is generated from eq. (3) of table 5, using the coefficient for work unit activism and discrete attributes of groups of workers informed by the patterns suggested in our analyses of individual attributes (table 4). High-status mobilizers are white skilled workers who are card-carrying union members, and who earn one standard deviation above the mean in hourly wages. Low-status mobilizers are African-American custodial workers who are card-carrying union members, and who earn a standard deviation below the mean in hourly wages. All other workers are represented who do not hold these attributes. Although bivariate associations suggest that levels of participation may be somewhat higher in larger work units, this association becomes weak and slightly negative once controls for individual status attributes and network identity and strike support measures are included. Consequently, the actual slope effects and our interpretations did not vary when we ran separate models for small, medium, and large work units.

celerating production function" argument posed by Marwell and Oliver (1993; see also Oliver, Marwell, and Teixeira 1985). These two possibilities may exist simultaneously. An initial core of workers who walk off the job reduces for others *the potential costs of striking*. The fact that the positive influence does not completely tail off or reverse implies that there are also *costs associated with not striking* when those in one's work unit are doing so at high percentages. These conclusions are nevertheless tempered by our recognition of data limitations, especially the fact that most workers in our case fall into units with high activism. That the mean effect and the confidence intervals surrounding it remain largely consistent do, however, offer some empirical leverage relative to our interpretation (see fig. 2, lower right-hand corner).

Our conclusions regarding on-the-spot calculations relative to one's network associations are also tentative given that the data represents a cross-section of workers who either walked off the job or did not (as opposed to a longitudinal account of workers striking and their coworkers following afterward). Our discussions with participants and union officials




FIG 2—Predicted probabilities of individual strike participation by work unit activism for low-status mobilizers, high-status mobilizers, and all other workers (lower right corner, average impact of unit activism and 95% confidence intervals) Groups of workers are defined as follows: (1) low-status mobilizers are African-American, custodial, card-carrying workers with the average custodial hourly wage (\$8.95), (2) high-status mobilizers are the white, skilled workers who are card-carrying union members with the average wage for skilled workers (\$13.71), (3) the last group (all other workers) represents the average values for all workers not included in the first two occupational categories.

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nevertheless do substantiate our interpretations and the possibility of an immediate effect. As late as the evening before the strike, for instance, union officials were only sure that about half the workers who actually walked out would in fact go. The decision whether or not to strike was especially instantaneous for many third-shift workers. Having already reported to work the evening prior to the strike, these employees were faced with the immediate decision of whether or not to walk out at midnight. Many, it turned out, actually *ran* out at midnight despite the negotiations being extended until 2:00 A.M. the morning of the strike (McKinney 2000).¹⁸

One rank-and-file activist summed up these possibilities by suggesting that while workers were signing up for picket duty in the week leading up to the strike, and certainly talking to one another and “sizing each other up,” many made up their minds at the last possible moment. Most workers signed up for picket duty in locations proximate to their actual work sites. This produced a situation across campus on the first strike day whereby employees coming to work saw their very own coworkers picketing: a scene that generated tremendous social pressure. More pointedly, as this employee recalled, workers were all of a sudden struck with the reality that “oh shit, everybody else in my department walked out.” Both of the possibilities we have described—grievance sharing prior to the strike and temporally proximate decision making—were forged by worker networks and were important in this particular mobilization.

The final equation of table 5 introduces the three network indicators simultaneously. The impact of percentage card-carrying declines to the point of nonsignificance once work unit strike action is included. Since card-carrying status was determined well before the strike, we interpret this decline to be reflective of the importance of class identity in the work unit, but only through strike action. This is not to suggest, however, that strike action in the unit is purely a function of identity dynamics. The persistent and strong effect of strike action in the unit, in conjunction with the actual pattern displayed in figure 2 and our ethnographic material, suggest to us that much of the impact was more temporally immediate.

¹⁸ The vast majority of CWA members work on the first shift. The third shift workers, however, who reported to work on the evening before the strike faced an immediate on-the-spot decision of whether or not to walk out. According to one of our informants, many came with picket signs and noisemakers at hand and actually ran out of the facilities in a jubilant display at midnight.

CONCLUSION

This article extends the understanding of social movement participation, and strike action specifically. Building on prior social movement and labor analyses, we suggested that participation in collective action will be patterned by both calculations associated with status position and the embeddedness of actors in networks—networks that may condition decision-making processes through information, grievance sharing, and identity building or that may more directly pressure individuals to act. The case of a labor strike on a large university campus provided the opportunity to address these questions with appropriate and unique data. These data include straightforward measures of participation, demographics on participants and nonparticipants alike, and network indicators that are meaningful given our population of interest and the actual form of mobilization examined.

Findings revealed the importance of background and workplace status, and their associations, for individual strike involvement. African-American and other racial and ethnic minority employees displayed higher levels of strike participation relative to whites. This is partially attributable to their disparate concentration in lower-paying custodial work. Here, the absolute income costs of participation are lower and wage grievances arguably more pronounced—something quite evident in our qualitative observations of protest events and pickets. Maintenance and especially skilled workers, in contrast, experienced a contradictory intrastatus tension between rewards on the one hand (which decrease strike support) and union loyalty and history (which increase strike support) on the other. Indeed, once we accounted for the depressant effect of their higher incomes, these workers were the most likely to strike. Importantly, as noted in our background discussion, this particular mobilization framed issues broadly and mostly in material terms. This served to bridge potential interstatus divides between black and white workers and between low- and high-skilled workers.

Such findings inform labor and social movement research given the explicit focus on the complexities of class and other background statuses in relation to action. Labor research, because of data limitations, has been somewhat limited in this regard to examinations of single occupations or relatively homogeneous workforces. Thus, variation in status impact and mobilization potential among advantaged and disadvantaged groups is often overlooked. This is unfortunate, as the status divisions and pulls specified here are relevant not just to labor mobilization but to social movement participation and persistence generally. Most movements, in fact, attempt to appeal to distinct social groups. In order to persist, they must also successfully negotiate internal status divisions.

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Equally, if not more important, is our finding that strike participation is shaped by more than individual status, income, and identity. Networks, too, are influential. Results indicated that, above and beyond individual causes, class identity within networks and especially strike action among those in one's unit have implications for individual involvement. Both quantitative results and supplemental ethnographic material suggest that workplace networks are crucial through grievance sharing and identity formation prior to the strike, as well as through individual decision making and calculations at a pivotal point. Here, an initial core of strikers in the unit appeared to be influential for engaging others in strike mobilization. The results also suggested, through a declining but persistent positive effect of network strike support, a possibility that there are lingering costs associated with not striking when others in one's unit do.

The impact of networks on involvement has been noted by social movement researchers for some time. Networks, this literature suggests, are essential to both the diffusion of insurgency across geographic space and in the recruiting and mobilizing of individual participants. Consistent with our focus, recent theorizing attempts to explicitly bridge discussions of individual status and decision making with those pertaining to network processes and impact (Snow and McAdam 2000). Our analyses build upon and apply these insights and recent developments in the social movement literature to labor mobilization specifically. Workers, we have argued, are typically embedded in networks at the point of production. The status composition of such networks, the potential information and identity shared among members, and the degree of protest involvement within, as findings revealed, may all have consequences for individual calculations and strike propensity beyond the impact of individual attributes.

Our conclusions are nevertheless tempered by recognition of data limitations. These include the inability to measure network dynamics outside the work environment, as well as limited detail pertaining to coworker interactional processes and potential friendship networks within the workplace. Consequently, the effects of networks on strike action presented here may be somewhat understated. Equally important, the generalizability of findings from our particular case must be considered, relative to other labor actions and social movements. Here, it is important to be explicit that our theoretical discussion and predictions are conditioned by the historically variable relevance of particular statuses, discussed previously, as well as by the university, public sector, and institutional context within which the mobilization we have described unfolded.

The employment setting on a large university campus likely entails more diversity than most workplaces and social movements.¹⁹ This par-

¹⁹ This arguably makes such a setting ideal for case analyses of mobilization. The

ticular university setting also represents public sector employment, where elite countermobilization may be somewhat constrained and where employers, historically speaking, have been more receptive to labor representation. Finally, the fact that the strike examined occurred within one institution also makes it somewhat unique relative to many social movements or industrywide strikes, which must recruit and forge networks in a broader geographic sense. One consequence is spatial and structural proximity of potential participants: something that lends itself to significant bloc recruitment (Zhao 1998). This may contribute to the high level of participation, relative to that of other social movements. Although variations in levels of activism were less than ideal, our data and analyses nevertheless reflect an important extension in a literature that typically examines *only* participants.

Despite these qualifications, most movements and workplaces have some internal status variations that may, to a greater or lesser degree, impact the capacity to mobilize. Furthermore, most social movements and labor mobilizations, be they intra- or interinstitutional, or public or private sector, typically rely on preexistent networks to recruit, share information and social movement culture, and alter potential participants' decision making. In the case of the analysis presented in this article, we combined analytical rigor with in-depth detail and background to address general theoretical questions pertaining to status distinctions among workers, their social networks, and their implications for individual participation. We thus have confidence in our findings and conclusions, and their utility for understanding more general strike and movement processes, and we see them as unique contributions to, and extensions of, prior work. The labor movement's multidimensional character as both a social movement and labor market institution, in fact, provides an ideal setting for studying the processes outlined and represents a rich, yet relatively untapped arena for social movement scholars.

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significant variation in statuses denoted throughout, on the other hand, may make our case more complicated than some mobilization campaigns that organize around a unique identity or a singular status.

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Narrating Social Structure: Stories of Resistance to Legal Authority¹

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Using stories of citizens' resistance to legalized authority, the authors propose that the act of storytelling extends temporally and socially what might otherwise be an individual, discrete, and ephemeral transaction. Adopting a concept of power as a contingent outcome in a social transaction, they emphasize that not only dominant, institutionalized power but also resistance to institutionalized authority draws from a common pool of sociocultural resources, including symbolic, linguistic, organizational, and material phenomena. Although such acts of resistance may not cumulate to produce institutional change, they may nonetheless have consequences beyond the specific social transaction: the authors propose that a chief means for extending the social consequences of resistance is to transform an act of resistance into a story about resistance. Based upon an appreciation of the structural conditions of power and authority, stories of resistance can become instructions about both the sources and the limitations of power. Because such stories are told in interaction with other stories, they become part of a stream of sociocultural knowledge about how social structures work to distribute power and disadvantage.

INTRODUCTION

If hegemony refers to that which is unthinkable, resistance must depend at some point in thinking the unthinkable. How does this happen?

¹ This article has had a long genesis, benefiting from the insightful comments of the *AJS* reviewers, as well as from the attendees and participants at sociology colloquia at Columbia University, Princeton University, and the University of California, Santa Barbara; the Law and Society colloquium at New York Law School, and the October 2002 Narrative Workshop in Boston. The work was remarkably improved by the generous readings and critique of Douglas Goodman, Michael McQuarrie, Frank Mun-

Through what process is that which is taken for granted and unnoticed revealed and made problematic? How are openings for resistance—the revelation of the taken for granted—created in situations where the probability of greater power lies with others? In this article we suggest that resistance is enabled and collectivized, in part, by the circulation of stories narrating moments when taken for granted social structure is exposed and the usual direction of constraint upended, if only for a moment. By telling stories of resistance, actors name and thus expose “what goes without saying” (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). By narrating those moments when they were able to best power, actors extend temporally and spatially individual acts of resistance.

Although scholars have long documented the resistant practices of subordinates in social interactions, they have given these activities considerably less attention than they have to more organized challenges to power, such as revolutions, strikes, boycotts, or class-action suits. The reasons for this focus are obvious and defensible. These forms of collective action often mark ruptures in the historical record. Because they are understood as being responsible for history “veering off course,” such acts of rebellion seem to warrant study (Comaroff 1994, p. xi). More recently, however, scholars have claimed that the seemingly small acts of defiance engaged in by persons in subordinate positions also make history, albeit a history that often seems to remain “on course.” To the extent that they, too, are “world-making” activities (Goodman 1978), these acts of resistance also warrant our attention.

Various referred to as secondary adjustments (Goffman 1961), tactics (De Certeau 1984), or “weapons” of the weak (Scott 1985), these everyday acts of resistance represent the ways in which relatively powerless persons accommodate to power while simultaneously protecting their interests and identities. Institutional ethnographies—of the wards of mental hospitals, assembly lines, classrooms, bureaucratic offices, barracks, prisons, and courtrooms—provide us with evidence of the universality of such practices (see, e.g., Hodson 1995*a*, 1995*b*, 1997*a*, 1997*b*). As Goffman (1961, p. 305) observed, “Whenever worlds are laid on, underlives develop.”

Paying attention to these tactical forms of resistance has been criticized on a number of grounds. First, because mundane oppositional practices are often clandestine and purposively ambiguous, it is not always clear how the practitioners of such acts interpret what they are doing. In the absence of such knowledge, some scholars have asserted that others may be attributing greater agency and a more highly developed oppositional

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consciousness than is warranted by the evidence (Rubin 1995; McCann and March 1995). Second, a focus on everyday resistance supposedly abandons a vision of transformative politics by a preoccupation with what appear to be individual, often momentary, trivial acts. Individual acts of resistance may do worse than simply fail to challenge power and inequity. Lacking the solidarity of organized social movements, the petty sabotages, backbiting, and tricks of peasants and powerless workers rarely unsettle institutional power (Tarrow 1994, p. 101). By providing temporary relief from the burdens that power imposes, tactical resistances may make insufferable conditions tolerable. In doing so, some argue, they inoculate power from sustained and more powerful challenges.

These criticisms derive from a conception that social structure and power stand before and apart from the resistant practices that oppose them. From the point of view of these critiques, resistance is merely a response to power, known only in the imprint it leaves on social structure. As Fitzpatrick (1999, p. 51) notes, these critiques posit "implicitly or explicitly an anterior order—power, society, or hegemony, for example—and locate resistance as that which stands outside of, and opposed to, this order." When resistance is understood only as an excrescence of power and structure, the sociological significance of resistance lies only in the success of its collective mobilization and opposition. Thus, resistance has often been analyzed for its ability to mobilize collective action, to perturb or alter arrangements of power, and to initiate change in social structures.

Yet to dismiss everyday forms of resistance on the grounds that they are individualistic and temporary is to foreclose sociological inquiry concerning the relationship between power and resistance. Although this kind of resistance may be opportunistic and individualistic, as its critics suggest, it is neither random nor idiosyncratic, as we will show below. The openings for resistance derive from the regular exercise of power. Resistance does not, in other words, seize upon lapses of power so much as it relies on the persistence of and familiarity with a particular social organization. Through everyday practical engagements, individuals identify the cracks and vulnerabilities of institutionalized power such as the law. Goffman recognized this connection between resistance, power, and structure when he described resistance, or "secondary adjustments," as a diagnostic of power relations. "From a sociological point of view, the initial question to be asked of a secondary adjustment is not what this practice brings to the practitioner but rather the character of the social relationship that its acquisition and maintenance require. That constitutes a structural as opposed to a consummatory or social psychological point of view" (1961, p. 201). Rather than imagine resistance as an episodic or occasional response to power, we begin this analysis following Goffman by reconceptualizing

resistance as a diagnosis, a consciousness, of the constitution of social structure and power (see also Abu Lughod 1990).

In the following section, we describe power as a contingent outcome in a transaction in which one actor, drawing upon diverse resources, is able to realize her objectives. Both dominant, institutionalized power and resistance to institutionalized authority draw from a common pool of sociocultural resources, including symbolic, linguistic, organizational, and material phenomena (Steinberg 1999*a*, 1999*b*). Some actors, however, are advantaged by having greater access to the schemas and resources that are effectively deployed within these transactions. Thus, while power can never be possessed categorically at the outset of a transaction, some actors enjoy a greater probability of realizing their aims. We emphasize the embeddedness of hegemony and, thus, the recursive and everyday uses of power. Within this framing, an act of resistance can be understood as a conscious attempt to shift the dynamics or openly challenge the givenness of situational power relations. Resistance signals the exploitation of structure to disturb ongoing expectations, and as such it is premised upon the apprehension of power, injustice, and structural opportunity.

Although acts of resistance may not often cumulate to produce institutional change, they may, nonetheless, have consequences beyond the specific social transaction. After presenting our research methods, we explain how resistance may be consequential even when it does not initiate collective action or immediate organizational change. The meaning of what seem like petty acts lies in their narratives. The process through which an event is made into a story is sociologically significant in and of itself. We argue that all stories are social events. In other words, stories are not just about social reality; "social reality" happens in stories" (Abbott 1992, p. 435). We will show that stories of resistance express, as an integral part of their narratives, a recognition of social structure as it operates within transactions. Each story recounts the way in which an aspect of social structure (e.g., role, rule, hierarchy) was deployed to achieve a momentary reversal of the more probable relational outcome. From an analysis of the stories of resistance told to us, we develop a typology of resistant practices that is derived from the ways in which aspects of social structure are mobilized in the transactions and recounted in the stories. By describing inversions of social structure that achieve a momentary reversal of power, the narratives of resistance reveal the tellers' consciousness of how opportunities and constraints are embedded in the normally taken for granted structures of social action. Moreover, the stories make claims not just about the structures of social action and the possibility of resistance but also about the justice and morality of resistance to authority.

Thus, a chief means for extending the social consequences of resistance,

we propose, is through the transformation of an act of resistance into a story of resistance, a story that by its telling extends temporally and socially what might otherwise be a discrete or ephemeral victory. In the discussion and conclusion, we suggest some possible implications of this work for further research. We cannot yet establish the relationship between these narratives of resistance and more collective stories of resistance that are developed and shared by social movement participants, and it would seem sociologically naive to assume that these individual narratives (we use the word "individual" guardedly, acknowledging that these draw from and contribute to larger cultural narratives and frames) simply aggregate or cumulate into social movement narratives. Yet it would be similarly naive to assume that movement narratives are imposed on inchoate, unnarrativized individual experiences. There seems, in other words, some gap—unexplored—between the stories people fashion locally about their experiences of relative powerlessness or injustice and the movement stories that mobilize participation. One might say that we approach the topic from the bottom up while many of the sociologists of social movements approach it from the top (collective) down. We are trying to conceptualize, theorize, and identify a method for studying the organization of and deference to power and authority.

RELATIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF POWER AND RESISTANCE

Our effort to document the "world-making" possibilities of everyday acts of resistance builds on scholarship describing the relational (or constitutive) basis of social organization, in particular how social transactions generate both individual exercises of power and more durable social structures.² Recent work in practice theory emphasizes connections between what Goffman (1967) called the interaction order of face-to-face exchanges and social structures understood as ongoing productions of social interaction (Connell 1987; Giddens 1979, 1984; Bourdieu 1977; Sewell 1992). Relational perspectives stress the embeddedness of the "very terms or units involved in a transaction" in dynamic processes (Emirbayer 1997, p. 287; cf. Somers and Gibson 1994, pp. 65, 69). In these approaches, individual experiences and perceptions of the constraints and resources operating within a situation are a central feature of social practices, processes, and structures. Perceptions of authority and power, including assessments of legitimacy and injustice, are necessary to act in any social

² Recent literature has argued persuasively (e.g., Emirbayer 1997) for a relational conception of social action in which transactions (mutually constitutive exchanges) rather than interactions (defined in this relational conception as exchanges between formed and distinct entities) are the basic units of social action.

system; they generate conformity to social expectations at the same time as they permit and sometimes encourage resistance to norms, authority, and power.

Power has been conceptualized as "the ability to achieve foreseen and intended effects" in a social interaction (Wrong 1979), as "the mobilization of people's concerted activities" (Smith 1990, p. 80), and as the recursive accumulation of these interactions and activities in a pattern of domination (Giddens 1979, p. 88; cf. Lukes 1974). In these formulations, power is the outcome of social transactions and thus is identified (at the outset of an exchange) as a differential probability of achieving foreseen and intended effects. Thus power is not a thing that can be possessed. Rather, it is a probabilistic social relationship, a series of transactions whose consequences are contingent upon the contributions of all the parties, those who turn out to be more powerful (superordinate) and those who turn out to have been less powerful (subordinate).

As a relationship among two or more persons, power relies upon a subordinate's participation and response. Because the successful exercise of power is contingent upon a performance by the subordinate party, power is intrinsically linked to the possibilities of resistance. "Even in the most oppressive and cruel cases of subordination," Simmel (1950, p. 180) wrote, "there is still a considerable measure of personal freedom." In the course of offering methodological instruction on how to study transactional processes, Foucault recapitulated this conception of power.

Power, if we do not take too distant a view of it, is not that which makes the difference between those who exclusively possess and retain it, and those who do not have it and submit to it. Power must be analyzed as something which circulates; or rather as something which only functions in the form of a chain. It is never localized here or there, never in anybody's hands, never appropriated as a commodity or piece of wealth. Power is employed and exercised in a net-like organization. And not only do individuals circulate between its threads; they are always in the position of simultaneously undergoing and exercising this power. They are not only its inert or consenting target; they are always the elements of its articulation. (Foucault 1980, p. 98)

This relational conception of power suggests that power is not realized only, or primarily, in open contest and struggle. "Power relations are asymmetrical in that the power holder exercises greater control over the behavior of the power subject than the reverse, but reciprocity of influence—the defining criterion of the social relation itself—is never entirely destroyed" (Wrong 1979, p. 10). Both subordinate and superordinate may share values and goals and experience no conflict of wills, and yet one

party's influence in the relationship may be stronger.³ Moreover, power often operates in unseen ways through institutions and cultural symbols, becoming so routinized that the distribution of influence, as well as the benefits and costs, in these transactions is relatively invisible. When this occurs, alternative ways of organizing relations are no longer apparent. Simmel (1950) described this institutionalized domination as a transformation of personality into a superpersonal value. He cited as a prominent example the idea of law, in which subordination to a person is transformed into subordination to a principle. This principle may be further transformed from a normative claim about how things should be done to a factual description of how the world works. Fuchs (2001) describes this accumulation and sedimentation of transactions over time and space as the production of social structure (see Hebdige 1979; Hall et al. 1978; Connell 1987; Silbey 1992).

The institutionalization of power in this way produces commonplace transactions in which both the sources of power and the forms of subordination are buried. In these transactions, no one seems to be demanding obedience, and subordinate parties appear to be normally socialized rather than compliant. The organization of relations and resources often obscures the mechanisms that systematically allocate status and privilege of diverse sorts. Over time, individual transactions may be repeated and may become patterned. Patterns may become principled and eventually naturalized. Social actors are thus constrained without knowing from where or whom the constraint derives.

"Hegemony" is often used to refer to just this kind of systemic power (Comaroff and Comaroff 1991, pp. 24, 23; cf. Bourdieu 1977, p. 167). Transactional advantage becomes stabilized as privilege when a pattern of action becomes habitual. We want to emphasize, however, that hegemony does not arise mechanically from particular social arrangements; instead, hegemony is produced and reproduced in everyday transactions, where that which is experienced as given is often unnoticed, uncontested, and seemingly not open to negotiation.

Power—whether hegemonic or contested—is exercised by drawing upon the symbols, practices, statuses, and privileges that have become habitual in social structures. Although structures—what we construe to mean the schemas and resources that pattern social life—often confront us as external and coercive, they are more accurately understood as emergent features of social transactions, (re)produced with each repetitive act and transformed with each innovation or unfaithful repetition (Sewell 1992). Enacting and exercising power, actors draw from this pool of com-

³ Wrong (1979) excludes those forms of physical violence that, although directed against a human being, treat him as no more than a physical object.

monly available structures: symbolic, linguistic, organizational, and material phenomena (Swidler 1986). No social act is *sui generis*; to be part of a social transaction, intersubjectively interpretable and possibly consequential, all acts draw upon this common cultural material. Every social transaction, including those of state institutions and legal processes, has the capacity to reproduce or challenge familiar arrangements and ways of doing things.

While this alliance between power and social structure has been widely recognized (Gramsci [1971] 1999), what is less obvious is the close relationship that exists between conventionalized structures and resistance. Since power is exercised through the patterned distribution of resources and schemas, if there is resistance to this power it must also operate through the appropriation of these selfsame structures. Resistance, as much as power, is contingent upon the structural resources available to the relational participants. Because structures help constitute identities, and expectations, the tacit or explicit apprehension and enactment of social structure is necessary in order to act in any social situation. "Counter hegemony has to start from that which exists, which involves starting from 'where people are at'. Such a conception of counter-hegemony requires the 'reworking' or 'refashioning' of elements which are constitutive of the prevailing hegemony" (Hunt 1990, p. 316). Since hegemonic power conceals itself within relations, if there is to be resistance, it must be initiated by an apprehension or appreciation of how social structure organizes those relations. "The existence of objective condition, of possibilities of freedom, is not yet enough," Gramsci (1999, p. 360) wrote. "It is necessary to 'know' them and know how to use them."

In this sense, resistance represents a sort of practical theory of social action, the discovery of social structure operating within the commonsense world of everyday life. While professional sociologists may spend their lives constructing accounts of social processes, they are not alone in "doing sociology." Garfinkel described, for example, "the actual methods whereby members of a society doing sociology, lay or professional, make the social structures of everyday activities observable" (1964, p. 250). As we go about our daily lives, we operate on the basis of understandings of how and why people behave as they do and of how and why things happen. We are constantly testing and revising our practical theories against our observations and experiences, even as we interpret those observed events and experiences in the context of our theories. Garfinkel noted the critical role of such practical theories in generating resistance. "A knowledge of how the structures of everyday activities are routinely produced [enables] us to tell how we might proceed for the effective production of *desired disturbances*" (1964, p. 227) in those structures and relations.

RECOGNIZING RESISTANCE

If both hegemony and resistance are relational, continuously in process, and enabled by appropriating structural schemas and resources, how do we recognize resistance? Given their ubiquity, daily rebellious acts defy easy summary or description. They include such practices as pilfering, violence or threats of violence, tricks, institutional disruptions, foot dragging, humor, storytelling, and gossip. However, not every joke or act of petty theft is an act of resistance. In order to be understood as resistance, such acts must invoke a particular interpretation of the situation in which they occur. "To resist is to experience autonomy, to experience oneself as planning against one's [opponent], and to interpret the [situation] as avoidable or controllable" (Gordon 1993, p. 142).

Resistance entails a *consciousness of being less powerful in a relationship of power*. In contrast to much social action in which the invocation of interpretive schemas and mobilization of resources is implicit and often unconscious, resistant practices are distinguished by the self-consciousness of the actor, a particular understanding of self and other, of being up against something or someone. Although we rarely question the forms of regulation and control that make relatively untroubled social action possible, no less the achievements of basic sociality, personality, and agency, resistant practices are distinctive in their alertness to the ways in which social interactions are organized. Thus, to produce unexpected results within institutionalized interactions, resistance involves special attentiveness to and (re)deployment of the basic schema and resources operating in conventionalized transactions. To refashion what is otherwise taken for granted depends on the discovery and manipulation of social structures within the commonsense world of everyday life.

Second, resistance also requires a *consciousness of opportunity*, an opening in the situation through which one might intervene and turn matters to one's advantage. Thus, resistance represents a consciousness of both constraint and autonomy, power and possibility. Tactical resistance often involves "making do" with what a situation offers (De Certeau 1984), remaking "the situation as it stands" (Dewey 1981), "working around" existing technical or social constraints. Almost by definition, those who practice tactical resistance have limited access to resources that otherwise might be converted into power within the situation, such as money, social position, social networks, education, or other forms of cultural capital. As a consequence, resistant acts use, in unforeseen and inventive ways, the resources that are at hand, the very same aspects of social structure that support power and domination. This bricolage may involve a reworking of the material world, such as using American flags as clothing to protest military intervention in Vietnam or Iraq. It may also entail a cultural

bricolage that imports to a situation statuses, relationships, or meanings that are foreign to it. Notably, these acts are often practiced to escape, rather than to change or stabilize, a relationship of power.

Resistant acts also make *claims about justice and fairness*. Resistant acts involve assessments that power has produced unfair constraints and opportunities while also attributing responsibility for the unfair situation. However, despite the underlying justice claims, tactical resistance, unlike more collective forms of resistance or formal social movements, rarely announces or justifies itself as such. Because resistant practices are typically enacted by those who lack the capacity to openly challenge or contest power, these practices are often hidden, intentionally designed and executed to remain unrecognized and undetected by those against whom they are directed. By remaining clandestine, resistance thus “preserves, for the most part, the on-stage theater of power” (Scott 1985, p. 273) and provides no public accounting or justification. Even in those cases where tactical resistance is open and traceable to an individual, it tends to be practiced so that it can be denied, if its agent is called to task.

Finally, because hegemony renders certain actions conventionally unthinkable, when it does occur, *resistance is often institutionally indecipherable*. In highly rationalized contexts of modern bureaucracies, indecipherability means that there are no standard operating procedures anticipating, no taxonomies classifying, no rules forbidding such practices. Nonetheless, while there may be no rules acknowledging or attempting to regulate specific acts, superordinates are not necessarily unaware of or bamboozled by such practices. It is just that the absence of rules or classification schemes makes these actions *officially* unreadable, without instructions about what to do under these circumstances. The fact that they cannot be deciphered by the formal rational organizations in which they occur insures that when and if they are detected, they will incapacitate that bureaucratic power, if only for a moment. Like more organized forms of challenge, acts of resistance create a measure of situational uncertainty. In what form or place resistance will appear is indeterminant. The overwhelming power of the situated authority can often limit the immediate effect of the individual resistant act and thus impede the mobilization and building of solidarity (Tarrow 1994). Institutions can also limit the long-term effects of repeated acts of resistance. Organizational practices are often restructured to make the resistant tactics once again decipherable and controlled. Indeed, we can often find the residues and marks of resistant practices in the evolving rules and procedures of modern organizations (see Lau 2000) and popular culture (the comic strip *Dilbert*).

COLLECTING STORIES OF LAW

If individual acts of resistance momentarily, or at best temporarily, stun power, do they have any other, longer-term consequences? Does resistance have the capacity to transcend the immediate social transaction? In the course of a study on the place and meaning of law in the everyday life of ordinary Americans, we were told thousands of stories, some of which were stories of resistance to legal authority (Ewick and Silbey 1998). In telling us of their efforts to oppose and resist legal authority, interviewees transformed a momentary transaction into a historical event, recorded not only in their own memory but reconstructed for an audience, if only an audience of interviewers who solicited and recorded it.

During 1990–93, we conducted in-depth, face-to-face interviews with 430 persons concerning how they experience, interpret, and use law. The interviews lasted an average of two and one-half hours. Respondents were selected through a multistage cluster sampling procedure from four counties in New Jersey. Counties were purposively selected for variation in racial composition, population density, and socioeconomic status. Within each county, census blocks stratified by race were randomly selected. From the census blocks, households were randomly selected. The resulting sample is representative of the demographic profile of the four counties according to the 1990 census. All but three interviews were conducted in the respondent's home. Each interview was tape-recorded. The transcriptions of 141 of the 430 interviews serve as the empirical basis of this article.⁴

We began the interview by asking how long people had lived in their homes, what they liked and did not like about their neighborhoods, and how they were the same as or different from their neighbors. Following this general, getting-acquainted opening, we inquired about any problems respondents experienced in the course of their daily transactions and relationships.⁵ The particular situations about which we asked were inten-

⁴ The selection of the 141 interviews to be transcribed was purposive rather than random (Trost 1986, pp. 54–57). We attempted to preserve the demographic representativeness of the original sample by selecting cases from a cross-section of social classes, races, genders, and geographical areas. Because our principal analytical goal in this part of the project was not to generalize to the population but to interpret the meaning and function of stories embedded in the interviews, we also based our selection of cases on the richness of the interview (in terms of length and degree of detail) and, in order to provide a context for the story, on our own familiarity with the case. For this reason, the resulting subsample of transcribed cases, while approximating the demographic profile of the entire sample, is drawn disproportionately from the approximately 100 interviews completed by Ewick or Silbey.

⁵ When respondents asked what we meant by "problem," we replied, "anything that was not as you would have wished it to be," leaving the widest latitude for the individual to offer his or her interpretation of events.

tionally varied and comprehensive, seeking to create rather than to foreclose opportunities for respondents to report diverse experiences and interpretations. We were seeking their experience and interpretations of the law and did not want to assume its place in their lives but rather discover it as it emerged in accounts of events. The list of probes included the sorts of events that people might very well define as legal problems and for which they might seek a legal remedy (events such as vandalism, property disputes, and work-related accidents). The list also included events and situations that were less obviously connected to traditional legal categories or remedies—such as the division of household labor, medical care, or curricular issues in schools. Although many of the kinds of situations about which we asked do not always, or even often, culminate in a legal case, they all involve situations in which a person might if they so chose, assert a legal right, entitlement, or status. Events of the sort that we asked about routinely generate cases for the legal system and appear on the dockets of local courts in the state. Although most people have these experiences, most do not treat them as legal matters. We were seeking to understand just how such interpretations are made, to define an everyday event as legal or not. Thus, if respondents claimed to have experienced a problem, we asked how they responded to the situation, what action they took, and what alternatives they considered but did not pursue. We did not ask explicitly about formal legal actions or agents until the very end of the interview. We waited to see whether, where, and how the law would emerge in our respondents' accounts.

The problem-inventory part of the interview was designed to produce a snapshot of the number, type, and variety of responses to potentially legal situations. The mention of a problem elicited a number of follow-up questions. This long inventory of probes was followed by a request to the respondent to speak further about any event of their choice. She (or he) was asked to describe the event in greater detail, to elaborate upon her experience of and reaction to it. These open-ended conversational questions were intended to elicit a narrative of the most problematic event by relinquishing control of the interview to the respondent, who could thus define the topics and themes and choose which details to include.

Our attention to narrative was engendered by noticing that, in responding to our long inventory of possible everyday problems—events that might have triggered a legal response—our respondents told us stories about themselves. Long before we moved to what we had constructed as the narrative portion of the protocol, they told us dozens of stories rather than just answering yes or no, this or that did or did not happen. Although some would answer our standard query—"Have you ever been bothered by (e.g., noise from neighbors)"—with a simple yes and little more until we probed, most of our respondents told us a story of relationships, con-

flict, and history, and they expressed their feelings about these. We had set out to understand what law meant in the lives of our respondents, how it was used or not used and why, but we began to realize that we needed to understand the role of stories in the experience of legality. What started as a project in legal mobilization turned into an analysis of narratives of legality.⁶

The analysis of the narratives' content proceeded at first by our reading through a subset of the 141 interviews and identifying themes that appeared recurrently. Based on that initial reading of 25 interviews, we identified approximately 60 themes, which we used to code the remaining interviews. These codes included references to capacity to act, willingness to act, time, inscription, property, bureaucracy, power, corruption, fairness, money, and costs, as well as references to formal legal actors such as judges or police. Obviously, any given narrative was coded as containing multiple themes, such as "police" and "humor," "resistance" and "time," or "self-reliance" and "right." There were often several dozen themes. The codes were typed into the computer file of each of the transcribed interviews. We were thus able to search efficiently for any reference to any of these themes (or keywords). Relying on these codes, we generated a separate data source comprising files for each code or theme. In each of the theme files were all the references to a given theme as it appeared in any of the 141 interviews. In order to preserve the context of the reference, surrounding pages were also copied and included in each theme file. In this way, we are able to identify more or less complete narratives as they were told to us in each interview. We now turn to a description of how our analysis of respondents' stories of resistance derived from theories of narrative and social action.

WHAT IS IN A STORY?

It has been noted that people tend to explain their actions to themselves and to others through stories (Mishler 1986; Bruner 1986, 1990; Sarbin 1986; Pillemer 1992; Pillemer et al. 1995; Ewick and Silbey 1995). In his book of essays *The Content of the Form*, Hayden White (1987, p. 1) observed that "so natural is the impulse to narrate, so inevitable is the form of narrative for any report of the ways things really happen, narrativity could appear problematic only in a culture in which it was absent." Rather than offering categorical principles, rules, or reasoned arguments,

⁶ In this work, "legality" is understood as an emergent structure of social action that manifests itself in diverse places, including but not limited to formal institutional settings. Legality operates as an interpretive framework and set of resources with which the social world (including that part known as "the law") is constituted.

people report, account for, and relive their activities through narratives: sequences of statements connected in such a way as to have both a temporal and moral ordering (see Ricoeur 1984–88). Some authors argue that stories, as a form of social action (Austin 1962), reflect and sustain institutional and cultural arrangements, bridging the gap between daily social interaction and large-scale social structures (Todd and Fisher 1986; Reissman 1993; Lèvi-Strauss 1964–71; Thompson 1984; Faye 1980). In other words, stories people tell about themselves and their lives both constitute and interpret those lives; stories are media through which identities are negotiated. Finally, stories enact and construct, as they describe, the world as it is lived and is understood by the storyteller.

The capacity of stories to perform these functions is connected to the narrative form itself. Synthesizing various extant uses in the social sciences, narrative as a form of communication has at least three features. First, a narrative relies on some form of selective appropriation of past events and characters. Second, within a narrative the events must be temporally ordered. This quality of narrative often requires that the selected events be presented with a beginning, a middle, and an end. Third, the events and characters must be related to one another and to some overarching structure, often to an opposition or struggle. This feature of narrative has been variously referred to as the “relationality of parts” or, simply, “emplotment.” The temporal and structural ordering ensure both “narrative closure” and “narrative causality,” in other words an account about how and why the events occurred as they did. These forms are related. The demand for closure “is a demand for moral meaning,” a moral principle in light of which the sequence of events can be evaluated—or what we call, colloquially, “the point of the story” (White 1987).

In order to analyze and synthesize the myriad stories respondents told us about events and problems in their lives, we disentangled and translated the representational features of narrative into familiar sociological concepts used to describe social action. Within the common features of narrative (especially temporal ordering, relationality of parts, emplotment, and moral meaning) we distinguished four analytical dimensions of social action: normativity, constraint, capacity, and finally, time/space. These dimensions form axes of variation among the stories of law we heard. Importantly, as an ensemble they provide the narrative causality and closure characteristic of conventional stories. Any narrative, including a story of law, is not just a description of what happened but also a statement of the normative grounds “whereby it may be justified” (Giddens 1984, p. 30), what White refers to as the moral principle or point of the story. What we refer to as normativity describes people’s beliefs about the ways in which people, including parties to legal transactions both professional and lay, should act. In stories of law, normativity also specifies why law

should or should not be invoked, obeyed, or resisted. References to normativity describe the moral bases of legality. The normative understandings of law both inform and are revealed by individuals' decisions to mobilize the law, their evaluations of legal processes and actors, and, finally, their own invocations and uses of law outside of formal legal settings.

Emplotment is also an account of how things happened. What makes stories sociologically interesting is just this empirical description beyond the normative justification for what happened. All stories contain a sociology, an account of the organization of social life (Van Maanen 1988; Maines 1993; Somers 1992; Cohen and Rogers 1994). While the ordinary actor, or what Garfinkel (1964) called the lay sociologist, may not provide the kind of account that the professional would give (with the attendant claims to accurate and valid representation) lay stories are nonetheless attempts to explain social action. They locate characters in time and space, describing both what enables and what constrains action. In other words, they point to the sources and limits of agency that exist within social structures. As such, narrative has become increasingly interesting to scholars as a means of accessing just these lay sociologists' understandings of their worlds (e.g., Heath 1983; Davis 1987; Maines 1993; Somers 1992; Cohen and Rogers 1994).

Narrative Processes

These conventional definitions of narrative display a strong substantialist stamp (Emirbayer 1997). In this casting, narratives are entities, recognizable by certain internal features (temporality, normativity, emplotment, constraint, and agency or capacity). Although they may be exchanged, or passed along, they retain an independence from the social transactions in which they are told. Although a narrative may share features with other stories (plot structure or normativity, for instance), it stands as a distinctive and identifiable story. By describing stories in terms of their content, this definition of narrative endows the story with an ontological independence. It ignores the processual, contingent, and collaborative aspects and downplays the transactional features of narrative, thus underestimating its socially transformative potential.

Understanding narrative as a dialogic production (Steinberg 1999b), however, will allow us to explain how individual acts of resistance can be consequential when transformed and told as stories of resistance. The story of the event is not the same as the act represented, and the telling of the story is more than the recounted events. The telling of a story is an event in itself (Austin 1962). Our conception of narrative must include an understanding that narratives are not things as much as they are

processes (Abbott 1992; Bakhtin 1981; Steinberg 1999a, 1999b). Recent work on discourse and narrative from a relational perspective (Emirbayer 1997) suggests, in this vein, that narratives exist and have meaning only within networks of tellers and audiences. According to this view, the acts of telling/writing, hearing/reading are not merely contingent features of a preexisting narrative. An untold story is, in fact, no story. Additionally, reconceiving narratives as processes, rather than entities, challenges the bounded notion of "a story." In this processual understanding, no particular narrative stands apart from narratives told before or from narratives yet to be told. A story draws upon the well of past stories and flows into future stories. Narratives are fluid, continuous, dynamic, and always constructed interactively—with an audience and within a context—out of the stuff of other narratives. They are produced retrospectively (with some previous narratives in mind) and prospectively (with some audiences in mind).

Constructed through transactions between speaker and audience, text and reader, narratives are always collaborative productions offered within overlapping relational contexts. When someone presents an account to an audience, subjective experiences must be translated into a common vernacular, employing culturally plausible interpretations (regarding character, motive, actions, and outcomes). Even the most personal story draws from and invokes public schemas—symbols, linguistic formulations, and vocabularies of motive—without which the story would remain unintelligible and uninterpretable (Silberstein 1988). Within this shared vocabulary, the storyteller can produce a hegemonic tale or a subversive story (Ewick and Silbey 1995); whichever way the story is constructed, however, she offers a moral interpretation and definition of the situation.

When the tale is told in face-to-face interaction, elements of the story may be subject to interrogation. The narrative may be interrupted as listeners provide additional examples from their own experiences and store of information or demand more detail and greater elaboration. People often provide hints about the stories they might tell, soliciting the audience to help unpack and elaborate an account (Jefferson 1985). The actual form and complexity of the story told depends in great part on the behavior of those to whom the hints are dropped. In some conversations, aspects of stories are introduced without elaboration. Only when the listener offers positive signs of willingness to hear more do the stories actually get told in an extended and more detailed version. In an interactively constructed elaboration, the definition of the situation that is claimed by the teller might be affirmed, amended, or rejected by members of the audience.

Stories thus change in the course of interaction to reflect the experiences and interpretations of others. Narrative change is ongoing because stories are rarely told once or to only one audience. We rehearse and retell our

stories in interaction after interaction: with friends, coworkers, family, even strangers. With each telling, in fact, we may be more likely to tell again. As the story is elaborated and amended to more successfully compel, persuade, amuse, or engage, we are emboldened to repeat it. And, with each interaction, meaning is made and remade collectively. Thus, any particular story is incomplete by itself. There remains at the end of most stories unresolved ambiguities. "[We] always need more stories because in some way they do not satisfy" (Miller 1990, p. 72). Narrative demands "our interpretive participation, requires that we struggle to fill the gaps to resolve the ambiguities. We struggle because the story's end is consequential" (Polletta 1998, p. 143). The sequences of action—the internal linkages, causality, ending—are to some extent always elusive. Through their interpretive engagement, audiences continue to participate in the construction of the narrative even after a particular story has ended.

Through this process, the stories of particular individuals and specific events transcend the subjective and the particular. The framing of an act into a story externalizes the consciousness of the actor/storyteller, "objectifying reasoning, knowledge, memory, decision-making, judgement, evaluation, etc. as the properties of social organization" (Smith 1987; 1990, p. 60). By displaying through their narratives a consciousness of capacity as well as of constraint, storytellers contribute to the common pool of social schemas and resources. By combining first-hand knowledge that is valued because it is direct, unmediated, and emotionally salient (the story) with what is more widely shared and culturally dispersed (familiar language, tropes, and experiences), storytellers assert, in effect, that their story is part of the ongoing human story, that "what is true for me is also true generally" (cf. Sasson 1995, p. 129; Gamson 1992). The creation of that "reciprocity in the negotiation of meaning" that is fundamental to social transactions (Gergen and Gergen 1997) often takes place by telling stories. Thus, stories generate meanings that underwrite subsequent social action, including, but not limited to, subsequent storytelling.

The stories that we report below are constructed accounts of acts of resistance. They bear the features of the transformations described above: the selective appropriation of events, a particular event order, the positioning of character in relation to a situation of relative powerlessness, and a sense of closure that provides a moral evaluation. Told within the interview situation, these stories, like all stories, are transactions in which meanings and definitions are offered to an audience. The conditions under which these stories were told (an interview) are distinctive. No doubt, the telling would be different were they told in a different setting—over the dinner table, in a court of law, or in a diary. Indeed, in a number of cases, references were included in the story that indicate that it had been told before, under different circumstances, to a different audience. As we in-

terrogate the content of these stories and use them to create meaning, we of course participate in the ongoing process of storytelling and the social transactions it necessarily entails.

Narrative and Resistance

The plots of stories of resistance offer distinctive accounts of law's power, the sources of its capacity, and the constraints that limit legal action. In the section following this, we show how stories of resistance offer a particular variation on the common narrative template. In constructing narratives out of everyday resistance, people expressed their consciousness of the injustice of legal power and announced to us their understanding of the role of structure in both enabling and limiting action. Importantly, in these stories, they explained how social structure can be, if only momentarily, appropriated for unexpected results.

Tellers of resistance stories emplot law as a powerful force, describe themselves as a protagonist up against this force, and present some action that avoided or overcame, if only temporarily, this situation of relative powerlessness. The act of resistance is described in the conventional narrative form of opposition, transformation, and moral victory. Moreover, in these resistance narratives, storytellers expose aspects of social structure, too often effaced in hegemonic genres. They express this recognition of social structure by recounting how institutionalized legal relations provided expectations and allocated opportunities within the transaction. At the very same time, because their narratives are stories of successful resistance, they offer an account of how these selfsame and familiar schemas and resources can be mobilized to reverse a more probable transactional outcome. The story of the act incorporates and displays this operative "lay sociology" (Garfinkel 1964), revealing and articulating the social organization of power that sustains the world as it is experienced and known. Although, as noted earlier, acts of tactical, everyday resistance are typically clandestine and unnoticed, by contrast when these normally clandestine acts are transformed into a narrative, they announce themselves as resistance. Contributing a particular account (the individual's experience) to the general (how the legal system works), the emotional to the structural (Barbalet 1998), the story of resistance transcends the moment of interaction, extending temporally and socially what might otherwise be an individual, discrete, and ephemeral victory.

When one considers the process entailed in narrativizing an event, petty acts of resistance become sociologically consequential. Exchanged with an audience, the event is represented in another time/space and a consciousness of the apparently unthinkable is displayed. The dialogic, collaborative, and relational features of narrative are particularly salient in

stories of resistance because their ending is not an inevitable outcome of the chain of events. The usual accounts of capacity and constraint are reconfigured and, for that moment, the institutionalized capacities and constraints of legality subjugated. At the heart of these stories is the promise, but not the assurance, of a reversal of power. As a narrative rather than a logical argument, the reversal of power is achieved, but with ellipses and ambiguities in the account of how the resolution came to pass. Thus, Polletta (1998) argues, the account of what happened demands more stories in the effort to explain exactly what happened, producing a relay of signification and interpretation. Through this spiraling process, the stories of particular individuals and specific events transcend the subjective and personal, implicating and inciting the audience in the act of resistance as the audience struggles to comprehend what happened and why. In this way, storytelling can be part of the practice and the amplification of resistance. The possibility of escalation and transformation is accomplished primarily through this collective construction of the story. The need for additional stories is all the more urgent in the case of narratives of resistance. Precisely because the reversal of power related at the end of these stories is fragile and the triumph so temporary, little is permanently resolved and stories of resistance, perhaps even more than most stories, do not satisfy. Herein lies their greatest subversive potential. Such tales must be retold. They must be matched by others' (similar) accounts. But stories are not just told; they are exchanged. And out of the exchanges of these stories and the moral claims they make, the resistant practices become part of the commonly available narrative resources.⁷ As one of our respondents explained,

I talked to a friend and stuff. My wife doesn't like it when I advertise it. I even asked her if she minded if I asked you today because she gets to like its private. But, the more you talk to people, the more you find out that you're in the same boat. There are other people in the same situations, that are caught in the system that will just eat you up. (Michael Chapin)

ACCOUNTING FOR THE POWER OF LAW

In this and the next section, we show how the stories—those of resistance and also those of compliance—were conveyed through common narrative templates. Stories of law turn out to be stories of power. All the narratives we collected included a justification of legal authority, why law was ap-

⁷ The comic strip *Dilbert* is testimony to the popularity and circulation of stories of resistance.

propriate or illegitimate in the instance. They varied, however, in the justifications offered. In some accounts, legal authority is represented and valued because of its objectivity, operating in a world removed from human caprice and enacted through disinterested decision making, colloquially referred to as "the rule of law." In other accounts, law was praised for its accessibility as an arena for articulating and pursuing self-interest. The legal process was described as a valuable technique for accommodating inevitable partiality, a normative space in which to negotiate particular and opposing positions. Finally, other accounts described the arbitrariness of legal authority, its unpredictability and raw power. Here law was simply the power of the powerful. Rather than seeing legal authority as derived from moral principles, objective reasoning, or regulated processes that legitimated its power, these stories reversed the direction of legitimation, describing power as producing the normative grounds upon which legality is exercised. Might, in these stories, makes right.

Many persons reported experiencing the law as a foreign and uncontrollable power. The force of the law was felt in a variety of ways. In some extreme cases, it was experienced as physical coercion, such as when one respondent was handcuffed to a radiator in her home or when another was arrested and jailed overnight; in both cases, the charges were mistaken and eventually dropped. More commonly, the law's power was experienced in its capacity to define situations and persons in ways that did not correspond to—and at times did violence to—taken for granted understandings of ordinary life. People reported that the tragic but sadly commonplace aspects of life are strangely reconfigured through law: harsh words between coworkers become harassment; or, the brutal violence committed by a spouse is euphemistically labeled "domestic violence." In short, people reported that when they confronted their lives within the legal domain, they often felt that they were subject to a power that could render the familiar strange, the intimate public, and the mundane extraordinary.

In modern American society, law, like most forms of public power, is organized bureaucratically. This means that people generally confront legal authority within impersonal, rule-governed, functionally organized hierarchies. More importantly, these same features often obscure those very same exercises of power. Bureaucratic organization reduces the exercise of power to the seemingly technical and impartial application of rational rules. Almost everyone we interviewed found the law, at times, to be arcane, unresponsive, costly, and depersonalizing (cf. Bumiller 1988). Many of our respondents also described the correlative dilution of authority and discretion that occurs at the boundary of most organizations, making any kind of informal or easy resolution of problems nearly impossible. For example, many of them described the difficulty, frustration,

and costs of dealing with government agents. Bill Villars articulated this widespread sentiment,⁸

Someone in authority could with the stroke of the pen solve a problem
But we couldn't reach that person or that person wasn't made aware of
the problem until many many efforts.

Respondents alluded to the inability of law to respond to the sorts of ordinary troubles that characterize everyday life, referring to the ways in which their problems and grievances were transformed into "cases" that could be processed and filed, reassigned and rescheduled. The particular contingencies of the situations that brought people before the law were often lost in the process. Their efforts to reinsert these vital facts were often thwarted or defined as irrelevant. The size and complexity of law place it, respondents claimed, far from the relationships of dependence and power that routinely produce trouble. Although the law defined rights and obligations, it was unable, our respondents claimed, to offer practical protection of those same rights. In part, this was because the organizational time and place of the law had little correspondence to the time and space of everyday life. Multiple court appearances, interminable waiting, and traveling to remote locations exacted a large price for many citizens, who had to choose to pursue their grievance by forgoing wages and family responsibilities or, alternatively, choose to "lump it," accepting the costs of the problem instead of those of the solution. From the respondents' perspective, they had to pay either way. In fact, one of the most common reasons people gave for not turning to law was that "it wasn't worth it." The formal apparatus of the law and the costs it exacted in time, money, and loss of privacy had the effect of rendering much of life "not worth it" from a legal point of view. Mired in formal procedures, captured by bureaucratic structures and remote from the real concerns of citizens, the law is often perceived to be unable to effectively resolve disputes, recognize truth, or respond to injustice.

These features of law did not reflect only the common frustrations with bureaucracy that is the stuff of so many popular critiques. The law also functioned in these ways to shape people's lives in more significant, albeit often unrecognized, ways. Women worked in what they reported to be situations of ongoing harassment. Members of minority racial groups lumped instances of suspected discrimination. Members of poorer communities suffered from an absence of police protection and conversely from the presence of toxic waste or hazardous effluents.

The arbitrary, even if legitimate, power of legal actors—bureaucrats,

* All names are pseudonyms.

public officials, police, and judges—was described in terms of this lack of responsiveness, empathy, or sympathy. Because it seemed unrestrained, it was experienced as capricious as well as preemptory. Toward the end of the interview, when we explicitly turned to questions about law, we asked respondents what they would do if a judge were to treat them unfairly. Many answered the question by describing the self-defining and thus arbitrary power of the law as it is embodied in the judge.

What other levels do you have? The only thing you got is the court. Everything is settled by the court. Somebody's opinion. And the people that are in power make their decision. (George Kofie)

There is nothing you can do. Just grin and bear it. Who can you complain to? You can't . . . there's nobody you can talk to. There is nobody higher than the judge. (Mike Chapin)

What can you do? They're always right. . . . Who you going to complain to, who cares? Truthfully, you know, and if they cared, what do they do about it? (Claudia Greer)

Not much you can do about it. Except complain. [Int.: Complain to whom?]
To no one. [Laughs.] To complain to yourself about the lousy court system. (Andrew Eberly)

Several respondents sarcastically alluded to the unrestrained power of judges by suggesting that they are Godlike.

File a complaint? [Laughing.] I have no idea. God, his superior? I don't know. (Michelle Stewart)

In court you are treated as a person of less value than the court officials or the judge. At that point, he's God. So, if you don't like this God, you go to another God. (George Kofie)

Despite what many respondents described as costly injuries, unfair treatment, and unrestrained power, most people told us that they went along with legal rules. Not surprisingly, however, given these assessments, some people responded by resisting and attempting to unsettle, if only momentarily, these same relationships of power.

STRATEGIES OF RESISTANCE: STORIES ABOUT SOCIAL STRUCTURE

To identify stories of resistance, we examined whether the narrative described an opportunity to avoid the consequences of relative disadvantage.

In our analysis, we were particularly interested in identifying the means through which resistance was achieved. As we argued above, resistance does not so much rely on failures of power as appropriate the resources of the more powerful. We theorized that resistance is premised upon a recognition of those very same aspects of social structure that more often support taken for granted authority and power. Thus, we analyzed the stories we were told to see whether the description of resistance displayed an appreciation of structural opportunities present in the transaction. Since legal power is structured bureaucratically, we expected to find resistance appropriating these same structural features—often employing several simultaneously, as the examples below illustrate.

From our analysis of the stories people told us, we identify a number of ways in which the storytellers draw upon social structure in these stories. The ways in which social structure is invoked as a strategy of resistance include a manipulation of social roles, exploitation of hierarchy, responses to rationalized rules and regulations, and responses to the disciplining of social interactions along dimensions of time and space. Heuristically, we identify these reversals of conventional features of structural relations in the narratives as masquerade (playing with roles), rule literalness (playing with rules), disrupting hierarchy (playing with stratification), foot-dragging (playing with time), and colonizing space. In what follows we examine these various tactics of resistance and offer illustrative stories from our data. Although we present these various tactics as analytic categories, in the actual stories related to us in the course of the interview more than one tactic is often described. Similarly, a given act might reasonably be interpreted as an example of more than one type.

Masquerade

The sociologically informed view that social action is based on roles includes two insights. First, it expresses the idea that a person's behavior (as well as his or her obligations, privileges, entitlements, and power) accords with expectations associated with the person's social position. At the same time, this view encompasses an equally relevant insight: because roles are not synonymous with the person, they can be manipulated to influence transactions. The manipulation of roles might involve some degree of deception. In these instances, persons engage in literal *masquerade* insofar as they pretend to be something or someone they are not. They assume whatever role would lead to a more desired outcome. What is worth noting in regard to such commonplace deceptions is that people do not typically assume roles that carry greater social status or power but often enact the position of someone who is needier or less powerful, thus making a different sort of claim on power. For instance, a common form

of informal resistance among subordinate workers involves "playing dumb," or presenting oneself as a less experienced, less knowledgeable worker in order to avoid work. Ironically, they feign a lack of the very knowledge that is necessary for the deceit in the first place (Prasad and Prasad 1998; Hodson 1995a, p. 144). In the more varied contexts in which persons encounter the law, the range of roles to be manipulated or assumed increases considerably beyond what is available in the workplace. Jesus Cortez, an elderly Hispanic man living in a rundown and dangerous area of Newark, told us that his calls to the police for help with neighborhood vandals were repeatedly ignored. Finally, he decided to change his voice to sound like that of a woman when calling. When he mimicked a woman, he told us, he got a "quick response."

Michelle Stewart reported lying about her age to a hospital in order to receive emergency room treatment. Because she was only 17 at the time, the first hospital she visited would not treat her without her parents' permission. Although she had been living independently for two years, having had no contact with her abusive parents, she realized that in the hospital's understanding of its legal obligations she was a dependent minor. Since she could not change her family situation in order to conform to hospital rules, she went to a different hospital and changed her age, matter-of-factly telling them she was 18.

In these two instances, Jesus Cortez and Michelle Stewart acted on an understanding of organizational behavior, an understanding acquired through experience and learning. These and other respondents presented themselves as whatever they needed to be—whether a (presumably) more vulnerable woman, an adult without family to help or support her, a naïve litigant, or a maid, as we will illustrate below—in order to instigate organizational action.

Often, however, the manipulation of roles as a form of resistance is not deceptive but, rather, selective. People may not so much assume a false role as selectively invoke or present themselves in a role to which they can lay legitimate claim, though perhaps more appropriately in another setting. A person's ability to invoke any particular role, for purposes of resistance or conformity, draws upon their store of cultural and social capital, their experience and knowledge of alternative roles, and the likelihood that the performance will be accepted as genuine. One of our respondents, a 45-year-old African-American woman we call Millie Simpson, told us how she deflected the consequences of court-ordered punishment, imposed for failing to report an automobile accident and for possession of an unregistered vehicle. When she was required by the court to do 30 hours of community service, Millie used her well-rehearsed role of churchgoer and veteran volunteer to offer service at the church she already attended and provided service for many more than 30 hours a

month. In this way Millie Simpson prudently invoked a role that defined the situation in a way that escaped the unwanted claims of power (criminal punishment for a court decision that was subsequently overturned, as it turns out, after she completed the mandated community service [Ewick and Silbey 1992]).

The choice of what role to invoke in a situation, of course, is not simply a matter of freely picking from a catalog of possibilities. Some role possibilities are not sanctioned, and the legitimacy and viability of role performances are not equally dispersed among populations. Middle-aged females of any race are more likely to successfully masquerade as churchgoers and volunteers than are young, unemployed men. Moreover, the behavior associated with some roles may also be the privileged knowledge of particular classes. Nonetheless, although the cultural capital and probabilities associated with varying roles are unequally distributed, people do have at their disposal an array of roles on which they strategically draw in their efforts to mobilize and shape the direction of power in social transactions. Hoodfar (1991), for example, reports that some lower-middle-class Egyptian women have returned to wearing a veil in order to continue working in the public sphere without censure. Many of the women with whom she spoke reported that they wear a veil in order to avoid criticisms by family members and neighbors for working outside the home and moving about in public. Ironically, then, these Egyptian women rely on a traditional symbol of female subordination in order to achieve a level of autonomy and financial security.

In another story we collected, Aida Marks, a 55-year-old African-American woman, expressed her understanding of the sources and organization of institutionalized authority and how it might be duped to her benefit. Marks relied upon a feature of racial and gender employment subordination—African-American women's employment as housekeepers for white middle-class and upper-class families—to secure service from the telephone company when calls for repair went unanswered. Unable to get results through the normal channels, Marks called the president of the telephone company. Although such officers are insulated from consumer complaints by layers of bureaucratic hierarchy, Aida Marks was able to cut through the organizational barriers by invoking a role that legitimated such access.

Interviewer: How did you finally get service?

Marks: I start at the top because the people in the middle want to move to the top and the ones at the bottom can't help you, they're in the same situation you're in. So I always, that's how I got to meet Robert A— [the president of the phone company], I called over there first and I told them I was his maid.

By claiming to be the corporate president's housekeeper, she was immediately put through to him, voiced her complaints about her inadequate telephone service, and was very soon visited by an expert team of repair persons. Marks drew on her racially marked speech and her knowledge of the back doors of formal organizations to manipulate a conventional expectation that African-American women serve as domestic workers for white elites, thus circumventing her lack of power in her legitimate consumer role.

Rule Literalness

Where masquerade is based on a recognition that social interaction is based on roles, *rule literalness* is based on an appreciation that all transactions are governed by rules. Because rules commit organizations to lines of predictable action, rules create both opportunities to resist and means of resistance. They can be counted on but also displaced. The incompleteness and openings in any rule system provide opportunities that resisters can exploit (Beckert 1999). This might involve finding a lacuna within a network of rules, a space that, by virtue of not being governed or defined, becomes momentarily free of control. Or, it might involve subverting the purpose of the rule by rigidly observing it. *Rule literalness* is based on the understanding that most transactions, while governed by rules, can run smoothly only if rules are systematically overlooked, bent, stretched, and otherwise ignored. Even within highly rationalized settings such as bureaucracies, rules must be applied with significant discretion and restraint for effective functioning. Recognizing this, persons create disturbances by willfully refusing to participate in these routine violations. Sometimes people elevate a rule to a general principle (Simmel 1950) and apply it in unanticipated circumstances to the disadvantage of more powerful others. By its very conformity to the explicit language of a rule, this form of resistance challenges and disrupts power by holding it accountable to its own rationality, subverting the purpose of a rule by rigidly observing it.

When he was arrested on a Saturday for driving without insurance, Michael Chapin was compelled to put up \$500 in cash as bail to guarantee his return to court for a hearing on Monday. In court, Chapin provided the evidence that there had been an error in the police insurance record and that indeed he had been insured at the time of his arrest. The charges were dismissed. At that point, he demanded that the court return the \$500 in cash.

Then they try to write me a check for my money back and I wouldn't accept it. I made a big stink. I said I want my cash back. I gave you cash,

I want cash back. . . . I said I don't care what you have to do. I don't care if you have to print the money up. I want cash money. You didn't trust me for a check, I don't trust you either. I made them open the safe. [The judge] came back to see what I was yelling at the clerk, telling her I want my money.

In this case, Chapin appropriated the court's rules requiring that payments be in cash only and used them against the court. He could demand that cash refund from the court, which normally sent refund checks, because the court claimed to deal equally with all parties. By insisting that he be treated according to the court's own criterion for cash transactions, Chapin challenged its usually unquestioned prerogative.

Precisely because such practices are not defined or identified by the "laws of the place" (De Certeau 1984), they do not disobey those laws. By remaining scrupulously within the rules, a challenge may be indecipherable (within the rules) and remain invulnerable to control. More important, the moral claim of a challenge remains unsullied by counterclaims of deviance. Because stories of resistance make justice claims, this moral positioning of the storyteller is sometimes more important than any material benefit.

Much informal resistance thus consists not so much of transgression as of hyperconformity to rules. Some respondents acknowledge the power of literalness by writing their own rules, relying on the power of the informal, implied contract to relieve themselves of otherwise asserted obligations. George Kofie claimed that he did not pay medical bills when hospitals insisted on double-billing him. With a knowing wink, he told us how he manages this.

When I go to the emergency room, I have a hospital bill, and a separate doctor bill. . . . I pay the hospital. Then I get a bill from some outside source for the treatment that I received in the hospital. This happens every time you go. And I've never been able to get any response from these people who send the bill. . . . I send letters telling them to explain to me the medical attention, then I will pay the bill. I don't get responses, then I don't pay it. [Int.: You don't pay the doctor bill?] I don't pay. I pay the hospital bill. . . . If the doctor is working in the hospital, why do I need to [pay him]? I go to the hospital and I pay the emergency room bill. Why do I pay twice? I don't pay unless I get the proper response. . . . When I go to my doctor's office, I don't get a bill from the hospital.

Rule literalness, or technical obedience, constitutes one of the most common ways in which persons manage their encounters with others who make compelling demands: ordinary citizens, legal agents, or organizations. It echoes the often repeated criticism of bureaucracy gone awry. Bradley Spears offered an analysis of how bureaucracies become unre-

sponsive, and how hierarchy, which we will discuss further just below, and structure underwrite power. Describing a state office, he told us,

If you don't dot an *i*, you jeopardize your complaint. . . . I'd like to re-organize their hiring practices, or training practices, so that the people who deal with the public are able to make decisions, are able to make judgment calls. I think they have no discretionary power, so consequently, if the dot on the *i* is upside down, they reject it. I think sometimes, there has to be some discretion used.

Disrupting Hierarchy

We were told stories about a third and familiar means of resistance: willfully ignoring hierarchy and with it the lines of authority, respect, and duty that are attached. Transactions among persons of different degrees of power and authority rely on a silent but mutual recognition of those differences. Because hierarchical deference so often goes without saying, ignoring these structural differences is disruptive precisely because it requires power to articulate itself. By demanding power to own up to itself, it calls what is more conventionally a bluff. In one form of disruption of hierarchy, another person's authority is appropriated and used against them.

Having, over the years, been subjected to numerous forms of harassment and humiliation at the hands of the local police, one woman described her response in one such instance.

I was riding down Hadden Avenue one day and the cop pulled up in back of me. All of a sudden, [the cop] turned on his lights and siren noise. Scared the mess out of me. I almost hit a parked car. And the only thing he did it for was to pass the light. Then he turned everything off and was cruising on down the road, you know? And I very nicely cruised on down the road and pulled him over and told him exactly what I thought about it. [Int.: What did he say?] I didn't appreciate it. He laughed. I told him you wouldn't be laughing if I turned his badge number in . . . because they are supposed to observe all speed laws just like we are if they are not on call.

Michelle Stewart provided a similar example of inverting the lines of authority and responsibility that define common relationships. She told us that as a teenager she had feared her mother's reckless driving when her mother had been drinking. After futilely pleading with her mother not to drive, Michelle directed her parent to the local police station.

I went with my mother one time when she was really drunk, like when I was fourteen. She was an alcoholic. She was always drinking and driving and crashing her car and everything. And I would get pissed off when she

would come to pick up my friends and she'd be like that. She endangered us. So, I brought her into the police department. I called her on her bluff. She told me she wasn't drunk and I called her on it. She goes, I'm not drunk, let's go get a Breathalyzer. So I went there with her, and she was obviously drunk and driving a child, me.

Michael Chapin told us another story, this time not about something that happened, but about something he wished had happened. His story revealed, however, the same insight about how making lines of authority explicit exposes the sources of power too often overlooked. Not wanting to remain passive in the face of what he believed was blatant union corruption, Chapin plotted to invert the relationship between the carpenter's union to which he belonged and its members.

My latest crazy idea was to picket the local. Get a hundred guys with signs. Call up the TV station, call up the newspapers and go down there and put them into shame. Shame them into doing something right. To change what's going on down there.

Had he arranged the picketing against the union local as he imagined he might, Chapin would have challenged the union's fiduciary relationship to the workers. More important, he would have made explicit the way in which union and management interests were aligned rather than contested, creating the corruption he was complaining about.

In these ways, asymmetrical lines of authority are reversed: a citizen stops a police officer, or a child usurps a parent's authority by reporting her mother's drunk driving to the police, or a union member envisions picketing his own local. In each instance, a person forces someone occupying a higher social position to make explicit the prerogatives of that status and to demand rather than simply to expect deference. The resistant acts impose costs by requiring those who would likely exercise greater power to use additional resources to reestablish authority (Parsons 1966).

In a second form of disrupting hierarchy, persons described the way in which they refused to acknowledge a line of authority or chain of command. One of the most common forms of resistance entails "leapfrogging" over layers of bureaucratic hierarchy. By reporting problems to those higher in the organization, people are also able to escalate the significance of their complaint, converting it from an individual into an organizational problem. Aida Marks incorporated this tactic in her story of her masquerade as a maid.

Sophia Silva told us her favorite story about her experience as a frustrated consumer.

When my children were young, my washer kept overflowing and I was

doing washes by the dozen, so I kept calling the repair place. They came and they kept fixing motors in it. This was costing us, and we were a young couple. Anyway, nothing was happening and I called, I think it was the General Electric number, and I called the company and I got the president of the company. And the secretary said, "I'm sorry, he's not available." And I said, "Well, I am going to call him until he is." So she said, "Hold on a minute." And he came on, and said how can I help you? I started to cry, I was so nervous. And he said, "Now you sit down and you tell me the whole story." And I told him the whole story That I have all these bills in front of me and I have this machine that does not work and nothing has been done. He said, "Don't you worry ma'am, it'll be taken care of." And five minutes later after we hung up, I got a call from a service company . . . out on Route 22, or something, and they came up and they fixed it. I mean, I don't mind paying for things, but . . . This is my favorite story

By going "to the top," respondents achieve three objectives. First, there is a high probability of having the concrete demands met. When superordinates are informed, the problem is usually remedied quickly. Many respondents discussed the routes they follow to get to the top. Gretchen Zinn cautioned, however, that this is a difficult climb. "I think you have to start through the regular channels though, or else they're going to send you back to that."

Second, by going to the top, respondents let higher-ups—the supposedly competent and responsible members of the organization—know about what is going on among their subordinates. Because it is often undesired information, the person who leapfrogs through bureaucratic hierarchy not only disturbs the official sequence of movement and action, she also introduces unwelcome information, or "institutional noise." David Majors, another union member, told us that the higher-ups in any organization or management "don't want any problems." Nonetheless, each level in the organization has its attention focused on those below as well as on those above (Emerson 1983). Respondents use this feature of organizational hierarchy as a wedge for their claims. Telling us about the state bureau of social services, David Majors commented,

On many occasions . . . I was forced to deal with their supervisors, and I usually got satisfaction out of them. Only because, you know, they don't want any problems . . . If I couldn't get the answer that I wanted to hear, and knew that should be forthcoming . . . [if] they were just putting it on the back of the table, and saying, you know, "I got all this work in front of me, I'm not going to do it," all you had to do was talk to their supervisor, and they're going to do it. Because that supervisor doesn't want to hear any grief from upstairs. Because if I don't get satisfaction out of him, I'm going elsewhere.

By reporting problems to those higher in the organization, respondents

are able to call forth higher authority to retaliate (for them) against those who have been obstructing the attempts at redress.

Third, going to the top of an organization allows respondents to experience a measure of agency and freedom that the bureaucratic processes of large organizations normally stifle. It is no doubt this satisfaction that accounts for the fact that one of Sophia Silva's "favorite stories" concerned the washing machine repair. The satisfaction of being heard is often enough for people to pursue this strategy even in situations they define as futile.

I don't necessarily think that it [letter writing and calling officials] has any value. For example, when we just went through the Persian Gulf War, I called different legislators in our state. I called each one of them and got myself, my opinion heard. (Gretchen Zinn)

I think on a couple of occasions [I sent] copies of the letter to the governor's office. Knowing the system, having access to the books and whatnot, it's pretty easy to find out what the chain of command is and to write. Not that it gets you anywhere. (Bradley Spears)

I go to whoever his superior is. I write a letter, not knowing, you know, if the letter would do any good or not. But I put it down in writing, my grievances. (Sophia Silva)

Other respondents also talked about letter-writing campaigns and barages of registered packages directed to the homes of corporate executives. Although legal resources, such as consumer protection laws, are widely available, most consumers understand that mobilizing these laws is unreasonably demanding for most of the small, daily transactions in which they feel cheated, misled, or ignored. Instead, citizens forgo the law and find ways of directly negotiating their disputes. These often involve some form of leapfrogging in which people rely on the shape of the organizational hierarchy and patterns of accountability to enhance their claims.

Foot-Dragging or Taking Time

Modern rationalization of social action converts time into units (minutes, days, weeks, or years) as a foundation for organizing complex social relations. Rather than understanding time as passing in an indivisible, continuous stream, one sees it as a set of distinct elements that can be abstracted, partitioned, calculated, and mapped onto social interactions as a mechanism of regulation and control. Shaped by temporal rhythms that are often inconsistent with subjective experiences of time, the more disciplined and formally distributed interactions within modern organiza-

tions are often experienced not merely as an interruption but as a confiscation of private life. One of the most common forms of resistance to the discontinuities and incongruities of contemporary time reckoning is *foot-dragging*, or *taking time*. Note that we did not use the more familiar construction "taking *one's* time." As a form of resistance, the time taken in foot-dragging is not that of the resister. It is time that belongs to one's employer, one's creditor, to anyone who defines and controls behavior in terms of time. In this regard, foot-dragging is a modern form of resistance that depends on, even as it defies, the rationalization of time.

Thus, when people cannot resolve disagreements with those whose profit depends on time rationalization, they sometimes accept defeat by complying but at a pace and in a manner that exacts its own price. As one woman involved in a credit-card dispute said, in these circumstances "I try to get a little of my own back," however she can. Although the motive may be to avoid what is perceived to be an unfair charge, the response is to comply in a way that disarms retribution. Rita Michaels said that a hospital unfairly charged her for being a subject in one of their medical experiments because they had not told her of the cost when they solicited her participation. Because the hospital was not charging interest on the statement, she took time in paying the bill.

It was \$250. And he sent me a bill for that, and I questioned it. And he told me what it was for. Every month I'd get a bill. It would say if you don't pay this bill, we're going to send you to a collection agency. I paid it ten dollars a month. I could've paid it all off in one shot, but I should have been told about [the costs up front]. . . . I did it to be a pest, you know. You can't take me to court if I'm making at least an effort to pay.

Anticipating problems, some people use time to avoid or minimize what they believe is their victimization. When asked if she had ever had problems with rental housing, such as having her security deposit withheld, Sima Rah responded:

[Laughter.] No. I laugh because we don't give the owner a chance to withhold our security. If we know we have to move, we don't pay that month's rent, which is our security. Because we know these landlords. They won't give your security back

Recognizing the value of time, people report "taking" it in compensation for losses that cannot be redeemed in other ways. Although Nell Pearson could not get full compensation from the insurance company for her losses in a car accident, when the opportunity arose she managed to make the insurance company lawyer "spend" the money she should have received. When he called her to negotiate a lower settlement, she used her knowl-

edge of lawyers' billing practices (where labor is reckoned to the minute) and kept him on the phone for as long as would likely equal the difference in what the insurance company offered and she wanted.

They turned it over to their insurance company, and I got a call from the insurance company's lawyer, wanting to settle the night before the small claims hearing. And we were haggling over \$50. I had already decided that he probably wasn't going to pay me the \$50 but I would get \$50 of his time on the telephone. So, after about a half an hour, he was screaming. . . . And he said, "I'm just going to have to see you in small claims." I knew he didn't want to go. It was too small an amount of money. So I said, "That's okay, you don't have to do it, I've gotten my \$50 out of you," and he said, "Is that what you were doing?" And I said, "Yeah. I know what lawyers are worth." And he said, "You've got your \$50."

In this way, foot-dragging is a means of exercising some control within situations in which little opportunity for control exists. As these examples illustrate, foot-dragging is less of a refusal (to pay, or act, or work) than it is an assertion of some level of autonomy in the course of complying.

Colonizing Space, Camping Out

Modern power can be defined in terms of a set of distinctive spatial as well as temporal practices. In large part, these practices involve the enclosure of space and the containment of individuals within enclaves such as those factories, schools, hospitals, barracks, and, more recently, shopping malls. The typically unarticulated norms regarding the occupation of these spaces (who will be where, for what purpose, and for how long) present abundant opportunities for disrupting power (Rofel 1992; Shields 1989).

It is also true that law not only regulates but occupies space, most importantly by privileging writing and inscription. By converting human transactions into written documents such as files, cases, transcripts, or police reports, relationships and situations are concretized, objectified, transformed into static objects. These written documents freeze thoughts, words, and transactions, imparting to them a greater fixity and truth value within the epistemological sphere of the law. Unable to penetrate the legal texts, many persons and groups remain unrecognizable in a world of paper, precedent, and archive. Even those who are able to enter the law's text often cannot control where they are placed or deployed. Having entered law's textualized realm, they are easily confined by it. Through inscription, words and transactions are given an existence apart from their authors.

In their dealings with bureaucracies, including legal bureaucracies, people often report, for instance, being transformed into "a case," which is

then filed away and forgotten. In many of the stories we heard, the privileging of texts and other forms of inscription were recognized as a central ordering principle of law (cf. Smith 1987, 1990). For example, Aida Marks told us a story in which she displayed her appreciation of the power of documents to organize social relations, enabling some and disempowering others. After her son Ronald had been shot, he was brought to a hospital that Marks believed provided substandard care to nonwhite patients. On the advice of a family doctor, she tried unsuccessfully to arrange for Ronald's transfer to another hospital. When she failed to persuade the hospital doctors and administrators to transfer Ronald, the medical records hanging on the end of his bed presented an opportunity to move him. Knowing that these records are the only official recognition of a patient's existence, Marks was able to make her son "disappear" from the hospital along with the papers.

I went up there at eight o'clock in the morning after Dr. Abraham told me to get him out of there. I had that big bag from Avon with me and this silly old nurse up there . . . , she gave me all of Ronald's records [to look at how he was doing]. So I pushed them down into my bag. . . . They didn't care whether he went, I don't think. They couldn't find those records. They was havin' fits.

After the "silly old nurse" mistakenly handed her Ronald's medical records, Aida Marks seized the opportunity to do what she could not do through direct means—transfer Ronald to a better hospital. Recognizing her relative powerlessness in the situation, Marks did not directly contest or question the authority of the doctors, nurses, or hospital administrators. Yet even without openly defying the professionals, she successfully disabled them by depriving them of their forms of privileged communication. Perhaps most revealing of her understanding of the role of textualization in the formal institutional world of the hospital was her observation that the nurses and doctors ultimately didn't care whether Ronald went, but they cared deeply whether the papers went. They were, she said, "having fits" about that, not about Ronald.

With regard to practices in physical geographical space, Martha Lee described how she would respond to a good friend who did not return an expensive tool he borrowed. She could cry, she suggested, or "camp out on their front porch until they gave it back to me. I don't think I would sue my friend." Thus, to Martha Lee, intentionally and obstinately being "out of place," occupying her neighbor's front porch, represents a more efficient and legitimate means of seeking compensation than those provided by law.

Sophia Silva described how she had learned this tactic of colonizing space, how she used it to get service in a department store when she was

being ignored, and how she subsequently taught the strategy to a young mother having difficulty getting service at Sears.

I was in Sears one day, and this young girl was there with all these children around her. . . . She had bought a vacuum cleaner like a week before and it did not work, and they were telling her to mail it back [to the manufacturer]. . . . And she was distraught. I said to her, "Don't you move." I said, "You stay there, you'll have to stay two or three hours until they give you a new one." And I kept coming back to check, and they did give her a new one.

Finally, Joan Walsh told us that she learned the usefulness of colonizing space by observing other parents who were "pushy advocates" for their kids. Sensitive about being a member of the "working-class in a snooty suburb," and about the fact that her son had some special learning needs, Walsh decided to occupy the guidance counselor's office at her son's high school because the counselor was not providing the paperwork her son needed for his college applications.

My son wasn't getting any place [trying to obtain a copy of his transcript]. So, one morning, I got up and I dressed nicely. Not jeans, but I got dressed nicely. And, I went to school with him at 7:30 in the morning and I went to the guidance waiting room and I sat in the chair and I said I'm going to sit here until I talk to him. And when he walked in and realized I was sitting with my son—because he recognized my son—he was very friendly. . . . So I got results. . . . But I feel that if I hadn't done that he'd probably, he may have missed out on the only school he wanted to go to, because they weren't sensitive to his needs. So I don't like to have to interfere like that but I learned back in elementary school when other mothers used to do it, and I used to be the type who didn't say much and sat back, that other parents were getting what their kids needed for them. . . . So I had to change my way and I had to start speaking up.

The spaces occupied are not only physical places or discursive texts. Odette Hurley described how her neighbors got together to occupy the police telephone lines in order to get help with some dog packs running around the town. Although she had called each time she had seen the dogs, the police never responded. "And finally when all the neighbors kind of formed together and started timing their calls, and we'd just call one right after another and kept calling and calling until they finally came and cleaned them up."

Here, as with other forms of resistance, the shape and form of defiance described in the stories derived from an appropriation of the structural resources of spatialization against which it was poised. Frustrated or defrauded consumers, taxpayers, and counseling clients challenge the rationalized processes that transform their grievances and problems into

manageable cases by insisting on being physically present. Unarticulated understandings about such matters as how long one stays in a department store or how hospitals authorize medical procedures are the grounds upon which such resistances operate. By recognizing and using these conventional expectations, previously ignored claims, requests, or pleas for help are heard.

DISCUSSION

Through the plotting of words and action, stories have the capacity to extend temporally, spatially, and socially what might otherwise be individual, momentary transactions. In this capacity, stories of resistance are no different than other stories. They differ, however, by the type of account they offer of the organization of action. Resistance stories display an understanding by the storyteller that social action in modern societies is organized primarily through social roles, rules, hierarchy, time, or space. In the stories of resistance, these standard aspects of social structure are used to reverse what the protagonist experienced as an unfair situation of subordination. Describing strategies that involved an opportunistic appropriation of just those features of modern legal and bureaucratic organization that sociologists use to describe social realities, stories of resistance illustrate Garfinkel's (1964) claim that not only sociologists do sociology. The content of these stories thus reflects and mobilizes the common experiences of relative powerlessness that social structures produce and hegemony often obscures. Thus, when everyday forms of resistance are turned into stories depicting the work of social structures, they are not individualistic, temporary, or inconsequential.

As the preceding analysis shows, these stories of legal encounters bear the central marks of resistance, as we have defined it. In each narrative, our respondent displayed a consciousness of being less powerful in a relationship of power. Aida Marks, Mike Chapin, Nell Pearson, Sophia Silva, Sima Rah, Michelle Stewart, George Kofie, and each of the other protagonists in the resistance stories we heard recognized that they could not get what they needed or wanted through conventional channels. Whether it was an appliance or phone repair, a hospital transfer, a cash refund, or full compensation for automobile damage, neither the legally protected rights of the individuals nor the obligations of the institutions with whom they were dealing were honored in what seemed like a routine matter. Thus, each of the protagonists experienced himself or herself powerless in the situation—as it stood.

Second, in each of these stories, the storyteller either implies or announces the unfairness of her disadvantage. They described their situa-

tions to us as problems, injustices, failures that "shouldn't be" or "should be otherwise." The "should be otherwise" expresses the sense that the institutionalized dynamics not only produced costs but were also wrong.

Third, each of our storytellers also saw an opportunity—using the resources at hand—to turn the situation around so that she got what she wanted. In each of these practices, the resisters recognized (and grasped) opportunity through their understanding of the structural resources of power. By appropriating specific roles and rules, hierarchical status and deference, the time and space of the opponent, resisters reveal their sociological skills. The sociological basis of the action displays the collective (i.e., structural) rather than individualistic and idiosyncratic nature of the acts. The resisters rely on, as they appropriate, features of the common shared social structure and culture. Moreover, these appropriations are more than momentary or transitory. If structure is built from the ground up through daily practice, as relational theories of power suggest, acts of resistance, as much as acts of conformity, are part of the constitution of structure (and of power itself).

Finally, and perhaps most importantly for our argument, the limited and patterned character of the resisters' tactics suggests that they are part of a common, albeit submerged, stock of knowledge. That knowledge is generally communicated through narratives that display common features: temporality, normativity, emplotment (constraints and capacities that help organize the action). Because people tell stories about these acts, the acts live beyond the moment, the locales, and the particular actors. Too much of the debate over the significance of everyday resistance overlooks this transformation of acts of resistance (which are defined as momentary and opportunistic) into narratives of resistance. These narratives are neither automatic nor inevitable results of the acts. The stories we were told about people's routine encounters with legal officials, with bureaucracy, and other forms of institutional authority are not simply passive representations of past events. They are a result of creative processes of selection, interpretation, and emplotment (arrangement and organization). If it makes sense to think about social processes themselves as being narratives, then these stories can be used, as we illustrate, to display and analyze the characteristic patterns in those narratives (Abbott 1992).

These stories are evidence, then, of more than a consciousness of structure. They also contain possible means for making future claims on structure, because they convey knowledge of how social structure works, how in particular instances it has been upended. Within the story, resistance is displayed and, thus, becomes "thinkable." What had been taken for granted is now revealed and made explicit. The understanding of how to disturb structure that is represented in the narrative can be used in other situations, by others, to impede the routine exercise of power. By telling

stories of one's success against power, what was personal, private, individual, and momentary is now shared, collective, and part of the "social process . . . a network of stories flowing into the present and the future" (Abbott 1992, p. 438).

CONCLUSION

In this article we have conceptualized and examined narratives of resistance to law and legal authority. We have suggested that individual acts of resistance become consequential as they are transformed into stories and, as such, live beyond the momentary, perhaps ephemeral, victory. As important, although we have not emphasized this, the stories are often told with enormous delight, and are often described as special pleasures—as Sophia Silva said, "This is my favorite story." Such satisfaction is not to be ignored. Thus, these "hidden transcripts" (Scott 1990), or "tales of the unrecognized" (De Certeau 1984, p. 68), are important in their own right. They remind us that "our practical daily activity contains an understanding of the world—subjugated perhaps, but present" (Hartsock 1990, p. 172; cf. Garfinkel 1964). As Sophia Silva suggests, the moments of resistance are often the most memorable parts of the journey. To ignore these tactics because they are momentary and often private is to reinscribe the power relations and social structure they oppose. To overlook these interventions is to deny their meaning within the particular lives, biographies, and relationships of everyday social life. But do they have any macrosociological meaning?

What is the relationship between the individually produced narratives of resistance (that typically account for individual acts of everyday subversion) and more collective stories that are developed and shared by social movement participants? Aminzade (1992, p. 458) suggests that "analytic narratives—theoretically structured stories about coherent sequences of motivated actions—can contribute to the construction of explanations of why things happened the way they did." By allowing us to develop a notion of "causality based on narrativity and the centrality of meaning, sequence, and contingency," these stories bridge individual micro events to the macro analyses of sociological theory. In order to more fully understand the role of narrative in challenging power and perhaps precipitating and sustaining collective practices, we need additional detailed empirical evidence regarding the processes through which the stories of individual acts of resistance accumulate. This task will require that we focus less on the precipitating events and, instead, excavate the gradual transformations achieved, symbolically or materially, in the months or years preceding and following those events. At what point do the schemas

embedded in the individual narratives convert into collective frames? In other words, we need to be attentive to incremental changes that may have escaped our analyses. To this end, we need to devise ways of measuring the long narratives of history, the seemingly endless plots that appear to lead nowhere but that may accumulate to produce new social relations and yet newer narratives.

Cultural analysts have begun to unearth some of the stories circulating at the margins rather than at the center (Brunvand 1981, 1984; Turner 1993). Fine (1992), for example, has mapped networks of diffusion for contemporary urban legends among adolescents and consumers, and Turner (1993) among minority communities. Future research might productively explore variations in both the narratives and the conditions that produced them for both informally and formally organized resistance. Moreover, research on historical events rather than on myths and legends is also needed. Polletta (1998, 2000) has begun this work in her study of the early organization of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC). She suggests that a particular narrative of SNCC's genesis—that it was spontaneous, spreading like a fever that just overtook people—was essential for the transformation into a continuing movement and organization. Although not entirely factual, "the narrative of sit-ins, told by many tellers, in more or less public settings, and in which spontaneity was a central theme, helped to constitute 'student activist' as a new collective identity and to make high risk activism attractive" (Polletta 1998). Pfaff (1996) suggests that circulating stories played an important role in mobilizing East Germans during the periods of quiet opposition that ultimately culminated in the regime's demise. "Though they were politically subordinated, ordinary East Germans expressed grievances and nurtured opposition in small circles of confidants" (p. 91).

Examining the role of storytelling in collectivizing resistance, we might also assess the consequence of variable patterns of production for different types of stories and storytellers—comparing, for instance, the accounts of professional scholars to stories such as those we have described, which are produced as and circulate as oral accounts in the course of everyday social interaction. Thus we might consider how and when producing accounts of resistance becomes a professional project and how dissemination may vary as a condition of the professionalization of production. In this vein, we note that jokes and songs as well as personal anecdotes convey narrative accounts of power and how it might be countered, and that these are often professional products. For example, Gordy (1999) has written of the political role of rock-and-roll music, and in particular of the emergence of rock as a genre of resistance under the totalitarian regime

of Milosevic and his Socialist Party of Serbia (see also Cushman 1995).⁹ And Garofolo (1992) reminds us that the song "We Shall Overcome" evolved from a religious hymn to a labor song to a protest song during the Civil Rights movement, thus vividly articulating different versions of powerlessness and protest.

These examples suggest that the narratives of resistance and opposition may carry distinctive historical trajectories. As part of the project of excavating these histories and their role in producing structural and political changes, sociological study can focus on the networks of circulation that lead to their vitality or morbidity. In order to do this, we will need to identify the paths through which tales of resistance circulate, paying particular attention to points of rapid diffusion as well as to the points at which stories are no longer told or shared. What are the features of narratives (whether songs, jokes, or anecdotes) that circulate widely? Because all storytelling relies on shared vocabularies of motive, it is likely that stories of resistance will circulate within networks of similarly situated persons who share not only the experience but the repertoire of cultural schema with which to make sense of it (Scott and Lyman 1968). What is the implication of this pattern for successfully challenging hegemonic situations? What narrative features determine the adaptability or transposability of a story, joke, or song under different regimes of power or contexts of struggle? Future research might focus on how stories are heard in different networks, how they are received by higher-ups (versus peers) in a hierarchical relationship. Research might also consider how narratives change within specific contexts of retelling. Are some contexts more conducive to elaborations of the narrative stream? Is there evidence that stories of resistance circulate and among whom? Some of our interviewees characterized their stories as having been told before, prefacing their tales with a statement such as "this is my favorite story," or "I have a good story I often tell." And, do people mark their stories as having transformative effects on themselves or others? This is a large research agenda, one that might help us map the important connections between micro interactions and macro structural formations.

By telling stories of moments of triumph against a relatively more powerful opponent—if only to sociological interviewers—individuals make and write histories that transcend temporally and spatially both the moment of action and the moment of authorship. Importantly, transcending the moment does not have a necessary valence with respect to re-

⁹ One band called themselves *Partijrejkers* (phonetically "party wreckers"). The ambiguity of the word "party" in their name allowed them to express their opposition to Milosevic's regime under cover of what was more typically construed as a hedonistic reference to themselves as rock musicians.

versing the trajectories of institutionalized power: some resistant practices may fortify existing arrangements (e.g., Bourgois 1998), while others may transform a nation (Polletta 1998). In any case, storytelling is one method of collectivizing and disseminating practices of resistance by contributing cultural knowledge of how power operates through institutionalized structures. These narratives of resistance need to be understood "not as limited by a time bound frame . . . but as constituents of a sequential social course of action through which various subjectivities are related" (Smith 1990, p. 221). Thus by narratively taking a stance against the law, our respondents not only revealed their understandings of power and identity, they actively constructed legality and subjectivity. The story stands not simply as a representation of events as they occurred but as a creative act of articulating the structural bases of power, as a political act of making a moral claim on power, and as a challenge to hegemony in its own right. By recalling moments when they faced power, and relating how they found and exploited cracks in legality's institutional façade, these people enacted and communicated conceptions of self that insisted on human agency and dignity. Relying on humor and bravado, their stories recount and celebrate either a reversal or an exposure of power. The fact that these tales are offered with smug pride or moral outrage indicates that behind the telling of the trick or humiliation lies a moral claim, if not about justice and the possibilities of achieving it, then about power and the possibilities of evading it.

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Book Reviews

Black Identities: West Indian Immigrant Dreams and American Realities.
By Mary C. Waters. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999.
Pp. xviii+413. \$36.95 (cloth); \$18.95 (paper).

John R. Logan
University at Albany, SUNY

Social scientists increasingly suspect that there is something special about how the latest wave of immigrants is settling into the U.S. metropolis. There are several reasons to expect a more difficult incorporation into the mainstream than was the experience of Europeans who arrived a century before. It is especially their children that are thought to be at risk, and the predominant expectation is that their assimilation will be segmented, with some finding a route toward upward mobility while others become integrated into an underclass in which they must give up both their ethnic distinctiveness and their hopes for economic success. Mary Waters examines this view in her field study of black immigrants from the Caribbean in New York. During 1991 and 1992 she and her assistants interviewed 202 people: employees of a food service company, high school teachers, and many young people with connections to predominantly Afro-Caribbean and African-American neighborhoods of Brooklyn.

Waters organizes the exposition in the following way: The first part of the book deals with adult immigrants. One remarkable chapter discusses how immigrants and black Americans confront unskilled low-wage jobs with little future in the food service industry, and how they deal with the strong racial stereotypes of their mostly white supervisors. Another discusses more generally how immigrants construct identities that juggle race, national origin, class, and gender. The second part of the book is about the situation of the next generation, including people who immigrated as children or who were born here of immigrant parents. Chapter 6 describes relationships within the family, especially the issue of parental control. Chapter 7 reveals the failures of neighborhoods and schools in Brooklyn's black enclaves. Chapter 8 explores how Afro-Caribbean youths develop racial and ethnic identities in this context.

On all of these topics the reader will find careful and sophisticated analyses, but the core contribution is on the issues of identity. Waters emphasizes the structural bases for people's choices about how to think of themselves—that is, identity as an outcome more than as a causal force. In her study of food service workers, for example, she demonstrates that having a transnational or Caribbean identity is a way to adapt more

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easily to the U.S. context of race relations, rather than an impediment to assimilation. An ethnic identity based on values such as hard work, unquestioning acceptance of harsh conditions, and low pay fits their job situation. As Afro-Caribbeans, immigrants discover, they receive preferential treatment by supervisors who have strong prejudices against black Americans, and they then adopt the same prejudices.

In a parallel way, young people born in the United States to immigrant parents or who immigrated as children also develop identities that match their experiences. Waters distinguishes three types. The first is "black Americans," who perceive their lives as tied to the racial barriers found in the United States. These are mainly youths from poor families, living in the inner city with little contact with whites. They are aware of their immigrant parents' disdain for black Americans, and certainly the parents associate black identity with downward mobility. Yet they reject that view and perceive that among blacks' better qualities is the willingness to "work hard and struggle" (p. 308). The second is "ethnic identified," who emphasize their Caribbean background to distance themselves from black Americans. This group is predominantly middle-class or suburban, or they are the higher performing students attending parochial school programs. These young people perceive that whites treat them, as Afro-Caribbeans, better than they treat blacks, and they feel that their ethnic values give them a better chance to be successful. In fact, their identity offers an explanation or legitimation of their success. The third group is "immigrant identified," able to juggle both an ethnic identity and acceptance of being black in the United States. These are mostly people who immigrated as children, for whom the "Caribbean" aspect of their identity is guaranteed by their speech or dress.

Waters places her findings in the context of the theory of segmented assimilation, which posits that resisting acculturation provides better opportunities to the second generation (p. 197). In her concluding chapter she accepts this formulation, asking why "becoming American" is now associated with less economic success (pp. 328-29). I believe her findings actually lead in a different direction. For Afro-Caribbeans, at least, her research shows that an "ethnic" identity can be understood as a form of assimilation. This ethnic identity is as much "an American-based identity" (p. 311) as is identification with U.S. blacks. But ethnic identity represents assimilation on the only available terms, "to claim an American identity as a member of a 'model minority'" (p. 330) and in this way to "make a case for cultural inclusion in American society" (p. 342).

Readers will appreciate the rich and thoughtfully selected ethnographic detail in this work, as well as its remarkably candid methodological appendix. By showing how racism so tightly constrains the choices of Caribbean immigrants, *Black Identities* offers key insights on the future of race relations in this country.

Lives in Translation: Sikh Youth as British Citizens. By Kathleen D. Hall. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2002. Pp. 259. \$55.00 (cloth); \$22.50 (paper).

Pamela Perry
University of California, Santa Cruz

Lives in Translation is an informed and theoretically astute analysis of how second-generation British Sikh fashion identities that are neither "purely" British nor Sikh, but hybrid "translations" that challenge the boundaries of what it means to be both. This work is firmly embedded within postmodern theories about and research on the ways immigrant and other identities are produced out of the relationship between social actors and social-discursive structures. The author, the anthropologist Kathleen D. Hall, advances on that literature by examining multiple spheres of cultural production (not one, like schools or politics) and illustrating how they interrelate in ways that open opportunities for creative self-construction by individuals.

Drawing on archival and ethnographic research in Leeds, England, Hall argues that discourses and social practices within law and politics, education, media, the family, and ethnic community come together in relational processes of "social incorporation"—the making of British "citizens"—but they do so in ambiguous and often contradictory ways. Their productive activity amounts to more than "assimilation" to the British norms (which is not possible given that British identity is constructed as an ascribed status) and more than "cultural maintenance" of Sikh identity and tradition (equally difficult if impossible when and where "traditions" are out of context and subject to competing expectations from the wider society). For second-generation Sikhs, the task is to sculpt a "third space" between the "two worlds" of British and Sikh identities and status communities. That third space amounts to the creative production of varied forms of cultural hybridity that shift across social contexts and time, often to reposition oneself with respect to locally prescribed norms and status hierarchies.

To elaborate on this argument, Hall illustrates and analyzes the cultural politics of the main "discursive fields" within Britain that construct, on the one hand, what it means to be "British" and/or an "ethnic minority" and, on the other hand, what it means to be "Sikh." She examines race relations legislation and educational policy in postwar Britain, highlighting the varied political and legal debates that have defined British citizenship. She points out how those discourses have rooted "authentic" British identity in primordial, racial terms and have replaced biologically based notions of difference between British and others with culturally based ones. Drawing on ethnographic research in a Leeds high school, Hall illustrates how this "ideology of British nationalism" works its way into educational policy and schooling practices, where essentialist notions

of British and Sikh identity and power are bolstered by racialized tracking, struggles for multicultural curricula and language rights, and a racialized norm versus other logic of social organization among students. As in U.S. schools, an ideology of meritocracy offers the opportunity for socioeconomic advancement of "minorities" through educational success, but the cost of that success is assimilation to the dominant cultural norm. Hall points out the contradiction between the achieved status conferred by meritocracy and the ascribed status of British nationalism and asserts that this is one of many sites where Sikh youths challenge normative identity boundaries.

Turning to the everyday lives of Sikhs in Britain, Hall examines what it means to be "Sikh." Of particular interest to Hall is the "ideology of family honor," which is sustained by maintaining the "purity" of caste membership through marrying into "good families" of the same caste. The concept of caste membership and identity is defined quite like British identity, as an ascribed identity within a status hierarchy. Therein lies the feeling among young British Sikhs of living in "two worlds" and the need to fashion something new, a third space—forms of cultural hybridity with which youths negotiate those worlds and push the boundaries of—and power relations embedded within—what it means to be British and Sikh.

This "third space" is the central claim of the book but is not illustrated until the last chapters of the text. Perhaps the deferral of that material was necessary in order to effectively examine and deconstruct the various discursive fields within which British Sikhs relationally and reflexively construct identities—a primary goal of the book and a commendable task in itself. The result, however, is that a tenuous thread holds Hall's argument together throughout much of the book. Hall's assertions are well backed by the literature, but as a reader I felt increasingly hungry for ethnographic substance to ground her claims. Moreover, I missed hearing more from Sikh youths themselves.

That said, *Lives in Translation* is highly effective in illustrating the multiple, intersecting, and sometimes contradictory spheres of cultural production that can act upon social agents as they creatively act to define themselves. Hall's adept synthesis of the literature on this subject in itself makes this book a fine resource for graduate students and professionals in political and cultural sociology and anthropology.

Looking West? Cultural Globalization and Russian Youth Cultures. By Hilary Pilkington, Elena Omel'chenko, Moya Flynn, Ul'iana Bliudina, and Elena Starkova. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. Pp. xix+300. \$49.95.

James Farrer
Sophia University

Since the late-Soviet era Russian youths have pursued Western fashions and danced to Western music. Many observers have taken this as evidence of a "Westernization" of Russian youths. However, Russian youth in the 1990s sometimes appeared fiercely nationalistic and anti-American. Does this mean the current generation has rejected the West? The authors of *Looking West* address these thorny questions in a qualitative survey of Russian youth cultures in the age of globalization. They argue that young Russians' appropriation of Western cultural practices is not blind imitation, but they also caution us against the latest theoretical discourses of localization and hybridization. Russian youths are not simply adapting foreign forms to make them more "Russian." For instance, Russian clubbers may see themselves as directly participating in global club cultures, while in other activities they emphasize the exclusive Russian nature of their practices. This pattern of "pick and mix" borrowing is organized through distinct local strategies of identity production.

The authors divide their informants into two main groups: progressive youths oriented to a particular scene or interest and normal (or mainstream) youths oriented toward neighborhood ties and mainstream pop. Progressives include such diverse groups as rock and metal fans, punks and skinheads, and groups the authors label "romantics," including Buddhists, folklorists, and hippies. One of the most striking of these latter romantic subcultures is the *Tolkinisty*, who organize games and pageants around the themes from J. R. R. Tolkien's *Lord of the Rings* series. Normals eschew subcultural musical tastes and embrace pop music and mainstream fashions. The authors caution that we cannot identify progressive youths with a greater openness to the West and normal youths with the consumption of local Russian products—both groups mix both global and local forms. For instance, progressive youths listen primarily to the latest global dance music or both Western and Russian rock, while normal youths listen to both Russian and Western pop or electronic dance music but rarely to rock music of any origin. Nor do Russian youths construct subcultural identities in the same ways as wealthier European and U.S. young people. For instance, consumption has *not* become the central practice through which Russian youths construct either progressive or normal identities. Instead, Russian youths tend to emphasize communication and the sharing of information. Indeed, youths tend to identify consumerism with the lifestyles of the "new Russians," the small group of nouveaux riches who can afford to purchase pricey brand goods.

Through a content analysis of media and focus group interviews with Russian youngsters the authors describe what the West means to Russian youths. First of all, they do indeed look west to Europe and the United States as sources of modern ideas and information. On the other hand, Russian youths see East Asia as offering little but traditional martial arts, mystical religions, and technologically sophisticated gadgets. There are, however, multiple Wests. While the United States is a cultural and economic leader and the home of many authentic subcultural forms, it also represents the worst aspects of Western culture and society for Russian youths—a materialistic society lacking spirituality and meaningful social ties. For Russian youths London is the progressive center of European youth culture, though otherwise English culture is perceived as conservative. Although Russian youths almost never include Russia in the category of the West, many provincial Russian youths perceive Moscow as being as much Western as Russian. In general, the West represents material affluence and artistic leadership, but it is not a source of spiritual values, which Russian youths associate with Russia itself. For instance, Western (dance or pop) music is described as “music for the body,” whereas Russian (rock, folk, or pop) is “music for the soul” (p. 225). Russian youths thus use the West as a foil for constructing Russian identities. As an example, stereotypes of Western men and women represent a contrasting Russian masculinity and femininity. Western women are perceived as independent and career-oriented, while Russian women are perceived as passive, pretty, and family-oriented. Western men are serious and hard-working, but lack the ability to “have fun” as Russian men do.

This volume is the result of an eight-year collaboration between researchers from the University of Birmingham and Ul'ianovsk State University. The Birmingham ties are evident in the focus on music, dance, and media consumption; imposing a theoretical and empirical focus that is informative but also limiting. “Postsubcultural” cultural studies emphasize how youths move among cultural scenes in a search for personal authenticity. The emphasis on various subcultural scenes leads the authors of *Looking West* to underplay other areas of youth life such as dating, sexuality, family, work, and school. We also learn little about the social structural factors that shape and limit cultural participation. The volume remains valuable, however, as a detailed empirical overview of Russian youths' cultural practices.

The Cultic Milieu: Oppositional Subcultures in an Age of Globalization. Edited by Jeffrey Kaplan and Heléne Lööw. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002. Pp. 353. \$75.00 (cloth); \$26.95 (paper).

James A. Beckford
University of Warwick

This collection of 10 contributions from a conference held in Sweden in 1997 ("Rejected and Suppressed Knowledge: The Racist Right and the Cultic Milieu") lies at the focal point of several different concerns. Its starting point is a classic essay by the British sociologist of religion, Colin Campbell, on what he termed "the cultic milieu," but the book's focus is much wider. It includes social movements, religious cultures of resistance, racist cultures, stigmatized knowledge, far-right ideologies, and the swelling protests against globalization and U.S. corporate culture.

The book begins with Colin Campbell's 1972 essay on the cultic milieu, although his name does not appear as one of the contributors. In fact, only half of the contributors cite his work, and Bron Taylor's chapter is the only one that deals adequately with the differences between his own characterization of the cultic milieu and Campbell's concept. This point is important if theorizing about the cultic milieu is to advance. Campbell identified the cultic milieu with ecumenism, syncretism, and tolerance among deviant religious and scientific ideas. But the editors and most of the contributors stress the oppositional character of today's cultic milieu and the paradoxical nature of relations between its constituent groups. In short, this book helps to put the notion of a cultic milieu on the sociological map but it could have gone further toward clarifying the notion's meaning.

Bron Taylor's comprehensive chapter on the wide diversity of religious and political currents that flow into "green radicalism" of the *Earth First!* type, denies that radical environmentalists and racist right-wingers could cohabit the same cultic milieu, although there may be some mutual influences. He clearly believes that there are limits to bricolage and tolerance among the environmentalists, who take inspiration from such varied sources as feminist Wicca, Native American spirituality, other New Age spiritualities, and anarchism. By contrast, Heléne Lööw's brief chapter emphasizes the relatively high degree of imbrication between ideologies centered on animal rights, environmentalism, and racism. She provocatively argues that they share similar notions of purity, impurity, and moral enemies. Mattias Gardell's chapter also suggests that the Nation of Islam has some strange ideological bedfellows. Strict notions of racial separation, he argues, paradoxically bring black separatists and white racialists together in a common cause that often includes anti-Semitism. The editors missed an opportunity to generate a debate about the points of agreement and disagreement between these three chapters.

Two chapters document the continuing persistence of cult-like Nazi

sympathies in the United States. Frederick Simonelli claims that the neo-Nazism associated with George Lincoln Rockwell and the World Union of National Socialists actually amplified the cultlike characteristics of Hitler's National Socialism. He supports this claim with evidence from Canada and Western Europe. Jeffrey Kaplan's chapter goes even further: his argument is that the alliance between U.S. Nazism, elements of Christianity, and the occult has actually grown stronger since the 1960s. The prominent role played by Charles Manson in providing an occult focus for white racialism and radical environmentalism receives special attention.

Religious oppositional subcultures are not always associated with racism, however. Timothy Miller's chapter recounts the history of dissident Mormon communities—but without utilizing the notion of a cultic milieu. László Kürti's chapter analyzes the spread of religious cults, shamanic practices, holistic healing, and dance-house music in Hungary since the early 1990s. His conclusion that Hungary has entered a cultic age in which people increasingly desert mainstream politics and culture to find consolation in "the marginal, the alternative and the semi-secretive world of the cultic" (p. 130) sounds alarmist. But Massimo Introvigne's chapter on the gothic milieu in Western youth subculture and on black metal satanism in particular makes no such alarmist claims. On the contrary, it stresses that this musical fashion with links to anti-Semitism appeals to a very small minority of young people.

The final two chapters in the book tackle the timeless question, Who will watch the watchers? Gordon Melton documents the historical twists and turns in anticult and countercult activities in the United States and Europe, whereas Laird Wilcox treats himself to a provocative attack on the "hidden background" and self-serving antics of four watchdog organizations—on the right and the left of the political spectrum—that monitor extremist groups. His conclusion is that watchdogs can be just as extreme and problematic as the groups that they are supposed to monitor.

The book displays some editorial weaknesses but it makes an original and valuable contribution to the sociology of "stigmatized knowledge." Despite the excessive length of some chapters and the outrageous number of endnotes, parts of the book will be invaluable reading for advanced undergraduate and graduate students on courses in social movements, sociology of religion, political sociology, and popular culture.

Global Networks, Linked Cities. Edited by Saskia Sassen. New York: Routledge, 2002. Pp. vii+368. \$26.95 (paper).

Mark Purcell
University of Washington

Saskia Sassen's new edited volume on global cities is a modest contribution to the literature on the new urban geography of the global system. Those at home with global cities literature will find much that is familiar and only a little that is new. For those not familiar with the literature, there are better books to begin with than this one (such as Sassen's earlier work). The "central effort" of the book, Sassen writes in the introduction, is "to contribute to the empirical and theoretical specification" of her thesis about interurban networks (p. 2). The book does so, she continues, by examining how cities in the global South operate in the hierarchy of global cities. She justifies the contribution of the book by saying "the fact that these cities are in the global South and in the mid-range of the global hierarchy provides a somewhat distinct cast" to the book's arguments (p. 3). What she finds most significant about examining cities in the South is that they allow "us to capture a dynamic in formation, unlike what is the case with global cities already well established" (p. 3). As the book unfolds, it becomes clear that these "dynamics in formation" are not used to rethink Sassen's thesis, but to reinforce it.

Sassen's introduction begins the book. She reiterates her influential and well-known thesis about the new centrality: the increasing geographical extension of economic activity has intensified the need for its coordination. Coordination activities have therefore proliferated, and they have tended to centralize geographically in particular cities because of the agglomeration economies that clustering creates and because of the importance of face-to-face interaction for maintaining trust in an increasingly complex business environment. Hence, global cities have become key locations in which global economic activity is organized. The remainder of the book is divided into three parts. Part 1 examines the "architecture of global networks." The first two pieces here stress the importance of telematics as physical infrastructure for interurban networks. The second two explore important methodological questions involved in examining such networks, and they make clear that we are very far from empirically demonstrating the theoretical claims of the global cities thesis.

Part 2 examines cities in the global South (e.g., Mexico City, Beirut) that do not coordinate economic activity on a global scale but rather do so at supranational regional scales. Thus Mexico City, for example, is a "relay city" that organizes activity regionally and then links up with coordinating activities in global cities that cover wider scales of economic production. Here the stress is on the role these cities play in the interurban network. In Part 3, the focus turns more toward the internal dynamics of networked cities. The question addressed is how cities in the South

(Shanghai, Buenos Aires) are developing the infrastructural capacity to host coordinating functions. These pieces are designed to be snapshots of global cities in development, which Sassen identifies as one of the main benefits of examining cities outside the core of the world economy.

The book certainly addresses some important questions. It points to the significant methodological difficulties of evaluating the global cities thesis empirically. It explores the key issue of telematics infrastructure and hints at the important policy question of whether infrastructure must lead clustering of coordination functions or vice versa. What the book does not do is significantly challenge or rethink Sassen's thesis. The cases from the global South tend to reconfirm the thesis by reverently fleshing out its gaps rather than contesting its foundations. Sassen is right that the book provides a needed empirical extension of her thesis into the global South. But I think it is reasonable for readers to expect this new research to present a somewhat greater challenge to the well-worn narratives than we find in this volume. If research on the South is only going to confirm what we expect to see, then its value is significantly less than if it will help us rethink our assumptions in productive ways. I do not mean this new work must overthrow the orthodox argument, but I had hoped new cases from the South would shake things up quite a lot more than they did. The arguments about global cities and their networks have evolved fairly little over the last several years. There is a distinct need for new perspectives that stimulate fertile debates and push the analysis in bold new directions. How can the Southern case studies help us creatively rethink the new centrality, the global geography of economic coordination, or the social and spatial polarization of networked cities? And how can they help us develop promising new research directions, such as the underexplored opportunities for democracy and resistance in global cities? The book offers some elaboration of our established ideas, but it stops well short of offering a compelling new agenda for studying the new global geography of networked cities.

Media and Sovereignty: The Global Information Revolution and Its Challenge to State Power. By Monroe E. Price. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002. Pp. ix+317. \$29.95.

Vincent Mosco
Queen's University

In spite of the word "revolution" in its title, this book challenges utopian visions proclaiming a new media-induced fall of the nation-state, if not an end to politics altogether. Addressing the relationship between media, particularly the Internet and new video media, and the state, this carefully researched book demonstrates that the state is alive and well and deeply involved in efforts to shape new media to meet domestic and international

pressures. Furthermore, although the title speaks of “challenge[s] to state power,” the book documents numerous ways in which the state rises to the challenge and makes use of new media as a means to expand its activities. Choosing not to follow the well-trodden path of those who see the state in decline, Price aims instead to demonstrate that the state is redefining its power by adjusting what he calls “its modes and practices of authority.”

The book is divided into three parts, which suggests the breadth of its coverage. The first takes up the impact of new technologies on the reshaping of media space and the response of the state, particularly in addressing what he calls the changing “market for loyalties” brought about by the expansion of communication, information, and entertainment access that fills the multitude of media spaces worldwide. His main goal in this part is to document how the state uses new media to protect its own information space against unwanted incursions and to expand its influence in the world. The second part takes a cultural turn by examining the metaphors, tropes, and other language tools that the state and other stakeholders in new media power struggles use to define the shifting meaning of politics, including the law, brought about by new media. Taking up terms like *privatization*, *illegal and harmful content*, and even the *new* in new technologies, Price makes the case for how language mutually constitutes (he is careful to eschew determinisms of all sorts) the political economy of new media. The final part of the book takes up new media and international relations, particularly by analyzing efforts to develop a foreign policy of new media, including attempts to mount campaigns of public diplomacy using international broadcasting and the Internet.

The strength of *Media and Sovereignty* lies in its wealth of detailed case studies and examples, particularly from the growing body of legal challenges brought about by deploying new media. Price provides perceptive comments on controversies surrounding, for example, the U.S. Communication Decency Act of 1996, which attempted to restrict Internet content, the program to equip televisions with V-chips to control violent and other “harmful” content, and the development of Radio Free Asia, which targeted China, Vietnam, and other Asian nations with U.S. information and propaganda. A professor of law and longtime analyst of new media (starting with cable television in the early 1970s), Price is obviously most comfortable with legal research. However, his knowledge of foreign affairs is also impressive, as evidenced by his analysis of international communication struggles in such hot spots as Rwanda, Bosnia, and Afghanistan.

Notwithstanding these strengths, the abundance of detail and the range of coverage—including the domestic and international media involvements of states throughout the world—tend to overwhelm attempts to theorize the state and to highlight the activities of other major players in the political economy of international media. There are bits and pieces of conceptual schemes and a valiant effort, oddly in the final chapter, to

provide an analytical framework' on media and globalization. But they serve as little more than useful heuristics for the specific purpose at hand. As a result, we are not offered much theoretical depth to take us beyond the admittedly important point that the state has not been swallowed up by either new media or globalization. Furthermore, while the identification of the state with power is welcome amid the hype about border-busting technologies, there is much too little attention directed at the role of global media corporations. The domestic and international power of AOL-Time Warner, News Corporation, the Walt Disney Corporation, Bertelsmann, Vivendi, Sony, GE-NBC, Viacom, Microsoft, AT&T, and a handful of others, merits considerably more attention in a discussion of sovereignty in a new media world.

In spite of these shortcomings, *Media and Sovereignty* will be welcomed by students of political communication, comparative and international media, and the sociolegal issues surrounding new media. It demonstrates a commendable effort to think outside traditional categories and political positions to provide a richly nuanced contribution to our understanding of politics and new media.

The Drama of the Commons. Edited by Elinor Ostrom, Thomas Dietz, Nivek Dolsak, Paul C. Stern, Susan Stonich, and Elke U. Weber. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 2002. Pp. xi+521. \$25.00 (paper).

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The Drama of the Commons is an edited volume produced under the auspices of the National Academy of Science's Committee on the Human Dimensions of Global Change. Its 13 chapters summarize advances in our understanding of "common-pool resources," first made famous by Garrett Hardin in his article "The Tragedy of the Commons." A common-pool resource is "a valued human made or natural resource or facility that is available to more than one person and subject to overuse." In addition to common pastures described by Hardin, common-pool resources include air and water quality, fisheries, public parks, and the geostable orbits used by communication satellites. The proper management of common-pool resources is a key component of most environmental policies. For this reason *The Drama of the Commons* should be of great interest to sociologists interested in the environment, institution building, and collective action. The systematic study of common property issues was legitimized by a 1985 National Research Council conference held in Annapolis, Maryland. I served on the organizing committee of this meeting. The 1985 meeting was largely the reaction to policies that undermined local and customary resource management systems by converting these resources to public or private property. These policies were justified in

terms of Hardin's tragedy of the commons article, which argued that collective controls inevitably led to resource degradation. However, a conversion to private or public ownership often led to increased degradation instead of to increased conservation. Attendees at the 1985 conference were from a wide variety of disciplines but a majority had extensive field experience in the developing world and expertise in natural resource management and development studies.

Since that meeting there has been an explosion of academic work on common property issues. Over a thousand scholarly publications have been produced on the topic and the study of issues surrounding common-pool resources has become an academic specialty with its own professional organization—the International Association for the Study of Common Property. The papers included in this volume were initially commissioned for presentation at the 2000 meeting of the association and were written by psychologists, anthropologists, a sociologist, ecologists, political scientists, and neoinstitutional economists. The book has four sections. The first examines how the characteristics of users and resources themselves affect management institutions; the second deals with the limitations of privatization; the third looks at the problems of integrating institutions at local, national, and international scales; and the final one examines emerging research issues.

The volume demonstrates that the field is still a multidisciplinary endeavor, but has experienced significant shifts with maturity. Rational choice models and neoinstitutional theories appear to have largely replaced the more eclectic approaches of the past. More emphasis is being placed on theory building and less is being placed on fieldwork in the underdeveloped world. As the study of common-pool resources became institutionalized, it developed its own vocabulary as well. While this change has led to more precision and tighter theories, it also makes this volume less accessible to nonexperts.

Nonetheless, *The Drama of the Commons* should be of interest to sociologists outside the rational choice area. The chapters by Arun Agrawal and Bonnie J. McCay are most directly relevant to sociologists. Agrawal's piece summarizes the previous research on common-pool resource management and reduces it to 35 testable propositions. Bonnie J. McCay's chapter is one of the few not grounded in methodological individualism and focuses on the importance of context, situation, and events in the creation of institutions. The book also gives excellent examples of how neoinstitutional economists, experimental psychologists, and ecologists view collective action. I was both relieved and bemused that these fields are coming to the (reluctant?) conclusion that equity and other "pro-social actions" are often as important to us as self-interest. The chapter by Richerson et al. develops a hypothesis that there is a genetic basis for a "tribal social instinct" that leads humans to value the social good. This is an intriguing albeit somewhat unusual piece of scholarship that integrates information from a variety of fields.

Because this is a collection of commissioned papers, *The Drama of the Commons* is better integrated and more comprehensive in scope than most edited volumes. Sociologists interested in collective action and property rights issues will find the book worth owning for the bibliography alone. This volume will be a useful reference for anyone who is interested in environmental policy or resource management—even those who do not subscribe to rational choice theory.

Class, Networks, and Identity: Replanting Jewish Lives from Nazi Germany to Rural New York. By Rhonda F. Levine. New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001. Pp. xii+196. \$79.00 (cloth); \$26.95 (paper).

Ewa Morawska
University of Pennsylvania

Class, Networks, and Identity is a case study of the adaptation to U.S. society of an unusual group of Jewish refugees from Nazi Germany who successfully transplanted their old-country middleman skills in cattle dealing and their communal organization and Orthodox religious practices from rural, western Westphalia and the Rhineland to rural New York. The story opens with a reconstruction of the economic activities and sociocultural life of Jews in rural Germany from the turn of the 20th century until the emigration of about 60% of them during the 1930s. Against this background, Levine retraces the process of putting down roots in the new environment by those who settled in south-central New York and, then, the assimilation of their U.S.-born children in comparison with that of the immigrants. The economic (employment, residence) and sociocultural (community and religious life, social relations with native-born Americans, and identity) assimilation of these two generations of German Jews is examined in the framework of three interfaced dimensions: the dynamics of structural opportunities in the surrounding environment, in-group social support networks, and religious/ethnic symbolic commitments bonding group members.

Class, Networks, and Identity is a well-researched and engagingly presented study. It certainly undermines a popular stereotype of German Jews as upper-middle class urbanites whose occupational position and Americanized culture and social life have made them part of this country's elite. As it extends existing studies of the assimilation of U.S. Jews to a rural environment and demonstrates how that setting has channeled this process along a different path than that reported in the cities, Levine's book is a valuable contribution to the field of U.S. Jewish studies and to immigration and ethnic studies in general.

The study also has a broader sociological relevance. In applying the three-dimensional, structure-networks-identity interpretative framework mentioned earlier to the explanation of the assimilation of immigrants

and their children, the study joins sociologists' ongoing efforts to construct an effective "micro-macro link" in their analyses of society's complex functioning. In the particular case examined by Levine, the argument evolves as follows: Structural changes in the fluid milk market in New York during immigrants' settlement permitted them to use their old-country class and ethnic resources to (re)create in their new environment an ethnic occupational niche in cattle dealing. This occupational concentration sustained intragroup social patterns and German-Jewish ethno-religious communal organization, which, in turn, facilitated immigrants' economic success in their ethnic niche (by the 1960s, German Jews constituted approximately 90% of all cattle dealers in south-central New York). The situation of immigrants' children was different. Their education in U.S. schools and integration into the social circles of native-born U.S. peers combined with the retention of Jewish rituals at home and, in a larger environment, with the structural decline of cattle dealing in the area in the 1970s. As a result, their German identity practically disappeared and was replaced by U.S. Jewish self-identification. They moved out of the ethnic occupational niche of their parents into mainstream U.S. business and professional occupations.

Levine's use of gender as an analytic category integral to her investigation (like class and generational positioning) throughout the study provides a good illustration of how this concept should be applied in sociological research. In particular, she demonstrates the role it played in German Jewish families' decisions to emigrate and, then, in their management of the accommodation to U.S. in occupational pursuits, community organizations, and the preservation of ethnoreligious customs and group identity.

The main weakness of the study lies in its unwarranted or exaggerated epistemological and theoretical claims. The author identifies her research as an "extended case study" as elaborated by Michael Burawoy ("The Extended Case Method," *Sociological Theory* 16 [1998]: 4-33). It meets, however, only one criterion of Burawoy's definition of this approach, that is, an analytic "extension" of the local case being examined to its broader structural ramifications. The other definitional component, self-reflexivity of the researcher or the awareness, reported in the study, of her cognitive impositions onto the research agenda and the interpretation of findings, is completely missing.

Two theoretical misrepresentations likewise detract from the value of the book. The assertion that the case it examines is "used to reconstruct [existing] theories" of immigrants' economic and cultural assimilation (pp. 3, 157) is not supported by what the author actually does in her study, namely, attempt to combine in one interpretative framework macro- (dynamics of economic opportunity) and mesolevel (class-ethnic networks and group institutions) structural and microlevel (cultural resources) factors that shaped the adaptation to rural New York society of German Jewish immigrants and their children.

Levine's claim about the novelty of her three-dimensional approach is not tenable, either. She does not acknowledge the close affinity of her approach either to the structuration model (which, for that matter, informs Burawoy's extended case method she supposedly applies in her study) or to theoretical studies in immigration sociology that propose social networks as the mesolevel "transmitters" between broader structural and everyday-life contexts of actors' activities (see, e.g., Jon Goss and Bruce Lindquist, "Conceptualizing International Labor Migration: A Structuration Perspective," *International Migration Review*, 29 [1995]: 317–51). Immigration/ethnic studies in which anthropologists and historical sociologists have successfully applied a similar approach in empirical research are not referred to, either (see, e.g., Louise Lamphere, ed., *Structuring Diversity* [University of Chicago Press, 1992]; Ewa Morawska, *Insecure Prosperity* [Princeton University Press, 1996]; Nancy Foner, "The Immigrant Family: Cultural Legacies and Cultural Changes," *International Migration Review* 31 [1997]; Mary Waters, *Black Identities* [Harvard University Press, 1999]).

Even with these shortcomings, *Class, Networks, and Identity* is an interesting and useful study that historians and sociologists of immigration should add to their collections. It will also be of interest to students of gender relations and to those seeking to link different-level dimensions of social life in their analyses.

Hidden Heritage: The Legacy of the Crypto-Jews. By Janet Liebman Jacobs. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Pp. x+197. \$49.95 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

Secrets, Gossip, and Gods: The Transformation of Brazilian Candomblé. By Paul Christopher Johnson. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xi+225. \$45.00.

Michael S. Gibbons
University of Evansville

These books present different accounts of secrecy in religion and culture. Johnson looks at Brazilian *Candomblé* and inquires into the paradoxical nature of secrets and secrecy. *Candomblé's* history is one of forced secrecy. The seeds of the religion arrived with the slave trade. The religion grew outside the view of many authorities, including Jesuits, slave overseers, and eventually the state. A legacy of secrecy is thus not surprising.

Eventually however, state repression ceased, and *Candomblé* became a less hidden practice. Now, Brazilian *Candomblé* can be a selling point for tourists and some ritual instruction can be found on the web. Along with this growing public presence, Johnson argues that part of the prestige of a *terreiro* ("Candomblé house of worship" [p. 7]) is its ability to attract

new members. This leads to the paradox of secrecy Johnson captures in the contrast between secrets (hidden knowledge) and secretism (a reputation for hidden knowledge).

Candomblé faces the problem of becoming a more public religion (giving away its secrets) while maintaining its secretism (the reputation that it still holds secret knowledge). Out of respect for his subjects, Johnson does not reveal all of Candomblé's secrets. He points out, however, that doing so would not really be harmful. What is important about secret knowledge in many cases, including this one, is simply that it exists. The existence of such knowledge is more important than whatever that knowledge actually is. Johnson points out that minimal cross-referencing and book reading provided answers to many of the questions denied him.

Secrets are socially constructed and contain an important spatial element. As one moves further away from public, male, and street space, one moves more toward the private, *terreiro* space of the priestess. An initiate gets closer (physically) to the heart of a *terreiro* as he or she gets closer to the *fundamentos* and secret knowledge.

Along with the spatial aspect of the social construction of secrets and secrecy, there exists another interpretive layer. This interpretive layer is key to Candomblé's resilience. Johnson argues that, while several good studies of the religion do exist, most fall prey to interpreting Candomblé's symbols monolithically. Johnson argues that there is a rich hermeneutic depth to the symbols of Candomblé. One symbol can mean several things and these several things array on poles with other things, creating an interpretive field rather more like art than logic. This deep symbolic field allows Candomblé to hearken back to (somewhat imagined) authentic African roots, while at the same time make the ritual and symbolical innovations needed to maneuver within changing social and political climates.

Jacobs's work starts from the premise that secrets themselves are dangerous. While most of her respondents did not suffer the full brunt of anti-Semitism, their legacy is born of protecting their identity as Jewish descendents. Jacobs's subjects are individuals who are realizing their heritage as Sephardic Crypto-Jews ("Spanish Jews who practice in secret" [p. i]). Some of her subjects had little idea of this ancestry, finding out only at an elder's deathbed. Others were fully aware of their hidden ancestry.

Jacobs describes the different faith trajectories of people realizing their ancestry as Jews. Some denied this Jewishness completely, as having no relevance to their already developed Christian faith. Others took a syncretistic approach, melding their developing Jewish faith with their Christian faith. One form of this syncretism, for instance, is millennial Judaism, seeing Christ as essentially a Jewish messiah. Finally, others converted completely to the Jewish faith. These individuals met with varying degrees of resistance by established Jews. Having been out of the faith for around five centuries, their authentic Jewishness was questioned. Others were

welcomed with open arms and spoke about finally belonging to a community.

An important point in Jacobs's work, echoed in Johnson's as well, is the role of gender in carrying on the Jewish cultural traditions. Even when they were not practicing Jews, mothers and grandmothers would follow personally significant rituals. They passed down this culture without the younger generations knowing what they were inheriting. Sabbath candles, female immersion, and an aversion to pork were all home-focused cultural practices passed down through mothers. The forced conversions drove Judaism underground, effectively destroying the masculine public sphere of the religion for this group. This left only the feminine, private sphere of the home in which to practice the religion.

These books are an interesting pair, for they have many parallels: both study religion and culture in groups whose oppression made secrecy a necessity; both study the effects that secrecy had on those religions; both encounter these religions now that secrecy is less a necessity born of persecution. They differ, however, in their approach to secrecy. Durkheim argues that looking at religion to see the veracity of individual tenets of faith misses the underlying truth of religion. Johnson makes the same point about secrets in Candomblé. The real point is not that the secrets themselves are important, but rather that they exist. It is this give and take between secrecy and knowledge and the fluidity and resiliency of this kind of secrecy that animates Johnson's work.

Jacobs takes a less constructionist approach to secrecy than does Johnson. Oftentimes in history, Jewish individuals were in grave peril, and thus Jewishness was a secret that mattered. Jacobs thus focuses more on how Jewish traits were hidden, and the effects of that hiding. One effect is that the traits are stripped to the essentials, so that when people want to reconstruct their Judaism, they find they have little to go on. Another effect is on the psychology of individual people. Many internalized their stigma, and (re)converting to Judaism helps them shed their stigma.

Jacobs and Johnson agree on the gendered geography of secrecy and faith. Through the taxonomy of Candomblé, the public street roughly represents masculinity, while the terreiro roughly represents femininity. The farther away from the public sphere one gets, the closer one gets to the terreiro and the priestess. Each terreiro has a priestess and she is the one responsible for handing down the rituals. Likewise, Jacobs focuses on the importance of the maternal in passing on the traditions. This takes place in the home, and is partly a result of the destruction of the public masculine sphere.

The geography of Candomblé then takes the form of a continuum with the private, sacred space of the priestess set against the public, profane male space of the street. The geography of Crypto-Judaism is also a continuum with the female practitioner and the home as site of practice at one end. This is not, however, set against a masculine, profane, public sphere so much as against its absence.

These books are highly recommended for several readers. Specialists should appreciate them, but both include enough history to inform any reader. These books should also appeal to those interested in secrecy and religion, and this is their most apparent audience. Cultural sociologists will also find them interesting for their focus on authenticity in culture and on the interplay between identity and community.

Mexico's Mandarins: Crafting a Power Elite for the Twenty-First Century. By Roderic Ai Camp. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Pp. xi+308. \$54.95 (cloth); \$21.95 (paper).

Beth Mintz
University of Vermont

This book, written by a political scientist, is about leaders and how they develop. It examines Mexican leadership and, in doing so, the author tries to identify characteristics descriptive of many Third World settings. It makes few claims about comparisons with the United States, although it draws heavily on the literature about elites and leadership in the United States as its reference point. In turn, it contributes to that literature in its attention to questions about mentoring, elite socialization, and interpersonal networking. In this way the book has much to contribute to the study of top leadership groups, more generally.

Questions about elite reproduction are not new. Pareto's circulation of elites immediately comes to mind. In research on the United States, however, recent work has concentrated on elite unity, rather than elite recruitment. In this context, Camp's discussion of mentoring is particularly interesting. He notes that we would expect mentoring in Mexico to be more entrenched than in the United States, but he makes an important point when he suggests that our lack of understanding of the recruitment and socialization of new leadership in *any* society is a major omission.

In the Mexican case, elites are a product of mentoring, and the pervasiveness of this process underscores the ability of a narrow group of leaders to choose their replacements. Mentors become more important still when Camp finds them to be key actors in both socializing future members of the elite and in helping them develop important interpersonal networks. Thus, the details of the recruitment process that he provides become a very important enterprise.

Camp's investigation of elite networks is also very interesting. Noting that the organizational networking approach (networks defined by institutional positions) grossly underestimates the extent to which elites are linked across policy areas in Mexico, he uses personal connections in three domains—education, career, and family—to identify interpersonal networks. He extends this emphasis on the individual to the institutional by exploring interorganizational ties, as well. While much of the interlock

literature uses institutional position to explore interorganizational relations, Camp uses intercorporate linkages as interpersonal connections. This is an interesting undertaking. Analysis of the "person" network has been understudied, and he reminds us of these networks' relevance. Camp looks at another important question here, that of causality. Do shared organizational positions create interpersonal ties or do interpersonal ties typically precede more formalized linkages? He finds that in Mexico, at least, interorganizational ties typically follow interpersonal ties.

Less successful is Camp's framework of a power elite. He begs the question of the differences between leaders, opinion leaders, elites, and a power elite. He wisely avoids rehashing the voluminous debates about the differences between a power elite, a ruling elite, a governing class, and so on, but he also sidesteps the notion that those debates were rooted in a particular set of views about power, either the institutional power of Weber (and Mills) or the class power of Marx. Moreover, the underlying question of how democracy is possible that fueled those debates in the United States, and fed the passion surrounding them, is missing here. Camp's argument is not about a power elite with its emphasis on unity but about "individual actors . . . who . . . share direct, informal, access to other elite actors in their sphere of influence" (p. 12).

The role of institutional position is also problematic in this context. Camp notes that Mexico's institutional development is sparse and its decision-making structure heavily reliant on informal linkages. Thus, it does not make sense to draw his sample of leaders using institutional position, the typical method in the literature he is addressing. Instead, he selected 398 figures (men?) who, he tells us, represent the most notable in five spheres: politics, the military, the clergy, intellectuals, and capitalists. He supplements these with celebrity elites. We do not know exactly how these groups were selected, but some are quite broadly defined. Politicians, for example, come from a variety of interest groups, including labor. But it is not for convenience that the power elite literature uses institutional position; it is rooted in theory. Indeed, Camp notes that as political systems grow in size and complexity, organizations become principal political actors. It is this Weberian notion that has made institutional position the realm of power elite analysis. And this notion suggests that Camp is studying leadership rather than a power elite in a formal sense.

Nevertheless, this book has much to contribute to our understanding of top leadership groups. It also contains a wealth of information about Mexico. Camp brings years of experience in studying Mexican elites to this work, and any reader interested in the details of the Mexican example will find this very useful.

Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka: Social Change and Cultural Continuity. By Lakshmanan Sabaratnam. New York: Palgrave, 2001. Pp. viii+272. \$55.00.

Tissa Fernando
University of British Columbia

The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has resulted in tens of thousands of lost lives, economic stagnation, and the sad ending of the tranquility that had been synonymous with the island. The international mass media have for the most part paid little attention to Sri Lanka's difficulties. This is regrettable since both the magnitude of the carnage and the sophistication of the Tamil separatist struggle call for greater attention. For instance, the suicide bomber had become a regular feature of the Sri Lankan landscape more than a decade before it made its dramatic appearance in the Middle East. If the popular media neglected the Sri Lankan conflict, there has been no shortage of scholarly interest. However, academic treatises, on closer examination, turn out to be thinly veiled justifications for the actions of one party in the conflict or the other. Sabaratnam's book is a refreshing change—balanced, theoretically informed, tightly argued, and above all free of polemics, it will surely be the standard by which future studies of the conflict will be judged.

Ethnic Attachments in Sri Lanka is located in the theoretical debate between "primordialists," who see ethnic nationalism as a product of premodern values and attitudes, and "modernists," who see it as mainly a cultural response to colonial rule. Modernists argue that premodern attitudes and beliefs will decline with modernization. This book argues for a third position, one that acknowledges the political and economic transformations brought about by colonialism and modernity and yet asserts the continuing salience of premodern constructions. Sabaratnam points to the perennial presence of politicized ethnicity of which nationalism is a modern form. Social forces of premodern times produced ethnic solidarities. "In effect, then, cultural authenticity is not the prerogative of modern human agency; it was invented in the past as well" (p. 12). The book documents this argument in the context of Sri Lanka. The broad theme of the book is an elaboration of the increasing ethnic salience in the island, beginning with medieval constructions of ethnicity, traversing changes in the Portuguese (1506–1658), Dutch (1658–1796), and British (1796–1948) periods, and arriving at its more virulent contemporary manifestations. Sabaratnam tells this story with remarkable clarity. The author provides rich evidence for the prevalence of medieval Sinhalese as well as Tamil ethnic constructions. This early ethnicity has been preserved in collective memory in the form of metaphors, motifs, and myths that are a rich source for contemporary ethnic movements. Colonial rule, of course, modified and changed medieval identities, but there has been a continuing thread. The impact of Portuguese and Dutch rule is nicely described in

chapter 3, and the transformations of the British period in greater detail in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 covers postindependence events perceptively, while chapter 7 provides the clearest analysis I have read of the immediate causes of Tamil militancy. The only limitation in the author's account is inadequate attention being paid to the impact of the Sinhalese Janatha Vimukti Peramuna (JVP) insurrection of 1971. For some two decades thereafter the Sri Lankan state considered the real threat to be the JVP. Consequently, Tamil grievances did not receive the attention they should have and perhaps would have.

What of the future? The author is not optimistic. He feels that the conflict is difficult to resolve, "as long as the visions that have led to it remain regnant in both groups. This vise has produced a dilemma that cannot be resolved without re-visioning" (p. 7). The author is right about the need for revisioning, but what does that mean in practical and realistic terms? This theme calls for elaboration. Sabaratnam, with his knowledge and insights, could have made a contribution here. But the author has contributed much. In general, this is an excellent study strongly recommended not only to students of Sri Lanka and South Asia but to those interested in ethnic conflict and nationalism.

Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State. Edited by David S. Meyer, Nancy Whittier, and Belinda Robnett. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi+366.

Ruud Koopmans

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During the 1980s, the field of social movement studies was characterized by what has been called "paradigm warfare." Different perspectives—relative deprivation, resource mobilization, new social movements, political opportunity, and framing, to name but the most important—were opposed, and various studies identified different "winners" in this contest. None of these perspectives could actually claim the title "paradigm"—at best they were partial theories that were good at explaining some things, but remained silent on many other aspects of social movements and collective action. For the past decade or so, calls for and attempts at synthesis have become widespread. If synthesis means replacing the old grievances OR resources OR opportunities OR frames OR identity by the additive grievances AND resources AND opportunities AND frames AND identity AND a couple of things more, then we have long succeeded, because this has been the program of many monographs, articles, and edited volumes over the last decade. But supposedly, theoretical synthesis means more than just that, and there seems to be broad consensus in the field that this type of more substantive synthesis still lies before us.

Social Movements: Identity, Culture, and the State certainly is an im-

portant contribution to this quest for a theoretical synthesis. In their bolder formulations, when they speak of "a new theoretical approach" or "a new generation of social movement theory," the editors even suggest that this volume has already done a large part of the job. In his introductory chapter, David Meyer identifies six main challenges in the field that "this book confronts . . . head-on": combining (micro, meso, macro) levels of analysis, linking collective identities to political opportunities, crossing disciplinary boundaries, moving away from the one-sided emphasis on "nice" left-wing movements, linking policies to protest, and making our research questions and results more relevant to movement activists. These are important challenges indeed, and in confronting the first two the volume has important advances to offer. What unites most of the contributions in the book is a renewed attention for the constitution of collective identities. However, unlike earlier work—for example, the European work on new social movements of the 1980s—collective identity is not seen as self-contained, but as constituted in interaction with external political environments. In focusing on this interaction between identities and political process, the book revisits some important insights of work on new social movements, but links these to the political process models that have come to dominate the field in the 1990s. Vincent Boudreau's chapter on democratization movements in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Burma, and Rebecca Klatch's comparison of left- and right-wing student movements (Students for a Democratic Society and Young Americans for Freedom) in the United States are recommendable examples of such theoretical linkages. Useful connections between different levels of analysis are also made in several chapters, for example, in Mildred Schwartz's provocative chapter on the advantages of factionalism in the case of the Canadian New Democratic Party.

Some of the other challenges identified by Meyer are met less successfully by the volume. Most of the chapters are single case studies on the "usual suspects" of social movement research, namely, the Civil Rights, women's, and labor movements, and only the Klatch paper and the excellent chapter by Rhys Williams on the use of religious frames and symbols by the Civil Rights movement and the New Right broaden the scope toward movements that are less likeable from the point of view of the average social movement scholar. The linkage between policy and protest is not a central concern of the book and only figures prominently in Kenneth Andrews's insightful paper on the consequences of the Civil Rights movement in Mississippi. Cross-disciplinarity is not really the book's strength, either, at least not if one expects this to mean the inclusion of perspectives other than sociology and political science. Probably, the editors mean the linkage to "interdisciplinary studies, particularly queer studies, women's studies, and ethnic studies" (p. 307). Indeed, several chapters, particularly in the final part of the book on "Collective Identities, Discourse, and Culture," as well as the concluding chapter by Nancy Whittier, draw on these literatures. Probably not everyone will agree with

Whittier that the future of social movement studies lies in incorporating flowers on the cultural studies tree such as black feminism, materialist feminist discourse analysis, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, which also figure prominently in the chapters by Nancy Naples and Belinda Robnett. The analyses presented in these chapters did not sound fresh and new to me, but reminded me very much of the European literature of the 1980s on new social movements. Apart from the theoretical perspective, this similarity also holds for some questionable methodological choices. Both Robnett's chapter on the radicalization of the Student Non-violent Coordinating Committee and Naples's chapter on community control movements rely only on interviews with female activists without providing any justification for this restriction.

Obviously, it is impossible to do justice to, or even mention all the contributions to this volume in a short review. Taken as a whole, the volume is not always as new and synthetic as the editors suggest, but its main thrust—the linkage of collective identities to political processes and external contexts—certainly points in the right direction. Moreover, the book contains several high-quality chapters that deserve attention in their own right. As such, the book is mandatory reading for students of social movements and collective action and an important contribution to the theoretical development of the field.

Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America. By Miguel Angel Centeno. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2002. Pp. xiv+329. \$45.00.

Philip Oxhorn
McGill University

Meticulously researched, Miguel Centeno's provocative study presents a comprehensive account of Latin America's proclivity to go to war over the past 200 years and the consequences of that proclivity. Turning Eurocentric theories that postulate warfare as the driving force behind the formation of modern nation-states on their heads, he argues that Latin America's experience both reflects and has contributed to the weakness of state formation throughout the region. As Centeno concludes, "No state, no war." Tragically for Latin America, Centeno also suggests the inverse: No war, no state.

It is well known that Latin American states generally do not go to war against each other and instead define their principal enemy as being internal. Centeno argues the reason is the state's limited capacity: "Simply put, each nation's military remained too busy killing its own peasants to bother with someone else's" (p. 91). However vicious Latin American militaries are toward domestic dissidents, they are largely paper tigers, incapable of orchestrating the kind of "systematic intense violence legit-

imated by the standard political rubrics" (p. 8) responsible for so much destruction elsewhere.

The most intriguing argument in the book concerns the positive and apparently irreplaceable role that warfare plays in creating nation-states. For Europe, the price of extreme violence was compensated for by the formation of strong central states that penetrated national societies. Militaries became the principal locus for creating integrated societies, as the mobilized masses were exposed to nationalist doctrine and the shared sacrifice of war legitimized norms of citizenship and equality. Moreover, these states could tax their populations to pay for all of this, culminating in the emergence of Europe's democratic welfare states.

By comparison, Latin America seems caught in a vicious circle. States are so weak that they can do little more than terrorize their own populations. The period of the most intense violence, the 19th-century wars of independence, did not lay the foundations for strong states, but created a dynamic that would perpetuate weak ones. The violence was often fierce, but large segments of the population were not mobilized to fight. Instead of cementing national rivalries, the colonized elites were pitted against the colonizers. Because they did not need to mobilize large armies to win, the victors did not need to integrate their societies. Instead, racial (and, I would add, class) divisions meant that the new rulers feared national integration and the mobilization of the masses. The elite did not need to create strong state institutions to extract resources from their own societies either due to their ability to tax external trade or turn to foreign loans. The weakness of these states also meant that when wars did break out, the states involved did not reap any of the benefits: "small" wars perpetuated weak states because of their limited mobilization of citizens and the lack of the requisite institutions to tax populations, organize large, modern armies, and integrate national populations. Tellingly, those states that most closely resembled the European model in the 19th century and should have benefited from the wars they launched against their neighbors, particularly Paraguay, were nearly destroyed by policies of conquest.

Such arguments are thought-provoking, if not entirely convincing. The centrality of war seems overdetermined. Costa Rica, for example, has Latin America's most stable democratic regime and most advanced welfare state. Yet it never "benefited" from anything like a modern international war, and it disbanded its army in the late 1940s after "only" a limited civil war that the original architects of its welfare policies lost.

More generally, the book focuses on what Latin American elites did not do: they did not go to war; they did not create strong state institutions; they did not even build strong armies. The majority of the population enters into the discussion only indirectly, through elite fears of the masses. Yet the admittedly European theories that Centeno draws on revolve around negotiation processes between elite and nonelite groups. While the consequences of war may be one important part of this dynamic, so too were issues of protection (both from internal and external threats),

resource extraction, distribution, and so on. Despite their weakness, Latin American states have maintained systems of domination that, from Centeno's perspective, seem remarkably stable given their limited militarization and notorious levels of inequality. While Centeno may be correct in arguing that "since there were few threats of war, there was little need [for elites] to create a population willing to sacrifice itself" (p. 215), what he does not explain is why Latin American societies are apparently so passive and, when they are not, are so readily suppressed.

Centeno's ambitious study will undoubtedly provoke much debate and further research. Its unique perspective and impressive breadth represent an important contribution to Latin American political sociology that will challenge researchers in a variety of specializations for some time to come.

The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis. Edited by John L. Campbell and Ove K. Pedersen. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001. Pp. xvi+288.

B. Guy Peters
University of Pittsburgh

The revived interest in institutional analysis during the past decades has influenced all the social sciences and has produced a variety of competing as well as complementary approaches to institutions and institutional analysis. This variety of conceptualizations of institutions has helped produce a number of interesting pieces of research, but also has produced substantial confusion, including confusion over some extremely fundamental issues such as, Just what is an institution? Further, it is not always clear whether we as researchers are best advised to consider institutions as an independent variable or a dependent variable, or both, in our analyses. While the obvious answer is that the status of institutions is a function of the particular research question, the various strands of thought emphasize one or another of the possible uses.

This edited collection reflects both the strengths and weaknesses of contemporary institutional analysis. On the one hand, the editors and authors discuss clearly, and in a very accessible manner, four varieties of institutionalism and demonstrate the utility of each approach for understanding policy choices and the outcomes of social and political processes. The majority of the authors in the volume would claim sociology as their home discipline, but they still manifest a range of alternative conceptions of institutions and a range of factors that are crucial to understanding the role of institutions in social and political life. I found the development of a concept of "discursive institutionalism" particularly interesting and innovative. This version of institutionalism argues that ideas embedded in ongoing discourses and social paradigms are useful for understanding and perhaps even explaining institutional change. This argument goes

beyond the more simplistic claims that "ideas matter" and attempts to demonstrate how and in what contexts ideas do have an influence.

The other most important positive feature of the volume is that the participants attempt to use institutions to explain policy and, especially, policy change. The chapters contained in this book are useful for giving the lie to the usual stereotype of institutional theory as excessively static and incapable of coping with change. Peter Kjaer and Pedersen and Jack Knight deal with policy change the most explicitly and are able to make compelling cases that institutional analysis can be used effectively to describe and explain change. This use of institutional analysis is especially valuable in that it demonstrates the interactions of institutions and the climate of ideas in such an explanation of change.

Although there are a number of positive aspects of the research reported in this volume, and several admirable chapters (David Strang and Ellen Bradburn and Colin Hay in particular), there are also a number of significant problems that minimize the utility of the book. At the most basic level it is not clear what an institution is to the participants in this volume. There is some basic similarity in the treatment of institutions throughout the volume, but also some variations, especially when more economic conceptions of institutions are introduced (in Knight's chapter, for example). It is always difficult to impose conceptual order on a group of colleagues, but the subtle yet important differences in the ways in which institutions are discussed emphasizes the familiar problems of edited volumes.

Another fundamental problem that is evident in this book is the question of the relationship between neoliberalism and institutionalism. On the one hand, the assumption sometimes appears to be that the shift to neoliberalism as a political and economic paradigm shapes the role of public-sector institutions. This relationship is posited at several points, but the logic through which the influence of these ideas is transmitted to institutions is at best vague. On the other hand, there are some points at which the authors assume that institutions have helped to define neoliberalism and to carry those ideas into practice. The latter dynamic is more persuasive, but even that logic is not fully developed.

Despite the difficulties and unevenness mentioned above, this is a useful volume that merits attention by scholars interested in institutional analysis. In fairness to the contributors, the ambiguity over definitions of institutions and their relationships with other dimensions of sociopolitics is hardly unique to this volume. The problem pervades a good deal of contemporary thinking and theorizing in institutionalism. The editors and contributors reflect that ambiguity and yet have helped to move institutional analysis forward.

Big Business and the State: Historical Transitions and Corporate Transformation, 1880s–1990s. By Harland Prechel. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2000. Pp. xviii+317. \$25.95 (paper).

Davita Silfen Glasberg
University of Connecticut

Ever since Sherron Watson blew the whistle on Enron, and since the discovery that Enron's practices were far more common among U.S. corporations than anyone had imagined, interest in the power structure of corporations has once again recaptured the attention of observers in and out of the academy. The ability of corporations to influence or control the state has, of course, been a favorite pursuit of organizational theorists and political sociologists, but specialists in each field have often spoken past each other. In recent years, an increasing number of researchers have pointed out that at no time has any one of these models consistently emerged as the "victor" over the enormous amount of literature that has grown up around the question of the relationship between the state and society. There is a need to find a way to somehow blend these differing theories into a more coherent model. Prechel attempts to perform this feat in this, his latest contribution to the search for such a model.

The book begins with the observation that the corporate form has undergone several significant structural incarnations during key periods of economic contradictions and crises. The key issue here is how these transformations may have affected corporations' ability to influence the state, and how the state may affect the corporate form. His adoption of a capital dependence theory to model this relationship provides him with greater flexibility to take into account the historically specific conditions under which certain relationships and corporate structures are likely to emerge. It also facilitates his attempt to braid the micro- (managerial), meso- (corporate), and macro- (political economy) structural levels of analysis, linking structure and agent in the analysis.

Prechel also notes that analysts have commonly adopted a single method of research, either engaging in single case studies (which draw the common criticism of limited generalizability) or quantitative analysis of large data sets (which draw the complaint that such analyses either cannot measure key variables such as historical processes mathematically and therefore miss important elements in the analysis or that they make erroneous assumptions about the linearity of social processes). Instead, he chooses to use both a historical, case-oriented approach that allows him to identify the historical processes that significantly affect the corporate form, and quantitative analysis to establish common features of corporate structural changes.

The material presented in Prechel's book is rich and detailed, well-organized, and cogently expressed. He draws a clear and compelling portrait of the political and economic context of the power structure of cor-

porations, and, more importantly, identifies the dialectical relationship between corporations and the state that too many observers miss. His terrific attention to detail and his sensitivity to the swirl of historical and political context and the interplay between structure and agent make one wonder: Where is the working class in this analysis? Labor is an integral part of capital accumulation, and labor activism has variably had a significant impact on policy as well as on corporate structures, relations, and practices. What was the relative level of labor activism during the historical periods examined here? That is not to assert that level of labor activism had an effect on corporate transformations or on the relationship between corporations and the state, but this is an empirical issue that would appear, as suggested by a large body of literature, to matter, especially during the periods of focus. If we are to accept Prechel's intriguing and convincing argument that we must sort out the conditions under which corporations, state managers, or classes might gain their interests through policy, he must move from examining elites and their organizations, and explore what effect, if any, labor may have had on these. What exactly was labor doing during the three historical periods Prechel examines in this book? If its influence was largely absent during these periods, he should note that; if it was active, vocal, and well organized, he should note that as well. In either case he should discuss what effect the level of labor activism may have had on the corporate transformations and the state policy that he does analyze.

The theoretical contributions Prechel offers with this book are significant. These would be made even stronger with the incorporation of Jessop's notions of state projects and balance of class forces. These concepts would allow Prechel to pursue the analysis he does so well here while incorporating questions of the role of labor and remaining faithful to his analytical approach. The notion of state projects reflects the insight that the state more typically pursues sets of policies around broadly defined goals, here identified as state intervention into the economy. Earlier entries into the state project help shape later policies as well as structures, relationships, and processes in the political economy. That this conceptualization is missing here reinforces the assumption that individual policies are isolated and divorced from other policies, an unfortunate implication in an otherwise refreshingly detailed presentation.

Despite these shortcomings, I would recommend Prechel's book for graduate seminars in political sociology, social organizations, political economy, and power and inequality. I would also recommend it for advanced undergraduate courses in these areas. Certainly, it is essential for anyone doing organizational or political sociology research.

Managing "Modernity": Work, Community, and Authority in Late-Industrializing Japan and Russia. By Rudra Sil. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002. Pp. xvii+485. \$60.00.

Vivek Chibber
New York University

Late development in the capitalist world economy has two characteristics that have captured scholarly attention for more than a century: first, it typically occurs as the product of a conscious strategy adopted by political elites—and hence has often involved heavy doses of state guidance; second, it involves the importation of institutions from advanced industrial countries that are then adapted to the local setting. In recent years, there has been a massive revival of interest in the first of these two characteristics—the dynamics of politically sponsored development, especially through state intervention. But there is also a venerable tradition of scholarship on the issue of institutional transfer and the dilemmas that it poses for development strategies. The topic of choice here has tended to be technology—understandably, since the transfer of industrial know-how is central to rapid development. Less prominent, though no less important, is a stream of literature on the organizational context in which technology is put to use, in particular, the structure of the firm and the labor process.

Building on the legacy of scholarship such as Reinhard Bendix's classic *Work and Authority in Industry* (University of California Press, 1974), Rudra Sil proposes to examine the importation of managerial practices from advanced economies to developing ones. Sil's premise is that managerial techniques developed in specific cultural contexts cannot be assumed to be easily portable. Managerial authority depends in part on material incentives and forms of control; it also relies, however, on bringing into line the requirements of work with the cultural milieu inhabited by labor. To the extent that it is radically out of step with the set of expectations and beliefs held by employees, it will be unable to muster the legitimacy to elicit adequate work effort. Now, this might seem to be a problem that will arise whenever a technique crosses national boundaries, but Sil argues that techniques are far more portable when imported *among* advanced countries and less so when they are taken from an advanced to a late-developing region. The reason is that advanced economies share relevant cultures of work, setting them apart from the latter group.

The book is about the constraints imposed on managers by late developers' normative context of work. The issue then becomes, How do managers successfully transpose advanced capitalist work organization to these exotic settings? Sil proposes to answer this by examining the importation of Taylorist managerial techniques to Russia and Japan during the course of the 20th century. His hypothesis is that a managerial strategy that employs a *syncretistic* approach to work culture will be most effective in mobilizing work effort. By syncretistic, Sil means an approach

that transposes the original design to its new setting, while at the same time selectively incorporating cultural elements of the new environment into the imported organizational practices—or, in other words, mutual adaptation. This he counterposes to alternative approaches: the modernist and the revolutionary, both of which see the inherited culture of the late developer as unproblematic—either because it can safely be ignored (modernist), or because it can easily be eradicated and a new one developed in its place (revolutionary); and the traditionalist, which assumes that existing cultural practices can simply be used, as retreads, in the new setting, thus obviating the need for any cultural transformation.

Sil cashes out this argument through a comparison of Japan and Russia. In both cases, efforts at rapid development led to the adoption of managerial techniques pioneered in the advanced industrial countries of the West. In both cases, the local culture of work encountered by the techniques was quite different from that of the West. Sil proceeds to show that in pre-World War II Japan and throughout the post-Lenin years of the Soviet Union, managers were unable to elicit adequate work effort from labor because of their inability to fashion the labor process in accordance with workers' cultural expectations. On the other hand, postwar Japan differed from the other cases, in that managers crafted the organization of work in a manner more consistent with employee expectations. This in turn contributed to greater labor productivity, which fueled the postwar "miracle" associated with Japanese development. Hence, the turn to a syncretistic approach paid off in postwar Japan, while the absence of such an approach hurt productivity in the prewar Japanese factories and in the Soviet Union.

The book is very well written, the argument is clearly laid out, and there is a good review of the literature on both cases. It is also laudable that Sil brings the Soviet Union into his analysis as a late developer, a move rarely made in the literature on the subject. Still, there are aspects of the argument—in its design as well as its substance—that are somewhat problematic. First, although there is no doubt that Sil is persuasive in his basic argument that syncretistic approaches to cultural adaptation will work better than the alternatives, this is largely because the alternatives are so implausibly drawn up that it is hard to see why *anyone* would ever hold to them. His thesis would have packed more punch if he could have shown that the revolutionary approach, or the modernist approach, actually has currency among contemporary students of late development. But it is hard to think of many scholars today who would seriously suggest that the local cultural legacy will simply dissolve upon the entry of new practices (the modernist approach), or that it can be easily eradicated (the revolutionary approach), and so on. The result is that while his argument is nicely packaged, it is less than sufficiently motivated, and the theoretical payoff, at the broadest level, seems somewhat paltry.

Second, while I am happy to believe that syncretistic approaches will find greater success than the others he outlines, it is not altogether clear

that the outcomes he examines are generated by the presence or absence of this feature of managerial practice. When he explains in his empirical narrative why (prewar) Japanese and Soviet managers failed to elicit adequate commitment from their employees, Sil slides from the mismatch between the imported work culture and the inherited local culture to one between the discourse of the new management practices and the lived shop floor experience of the workers (pp. 159, 172, 259, 267). In other words, he points to a contradiction between the promises and self-descriptions of the bosses and their actual practice. Sil appears to see the latter phenomenon as bound up with the former, or with an instance of it, but it is not. A mismatch between managerial discourse and promises on the one hand, and the actual practices on the shop floor on the other, can obtain independently of the broader incongruity between local cultural legacies and the imported culture of work. For example, the former kind of conflict is endemic to capitalist labor processes within advanced capitalism, where the broader cultural mismatch is presumably absent. Sil apparently does not see this as problematic, for he makes no attempt to adjudicate between the two kinds of mismatches as rival mechanisms, even though he does appear to recognize that they are distinct. Greater clarity on this point would seem warranted. Nonetheless, I do recommend this book for classes on late development, cultural studies, and the labor process.

Unions, Immigration, and Internationalization: New Challenges and Changing Coalitions in the United States and France. By Leah Haus. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Pp. vii+219. \$55.00.

Hector L. Delgado
University of La Verne

The United States and France are not known for their strong labor movements. In 1997 the percentage of unionized workers in the private, non-agricultural sector dropped below 10% in the United States. France was already there. Most unions in the United States are simply trying to keep what members they have, and, according to Haus, French unions simply do not organize. Some unions in the United States, however, have been organizing effectively, and immigrants, both documented and undocumented, have been at the forefront of several high-profile and successful union-organizing campaigns. At the close of the 20th century, several unions, along with the AFL-CIO, became some of the most vocal advocates for immigrant workers and liberal immigration policies in the United States, as did unions in France. This was not the case for either earlier in the century.

In this historical and comparative study, Leah Haus explains organized labor's shift in both countries from a restrictionist position on immigration

policy at the beginning of the 20th century to a less restrictive one at the close of the century. In the early part of the 20th century unions in both countries were decidedly more restrictionist. It made sense to unions then. In order to protect the jobs and wages of native workers unions in both countries, with minor exceptions, pressured the government to restrict immigration and generally opposed the organization of immigrant workers. But as Haus notes, the world has changed and organized labor has had to adjust. The reason for this shift in union policy lies in the internationalization of economic processes and human rights. Unions question the state's ability to control immigration flows and therefore do not see the point of pushing for something the state cannot deliver. Under these conditions, *opposing* restrictive immigration legislation and *supporting* more liberal measures will facilitate the organization of immigrant workers as an alternative for improving wages and working conditions. Concurrently, the internationalization of human rights concerns have called into question states' "right" to control immigration and this in turn has prompted unions in both countries, but especially in France, to adopt a more liberal position on immigration.

Similar in several important respects, unions in France and the United States differ in others. French unions' policy preferences are driven by ideological and class-conscious concerns to a much greater degree than the "pragmatic and incrementalist" U.S. unions. While both adopted less restrictionist positions at the end of the 20th century, they did so for reasons that reflect this fundamental difference. U.S. unions were concerned principally with the impact of immigration and immigration policy on their rejuvenated organizing efforts, while the more "ideational" French unions, "known for their general inactivity when it comes to organizing" (p. 9), demonstrated more concern for "normative issues relating to the state's right to control migration than did their pragmatic U.S. counterparts" (p. 10).

My own work and that of others on the unionization of undocumented immigrants in Los Angeles generally supports Haus's contention that unions have little choice but to organize immigrant workers. Where we may quibble a bit is on whether it is the inability or *unwillingness* of the government to control immigration flows. Even if the government could do a better job of reducing immigration, organized labor is not strong enough in either country to reduce appreciably the influx of immigrant workers if state immigration policy is driven principally and ultimately by corporate interests, as I believe it is, and as the French communist federation, the CGTU, contended in the 1920s. Regardless, unions are concerned that more restrictive immigration initiatives and enforcement would likely result in an increase in undocumented immigration. Organizing undocumented workers would be more difficult than organizing documented workers, and a recent Supreme Court decision stripping undocumented workers of their National Labor Relations Board protections will make the task even more difficult.

In the final chapter, Haus recommends case studies of countries with strong unions, and she backs it up with her own brief analysis of the English case (although England has experienced a steady decline in union membership as well). In her analysis she observes that geography (England is an island and the United States has a 2,000-mile border with Mexico) is an important variable as well. She ends with the observation that the future of organized labor rests in part on its ability to organize immigrant workers (and their children). This, Haus adds, applies pressure on unions "to refrain from the restrictionist coalition and to join the liberal coalition in immigration policy debates" (p. 176).

This well-written and accessible book fills a gap in the literature on the linkage between organizing and union immigration policy preferences—and it does it very well. While the argument may not surprise most labor movement scholars and activists, I recommend the book especially to them and encourage them to continue the debate, since so much rests on unions' ability to organize workers across racial, ethnic, gender, and national lines.

Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900–2000. By Kevin Fox Gotham. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002. Pp. xii+204. \$62.50 (cloth); \$20.95 (paper).

Lincoln Quillian
University of Wisconsin, Madison

In Kansas City in 1900, whites lived on every street on which African-Americans resided, and in no area were African-Americans the majority. By 1950, most African-Americans in Kansas City lived in predominately or entirely African-American neighborhoods. In 2000, the situation much more closely resembled 1950 than 1900, with the relocation of more than 60% of white or African-American households required to achieve a racially even distribution of population. The rise of black-white segregation in Kansas City, and by implication other cities, is the main subject of Kevin Fox Gotham's *Race, Real Estate, and Uneven Development: The Kansas City Experience, 1900–2000*. Gotham focuses on the role of real estate agents and federal policy in creating racial residential segregation and in the economic development of the suburbs and decline of the central city.

The book alternates between discussions of real estate practices and housing policy at the national level and their effects on Kansas City. The first few chapters examine racially restrictive covenants preventing sale or rental of white-owned property to blacks and the effects of the open racial bias in federal underwriting guidelines for mortgage lending. The chapters covering 1940–70 focus on blockbusting by real estate agents in transitional neighborhoods and argue that federal redevelopment and

slum clearance programs maintained segregation and primarily benefited local developers. The final chapters analyze the many faults of the Kansas City implementation of the Federal Housing Authority's 235 program, which aimed to provide mortgage insurance and subsidies for low-income households—and broadly discuss factors impeding positive change in recent decades.

Much of Gotham's discussion of the institutional practices contributing to residential segregation will be familiar to readers of Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton's *American Apartheid* (Harvard University Press, 1993), Kenneth Jackson's *Crabgrass Frontier* (Oxford University Press, 1985), or several other accounts by sociologists and urban historians. Gotham provides a good description and many details of how these factors played out in Kansas City. Particularly interesting, and not available in these other books, is his discussion of how school boundaries were redrawn to maintain segregated schools and the reciprocal influence these boundaries then had in maintaining housing segregation.

The book's major original argument, which is developed across several chapters, is that the real estate industry played a central role in creating segregated urban space and inner-city disinvestment. Although many authors discuss real estate practices that contributed to segregation, no other author goes so far in arguing that the real estate industry is primarily responsible for black-white residential segregation. The key to the argument is the claim that, in addition to implementing segregationist practices, the real estate industry was crucial in developing and disseminating a "segregationist ideology" that blacks "ruined" neighborhoods and destroyed property values. Thus, he argues, the real estate industry is largely responsible for white desire for segregated white neighborhoods. His discussion of later decades likewise argues that the real estate industry promoted "privatism"—the belief that government housing programs should act through the private housing market—which he views as a major obstacle to addressing segregation and housing inequality. He argues these ideologies also became important in federal policy due to the lobbying efforts of the National Association of Real Estate Boards (now the National Association of Realtors).

Gotham's descriptions of specific policies and practices are largely correct, but I was unconvinced of the importance given to the real estate industry in forming mass "ideologies" that promoted segregation. In particular, Gotham overreaches when he claims that whites would have accepted a large influx of black neighbors with equanimity except for "the deliberate and organized efforts of the real estate industry to market racial exclusivity" (p. 46). This takes whites' racial views in the early part of the 20th century as far too much of a blank slate. The widespread belief among whites in black biological inferiority in the 19th and early 20th centuries, combined with the extreme poverty of black migrants from the Jim Crow South, make it unlikely that whites would have been accepting of large numbers of black neighbors even had the real estate industry

been a bastion of integrationist sentiment. Gotham points toward the low level of residential segregation in 1900 as supporting his thesis, but this reflects the small numbers of African-Americans in Kansas City in 1900 and the employment of many as domestic servants in white households, not an absence of racism.

Although I was not persuaded by all of the book's arguments, Gotham has produced a well-documented case study of the role of institutional factors in the development of racial segregation and inner-city disinvestment in Kansas City. I would recommend the book to anyone who has read a general account, such as *American Apartheid*, and wants to know more about the history of practices and policies that have contributed to racial residential segregation and place stratification in modern U.S. cities.

Civility in the City: Blacks, Jews, and Koreans in Urban America. By Jennifer Lee. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002. Pp. xii+270. \$35.00.

Suzanne Shanahan
Duke University

Interracial urban violence makes for good headlines and explaining it makes for good sociology, but this fascination with the most violent and contentious moments in urban race relations may well skew our perception of day-to-day life. Jennifer Lee's *Civility in the City* redirects our attention with a theoretically sophisticated and highly accessible corrective. Building on an ethnomethodological perspective and based on in-depth interviews and extensive ethnographic research, Lee argues that daily interracial commercial interactions are typically uneventful. Indeed, she maintains that "the prevailing image of racial warfare is inconsistent with most merchant-customer interactions. An important untold story is the mostly quotidian nature of commercial life. . . . The everyday interactions between Jewish, Korean, and African American merchants and their customers are not antagonistic, but rather positive, civil, and routine" (pp. 5-6). This point is, of course, not new to anyone who lives in an interracial city or who studies such cities, but it is a point that is often obscured by the drama of periodic conflict.

In this study of urban communities in New York and Philadelphia, Lee quite convincingly illustrates how civility, not conflict, characterizes most interracial commercial interactions. To make this argument, Lee draws from the literature on merchant-customer relations. In chapter 3, for example, Lee fascinatingly describes how different merchant-customer relationships are created given the type of service or product being offered. While furniture sales and hairstyling require the development of a more intimate relationship with a potential customer or client, selling milk at a convenience store does not. Indeed, many immigrants occupy a retail

niche where efficiency is key and where personal service is not only unnecessary but perhaps even a nuisance. In quick and impersonal interactions there seemingly is little opportunity for racial tensions to regularly flare. Simply put, racial interactions are shaped by the nature of the commerce. This fact is clear to the shop owners Lee studies. They make strategic business decisions to manage the nature of the merchant-customer relationship and control the age and class of the clientele. They know well that both are critical to the maintenance of daily civility.

But this book is not an account about how race does not matter. Rather, it is a story about how race is managed. In chapter 5 Lee describes how even the most trivial merchant-customer disputes can be quickly racialized and how merchants work hard to both prevent escalation and deracialize tension. "Tension is mediated on an everyday level because merchants and their employees work hard to maintain the normal routine" (p. 163). Indeed, this need to defray or allay tension is why immigrant shop owners routinely employ black managers or why they often have women—who are perceived to be less confrontational—work in the storefronts. Civility is not inexorable, but rather is carefully and strategically cultivated.

Thus, while the focus of the book is on understanding "how social order, routine, and civility are maintained each day" (p. 6) and while she stridently defends the banality of daily interaction, Lee recognizes the ever-present potential for violence. Merchant-customer relations are always an "odd mixture of prosaic routine and explosive tension, of affectionate customers and racial anger" (p. 71). Toward this end, chapter 7 explains how and why the self-generating order of daily life may break down. "Against the backdrop of everyday routine, how can we explain the protest motivations that lead to large-scale conflicts such as fire-bombings of Freddy's clothing store in Harlem or boycotts of Korean- and Jewish-owned businesses throughout the nation?" (p. 143). Indeed, Lee hopes to provide a single framework within which to understand both interracial civility and racial conflict. Lee argues that the merchant-customer relationship needs to be situated within a structural framework and in particular within the structural framework of macronarratives of U.S. race relations. Merchants and customers are also members of racial groups that have long-held beliefs about one another. More specifically, Lee argues "when groups question their position in the ethnic hierarchy that social order breaks down" (p. 163). Two aspects of this argument are problematic. The first is that Lee provides no mechanism by which individuals come to question their position as members of a group. Thus the question of when and where civility is likely to give way to conflict is unclear. Not every unsatisfactory commercial transaction escalates into tension or conflict. Second, by invoking "group position theory" (p. 163), Lee shifts both her theoretical focus and unit of analysis. Why are these macroracial narratives only important when disputes arise? Why do they not infuse every commercial interaction? It is important to note that the book offers such a masterful and engaging account of civility, the attempt

to explain conflict appears simply unnecessary. Because of both its accomplishments and its intentions, *Civility in the City* will be of immense appeal to anyone interested in urban race relations.

Policing Hatred: Law Enforcement, Civil Rights, and Hate Crime. By Jeannine Bell. New York: New York University Press, 2002. Pp. xii + 227. \$38.00.

Valerie Jenness
University of California, Irvine

For over two decades lawmakers have been busy passing hate crime laws throughout the United States. As a result, almost every state in the union has something that could be called a hate crime law and the federal government has authorized data collection on U.S. hate crime and proscribed enhanced penalties for perpetrators who select their victims on the basis of some (but not other) social statuses. As hate crime law has been institutionalized, the policing of hatred has been authorized by the state. Thus, the question needs to be raised, How has hatred in the form of bigotry been policed by law enforcement personnel? Jeannine Bell's book, *Policing Hatred: Law Enforcement, Civil Rights, and Hate Crime*, addresses this important and timely question in a way that speaks to concerns about the constitutionality of hate crime law, the use of police discretion, the dynamics of community policing, and, most important, the reliance on law to resolve conflicts based on race, religion, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation, and other axes of differentiation.

Bell relies upon multiple sources of sociologically rich data, most notably observations, interviews, police records, and media accounts, to examine how a specialized detective unit, the "Anti-Bias Task Force" (ABTF), in "Center City" goes about the business of enforcing hate crime law. Enforcing hate crime law is no small feat. As Bell explains, "hate crimes are different from other crimes in that they give more power to the police" (p. 3); moreover, "since most bias-motivated incidents are first placed in other criminal categories such as battery, assault, and vandalism, bias crimes do not exist in practice until police say they do" (p. 12). With this in mind, Bell discusses the constitutional concerns raised by hate crime law and their enforcement, the routine practices and procedures whereby hate crimes are *made* (not merely discovered and documented) by police, and the multiple ways in which police discretion and community action intersect. She does so to "provide a wide-angled view of the system out of which actual hate crime charges emerge" (p. 26) and thereafter to offer policy recommendations related to the enforcement of hate crime law.

Bell begins her study by describing the parameters of U.S. hate crime law and acknowledging the "constitutional fine line" (p. 17) law enforce-

ment personnel must walk as they try to enforce hate crime law without encroaching on hate speech protected by the First Amendment. Bell argues that although the enforcement of law in general is fraught with difficulty and intimately connected to the use of police discretion, the enforcement of hate crime law in particular is even more complicated insofar as police officers are put in the difficult position of having to determine the motivation of a perpetrator: "Bias crimes require police officers to examine not only what happened, but *why* it happened" (p. 13, original emphasis). For her, then, the question becomes, how do officers make these difficult determinations?

To address this core question, Bell situates the ABTF in a historical and organizational context that ultimately shaped what it was and was not able to accomplish. Housed in the commissioner's office, the ABTF was formed in 1978, two years prior to the passage of a hate crime law in the state. The ABTF's original charge was to respond to social unrest that began in the mid-1970s, most of which was connected to race relations in general and housing (de)segregation in Center City. Once a hate crime law passed in the state, however, the ABTF's official duties expanded to include the investigation of hate crime in Center City. What began as a social service unit in the Commissioner's office transformed into a policing unit as personnel in the unit were given full police powers, including the power to arrest, and as "neighborhood disturbances" were elevated to a top priority. In this context, the ABTF was formed to coordinate the police department's response to racial incidents (and later, other forms of bias-motivated incidents), design strategies for preventing and controlling such disturbances, and provide services for victims of such incidents and crimes. This history resulted in an organizational structure that, in large part, determined the range of possibilities for enforcing hate crime law. More important, it set the stage for community relations that impeded the investigation hate crime cases, especially what Bell calls "police-minority interaction," in a politically charged atmosphere that encouraged underenforcement of hate crime law.

In an insightful chapter aptly titled "Investigation: Detectives and the Making of Hate Crime" and "The Decision to Seek Charges," Bell skillfully describes how detectives in the ABTF engaged in informal routines and official practices that enabled officers to "make a case" (p. 59) that a hate crime has occurred and thus an incident should be charged accordingly. Operating as "street level bureaucrats" working "on the ground," detectives in the ABTF undertook a multilayered process that began with an initial screening of all cases forwarded to them and, on occasion, concluded with an official hate crime charge accepted as such by the District Attorney. This process first involved examining the case to determine if it was even worthy of becoming part of the unit's case files. Bell points out that detectives generally did not investigate what they perceived to be unsolvable cases (i.e., cases that came to them with no leads). These cases were "given the broom." The remaining cases were subjected to a series

of investigative routines and practices that often sharply diverged from those taught in the police academy, including filtering the initial account of the event contained in the incident report through a series of "stock stories" based on what had happened in previous cases; generating a series of possibilities that frame the event; labeling elements of the event before the investigation was undertaken; and assessing the credibility of the victims, witnesses, and suspects before interviewing them by checking each person's criminal record.

As cases were subjected to these routine legal and extralegal practices, Bell convincingly demonstrates they must meet two "basic requirements" to be labeled a hate crime. Namely, the perpetrator and victim had to have different identities in terms of race, gender, sexual orientation, and so on, and the context in which the crime occurred must suggest to detectives that the crime could not be attributed to anything other than bias (i.e., it could not be attributed to anger, revenge, jealousy, greed, etc.). Interestingly, the presence of mixed motives ensured a case was not deemed a hate crime. Beyond these necessary requirements, detectives relied on a number of "bias indicators"—such as the use of derogatory language during the incident, the location of the incident, the degree to which the victim's group was significantly outnumbered in the area, and whether the suspect had a history of involvement in bias-motivated attacks—to adjudicate between competing stories, weed out false reports, avoid policing speech rather than crime, and ultimately determine if a hate crime had, indeed, been committed. Accordingly, Bell is ultimately able to arrive at an empirically derived model of the terrain a case must traverse in order to be labeled a hate crime. This terrain, Bell argues convincingly, is primarily organized around ruling out alternative explanations for the occurrence of the incident or crime.

In the most interesting chapter of the book, "The Difficulty of Hate Crime Investigation," Bell moves away from the general problem of hate crime law enforcement to specific problems of enforcement in a community that is opposed to the enforcement of hate crime law. Here she describes how the majority of hate crimes in Center City come from one neighborhood, Gertown, an all-white working-class neighborhood that contains less than 10% of the Center City's population. Drawing on historical data and media accounts, Bell nicely describes how "hate crime law was more than just unpopular in Gertown; residents were mobilized against its enforcement" (p. 84). Residents of Gertown had long since resisted integration of public housing, were fearful of the influx of outsiders (especially minorities), and most importantly, resisted the ABTF's efforts to investigate hate crimes against whites. In order to impede the enforcement of hate crime law, white residents used a variety of "obstructionist tactics" (p. 111) to hinder the ABTF's investigations. For example, a number of residents of Gertown listened to police scanners to identify the location of hate crime incidents so that they could identify where a crime was occurring and remove key pieces of evidence before the police arrived

on the scene. In addition, residents would simply refuse to provide ABTF detectives with information needed to solve a crime and rely on the local media to politicize the enforcement of hate crime law such that it was positioned as a tool to harm whites. Ironically, Bell demonstrates, the obstructionist tactics hindered investigations of black-on-white bias crime that the community might have actually supported. Surprisingly, Bell does not place this exceptionally interesting dynamic between the ABTF's detectives and the communities over which they have jurisdiction into a larger context of community policing. To do so would have raised all sorts of provocative questions about hate crime law and the viability of using community policing to enforce it.

Regardless, this book is praiseworthy for addressing an age-old sociological question: How do social facts come into being? It explains how hate crime, as a modern social fact, comes into being at the hands of those working the front lines of the criminal justice system. Moreover, this book is commendable for situating police discretion and practices in a larger sociological context that includes community dynamics, organizational structure, police culture, and, most importantly, larger political debates about the ways in which the mandates of hate crime law and larger constitutional provisions are or are not at odds. With regard to the latter, this is the first study of the policing of hate crime that is well-positioned to draw on empirical findings to respond to a crucial law enforcement question: Can hate crime law be enforced and, if so, with what consequence? For this reason, this book contains exceptionally important academic and policy contributions, especially for those interested in the use of law to combat discriminatory violence.

Contentious Curricula: Afrocentrism and Creationism in American Public Schools. By Amy J. Binder. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002. Pp. xi+307. \$35.00.

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Afrocentrists and creationists are not commonly viewed as part of the same movement. One is a movement of the left, the other of the right; one is race-based, the other faith-based; one is centered in the urban North, the other in the rural South. And yet, the two groups have important commonalities. Both are the product of a feeling of dispossession in society generally and alienation from public schools in particular. Both seek to redress this through a modification of the curriculum. This is a particularly important venue for cultural struggle since the curriculum is a key carrier of "legitimate knowledge." As such, it is also slow to change. Thus, although Afrocentrist and creationist challenges are the subject of *Contentious Curricula*, the book is more fundamentally about the need to study

culturally oriented social movements in their organizational contexts and the power of organizations to resist such movements.

The book's first six chapters are divisible into three parts. The first consists of a theoretical introduction (chap. 1), historical overview, and explanation of the research design (chap. 2). The second is an overview of Afrocentrist challenges in New York state, Atlanta, and the District of Columbia (chap. 3) and an analysis of the factors influencing the outcomes in these cases (chap. 4). The third part does the same for creationist challenges in Vista (California), Louisiana, California, and Kansas (chaps. 5–6). The conclusion (chap. 7) is an extended plea for other researchers to conduct further studies along the lines this work suggests.

As someone who has written on the institutionalization of multicultural curricular change, the highest praise I can give *Contentious Curricula* is to say I wish I could have read it before I finished my own book. Binder's theoretical range and empirical rigor is impressive. The research design allows her to make comparisons both within and between the two movements, and she does well to highlight the uniqueness of each case without treating them as idiosyncratic. This is due to the strong theoretical concern that drives the analysis. Binder is working at the intersection of three sociological literatures that she claims have developed too independently from one another: cultural sociology, social movements, and organizational sociology. She writes, "Looking through each of these lenses, separately, clarifies different dimensions of these challenges. Looking through them all at once, however, will yield an even better understanding" (p. 25).

When she focuses these three lenses on each of the two challenges, the picture that emerges is clear. We see why Afrocentrist challenges had greater short-term success than creationist challenges, but also why both ultimately failed. Binder's analysis shows that both employed broadly resonant cultural frames of pluralism and inclusion, but these received greater sympathy when advanced by Afrocentrists. In the long run, both failed to achieve significant curricular change due to the resistance of educational bureaucrats. I cannot adequately summarize all of the book's many insights here, but suffice it to say that the patient reader will be rewarded abundantly.

Although, or perhaps because, this book is a fine example of disciplinary sociology, I did not enjoy reading it. It felt like a 250-page journal article. Binder's exhaustive and exhausting effort to "situate" this work in "the literature" and to distinguish her "contributions" tested my patience. At times, her effort at distinction makes the existing literature look intellectually feeble. If Binder is to be believed, social movements scholars spend a lot of time bursting through open doors. For example, Binder makes a case for her perspective in part by insisting that "the actions of protesters are only one determinant of social movement outcomes. Equally important are the characteristics of targets" (p. 19). When they are not making common sense difficult, social movements scholars seem to be bracketing it, forcing Binder to offer this corrective: "Organizations are not the uni-

tary, purposive, rational entities that so much of the social movements literature depicts them to be" (p. 19).

Elsewhere, Binder carves out theoretical space by painfully elaborating some obvious distinctions. For example, she argues that understanding how creationists made inroads into school boards but not into school bureaucracies requires a distinction "between political authority and bureaucratic/professional authority as two different kinds of 'insider' status" (p. 227), but this is no revelation to anyone who studies political systems and recognizes the distinction between setting policy (legislation) and implementing it (administration).

Finally, lost in all of Binder's contributions to sociology is any reflection on the implications of her analysis beyond the discipline. Although Binder's theoretical and analytical blade is sharp, her practical and normative blade is blunted. Consequently, her critical scissors do not cut as well as they might. Thus, *Contentious Curricula* will largely be of interest to professional sociologists working in the areas her book addresses directly. Perhaps that is enough. From what I know of her, however, I do not doubt that Binder is capable of a broader effort in the future.

From Here to University: Access, Mobility, and Resilience among Urban Latino Youth. By Alexander Jun. New York: RoutledgeFalmer, 2001. Pp. x+157. \$70.00.

James R. Valadez
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In recent years there has been a growing amount of attention given to the analysis of access and opportunity for Latino students to enter post-secondary education. Much of this work has provided much needed insight into these issues and has been based chiefly on large-scale national databases (Julian Betts and Magnus Lofstrom, "The Educational Attainment of Immigrants," in *The Economics of Immigration* [University of Chicago Press, 2000]; Therese L. Baker and William Velez, "Access and Opportunity in Postsecondary Education in the U.S.: A Review," *Sociology of Education* 69 [suppl.]: 82-101; Richard Fry, *Latinos in Higher Education: Many Enroll, Too Few Graduate* [Pew Charitable Trusts, 2002]; Georges Vernez and Allan Abrahamse, *How Immigrants Fare in U.S. Education* [Rand, 1996]). Alexander Jun's book, *From Here to University*, is a notable exception to these quantitative studies and provides an uncommonly personal view of a group of Latino students attempting to overcome personal challenges on their path to higher education.

Jun seeks to understand the inequities in public education and the difficulties Latino students face in gaining access to and succeeding in prestigious higher education institutions. The situation for the students Jun follows is magnified by their experiences at the poorly funded, low-

achieving, and troubled public schools of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD). To provide evidence, Jun employs a case study technique that focuses on the lives of five Latino students who are participants of the University of Southern California's (USC) Neighborhood Academic Initiative (NAI). NAI identifies 50 seventh graders from local inner-city schools and provides the students two hours of daily academic instruction, afternoon tutoring, and Saturday enrichment classes for their families. All students who remain with the program through high school graduation and are academically eligible for admission receive a full academic scholarship to USC. Jun was able to contact and enlist the cooperation of five graduates of the NAI program who were enrolled at USC during the course of his study.

Jun chooses to focus on cultural capital as his theoretical framework for examining the students' progress through higher education. Jun may be correct in citing cultural capital as a critical feature of understanding differential academic performance among students, but focusing on cultural capital may be oversimplifying the complexity of Bourdieu's theory and provides an incomplete explanation for the lack of educational progress for minority groups. Susan Dumais ("Cultural Capital, Gender, and School Success: The Role of Habitus," *Sociology of Education*, 75 [1]: 44–68) agrees with this assertion and explains that cultural capital is but one form of capital that Bourdieu described and that by focusing on cultural capital sociologists may be giving inadequate attention to another crucial element influencing education: habitus. Bourdieu (*Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste* [Routledge & Keegan Paul, 1984]) himself noted that cultural capital, habitus, and field all work together to generate behaviors that determine a students' experience with educational institutions. While Jun's framework incorporates aspects of cultural capital and habitus, the heavy reliance on cultural capital limits his analysis and ignores the interplay present in Bourdieu's theory that may have shed light on the successes and failures of the students he followed.

Jun's students, with the exception of Ricky, are products of LAUSD's inner-city schools. Predictably, the four inner-city students struggle in their early years at USC. The students cite a variety of reasons for their difficulties, most notably the lack of academic preparation and misjudgments regarding the expectations of college life. Ricky's case provides an interesting contrast in Jun's study. Although initially Ricky was enrolled in an inner-city school, his family moved to the suburbs to escape some of the problems associated with urban life and to seek better education opportunities in a suburban school. Jun's thesis that inner-city schools provide inadequate preparation and serve to thwart the aspirations of its students receives ample support here. In contrasting the experiences of the four inner-city students with Ricky, Jun correctly attributes the disparity in achievement to different levels of social and cultural capital bestowed by schools and families from urban and suburban areas. Jun,

however, could have expanded his analysis with a more thorough treatment of the role of habitus and field in the students' lives.

Jun's strongest contribution is his rich account of the lives of the five Latino college students. Through their life histories, Jun provides details of family life and the personal struggles of the students as they progress from troubled public schools to the university. In particular, Jun's descriptions of the students' relationships with their parents and significant others offers a rare inside view of Latino student day-to-day life. The depiction of the cultural elements in the students' biographies places emphasis on the conflicting dilemmas these particular students experience. On the one hand, Jun describes families that support their students' ambitions, yet on the other, the families often pressure them to remain close to home. Jun's life histories reveal the students' internal conflict over these demands and provide a clearer understanding of the social and cultural forces shaping Latino student educational decision making.

In summary, Jun's study reiterates what is widely known but worth repeating regarding large urban school districts: These schools seem to provide few advantages for Latino students. Jun's study indicts LAUSD's large urban high schools as largely ineffective institutions that fail to prepare Latinos for higher education. In Jun's view, NAI offers a glimmer of hope for students. Although labor intensive and expensive, these type of partnerships between urban universities and the communities that surround them are part of the solution needed to build higher education pathways for Latino students.

Freedom Is an Endless Meeting: Democracy in American Social Movements. By Francesca Polletta. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002. Pp. xi+283. \$35.00.

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In a time when even the formal bureaucratic structures of U.S. representative democracy have been looking ineffective, with simply resolving an electoral tie vote seeming to overload the system, it is more than refreshing to read such a sensible discussion of the political merits of participatory democracy. Francesca Polletta takes issue with the common wisdom that organizations seeking political effectiveness must strategically prefer formalization and hierarchical decision-making to the time-consuming processes of involving members in making the choices that matter for the group. She argues instead that there are significant political benefits in participatory structures, as well as costs and risks associated with doing politics in this way. She makes the case for seeing participatory practices as a matter of strategic choice as well as an expression of group norms and beliefs. Polletta shows how the availability of models, the cultural

meaning of practices (e.g., the practice of having formal offices in an organization is seen as expressing the seriousness of the organization), and the displacement of conflict over goals into struggles over structure have more to do with why and how social movement organizations become more or less participatory over time than any sort of iron law of efficiency can explain.

Polletta does a splendid job of tracing the history of participatory democracy within social movements of the late 20th century, beginning from pacifist groups and labor education movements before and after World War II and taking the story up to contemporary antiglobalization groups and community organizations built along the Alinsky model in urban areas. The middle chapters cover the more familiar cases of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC), Students for a Democratic Society, and women's liberation groups, but as with the earlier and later examples, Polletta offers new insights from original research (both archival and interview based) into what participatory democracy meant at different points for these groups, and why they moved into and away from structures that fostered participation. While she does not deny the problems with such structures that have often been discussed by others—such as the amount of time they cost, the potential for unrecognized cliques to govern, the exclusionary inclinations of intense friendships, the substitution of informal authority and covert manipulation for more overt decision-making processes—Polletta carefully and critically balances these costs against other benefits that members seek and often find in participation, such as the development of a sense of ownership of the organization, growth in self-confidence and political knowledge among members, and more equally sharing real power to articulate and achieve their own interests.

One of the many insights Polletta offers into how participatory democracy works is that it is not just one structure, but can take many forms, no less than representative democracies do. Because these are informal structures for the most part, they draw informally on models of interaction outside the organization. She distinguishes between the types of practices that are more educational or "tutelary" and which expressly aim at developing members' political knowledge and skills; those that are more consensus oriented and conscience respecting; and those that express the norms of friendship, intimacy, and generalized trust. Each experiment in participatory democracy, she shows, is taken up with a strategic goal in mind for which certain of these practices are indeed well-suited; for example, as the developmental goal of creating new activists and the tutelary style originally worked in SNCC. But the meaning of the democratic practice also comes to be embedded in the conflicts in which the organization engages. Again, taking the example of SNCC, Polletta focuses on how the defeat of the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party in Atlantic City made the goal of producing people who would stand up and make demands of the system, as they had done, more questionable.

Polletta argues that SNCC's uncertainty about goals became displaced into debates over organizational structure so that the race of activists came to symbolize these concerns, ultimately being translated into meaning that a more hierarchical organization would be more "authentically black." Turning away from participatory democracy in this (as in the other cases she examines) had explanations other than organizational efficiency or political effectiveness at its root. Polletta offers telling detail from her research into all of the groups she discusses and invariably throws new light on their struggles over group structure. She effectively resists the division between structure and culture, no less than the false notion of "rationality" that separates strategic choice from normative demands and available cultural repertoires. Because this study is a model for well-focused qualitative research into organizational process and structure, it not only speaks to social movement scholars but also offers considerable insight into any organization's decision-making processes. Her research points more broadly into when and how groups think and act effectively as well as how individuals can, via group participation, become real agents in making democracy work.

Public and Counterpublics. By Michael Warner. New York: Zone Books, 2002. Pp. 334. \$30.00.

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University of Essex

Michael Warner is a prominent queer theorist (and also professor of English at Rutgers) whose earlier works have highlighted queer as a strategy to break borders and resist normalization. In an earlier work (*The Trouble with Normal: Sex, Politics and the Ethics of Queer Life* [Harvard University Press, 1999]) he specifically rejects the urge to be normal and seems to be championing transgression in all forms, but especially erotic transgression. He has been severely critical of the ways in which some mainstream lesbians and gays have played such a prominent role in championing marriage, reproducing family structures, and sanitizing sexuality. Here, he continues these themes in eight essays, written over a decade for different reasons and from a range of angles. At its heart, the book addresses the shifting nature of the public and the emergence of counterpublics.

Warner suggests the idea of publics and counterpublics may be a more useful concept for current times than that of community, and the book examines some of the ways in which publics are called forth through writing, drama, and media. Warner argues that a public is self-organized, brings together relations between strangers, can be both personal and impersonal, and can be constituted through mere attention. For him "a

public is the social space created by the reflexive circulation of discourse" (p. 90). It is poetic world making and takes on many historical forms.

The creation of publics has to be a question that sociologists should address more firmly and Warner is an exemplary guide to the framing of such issues. Some of the early chapters provide overviews of classic debates between liberals and their critics (e.g., Kant, Habermas, Arendt, Pateman) alongside attempts at some systematization of the field, but most of the chapters are eclectic case studies showing different publics and counterpublics (gay, transgendered, feminist, black, etc.) at work. Thus in one chapter, we are treated to discussions of the African Theatre of 1821–24 and a literary periodical of the time (*St Tammany's Magazine*)—which documents a play that was possibly performed at the theater in 1821—as an instance of radical resistance. In another chapter, we are given an account of a temperance tract (later known as the novel *Franklin Evans*) which is viewed as the start of an "addiction literature" (p. 281), the temperance movement (possibly the largest social movement in history, Warner claims), and the novel's author, Walt Whitman. This seems to be one of the cores of the book: to illustrate the creations of new publics and counterpublics. Just who is the public, how does it come into being among strangers, and how does it work?

A telling chapter is chapter 3, which speaks in detail of styles of intellectual publics and which is really an essay on reading and writing communities: "For whom does one write or speak? Where is one's public?" Warner asks (p. 128). Starting with a consideration of George Orwell's character Winston in 1984, Warner considers the various attacks made on academic writing for not being clear enough for a general public, suggesting that indeed some academic and queer audiences really do require a new language to say the new things they wish to say. This allows him some space to consider the attacks made on the writings of left academic theory—often densely indecipherable, ponderously unclear, and written for small elite groupings (there is a discussion of the notorious case of Judith Butler). Warner seems to value the new publics that emerge through some kind of "defamiliarization" of language. He does seem to equate good writing with a popular audience while arguing that "bad writing is necessary" (p. 137).

A chapter on sex in public coauthored with Lauren Berlant is also a fascination. Published previously, Warner does not mean to signpost here the usual debates on sex in public (as found, e.g., in Pat Califia's book of that name and as evidenced in the sociological analysis of tearooms, cruising, truckers, and bathhouses from Laud Humphreys and Edward Delph onward). Rather, the aim is to capture the ways in which a kind of "national heterosexuality" along with "family values" saturates much public talk, while at the same time queer cultures work to subvert them. Again, the mode of writing is through case studies and theoretical development. One example is a discussion of the New York City Council's Zoning Text Amendment in 1995, which regulated public spaces (p. 190).

Another example is the queer counterpublic of a "garden variety leather bar." Here the conventional routines of "spanking, flagellation, shaving, branding, laceration, bondage, humiliation, wrestling—as they say, you know, the usual" are suddenly subverted by the less than usual: a cabaret of what is called "erotic vomiting" (pp. 206–10). I will not go into "the publics" that attended this show of erotic vomiting, but it is a clear demonstration of the creation of a relatively unusual counterpublic space that would not be everybody's cup of tea.

Although he covers much ground, some central sociological concerns are missing. I was left a little puzzled by his lack of any sustained focus on the new media and technologies that now really construct (or invade) the public. I think of how everyday my public spaces are invaded by mobile phones—a new solitary landscape of communicating people creating new formations that are too underestimated. It also seems a little odd that in these multicultural, globalizing times, there is scant attention paid to publics outside the United States in the book, or to what might be called globalizing counterpublics. The core sociological concept of "community" is dismissed with no concern for the recent debates established by Etzioni or Putnam. Likewise, the work of Joseph Gusfield on the culture of public problems (and indeed the whole "claims-making" traditions of social problems theory) is nowhere mentioned. And there is little here for those interested in developing debates on citizenship further—though the very idea of publics is so closely linked.

But these are just quibbles for this is an eclectic dazzler of a book, and Warner does not aim at a comprehensive or systematic account. I hope this stimulating study will extend discussions of the public/private debate, provide recognition for queer theory's growing contributions to the world of social theory, and become an influential benchmark in sensing the importance of the counter public.

The Changing and Unchanging Face of U.S. Civil Society. By Marcella Ridlen Ray. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002. Pp. xii+269. \$39.95.

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Marcella Ridlen Ray argues, contra Robert Putnam (*Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community* [Simon and Schuster, 2000]), that civil society in the United States is not in decline, but has been relatively stable by quantitative measures, though flexible and dynamic, over much of the course of the 20th century, including the last few decades that have given rise to the most concern. In reviewing an impressive range of quantitative and public opinion studies, as well as community studies, she concludes that "the important point is that Amer-

icans continue to get involved in community affairs despite a long-standing ambivalence about the costs of time and effort" (p. 68). Indeed, if we look at various other indicators, she argues, "U.S. civil society is more democratic and flexible than ever as we enter the twenty-first century" (p. 230).

Ray examines not only the extent of voluntary associations, where she finds substantial percentages of grassroots associations uncounted by Putnam and a rate of growth greater than population growth, but also a growing pattern of rich diversity and multiplex communication with much room for choice and innovation. The two chief areas where she sees vulnerability are in the autonomy of associations in the face of encroachment from external and centralized forces, especially government, and the mediating role of political associations, especially parties, whose capacity for aggregating interests and developing consensus has declined.

In my own research with Lewis Friedland (*Civic Innovation in America: Community Empowerment, Public Policy, and the Movement for Civic Renewal* [University of California Press, 2001]), we also found much evidence of the democratic capacity of Americans to innovate over the past four decades to solve public problems, as well as areas where Putnam has seriously undercounted associations such as local environmental groups. In cities, such as Portland, Oregon, where there has been a notable concentration of a variety of complementary innovations in public participation and complex civic partnerships, Putnam's general explanatory factors (e.g., aging of the World War II civic generation, television use) cannot possibly account for differences with less civic regions. But Ray's data are often presented in too scattershot a format to effectively challenge Putnam's carefully constructed account of decline, which still remains, despite legitimate criticisms by Ray and others, a very formidable argument.

There are a number of areas where Ray's case for dynamism could be much stronger. In the chapter on autonomy, she presents arguments on sustainable community development from developing societies and community organizations in Chicago in the 1960s, but nothing on community development organizations in the contemporary United States, or other democratic innovations in Chicago today, of which there are an interesting array and which create patterns of interaction between civic associations and government that would be very instructive for her overall argument. The chapter on diversity begs for a much more extensive treatment of different types of organizations in local civic ecologies and linkages (or lack thereof) among ethnic and racial groups. The easy assertion of growing political equality needs to be placed against the impact of growing economic inequality on social connections and the relative weakness of social capital in certain metropolitan areas.

Ray argues, correctly I think, that there is a substantial reservoir of pragmatic public spiritedness in the United States today. But this spirit, and the reported self-confidence of Americans in their capacities to make

a difference in their communities, while very important, begs the question of whether civic capacities (appropriate skills and organizational capacities) are adequate to the increasingly complex problems and policy conundrums we face. General studies of civil society or aggregate levels of social capital fail to address the question of the kinds of civic capacities that are needed relative to specific problems. Thus, if our problem is how to protect and restore integrated ecosystems, we need to know about the civic capacities of watershed associations, multistakeholder ecosystem partnerships, and of professionals at all levels of government and in various trade associations to work with citizens in developing sustainable strategies, rather than battling in courts while ecosystem health further deteriorates. General indicators of membership in environmental groups or public opinion on the environment will not help us much. If our problem is school reform, we face a whole other set of issues about civic capacity, as Clarence Stone and his colleagues have demonstrated (*Building Civic Capacity: The Politics of Reforming Urban Schools* [University Press of Kansas, 2001]).

Ray has written a book that should be read by anyone interested in the current debates about the general health of civil society in the United States. But if we believe in the capacity of Americans to reinvent their pragmatic democracy, it is perhaps time to shift attention away from general surveys and outmoded baselines toward specific institutional and policy arenas and the kinds of civic capacity being generated or possibly required to solve real problems.

Social Capital: A Theory of Social Structure and Action. By Nan Lin. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001. Pp. xiv+278. \$22.00 (paper).

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London School of Economics

As the title of this book suggests, its author sets an ambitious objective to locate the idea of social capital at the center of social structural analysis. But what is social capital? What does it add to the repertoire of structural concepts already available to us? Given the current ballyhoo about the concept (theory?), one might have been excused for believing that definitional matters are a settled issue. But that is not the case, and unfortunately Lin is not terribly helpful in sorting things out. Indeed, it is difficult to evade the excoriating conclusions recently drawn by Steven Durlauf in his review ("Bowling Alone: A Review Essay," *Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization*, 47:259–73) of Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone*, another book about social capital. Why has such a potentially important theoretical endeavor attracted authors who choose to present ideas in an unrigorous manner, especially when it appears that

the central ideas are located in one of the few areas in sociology (structural analysis) where reasonable technical standards otherwise prevail? On page 29 we read, "social capital as an investment in social relations with an expected return in the market place should be defined as resources embedded in social structure that are accessed and/or mobilized in purposive action." This, however, seems to confound two differing conceptions—the tension between which runs throughout the book. First, social capital can presumably be defined as (social) relations, which themselves can be maintained, invested in (time, effort, etc.), and depreciate. Second, social capital can be identified (as Lin often appears to want to do) with the resources (human capital, etc.) that can be transmitted down the relations. It is difficult, however, to conceive of "investment" in these resources (apart from investing in the relations down which they may pass, be exchanged, etc.). Furthermore, it is not clear why the concept should be tied to market exchanges. An author is entitled to run these conceptions together, but if so, this must be achieved in a consistent and coherent manner. I am not sure Lin accomplishes this.

If the concept of capital is to confer analytical advantages over and above the old idea of merely being embedded in an exogenously generated network (direct and indirect relations) then it would probably prove sensible to conceive the (social) relations as a production (i.e., of purposive action) technology in which appropriate investments can be made with embedded resources as the inputs to this technology. The two ideas do, of course, fit together when so conceived, and would provide a framework in which purposive action actually generated (i.e., rendered endogenous) the relations (i.e., social capital). As it is, Lin's formulations, which are rarely sufficiently rigorous, fall short.

Consider chapter 6, which presents a model of the impact of social capital upon status attainment. There is often a stark disjunction between the text and the semiformal diagram model (p. 83). In the text, we find the sensible idea whereby prior social status (e.g., previous job or parents' status) causally affects both the resources accessed through networks and the network relations themselves. Yet when we come to the model, the "extensity" of ties (an unnecessary neologism) is formulated as exogenous. Similarly, the text speaks of the impact of initial position on attained status, though in the model it only has an effect through the resource network. Small points perhaps, but the book is replete with such infelicities. The chapters on networks are presented largely informally and the ideas are often unclear—certainly anybody not versed in network analysis will often find the text difficult to follow. I really think the days are over when theory can be formulated in this loose a manner. This is a pity, for it is a very well-intentioned book.

The Soul's Economy: Market Society and Selfhood in American Thought, 1820–1920. By Jeffrey Sklansky. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002. Pp. xiii+313. \$45.00 (cloth); \$19.95 (paper).

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In *The Soul's Economy*, Jeffrey Sklansky shows how the sturdy traditions of political economy developed in the English, Scottish, and French Enlightenment, with their emphasis on labor and property, became transmuted into early 20th-century ideologies of corporate capitalism, which gave a central place to the malleable socialized self of the consumer. To oversimplify his subtle argument, Sklansky claims that while the social psychologists and sociologists who fashioned these new ideologies believed they were undercutting the retrogressive freehold individualism of the old political economy that justified class inequality, they were also, ironically, turning their eyes away from the mechanisms that produced that inequality through the capitalist wage labor contract.

So while Sklansky's book is a neat exercise in the recovery of an interesting and complex pattern of intellectual development before the Progressives and the Pragmatists, it is also the history of a burial: the interment of some useful analytical tools that would help explain why, "when the American working class was widely presumed dead, rank-and-file resistance to global capital showed renewed vigor in the United States as well as abroad" (p. 232).

The book covers the period from 1820 to 1920. By coincidence, 1920 was also the year of Max Weber's death. Readers will find in Sklansky's book a different set of reverberations between the "soul" and the "economy" from those to which Weber was attuned. Benjamin Franklin has a small part (unlike his starring role in Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* [Scribner, 1958]), but much more attention is given to George Fitzhugh's critique of Franklin's approach, which he finds "low, selfish, atheistic and material" (p. 96). Fitzhugh, writing before the U.S. Civil War, was an apologist for Southern slavery and part of a broader pattern of resistance to the model of rational economic actors inherited from the Enlightenment by the generation that made the U.S. Revolution.

These early resisters were, at first sight, strange bedfellows. What was there in common between New England Transcendentalists such as Ralph Waldo Emerson (philosopher), Horace Bushnell (theologian), and Margaret Fuller (cultural critic); Southern paternalists such as George Fitzhugh and Henry Hughes; and the Philadelphia-based political economist Henry C. Carey? What united them was their revulsion against the exclusion from the Enlightenment model of the warm, intuitive side of human nature, the propensity for feeling affinity with others, and the capacity to cooperate and share. In every case, the resistance was directed not against the material inequalities or forms of exploitation found within

social relationships but against the justifications for keeping such relationships narrow, cold, and uncaring.

Classical political economy came under renewed attack after the Civil War, when monetary reformers argued that the workings of the economy should be remodeled to encourage close association between labor and capital, linking them through the mechanism of freely available credit and cash. In other words, the needs of different social groups should be the criteria for determining the flow of resources. Social scientists took up the theme, developing models of society that emphasized interdependence and the responsibilities of the rich to the poor.

Then, in a brilliant chapter on the postbellum crisis of political economy, Sklansky shows that this intellectual field was deeply split during the depression years at the end of the 19th century. Henry George defended the rights of labor by attacking rentiers while capital found its defender in William Graham Sumner, who laid into the supporters of redistributive taxation. However, both moved in a collectivist direction, the former demanding that labor share in the fruits of the market, the latter discovering the significance and strength of the group, corporation, or society as opposed to the individual.

By this stage of the game, the classic model of human beings in command of themselves and in charge of national government was beginning to seem distinctly shaky. New psychologists such as G. Stanley Hall, John Dewey, and William James met this challenge by arguing that the free exercise of human will depended upon human beings acquiring understanding and control over their beliefs and the social practices through which they were expressed. Meanwhile, a new breed of economists such as Simon N. Patten and, from the other side of the political fence, Thorstein Veblen began to describe the market as a cultural formation rather than in terms of rights to resources. Finally, a similar pattern was found in sociology where Lester F. Ward and Edward A. Ross discovered the power of public opinion.

The whole argument is thoroughly worked and flows smoothly. It has the weight of a doctoral thesis but none of the ponderousness. Jeffrey Sklansky has produced a learned and carefully crafted work that, as has been seen, carries a sting in its elegant tail.

The Mirth of Nations. By Christie Davies. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Publishers, 2002. Pp. xi+252. \$39.95.

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The study of humor has a weak position within sociology. Rarely is humor examined in our journal articles, the ASA has no section for scholars who study humor, introductory textbooks devote little space to it, and few

sociology graduate courses deal with it. Instead, sociologists' work on humor is scattered and appears mainly in interdisciplinary journals and anthologies or in the literature of folklore, psychology, anthropology, or communications. That is where much of the writing of Christie Davies, the leading authority on comparative ethnic humor and a professor of sociology at University of Reading, appears. Sadly, "sociology" is conspicuously absent from the list of subject areas on the jacket of Davies's latest book—the publisher indicates that *The Mirth of Nations* is for readers interested in humor, history, or cultural studies. Davies suggests, however, that sociologists' inattention to humor and failure to give it a rigorous comparative, historical, and contextual analysis leads many of us to hold untenable assumptions about ethnic jokes, misunderstand these jokes' origins, and misjudge the sentiments of many people who tell or laugh at derogatory ethnic jokes.

Davies analyzes humor as a "social fact," modeling his approach to ethnic jokes on Durkheim's study of suicide. He examines the social conditions and relations among ethnic groups in places and time periods that popular "cycles" of ethnic jokes (e.g., Polish jokes, Jewish American Princess jokes, Scottish jokes, and "Newfie" jokes) arise or are popular. Davies's theoretical agenda is to test and *refute* an idea that has substantial acceptance among many social scientists and political activists—that ethnic jokes arise from intergroup conflict, hostility, or aggression (i.e., ethnic jokes reflect prejudice or constitute "hate speech"). His chapters on jokes about different ethnicities show that aggression, hostility, conflict, or sense of threat are *not* necessary or sufficient conditions for the telling of demeaning jokes, and Davies finds no correlation between the content (or frequency) of ethnic jokes and levels of negative sentiment toward the butts of those jokes. For instance, chapters on Polish jokes show that rather than originating when hostility and conflict between Polish Americans and others were acute (1890s–1930s), these jokes arose and became popular when it was at a low ebb (late 1940s–1970s), and rather than being started by groups that felt antagonistic toward Poles, Polish jokes probably were created by Polish Americans poking fun at themselves. Moreover, Davies argues that if these jokes really express hostility toward Poles, then there should also be an abundance of other expressions of anti-Polish sentiment in U.S. culture at the same time Polish jokes are popular. But Davies finds little other anti-Polish material accompanying the Polish jokes, so he concludes that Polish jokes are not necessarily indicative of negative feelings on the joke teller's part. Of course, he is *not* arguing that ethnic jokes never are created out of intergroup conflict or threat, or that they never are used to express hostility, only that ethnic jokes often are unencumbered by these things.

Davies is insistent, but less convincing, on two related points. He contends that ethnic jokes are just a form of play and should not be taken seriously, and even claims that, "Jokes can have no significant political impact [because other more powerful forces shape the world]" (p. 222).

Many readers may also remain skeptical of Davies's claim that ethnic jokes, because they are meant to be funny, are entirely different phenomena than ethnic slurs and other derogatory gestures aimed at certain groups.

The Mirth of Nations extends Davies's work in previous books. It is based on his extensive international experience and interviews with joke tellers and folklorists, plus intensive inspection of joke books and humor archives around the world. Although he authoritatively comments on the prevalence of ethnic jokes in different eras, few numbers or statistical tables are presented. This work is rooted in traditional positivist sociology. It eschews postmodern interpretations of humor, and Davies is perturbed with "ultra-liberals" who try to suppress ethnic humor. Davies provides abundant examples of ethnic jokes; many are not funny to me, though his list of Australian slang expressions for vomiting (p. 93) makes the book worthwhile from a humorous standpoint.

Most chapters do double duty—providing interesting social histories of the origin and evolution of ethnic jokes and refuting "conflict-aggression" interpretations of ethnic humor. Presentation of his theoretical stance in each chapter (and the introduction and conclusion) is redundant, but it allows us to assign one or two chapters for students to read and still get the author's main point. Since humor (or attempts at it) are among the most pervasive elements in popular culture, and since derisive jokes aimed at ethnic groups often create public controversy, this subject should have a higher profile in sociology. *The Mirth of Nations* is an important book to consider.

Speaking from the Heart: Gender and the Social Meaning of Emotion.
By Stephanie A. Shields. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Pp. xiii + 214. \$28.00.

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What is emotion? When does it matter? Who and what gets called "emotional?" What does it mean when this happens? How do we know when a person is "speaking from the heart?" How are emotion and gender interrelated? For instance, how do emotion beliefs create and maintain gender boundaries and, in the process, produce gender identities? Also, how and why do we present, negotiate, and realize gender identities through "doing emotion?" In *Speaking from the Heart*, Stephanie Shields incisively addresses these questions and offers revealing insights into how emotion shapes our everyday lives as women and men.

Shields begins her book with a brief overview of how researchers have defined and analyzed emotion. She then describes her own conception of emotion (i.e., emotion is "taking it personally") and points out why fem-

inists, psychologists, and other scholars need to reconceptualize the intricate interconnections that exist between emotion and gender. In the process, Shields proposes that a more comprehensive analysis of these interconnections requires an investigation of how people's beliefs about emotion shape their emotional language, experiences, and actions, especially as they construct and sustain gendered selves.

Shields makes this investigation a central feature of *Speaking from the Heart*. In chapter 2 she reveals how women and men rely upon emotion stereotypes in assessing, displaying, and interpreting emotion and in acquiring and expressing gender identities. She also documents how gender differences in emotional experience and display are far more context-dependent than prevailing emotion stereotypes would suggest. In chapter 3 Shields illustrates how beliefs about emotion are coded by gender and, simultaneously, serve as codes for gender. Moreover, she demonstrates how women and men "do gender" through "doing emotion." That is, she shows how they enact gender identities (and experience these identities as authentic) in and through emotion beliefs, values, and displays.

In chapters 4 through 6 Shields examines images of male and female emotionality in two historical periods—the late 19th and late 20th centuries—in an effort to decipher the gendered nature and expression of emotion stereotypes. In doing so, she reveals how and why the belief that ideal emotion is "manly emotion" emerged during the latter part of the 19th century. She also considers how the notion of masculine inexpressivity became so prevalent in the late 20th century and why this notion obscures our understandings of male emotionality. Shields provides a particularly cogent critique of "the fallacy of the inexpressive male" in her analysis of how sports talk is saturated with emotion talk and feeling displays. Most crucially, Shields highlights the point that a new standard of manly emotion, reflected in representations of male emotional nurturance, has become increasingly prominent and celebrated in U.S. culture. This standard encourages men to feel passion and express nurturance, especially as caregiving fathers, but not in a "feminine" or "merely emotional" way. Instead, drawing on post-Enlightenment understandings of male emotionality, it stresses that passion needs to be managed and controlled in the service of reason.

Shields concludes *Speaking from the Heart* with an analysis of how manly emotion serves as the standard by which both men and women are evaluated. She subsequently describes the emotional double binds that this standard creates. For women, the double bind is the expectation that they should display appropriate (and sometimes extravagant) nurturance while also conforming to the hegemonic standard of manly emotion. For men, the bind is how to attain the slippery ideal of manly emotion, particularly in the face of expectations that they should be loving friends, fathers, and partners but also maintain emotional self-control. Shields wraps up her book with discussions of how emotion is named, how the

boundaries of appropriate emotion are policed, and how emotional authenticity is claimed, owned, and enacted.

Overall, I have to commend Stephanie Shields for writing such an engaging, illuminating, and panoramic book. *Speaking from the Heart* is filled with provocative insights. I must admit, however, that I felt disappointed by a few features of the book. I felt most disappointed by the author's failure to discuss how emotions are generated, defined, and expressed interactively. In exploring this theme, Shields could have drawn usefully upon the work of interactionist scholars such as Candace Clark, Norman Denzin, Thomas Scheff, and Peggy Thoits. I also felt disappointed by the author's failure to explore how and why sexuality serves as a key medium through which women and men "do gender through doing emotion." I found it both troubling and surprising that a book examining the links between gender and emotion included no discussion of sex or sexual relationships. Finally, while appreciating the author's insights regarding the new standard of manly emotion that has gained ascendancy, I was disappointed that she did not offer more discussion of how this standard is contested and negotiated.

I do not offer these critical reflections to deter readers. On the contrary, I offer them in the spirit of calling others to emulate Shields's goals in this book and to further explore the links between gender and emotion, especially as they get played out in the realms of sports, sex, and politics.

Making Men into Fathers: Men, Masculinities, and the Social Politics of Fatherhood. Edited by Barbara Hobson. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Pp. x+328. \$60.00 (cloth); \$22.00 (paper).

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Studies on social policy, research on fathers and families, and critical men's studies have tended to be distinct arenas of scholarly activity. *Making Men into Fathers* provides a welcome and sophisticated synthesis of these areas of inquiry. The book is a collection of articles that focuses on how state, market, and family processes construct fatherhood in the United States, Sweden, Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. Authors compare these nations on a range of topics including welfare regimes, the cash and care facets of fatherhood, child support and custody, parental leave, and masculinities. All comparisons are anchored in the contexts, histories, and discourses specific to each country. The collection relies on a variety of data and methods including narrative analysis, descriptive statistics, and multivariate analysis. More than a description of national policies on "making men into fathers," the book is an impressive effort to theorize the various concerns about fatherhood (the ideology), conditions for fathering (the practice), and experiences of fathers (as individ-

uals). Locating gender at the core of its analysis, the book interrogates claims about a "crisis in fatherhood" by analyzing competing definitions of "father" and comparing the social politics affecting the "cash and care" facets of paternal rights and duties. Barbara Hobson explains: "Our purpose is to situate these politics in the broader context of policy regimes, ideological and cultural frames of family and gender, and structural changes in post-industrial globalizing economies" (p. 3).

While the anthology highlights the constraints on fathering, it argues that constructing fathers must be understood as a multilayered and fluid phenomenon, irreducible to policy regimes, market conditions, or cultural ideologies since fathers themselves are multiple, diverse, and differentially empowered. Conceived at a conference in 1995 and developed over four years, the anthology coheres because of themes addressed throughout the text (e.g., cash and care, masculinities, policies, citizenship, and sexuality) and, more important, a model presented in the introduction by Barbara Hobson and David Morgan and carried forward by authors of subsequent chapters. Briefly, the model is constituted by three triangles, each recognizing key relational facets of "making men into fathers": the "state, market, and family" triangle examines institutional contexts and interfaces with the domestic triangle of "husband/father, wife/mother, and parent-child," which recognizes the gender and generational relations that constitute being a father; both of these triangles interface with the "fathering, fatherhood, and fathers" triangle.

The triangles provide structure; their rotation provides some fluidity. This model allows authors and readers to compare chapters that address individual nations—such as the Swedish recognition of unmarried, biological fathers versus the German and Dutch emphasis on married or household fathers. It enables analysis of how a state may support a kind of "fatherhood" (obligations and duties promoted by the state), such as the U.S. emphasis on fathers as breadwinners, without supporting many "fathers" regardless of market conditions, class, and race/ethnicity. The model also reveals how contested discourses about masculinities and fatherhood also affect state policies—in the United States, Spain, and Sweden. In addition, every chapter contains insights, frequently based on well-conceived questions and complex analyses. For example, Livia Sz. Oláh, Eva M. Bernhardt, and Frances K. Goldscheider examine how the degree of state support and the nature of gender role attitudes in Hungary, the United States, and Sweden systematically and differentially affect fathering, revealing contradictory results for gender ideology and fathers' engagement.

David Morgan acknowledges most of the book's limits in a superb epilogue. This is a Eurocentric analysis—indeed the triangles may lose their heuristic qualities if one wanted to compare constructions of fatherhood in, for example, Egypt and Sweden and South Africa. In spite of its aspirations, only two chapters seriously theorize global influences on fathers (Jeff Hearn's "Men, Fathers and the State: National and Global

Relations" and Morgan's epilogue). There are only a few asides in the book regarding gay fathers, and even fewer asides regarding the impact that reproductive technologies are having on constructions of fatherhood.

Still, this is an excellent anthology. One can read the well-organized book from the first to the last chapter, as I did. Yet each article can stand alone and be read in combination with different articles. Indeed, I recommend reading Morgan's epilogue as a prologue. It provides an overview of the text, the limitations of the anthology, and an engaging analysis of the role of modernity in the reconstructions of fatherhood. This book will be essential reading for scholars of the welfare state and social policy. However, it will also be extremely valuable in graduate courses on social policy, family, and gender. It ventures to import masculinity and gender politics into arenas that have tended to be "gender blind"—particularly when it comes to men.

Mommy Queerest: Contemporary Rhetorics of Lesbian Maternal Identity.
By Julie M. Thompson. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2002.
Pp. xiii+177. \$29.95.

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Bridging communication studies, sociology, and legal studies, Julie M. Thompson argues in *Mommy Queerest* that the term "lesbian mother" is constructed as an oxymoron. Because dominant discourses vilify lesbians as immoral, criminal, and sexually predatory, lesbian motherhood is constructed as unnatural and dangerously threatening to "the family." Thompson analyzes the ways in which the validity of lesbian motherhood is contested in three forums for public discourse on the topic: custody cases involving lesbian mothers, the journalistic accounts of these court cases, and the academic research of psychologists whose work is used as evidence in these cases. For each, she critically examines the discourses used about lesbian motherhood, as well as the ways in which these discourses limit what counts as legitimate identity.

Thompson begins by analyzing articles from both mainstream and lesbian publications. She finds that both types of publications take the natural heterosexuality of families for granted, which results in the mainstream press consistently ignoring the existence of lesbian-headed families. When such families do get recognized, it is often within the context of "family values" debates in which lesbian mothers are depicted as contributing to the downfall of U.S. families. Articles in lesbian or feminist publications show more ambivalence, depicting lesbian mothers either as traitors who have succumbed to the will of the patriarchy, or as the vanguard of feminism, daring to create families completely outside the sphere of male control.

Thompson next examines the rhetoric of legal decisions in custody cases involving lesbian mothers. Historically, courts have considered lesbian mothers, by definition, to be unfit. In many cases, *lesbian* and *mother* have been viewed as so antithetical: women cannot possibly be both, so courts often force women to choose between the two identities. Thompson finds that, interestingly, this is not the case for second-parent adoptions, in which the courts use the rhetoric of "functional maternity" (as opposed to biological maternity) to recognize the legitimacy of two-parent planned lesbian families.

Next Thompson takes on the work of Nancy Choderow and other psychologists. Though recognizing that these authors aim to help lesbian mothers in their court battles, Thompson criticizes their comparisons between children raised in heterosexual and nonheterosexual families. These comparative studies, she argues, presume that lesbianism (and thus lesbian motherhood) is problematic and deviant. They define "normal" children as those who are heterosexual and properly socialized to traditional gender roles. Although these studies find that lesbian mothers are equally as "successful" as heterosexual families at raising "normal" children, the underlying assumption that traditionally gendered heterosexuality is both normal and desirable undermines support for lesbian mothers and, Thompson asserts, ultimately reifies their deviant status.

The book has several strengths. Unlike many studies from the constructionist perspective, it carefully analyzes the links between discourse, social structure, and people's real lives. Thompson demonstrates how rhetorical strategies that benefit some individual lesbian mothers in their own court cases can invoke discourses that are damaging to lesbian mothers more generally. She also successfully demonstrates how social institutions use rhetorical strategies to police the boundaries of the identities *mother* and *lesbian*. Finally, she goes beyond a simplistic media analysis to explicate how the legal system, media, and academy each use discourse to construct lesbian motherhood in particular ways, and, most important, how discourse used in these different spheres legitimates, reinforces, and reifies discourse used in the others.

Unfortunately, Thompson (who is trained in the humanities, not sociology) gives scant information about her sample or analytic method. Although she analyzes data over a 30-year period, she gives no indication of how discursive patterns and rhetorical strategies have changed over time. Presumably, the American Psychological Association's declassification of homosexuality as a mental illness, the AIDS crisis, and the introduction in some states of legal protections for gay and lesbian parents has had some impact on the discourses and rhetorical strategies that have been used, but this is never raised in the analysis. And, although Thompson promises to provide strategies for promoting more lesbian-affirming discourses, she also falls short here. She recommends challenging current constructions of sex, gender, and sexuality, as well as the stereotype that lesbians "recruit." She urges lesbian-family advocates to avoid talking

about these families as "alternative" or "nontraditional," and to combat the notion of "special rights" for gay people. These suggestions, however, seem more commonsense than informed by the rich analysis that she gives us, and ultimately are not very helpful.

Despite these shortcomings, the book makes a solid contribution to our understanding of social constructions of lesbian motherhood and will be useful to sociologists of family, sexuality, and law, as well as to those who are interested in constructions of deviance, or connections between discourse and social structure more generally. Though it was decidedly not written for a general audience, those engaged in custody battles and their advocates may also find some useful kernels in the chapter analyzing legal decisions.

Cultural Change and Everyday Life. By David Chaney. New York: Palgrave Press, 2002. Pp. ix+208. \$69.95.

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Like pop art and postmodern novels, works in cultural studies too often appear to be created by people wearing faulty bifocal glasses. Through the magnifying lenses small details of everyday life loom too large; through the distancing lenses crucial features of everyday life disappear. In the worst cases, small details of the mundane appear to validate an author's entire interpretive standpoint, which may be as remote from ordinary life as romantic populism, bleak pessimism, or cynicism verging on contempt. But the best works in cultural studies seek to understand everyday life no differently than the best works in sociology: by identifying contexts and ways of life that people may only partially or imperfectly understand and by showing how these milieux and practices are implicated in the political, economic, and cultural conditions of the times.

David Chaney's *Cultural Change and Everyday Life* should be a good book to demonstrate the affinities between cultural studies and sociology, and in some ways it is. Chaney is a British professor of sociology who has published extensively in cultural studies. This is not to say that Chaney's book conforms to sociological readers' expectations. To the contrary, he reconfigures his purposes and insights in each of the book's chapters and sections in a kaleidoscopic way. Individual lines of thought are hedged, buffered, and revised, and even digressions are interrupted by qualifications. Chaney's premise throughout is that everyday life in late modernity assumes unprecedented and paradoxical forms, but from there I had difficulty identifying a linchpin or an overarching theme.

One theme, which is especially prominent in the early chapters, provides a good sense of Chaney's way of reconciling sociology and cultural studies. Twentieth-century artists and social scientists, he argues, have been ob-

sessed by the question of how to represent everyday life. Modernism in the arts failed to grasp the mundane, and positivistic social science tried to ignore it. As a result, new approaches (e.g., photography, documentary filmmaking, cultural studies) began to treat various properties of the mundane as problematic in themselves. Chaney believes that both the intellectual fascination with the mundane and various difficulties in representing it stem from what he terms the "irrationality of everyday life." This is the paradoxical result of the capitalist and political rationalization of modernity, which disenchant and fragments popular culture. This argument is no more romantic, pessimistic, or cynical than the theories of late modernity by Giddens and Beck on which Chaney relies. Chaney also cites Berger and Luckmann as inspirations, and many of his insights beyond those I summarize here deal with the changing social construction of the mundane moral order (e.g., the influence of popular entertainment on contemporary perceptions of households and personal identities). Chaney is a sober sociologist and along the way he offers some acute responses to exaggerations in cultural studies.

So far, so good. Chaney not only avoids the bifocal distortions found in cultural studies, he makes the intellectual search for valid representations of the ordinary a sociological theme. But this argument has problems. For example, Chaney appears to overstate the extent to which adequate representations of the mundane satisfy artistic and intellectual ambitions. Chaney recognizes that even the most accurate ethnographies, documentary films, and so on, selectively focus on some details, making others seem unimportant. But he forgets that figure and ground are easily reversed, so that significant details in one work may become trivial in another. Here Chaney could benefit from Hans-Georg Gadamer's notion that retrieval and interpretation of cultural items depends upon a hermeneutic fusion between second-order and first-order horizons. Moreover, second-order horizons generally result from something more than pure fascination with the mundane. Cultural disputes and turf wars often spark interests in everyday life just as much as the sheer problem of adequate representation, and value relevance colors every intellectual interest.

However it originates, is the deep concern to interpret everyday life as unique to modernity as Chaney claims?—perhaps, if you agree with Chaney (e.g., p. 167) that the gap between cultural elites and popular culture was much narrower prior to modernity. Chaney makes a good point insofar as premodern public pageants (e.g., Greek and Shakespearean drama, Christian spectacles) spoke in different voices to more and less sophisticated audiences, but the gap was much wider in more abstract genres. Theologians have been retrieving and interpreting everyday customs from a considerable cultural distance since Western civilization began. So have secular thinkers from Plato to Montaigne. These intellectual legislators were not self-conscious about their methods of representation, but the hermeneutic gap was wide when premodern priests, prophets, and philosophers critically examined customary ways of life.

Chaney's references to the irrationality of contemporary everyday life are problematic in a different way. Chaney does not claim that everyday life is as charged with raw emotion and tribal aggression as masters of sociological audacity such as Michel Maffesoli suggest. All he really means is that the moral order of popular culture does not cohere. Thus, after the initial surprise with the term "irrationality" subsides, sociologists will find themselves on some pretty familiar ground. True, the incoherence of modern culture has fostered some radical transformations in contemporary everyday life, but Tocqueville, Weber, Durkheim, and Simmel saw the fragmentation of culture coming over a century ago. Perhaps it just took some time for contemporary artists and investigators to refocus their vision.

Twice Dead: Organ Transplants and the Reinvention of Death. By Margaret Lock. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2002. Pp. xii+430. \$65.00 (cloth); \$24.95 (paper).

Annemarie Mol
University of Twente

Death is no longer what it used to be. In her latest, wonderful, book Margaret Lock describes its reinvention as the combined outcome of the emergence of ventilators (which can keep people breathing who would die without them) and transplantation medicine (which takes failing organs out of the bodies they no longer serve well and replaces them with healthier specimens). Originally the "new" organs were taken either out of living relatives who could live without them (as with kidneys, where we have two and seem to need only one), or out of the bodies of people who had died. This was not ideal. The operations required are hard on living relatives, and the quality of organs taken out of a body in which the blood no longer circulates is poor. Thus, the reinvention of death has come as a medical necessity. If some of the people on ventilators could be recognized as "hopeless cases," with no prospect of survival, then their organs would be ideal for transplantation. Lock examines the search for an appropriate delineation of the class of hopeless cases in North America. They were not called "hopeless cases," since violating a nondead body to take its organs was inconceivable. Death was essential. And since the crucial sign of hopelessness was the absence of brain function, they came to be called "brain-dead." A new medical and legal category was brought into being.

But: this reinvented death was not the simple outcome of the combined emergence of ventilators and transplantation medicine. Lock does not present us with a technologically determinist story. In Japan, she reports, the same technology was available and yet things took a different course. In Japan neither brain death as a category, nor the harvesting of organs

from brain-dead bodies, was readily acceptable. There were many heated debates and (at least up until 1998) hardly any transplants. From Lock's comparative analysis we not only learn about Japan but also about North America. Contrast provides focus. For a start, there are cultural specificities. For many people in North America cutting short the gradual process of dying to a single moment at which death is pronounced was acceptable. Nor did it bother people too much that physicians were the ones to pronounce it: death, after all, is taken to be a physical affair. Not so in Japan. There, dying is lived as a social matter. It primarily concerns the family, which has to take leave of a person respectfully. A person does not reside in the brain but in the entire body. And why open up that body after death in order to give its organs away? The Christian tradition of the charitable gift that informs the willingness to donate in North America is absent in Japan. There, instead, relatives who have died stay much closer to the living.

But not all differences have to do with cultural appreciations of dying. People in North America also appear to trust their doctors. In Japan the memory of recent betrayals of trust is too vivid to make it easy to believe a doctor who says "your daughter is dead" while her heart is still beating. The specific history of the first transplants in Japan did not contribute much to making them welcome either. These were done on poorly diagnosed patients, with a poor outcome, using organs of people who were not well cared for. They compounded so many forms of misbehavior that transplantation medicine started out with bad press. In North America, by contrast, the press printed the success stories of happy organ recipients while skipping the unhappy ones (the dead, those in poor health or troubled by the lifelong requirement for antirejection medication). The North American press fostered the idea that the untimely, meaningless death of one's relative in a nasty accident could still be made meaningful after all—by letting the organs live on and give life to others.

Stressing that death is social, Lock moves away from the nature/culture divide twice. First, Lock, siding with her Japanese informants, tries to teach her North American readers that when someone dies they have to say goodbye to a person who is not confined to a body, but with whom they also have social ties. Somehow medical interventions have to allow families a proper space for this farewell. Second, Lock argues that there is no such thing as an uninvented, natural death before or beyond our human (material, cultural) dealings with it. So if this book, with its highly diverse, variously juxtaposed, and impressively rich stories has a moral, it is this: that instead of hunting for the one, true, objective, real diagnosis of death, we would do better to keep on seeking good ways of living with the inevitable, but ever so variable, intricate process of dying.

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



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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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